

Transforming NATO

An NDU Anthology

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Contents

Foreword vii

Part I: Military Transformation

Chapter 1

A New Military Framework for NATO (2005) . . . 3

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler

Chapter 2

Transforming European Forces (2002) 39

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Chapter 3

The NATO Response Force 2002–2006:
Innovation by the Atlantic Alliance (2006) 61

Richard L. Kugler

Chapter 4

Creating a NATO Special Operations Force
(2006) 83

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith

Chapter 5

Needed—A NATO Stabilization and
Reconstruction Force (2004) 99

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Chapter 6

Constabulary Forces and Postconflict Transition:
The Euro-Atlantic Dimension (2005) 117

David T. Armitage, Jr., and Anne M. Moisan

Chapter 7

Transforming NATO Command and Control
for Future Missions (2003) 135

Charles L. Barry

Part II: Political Transformation

Chapter 8

Dual-Track Transformation for NATO
(2003) 161

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Chapter 9

NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the
Consensus Rule? (2003) 195

Leo G. Michel

Chapter 10

Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
(2007) 215

Franklin D. Kramer and Simon Serfaty

Chapter 11

Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for
a New Era (2004) 229

Jeffrey Simon

Chapter 12

- NATO: Surviving 9/11 (2008) 245
 Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Chapter 13

- Should NATO Write a New Strategic
 Concept? (2008) 275
 Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk

Chapter 14

- A New Transatlantic Compact? (2008) 303
 Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk

Part III: New Operations and Missions

Chapter 15

- Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of
 Euroatlantic Institutions (2007) 339
 Jeffrey Simon

Chapter 16

- Securing Afghanistan: Entering a Make-or-Break
 Phase? (2007) 359
 Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes

Chapter 17

- Programming Development Funds to Support a
 Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Nangarhar,
 Afghanistan in 2006 (2008) 379
 Michelle Parker

Chapter 18

The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: Future Options for NATO (2007)..... 403

Friis Arne Petersen and Hans Binnendijk

Chapter 19

Transatlantic Homeland Defense (2006) 415

Hans Binnendijk, Steven J. Flanagan, et al.

Chapter 20

Responding in the Homeland: A Snapshot of NATO's Readiness for CBRN Attacks (2007).. 429

Michael Moodie and Robert E. Armstrong with Tyler Merkeley

Chapter 21

Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic? (2006)..... 443

Kimberly L. Thachuk

Part IV: Transforming NATO Technology

Chapter 22

NATO Technology: From Gap to Divergence? (2004)..... 467

Donald C. Daniel

Chapter 23

Russia and NATO: Increased Interaction in Defense Research and Technology (2005) 481

Donald C. Daniel and Michael I. Yarymovych

Foreword

Since September 11, 2001, the National Defense University has undertaken a series of studies on the Transformation of NATO for 21st Century missions. These studies focused on needed military capabilities, political transformation, new operational requirements, new missions, and NATO science and technology. Some of these studies made recommendations that were adopted as NATO policy while other may be ahead of their time. Most were published by the National Defense University.

The purpose of this volume is to collect these studies under one cover. We have resisted the temptation to rewrite or update each study. They are presented here as they were originally printed. We hope that in reprinting them here, they may initiate a renewed emphasis on transforming the alliance.

Hans Binnendijk
Gina Cordero

Part I: Military Transformation

A New Military Framework for NATO (2005)¹

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler

Overview

Although Americans and Europeans do not always agree on political strategies in the Middle East, they have a compelling reason to reach an accord on the need to strengthen North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces for future operations in that region and elsewhere. If adequate military capabilities are lacking, the Alliance will not be able to act even when its political leaders agree on the need to do so. But if it creates such capabilities, it will be able to act either ad hoc or across the board if a common political strategy eventually were to emerge.

This article proposes a new and comprehensive military framework to help guide NATO improvements in the years ahead. This framework envisions a pyramid-like structure of future NATO forces and capabilities in five critical areas: a new NATO Special Operations Force, the NATO Response Force, high-readiness combat forces, stabilization and reconstruction forces, and assets for defense sector development. The United States would provide one-third of the necessary forces, and Europe would be responsible for the other two-thirds. For the Europeans, creating these forces and capabilities is a viable proposition because they require commitment of only 10 percent of their active military manpower, plus investments in such affordable assets as information networks, smart munitions, commercial lift, logistics support, and other enablers. If NATO succeeds in creating these forces for power projection and expeditionary missions, it will possess a broad portfolio of assets for a full spectrum of operations against such threats as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cross-border aggression.

Diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic are seeking to overcome the discord over the invasion of Iraq and to close ranks to meet a daunting set of shared security challenges, from defeating radical Islamic terrorism to controlling Iran's nuclear activities to building a free Iraq to achieving an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. Yet there remain deep differences over more basic issues: reliance on the use of force, the legitimacy of preemptive war, and whether to foment sweeping political change throughout the Middle East. Until these differences are settled, it will be difficult for the United States and its major European allies to formulate a serious common strategy or to act in unison in crises.

Perhaps the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General will succeed in organizing a deep dialogue from which an agreed strategy will emerge. But even in the absence of a new grand accord, NATO can accomplish work of grand importance. The focus should be on developing a comprehensive, common framework for NATO defense *capabilities* and then proceeding programmatically to put real flesh on that framework. The logic is straightforward:

- Capabilities for common action are needed, even though this action may not always be chosen (for non–Article 5 contingencies).
- If and when a common strategy emerges, NATO must have the capabilities to execute it.
- The United States and its European allies must be able to agree on necessary capabilities, even while unable to agree on grand strategy or on when and where those capabilities should be used.

This paper proposes a new defense framework for NATO combat forces and other defense capabilities as a guide to force planning, priority-setting, and cooperative programs. The framework covers the full spectrum of dangers that Americans and Europeans agree exist and the capabilities needed by the Alliance to meet these dangers. The framework is capabilities-based, not threat-based, meaning that it is predicated on what NATO members think their alliance should be able to do, not on predictions of who their enemies might be. The framework has structural integrity in that each piece fits with the others, making the whole stronger than the sum of the parts. Within this framework, we suggest specific capabilities—some existing, some agreed, and some new. Finally, this article suggests how the NATO defense framework should match up with the new U.S. military presence in Europe and growing European Union (EU) defense efforts.

To some, this agenda may seem overly ambitious for NATO and seem to ask too much of the European allies. This is not the case. The en-

tire framework includes only about 10 percent of Europe's active military personnel. It mainly involves reorienting forces for new missions, making them more deployable, network-centric, and interoperable—goals that NATO has already embraced. The framework need not be filled out at once; a period of 5 years or more will suffice. Thus, it is affordable, practical, and politically feasible, even with continuing differences over grand strategy.

A Capabilities-Based Alliance

Since NATO began responding to security dangers outside member territory and its traditional area, first in the Balkans and then beyond, it has changed from an alliance of commitment to one of choice. During the Cold War, the Article 5 obligation to act in common defense was the starting point, and the capabilities to do so followed. Now, the main dangers lie outside Europe to the southeast, and members are unlikely to be attacked directly. Because of differences in strategic outlook and political goals, moreover, there may be not only no obligation to act together, but also no inclination to do so.

Observers can debate whether current differences reflect a natural, structural post-Cold War loosening of U.S.-European solidarity or a serious but situational disagreement over the invasion of Iraq. Whichever the case, if NATO does not build and maintain adequate capabilities, it will be able to mount only improvised responses to crises when its members choose to act—a recipe for military weakness, indecision, and lack of credibility at moments when strength, decisiveness, and credibility are most needed. Failure to have a *complete* set of capabilities could invite challenges. Rather than neglect capabilities because of disunity of purpose, NATO must build capabilities to enable action when unity exists.

The United States and its European allies had a single mode for collective action during the Cold War. Now, they have several. One is formation of an ad hoc coalition for an operation that is not ordered by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and not carried out by the integrated command. Another is an operation that is ordered by the NAC and directed by the integrated command but with forces provided by just a few members. The third is an operation ordered by the NAC, directed by the integrated command, and composed of forces from many members. The past years have seen all three modes employed in such diverse contingencies as Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Having all three options provides valuable flexibility; each one is worth having, and each can work, but only if it can draw upon well-prepared capabilities.

A strong capabilities-based alliance is possible because of the similarity of U.S. and European views on key challenges of the global security era, despite disagreement over how to respond to them. From these similar views, it is possible to derive the contents of a warehouse of defense capabilities. Those we prescribe are:

- ▶ NATO Special Operations Force
- ▶ NATO Response Force
- ▶ NATO High Readiness Forces for major combat operations
- ▶ NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Forces
- ▶ NATO capacity for Defense and Security Sector Development for countries in transition.

The Value of Military Accord

Prior to the NATO Istanbul Summit in mid-2004, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer urged the Alliance to write a new Harmel Report, aimed at finding common ground on Middle East policy and strategy.² Others echoed this idea and called for such a report to become the basis for a new NATO strategic concept that would reflect agreed principles for action outside Europe, including the Middle East. Meanwhile, despite U.S.–EU and intra-EU disagreements over the use of force and policy toward Iraq, the European Union issued its own global security assessment, which was strikingly similar to that of the United States. Yet because of the disagreements, the Istanbul Summit took no important initiatives and reached no agreement to forge a common strategy for the Middle East or set standards for the use of military force.³

The United States and Europe are not at odds across the board. They share many common interests and goals in the world at large. For instance, they have similar views on the democratization of the former Soviet Union, as their united stance on Ukraine's elections shows. Nor are they wholly polarized on the Middle East, where they agree on the need for a democratic Palestinian state and on the criticality of secure oil supplies. Approaches to Iran are being harmonized. NATO leaders are cooperating in many aspects of the war on terrorism and policy toward Afghanistan.

Perhaps the future will produce greater strategic and political harmony between the United States and those European countries that disagree with its policies on the use of force and in the Middle East. A dramatic coming-together could occur, for example, in response to an al Qaeda attack on Europe, defeat of the insurgency in Iraq, an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, or success in preventing Iranian production of

nuclear weapons. A safer assumption is that the United States and major European states will continue to agree on some policies and crises while disagreeing on others. But again, this condition neither precludes nor makes less crucial U.S.-European agreement on the capabilities their alliance should possess. The persistence of strategic discord need not and ought not to block agreement on capabilities.

There is precedent for agreement on capabilities despite disagreement over purpose and policy. In the 1960s, NATO experienced strategic divergence and political discord over what to do about the Soviet Union's nuclear buildup. Whereas the Europeans wanted to cling to a strategy of nuclear deterrence, the Americans wanted to bolster NATO conventional defenses to lessen reliance on escalation. The debate between them raged for years, and it did not end even when NATO agreed in 1967 on the need to be capable of both "forward defense" and "flexible response." What finally softened the debate was progress in strengthening military cooperation. As a result, NATO conventional forces improved while nuclear capabilities were maintained. The Americans became satisfied that the Europeans were truly committed to a better conventional defense, and the Europeans became satisfied that the Americans were still committed to a strong nuclear deterrent. From this practical agenda of enhanced military cooperation came greater political harmony and strategic coherence, as the Alliance pursued a dual agenda of strong defense and arms control.

Again, in the 1980s, the United States and Europe were at loggerheads over how to respond to the Soviet Union's conventional and nuclear military buildup, as well as its invasion of Afghanistan. Whereas Washington was calling for a NATO strategy of force buildup and counter-pressure, many Europeans favored arms control and détente. Without resolving this tension, the Americans and Europeans were able to agree to reconfigure NATO defenses in Central Europe for nonlinear combat and to deploy improved nuclear missiles in Europe while also pursuing arms control negotiations aimed at banishing such nuclear missiles on both sides. As the 1980s unfolded, this agenda helped restore Alliance unity and contributed to convincing the Soviet Union to end the Cold War.

Today, notwithstanding political debates that have raged across the Atlantic, a roughly common view on required NATO capabilities has quietly emerged. This is evident in NATO pursuit of the Prague Capability Commitment and the NATO Response Force, both of which were adopted at the Prague Summit of 2002 and reaffirmed at Istanbul in 2004. Despite public impressions that the United States has lost interest in the Alliance, Washington led the way toward adoption of the Prague and Istanbul de-

fense programs. Moreover, many European countries that disagree with U.S. policy on Iraq do agree on defense requirements. France is among the leaders in European military transformation, and Germany is now pursuing a parallel effort. Although the European Union is trying to create its own military forces, it is not proposing to reduce its reliance upon NATO for most warfighting missions and is eager for cooperation with NATO defense planners.

Alliance agreement on a comprehensive framework of needed capabilities could contribute to convergence on strategy and restoration of mutual confidence. Success at building better European military forces for such a framework will alter the conditions for determining military responses to crises. European governments will not be averse to military action just because they lack the capability to act. The United States will have an incentive to seek multilateral action rather than to act unilaterally because its European allies lack usable capabilities.

NATO Military Progress and Shortfalls

News media have focused on intramural Alliance political disputes and largely overlooked the military progress of the past 2 years. The Prague Summit decisions to reorganize the NATO military command, to create a new “Allied Transformation Command,” and to field the NATO Response Force were critical because they opened new avenues for military preparedness and multilateral cooperation. These have not been the only important steps. During 2003–2004, the Alliance:

- ▀ Reformed its force-planning process to enable creation of adequate capabilities for new missions
- ▀ Conducted exercises that have helped its military forces prepare for new missions
- ▀ Launched a program to improve communications through use of Italian, French, and British satellite constellations
- ▀ Initiated studies to create defenses against missile threats to Europe
- ▀ Endorsed a “Program of Work for Defense against Terrorism,” which comprises eight high-priority armaments directives in such areas as protecting harbors, detecting use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), enhancing intelligence, and performing consequence management
- ▀ Completed creating the “Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Battalion”

- Signed a long-delayed contract to buy a new air-to-ground surveillance system
- Improved its strategic sealift by creating a Sealift Coordination Center and signing an agreement to gain commitment of several roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) cargo ships from the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Norway.⁴

Meanwhile, NATO also expanded its military operations outside its new borders. While it has completed its original stability mission in Bosnia and transferred main responsibility for peacekeeping to the EU, it retains a military headquarters in Sarajevo to assist the country with defense reform and to support the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It continues to perform major peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, the fate of which remains unsettled. After initially being embarrassed by its inability to act decisively in Afghanistan, NATO subsequently agreed to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there, and to deploy Provincial Reconstruction Teams to the western countryside; ISAF today stands at about 8,000 troops. In Iraq, NATO has agreed to an expanded role in training Iraqi forces.

Thus, recent defense measures show that NATO is capable of step-by-step progress toward upgrading its military forces for new missions, and recent operations show that NATO is willing to use its forces ad hoc. Still, there are two significant discrepancies. First, there is no agreed framework covering the entirety of needed capabilities—a gap this article aims to fill. Second, the European allies need to prioritize their defense expenditures—an effort this article may help to illuminate.

Critics complain about the inability of European militaries to produce more personnel for missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These limitations reflect the extent to which many European military forces remain largely tailored for continental defense missions, even though the saliency of these missions has largely vanished. To protect Europe, NATO still needs forces in such areas as air and maritime defense, missile defense, and counterterrorism. But it no longer needs large numbers of ground and air forces configured for campaigns against massive invasion. While some progress has been made, most European militaries still lack the capacity to project sizable forces rapidly outside the continent. In a fast-breaking emergency, they could draw upon Britain and France to deploy, at most, 60,000 troops, far less than the United States can project. In slower-moving situations, they can perform better; some 56,000 European troops are stationed in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Even then, however, their

manpower policies limit the size of their rotational base, which constrains the number of troops that can be kept abroad for long periods. As a result, European militaries claim that they cannot handle far bigger deployments than now, even though they have about 2.4 million active-duty troops, which is far more than the U.S. total of 1.4 million troops, 340,000 of which are stationed abroad, including in Iraq. A fair estimate is that, whereas the United States could deploy overseas about 700,000 service personnel from all branches over a period of 3 to 6 months, Europe could deploy at most 150,000.

Despite the deterioration in security conditions, especially in and arising from the Middle East, most European defense budgets have not grown, and investment budgets have been starved. Yet as NATO Military Authorities have argued, retiring many excess forces no longer needed for border defense could liberate substantial funds. These funds could be plowed into investments to create network-centric forces for expeditionary missions and for operating with U.S. forces. Simply put, ample resources exist to meet comprehensive NATO capabilities requirements, if those resources are properly allocated.

Challenges and Dangers of the Early 21st Century

The allocation of defense resources should, of course, reflect the assessment of the security environment. For all their differences over policies on the use of force and Middle East strategy, the Atlantic democracies more or less agree on the nature of the main security dangers in the current era. Broadly stated, there is a common view that, from Africa to South Asia, many states are plagued by poor development prospects, illegitimate governments, lack of connectivity to the world economy, religious radicalism and strife, and unfriendly neighbors. Further, Alliance members agree that these conditions have given rise to both strategic terrorism and an appetite for weapons of mass destruction. These developments threaten the surrounding regions, the dependability of world oil supplies, and Western societies. Consequently, most NATO members and partners recognize the importance of promoting political-economic transformation in this geographic swath, employing force when necessary to safeguard peace and protect vital interests, and setting the conditions for stability and reconstruction when conflict does occur.

Within this generally agreed assessment of security trends in the world beyond Europe, there is consensus on certain dangers and challenges:⁵

- Terrorism that aspires to global reach and harm

- ▶ Proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical WMD in the hands of countries and terrorist groups willing to use them
- ▶ Proliferation of conventional weapons and information technologies that, along with WMD, support asymmetric strategies aimed at countering U.S. and allied military force operations
- ▶ Rogue governments that oppress their own people and are poised to commit aggression against their neighbors and otherwise menace entire regions
- ▶ State-to-state rivalries that produce military competition, threaten to erupt into war, and create a climate of fear and distrust throughout their regions
- ▶ Ethnic tensions and radical ideologies that foster violence
- ▶ Growing potential for state failures, thereby creating domestic turbulence and mass migration
- ▶ Failing states that provide sanctuaries for terrorists and organized crime
- ▶ Ethnic, sectarian, and separatist instability and violence stretching from Africa through the Middle East and into South Asia and Southeast Asia
- ▶ Mass killing of civilians, especially in sub-Saharan Africa
- ▶ In parts of Africa and Asia, stalled economic and political development, caused in part by exclusion from world markets, thereby producing social anxiety in a setting of fast population growth, poverty, urbanization, and ineffective governments
- ▶ Absence of democratic governance and economic progress in an era of global communications, high public awareness, rising standards of expectation, and growing frustrations
- ▶ Rising demands for fossil fuels, natural gas, and water, coupled with growing environmental degradation.

Although there have been and remain U.S.-European differences over the role of military power in tackling these problems and the conditions in which the use of force is justified, both Europeans and Americans realize that power and force have roles to play but cannot be predominant. To suggest that the United States regards force as its policy instrument of choice is as wrong as to suggest that Europeans will not use force under any circumstances. In general, both favor policies and efforts aimed at ameliorating hostility and fulfilling aspirations for prosperity and freedom, thus reducing reliance on military instruments.

A New Framework for NATO Defense Capacity

In the face of this agreed assessment of dangers, a multidimensional concept of security is both needed and possible. U.S. and European forces will need to be fully prepared for major combat operations that could cover a wide spectrum of missions and geographic locations. They also have to be prepared for many other missions, such as limited intervention, conflict prevention, crisis management, consequence management, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement, postconflict occupation, stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, partnership building, and the creation of democratically accountable and capable military establishments. This wide spectrum of new-era missions will require military forces of diverse skills and capabilities that extend considerably beyond the traditional mission of deterring and fighting major wars.

In addition, the very way of thinking about requirements must change. The challenges ahead cannot be reduced to a small set of predictable contingencies for which U.S. and European forces can be optimized. Recognizing this, current U.S. defense strategy calls for capabilities-based planning to create a diverse portfolio of military assets that are modular and scalable and that provide high degrees of flexibility, adaptability, and agility. Increasingly, NATO and European military commanders are coming to the same conclusion.

Likewise, U.S., NATO, and European commanders are adopting similar views on military transformation. Nearly all agree that transformation should focus on blending advanced networks, sensors, munitions, modern weapons, and new logistic support to create forces attuned to military operations of the information age, which are radically different from those of the industrial age. They also agree on the need to prevent a big “transformation gap” from emerging between U.S. and European forces that would prevent them from operating closely together. While they recognize that U.S. forces will remain ahead of many European forces in the transformation process, they aspire to accelerate transformation of European forces so they will be capable of working alongside U.S. forces, with common information networks, in future operations across the entire spectrum.

Finally, military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic agree on the nature of military operations. Although U.S. forces are already prepared for many expeditionary missions, European forces must increasingly acquire the assets for power-projection and force operations that are needed to perform these and other missions. If they strive to do so, the consequence might be European forces that may be smaller than now but tailored to

perform many missions in partnership with U.S. forces. Transatlantic agreement on these important matters provides a solid foundation for a new strategic framework for NATO-wide force improvements.

To help guide NATO defense planning, this paper proposes an integrated, five-tiered defense pyramid of forces, capabilities, and assets for new-era missions. In each category, NATO will need to establish appropriate goals for forces and capabilities, assess existing assets against these goals, and design programs to achieve them. This pyramid is a useful tool to help NATO see the whole as well as constituent parts and their relationships. Its key point is that being prepared for future missions requires a broad portfolio of multiple, different assets, not a one-dimensional military configured for a single type of warfare.

Each tier of the pyramid identifies military assets required for specific types of new-era missions. At the top of the pyramid are relatively small forces for sudden, demanding, quick-response operations. They include the NATO Response Force (NRF), already in train, and a *new* NATO Special Operations Force (NSOF). In the middle of the pyramid is the largest component, the NATO High Readiness Forces (HRF) for sustained major combat operations. Improvements to these forces should focus on a limited set of divisions and brigades, fighter wings, and naval strike groups, provided with the information networks, joint warfighting assets, logistic support, and transport needed for expeditionary missions against significant opponents. One tier down is a *new* NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (NSRF) for the mission of occupying territory, stabilizing postconflict settings, and helping begin the task of reconstructing countries with functioning governments and economies. At the bottom of the pyramid are assets—largely human and institutional—for the mission of NATO Defense and Security Sector Development (NDSSD), helping foreign militaries and other security institutions modernize, democratize, and improve their performance.

Today NATO has formally assigned assets in only two of these five categories, the NRF and HRF. In our view, NATO will be sufficiently endowed for future missions only if it has adequate forces and capabilities in all five areas. NATO forces, for example, could be used sequentially. A crisis intervention could begin with use of the NSOF for targeting enemy positions, as occurred in the early stages of the invasion of Afghanistan. Next, NATO could deploy the brigade-size NRF to establish a foothold, defeat access-denial threats, and conduct initial strikes. Then, NATO could deploy the larger HRF to conduct major combat operations aimed at winning the contest in this key stage of warfighting. Afterward, NATO

could deploy the NSRF, which would work alongside the HRF to stabilize the situation and begin reconstruction until peace is restored and civilian assets can be deployed to complete the reconstruction phase. At this juncture, NATO assets for the NDSSD could begin helping the new government to preserve safety and security while building democracy.

Such a sequential process is not the only or even most likely way that these NATO forces and capabilities could be used. Instead, they could be used individually or in a combination suited to the situation. For example, some situations might require only the NSOF, or NSOF forces and the NRF, followed by commitment of the NSRF. Other combinations are equally possible. Moreover, peacetime relationships with many foreign countries might involve only the use of NATO assets for defense sector development, in a manner reflecting how the NATO Partnership for Peace (PPF) has been carried out with many European countries. For this reason, the pyramid of forces and capabilities must be modular and scalable. NATO must be capable of tailoring packages to meet the unique requirements of each situation. A NATO defense pyramid of such assets, which cover a wide spectrum and are capable of being combined in many ways, will provide the flexibility and adaptability needed for a wide range of possible futures. This pyramid will ensure that when NATO political leaders decide to act collectively, they will have the full set of forces and capabilities at their disposal.

Figure 1–1. A NATO Framework of Future Forces and Capabilities for Expeditionary Missions



Building the Pyramid

As the ancient Egyptians could attest, it is one thing to draw a pyramid and quite another to build one. To be prepared for all five types of missions, NATO will need to be able to draw upon both U.S. and European forces. As a general rule, the United States might provide one-third of the military commitments and Europe two-thirds. In order to make progress in the coming years on building a well-stocked military warehouse, European NATO members will need to focus their limited investment funds on program priorities that can yield high-leverage returns in the form of enhanced, usable forces and capabilities. All 5 of these areas are appropriate for investment as well as other force-improvement efforts, such as developing new doctrines, creating new structures, and establishing new employment practices. The necessary steps are modest and will not unduly strain NATO and European capacity to pursue them. The following discussion moves from the top of this pyramid to the base.⁶

NATO Special Operations Force⁷

National special operations forces (SOF) have proven their high value because of their many uses. SOF can be used to conduct surgical attacks on terrorist camps, help train foreign militaries in counterterrorist operations, free hostages, destroy obstacles and threats, and conduct surveillance behind enemy lines. As fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq shows, they can use lasers and global positioning system devices to spot enemy targets, and then transmit the information to air forces to achieve precision strikes. Special operations forces are light, lethal, small, mobile, well trained, and superbly conditioned. Because they are easily networked with other forces, they can be powerful force multipliers. In addition, SOF are highly flexible and adaptable.

Some years ago, the United States took the step of creating a new Special Operations Command for SOF, with a formal headquarters and staff, forces assigned from all services, and a separate budgeting program aimed at funding their unique requirements. This step has yielded strategic dividends, particularly in combating terrorism. Pressures are mounting to enlarge SOF assets because of their capacity to perform so many important missions and to work closely with other forces, including large ground and air forces conducting major combat operations. NATO and Europe would be well served by a similar capability.

Most European militaries grasp the value of SOF, and many have well-trained SOF units in their ranks, such as the fabled British Special Air

Service. But these national units are not organized into a multilateral entity that could operate under NATO command. A new SOF command could be built upon existing U.S.-French SOF units imbedded in Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and on SOF units operating in Afghanistan.

There is much to be gained by sharing know-how through multilateral training and exercises. Beyond this, most contingencies in which NATO allies may operate together will require SOF. While SOF often operate in small groups and in isolation, much can be gained by improving their interoperability in such areas as communications and networking, doctrine, tactics, weapons, and logistics. British and French SOF, for example, should be able to work together using information networking to guide precision strikes of American, German, and Italian aircraft.

What steps should NATO take to capitalize on this opportunity? An attractive possibility is to create an NSOF command with responsibility for the coordination of Alliance-wide SOF goals and collaborative programs. This would require multinational agreements on intelligence sharing and other matters. Despite national sensitivities, such agreements can be forged. The actual NSOF should have a small inner core and a larger outer network. The inner core could be as small as 300 troops, with specialized technology, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), focused on one or two vital missions, such as counterterrorism and counter-WMD. This inner core would be formally assigned to NATO, highly integrated, stationed at one location, and composed of rotating national SOF units. It would have uniform equipment and procedures and be ready to deploy within 72 hours.

Surrounding this inner core would be a larger, looser outer network of SOF assets from many nations that would perform such other missions as fire support, infiltration, intelligence gathering, hostage rescue, peace-time advising of new partners, civil affairs, and psychological operations. The SOF assets of this outer network need not be collocated, but they would form a networked posture, and they must meet NATO standards and be available for commitment when the need arises.

The entire posture of inner core and outer network likely would include no more than 1,000 troops, which could be one-third U.S. forces and two-thirds European. Although an NSOF would not be a big consumer of logistic support and airlift, it must have assets that enable it to move quickly and sustain itself at long distances. In addition, it would need UAVs, some gunships, and other specialized assets.

Such a two-part NSOF offers the potential to add significantly to the NATO warehouse of usable capabilities. Ample national SOF already exist,

so additional forces do not have to be created, nor do individual skills have to be greatly improved. The cost of an NSOF headquarters, training facilities, new equipment, and exercises would be modest, and certainly much less than the NRF. This proposal could be adopted at a NATO ministerial session and implemented in a few years. Within a short time, NATO would have a superbly trained NSOF that could operate independently or with the NRF and other NATO forces. NATO capacity to handle situations demanding swift application of small amounts of SOF power would be greatly enhanced.

NATO Response Force

Approved at the Prague Summit in 2002, the NRF speedily reached initial operational capability in fall 2004, and is now undergoing tests and exercises to develop its capabilities. It will reach full operational capability in 2006, well ahead of its original schedule. Currently, it is composed of about 17,000 troops; by 2006, it will have its full complement of ground forces and reach its target of about 20,000 troops. The NRF is an elite, joint force configured for high-tech strike operations. It will be available within 5 to 30 days and will have 1 month of staying power before replenishment is needed. It can be used on its own, or it can be a spearhead for larger NATO forces. It is to be composed of one ground brigade, plus commensurate air forces and naval forces, and backed by the mobility forces and logistic support assets needed to operate far beyond European borders.⁸

The NRF is a rotating force drawn from NATO's High Readiness Forces. At any time, one contingent of 20,000 troops will be on duty, in high readiness status for 6 months; another will be standing down from recent duty; and another will be preparing for future duty. Membership in the NRF is open to all NATO members. Multiple countries, including France, are participating enthusiastically. For example, in late 2004, the NRF consisted of naval units from the United Kingdom, plus ground and air forces from the southern region. The rotational nature of the NRF means that a dozen or more nations can participate significantly over a 2-year period. Over a longer period, all NATO members will be able to participate if their forces and assets meet NRF standards. High-level command of the NRF is being rotated among the NATO Joint Force Commands in Brunssum and Naples and its Joint Headquarters in Lisbon. In a contingency, the NRF is to be led by a Deployable Joint Task Force. During 2003–2004, NRF 1 and 2 were activated as prototypes and test beds. Certification and evaluation are taking place during NRF 3 and 4 (2004–2005.) Full operational capability will be reached during NRF 5 and NRF 6 (2005–2006.)

For all of its progress, full NRF development cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, senior NATO officials must carefully monitor its evolution to ensure that it does not fall short of its promise. Part of the challenge comes from meeting its dual-purpose agenda. The NRF was intended not only to be an operationally ready strike force, but also to be at the cutting edge of NATO transformation in ways that send ripple effects to other European forces. For this purpose, it needs not only modern weapons but also advanced information networks, sensors and munitions, joint doctrine and training, and mobility assets. Fulfilling both agendas does not come naturally. The demands of operational readiness can discourage experimentation with new weapons, doctrines, and structures. Many of these transformational purposes can be accomplished before assigned units combine to form the NRF and during the 6-month period when they are undergoing training for duty. Even so, a careful balancing act will be needed to ensure that neither operational readiness nor transformation is neglected.

Equally important, the NRF cannot be “a force for all seasons.” While it was originally intended to be a high-tech strike force for use in combat, the natural tendency (already evident in official NATO documents) is to use it for other purposes, including peacekeeping, hostage rescue, non-combatant evacuation, embargo operations, security for events such as the Olympics, counterterrorist operations, and stabilization and reconstruction missions. Here, too, a balancing act will be necessary. If the NRF tries to be capable of performing all of these missions, it is likely to be proficient at none of them, including crisis response and high-tech strike missions. If NATO needs additional quick-response forces for a wider spectrum of missions, it should create them (for example, the NSOF) and allow the NRF to focus on its main purpose.

Finally, the NRF was intended to be mainly a European force, but it cannot be exclusively European. Initially, the United States played a low-profile role because it wanted the Europeans to take the lead in creating the NRF. Now that this goal has been accomplished, the United States must make regular contributions to NRF rotating combat forces. U.S. contributions are expected to increase during prototypes NRF 5 and 6, and thereafter. The United States must also provide help in such areas as advanced command, control, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks, airlift, and logistic support until the Europeans become self-sufficient in these areas. Initially, some Europeans criticized the United States for not participating enough in the NRF, but this problem appears headed toward solution.

NATO High Readiness Forces

Analyses of defense priorities for new-era missions often gloss over NATO main combat formations, the HRF for major deployment for defense under Article 5 or crisis response operations. The reason normally is a set of erroneous assumptions: that HRF forces for major combat operations are irrelevant for expeditionary missions outside Europe, or already are adequate for the task, or are too hard and expensive to reform. Ignoring these forces would be shortsighted because they may well be called upon for expeditionary missions that cannot be handled by the NRF. NATO concepts call for a brigade-size NRF deployment to be reinforced by a corps-size CJTF when operations expand in terms of opposition or geographic scope. The HRF is also intended to provide for rotational depth for long-term operations. Indeed, they were used in the Kosovo war, and today are being used in the Balkans and Afghanistan for peace enforcement. At present, much of the HRF is not adequately capable of projecting power swiftly and performing major combat operation missions in distant areas. Reforming these forces is not beyond reach. The NATO Defense Capability Initiative did not achieve this worthy goal because it was scattered across too many forces and measures, and the Prague Capabilities Commitment evidently is encountering similar troubles. But NATO can succeed if it focuses on a small set of HRF units that are earmarked for overseas deployment, and improves them with high-leverage, affordable programs. Once again, the United States should provide about one-third of the troops for HRF for major combat operations outside Europe.

NATO today suffers from no lack of European HRF for major combat operation missions. HRF have a readiness status that calls upon them to be available within 90 days of call-up. Other NATO forces are Forces of Lower Readiness, available within 90 to 180 days, and Long-Term Buildup Forces, available after 365 days. Current HRF troops can be divided into two categories: many are “in-place forces” for local use, but some are “deployable forces” that ostensibly can be used for operations beyond their immediate locales. (See Table 1-1.) The ground forces and command structures that fall into the latter category are products of history and strategic logic. In the early 1990s, NATO created a single corps headquarters for ground missions, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which was designed to command three to four divisions. Later, it designated five additional corps headquarters as operationally ready commands to provide for concurrent contingencies and rotational duties: the German-Dutch Corps, the Eurocorps, and one corps each from Italy, Turkey, and Spain.

Today, if one or more of these corps headquarters is called upon to deploy outside Europe for major combat operations as the land component of a NATO CJTF, in theory they could draw upon an estimated pool of 12 active divisions (or the equivalent in brigades) provided by multiple countries. Joining these ground forces are fighter wings that provide about 500 to 600 combat aircraft, and about 100 combat ships in NATO Task Groups. By any measure, this is a sizable pool of joint forces that totals 400,000 to 500,000 military personnel.⁹ The problem is that while most of these ground forces can operate on the European continent, they lack the logistic support and lift needed to deploy outside Europe quickly. As a practical matter, the Europeans today could rapidly deploy only one or two of these divisions to long distances.

Table 1–1. European Divisions Available to NATO*

Total Divisions	57
HRF Divisions	25
"Deployable" HRF Divisions	12**

*Unofficial estimates by authors drawing on open sources, including *The Military Balance 2003–2004* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003).

**Total is 36 brigades, or 12 division-equivalents.

How many of these forces does NATO really need to be well prepared for expeditionary missions outside Europe? NATO military commanders contend that they must be capable of responding to multiple concurrent contingencies (for example, two major combat operation missions and a peacekeeping mission). While this requires three NATO CJTF headquarters, it no longer requires the massive combat forces of the past. In current less-demanding contingencies and information networking for joint operations, relatively small forces can perform most missions. NATO will be adequately prepared if, in addition to units assigned to the NRF, it has a rapidly deployable European force of 5 to 6 divisions (15–18 brigades), 275 to 325 combat aircraft, and 50 to 60 naval combatants. These European forces will join with still-substantial U.S. military commitments of one to two divisions, plus air and naval assets (discussed below), to create a powerful NATO capacity for expeditionary warfare. Such a posture might not meet all plausible requirements in the eyes of NATO military commanders, but it would roughly triple European capacity for power projection, and it would put Europe into the ballpark of being able to work closely with the United States in expeditionary missions.

NATO can easily field this number of European forces by drawing upon one-half of its existing pool of “deployable” HRF units. Most of the forces in this pool, however, are not truly deployable outside Europe. Their problems are threefold: they cannot travel swiftly to long distances, sustain themselves for long periods, or achieve adequate interoperability with U.S. forces. While these problems especially apply to ground forces, they also are serious impediments to many air and naval forces. Fixing these problems should be a main NATO agenda. The task does not promise to be prohibitively expensive—that is, *if* NATO focuses only on this limited set of forces, *rather* than squander resources on other forces and priorities. These HRF units are already fully manned, and they regularly train and exercise at proper levels for proficiency in combat. As a general rule, they also are well armed, with modern weapons systems and a growing number of smart munitions and sensors. Some new acquisition programs will be needed, but not enough to bankrupt European defense budgets, if savings are found elsewhere or parliaments begin funding annual real increases in spending. Some NATO members will be better able to contribute because their forces are generally well armed and modern, but other countries can participate by contributing combat units or support assets in niche areas.

A NATO improvement program should begin with information networks, which are vital to carrying out joint operations that blend ground, naval, and air forces. Fortunately, the Europeans are already well along in this enterprise as a result of recent decisions to acquire a set of tactical and strategic systems for intelligence, wide-bandwidth communications, and management of operations. The Europeans are not aspiring to the U.S. standard of network-centric warfare, but they are aiming for “network-enabled warfare” or a similar concept, with networks that are fairly sophisticated and, above all, that can plug into U.S. networks to permit combined U.S.-European operations. The Europeans likely will achieve this standard in a few years, but NATO will need to ensure that new national networks can be integrated to form multinational networks and that European and U.S. networks are fully interoperable.

In addition, a NATO improvement program should focus on creating new structures for deployable High Readiness Forces. Modern ground operations are transitioning from their earlier emphasis on divisions to a growing emphasis on brigades. In the U.S. Army, for example, many combat and support assets formerly assigned to the division commander are being dispersed to his three brigades. The goal is to create brigade combat teams with the full set of assets needed to operate independently on the battlefield, miles from each other, and without looking to higher echelons

for help. Because such brigades will be highly modular and adaptable, different combinations of light, medium, and heavy units can be quickly packaged to handle a spectrum of situations. Air forces are undergoing similar changes. In the U.S. Air Force, the emphasis is on the packaging of fighter aircraft, bombers, airborne warning and control systems, joint surveillance target attack radar systems, electronic warfare aircraft, and other support aircraft to create self-contained units for expeditionary warfare. The same practice of force packaging applies to naval warfare, where the U.S. Navy has blended carriers, amphibious assault ships, surface combatants, submarines, and support ships to create formations for expeditionary operations.

NATO and European militaries should carefully study these changes being pursued by the U.S. military, not because they are “made in America,” but because they make operational sense on the modern battlefield. Indeed, some European militaries are already pursuing them by creating independent brigades. European HRF need not mimic U.S. forces in the particulars. If they adopt similar concepts, they will go a long way toward making the transition from old-style continental operations, in which force components fought separately, to new-style expeditionary missions, in which all components are not only well structured but can fight jointly as well.

If new European force structures are to be capable of fighting alongside U.S. forces, they must be equipped with the array of assets needed for major combat operations in the information age, which are complex and fast-paced. Rather than bludgeon the enemy through battlefield-wide attrition, they endeavor to fracture enemy cohesion through rapid maneuver and precise delivery of firepower. They require forces to operate simultaneously rather than sequentially, and to disperse widely rather than mass at central locations. European forces possess some of the assets needed for such operations, but not yet all of them. Acquiring the rest must be a goal of procurement plans that focus, first and foremost, on equipping the limited set of forces being prepared for expeditionary warfare. Equally important, the Europeans will need to strengthen all three components of ground, naval, and air forces, rather than emphasizing one to the exclusion of the others. This especially holds true for integrating ground and air forces so that they can work closely together; thus far, Europeans have devoted less effort than Americans to employing air forces to contribute to ground battles. Many European countries do not have large navies, but such countries as Britain, France, Germany, and Italy have modern navies that are blue-water capable and can be used for joint expeditionary missions.

An emphasis on all three components of ground, naval, and air forces is necessary because they play important roles in expeditionary warfare, in-

teract considerably in joint operations, and depend on each other. In order to conduct expeditionary warfare and joint operations, modular and adaptable European ground forces should field a mixture of heavy, medium, and light units that are equipped with a combination of weapon systems for direct fires, indirect fires, and standoff fires at long distances. Emphasis is shifting from heavy armor to lightweight armor, but all vehicles must have the firepower, survivability, and tactical mobility to defeat well-armed opponents. Because of growing ground-air interactions, European air forces must be capable of not only defending their airspace but also contributing to land battles by fielding assets for all-weather/day-night operations, precision strikes, and close air support. Modern aircraft are necessary, but so are sensors, munitions, and support assets. European naval forces must be capable of both defending the seas and carrying out littoral operations and launching cruise missiles as part of the joint campaign in support of ground and air forces. European warships typically are smaller and less well armed than U.S. counterparts, but they often possess important capabilities in such areas as countermine warfare and littoral patrolling. Britain's plan to acquire larger aircraft carriers is an example of efforts that can help transform European navies for expeditionary warfare.

For all three components, NATO needs to determine the European forces and capabilities that will be needed for new-era missions. It should next assess existing European assets and make judgments about where additional capabilities are needed to close existing gaps, and then communicate appropriate force goals and priorities to European members for the crafting of appropriate programs and budgets under NATO guidance. Keeping a tight focus on critical High Readiness Forces, capability requirements, and program priorities will be essential. What must be avoided is the past tendency to scatter improvement efforts across the entire European force posture, including stationary units that are not intended for deployment missions. Indeed, the Europeans could save money for investments in deployable HRF by disbanding sizable numbers of other forces or moving them into reserve status. At a minimum, stationary forces should not be targets for expensive modernization any time soon.

Finally, a NATO improvement program must remedy shortfalls in mobility assets and logistic support. NATO has been working on these two problems for several years, but much remains to be done. For example, the recent agreement to secure commitment of 10 RO/RO ships from various nations is helpful, but movement of a single division could require 20 cargo ships. An inexpensive solution is access to more cargo ships and wide-bodied air transports from Ukraine or the commercial sector.

Likewise, NATO combat forces need multinational logistic support that is tailored to the unique demands of expeditionary warfare. Logistic support is critical for expeditionary operations because combat forces must be self-sustainable: they cannot draw upon their European economies or local economies in underdeveloped countries. The solution is not to create ponderous support structures composed of many truck transport, supply, and maintenance units coupled with huge stocks of war reserves. Instead, the solution is to take advantage of such new-era concepts as *just-in-time* and *sense-and-respond* logistics to create lean support structures that can deploy quickly and get the job done proficiently. The practice of fielding multinational logistic structures, rather than purely national structures, has many attractions. It will enable countries to specialize in niche areas of comparative advantage and permit efficient use of resources, thereby reducing the size and weight of logistic support assets and increasing their speed of deployment. Multinational logistic systems can reduce by one-half the manpower and stocks that otherwise would have to be deployed for logistic support.

In summary, creating better HRF units for expeditionary missions and major combat operations is not only important, but also a doable proposition as long as NATO focuses on a small set of forces—an approach that has worked for the NRF and can work for the HRF. This agenda cannot be accomplished overnight. But over the course of a few years, a great deal can be done to transform Europe into a serious participant in power projection and major expeditionary warfare by 2010. The tasks of acquiring modern information networks, creating new force structures, fielding a diverse array of assets, securing sealift and airlift support from the commercial sector, and creating streamlined logistic support may be complex, but they do not require huge spending of scarce investment funds. While some new acquisition programs will be needed, this agenda mainly requires organized effort, multilateral cooperation, and a capacity to innovate. Thus far, the Europeans have not shown the necessary willpower to overcome barriers, but in recent years, they have been making encouraging progress. If they are willing to pursue the remaining measures, NATO can provide a forum for them to succeed in a relatively short period.

NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force

The experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq make clear that expeditionary operations often do not end once major combat is concluded. When long occupation or presence follows, the task becomes one of stabilization and reconstruction, which helps guide the transition from battlefield vic-

tory to enduring peace. *Stabilization* refers to the process of ending the resistance of enemy forces, insurgents, terrorists, rebellious political activists, and common criminals. *Reconstruction* refers to the process of restoring a functioning government, society, and economy. The stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) process is intended to lay a solid foundation for a longer-term effort aimed at building democratic governments, civil societies, and functioning market economies. S&R missions often are anything but easy; they can involve prolonged low-intensity fighting against insurgents even as efforts are under way to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and to create new governmental institutions. Nor is success guaranteed: as of this writing, Afghanistan seems headed toward a favorable outcome, but the fate of Iraq is hanging in the balance. The enduring lesson is that much depends upon the effectiveness of the S&R operation, including its strategy and how it is implemented.¹⁰

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States and its European allies tried to perform S&R missions by *re-rolling* their military forces—that is, they endeavored to switch their forces from combat operations to S&R tasks. This transition has proven to be difficult because combat forces lack a full measure of the unique assets needed for reconstruction—military police, civil-military affairs, civil administrators, medical aid, civil engineers, construction teams, psychological operations, and specialists capable of speedily processing contracts with commercial businesses. For example, a combat engineer battalion will possess the assets needed to create defensive positions, keep roads open, and clear battlefields of mines. But it may lack the S&R assets needed to repair damaged office buildings, reconnect electrical power grids, and restore sewage and water systems. The same applies to medical care. While military units will have the capacity to care for troops wounded in battle, they may lack a comparable ability to contain infectious diseases among large populations, to distribute drugs and other supplies across a large countryside, and to run civilian hospitals in damaged urban areas. For these reasons, even combat service support units cannot always be re-rolled to perform S&R missions.

Because re-rolling has proven to be a shaky practice for reconstruction missions, a major implication is that the U.S. military should organize special assets for quickly performing S&R missions even as major combat is giving way to fighting against insurgents. Equally important, NATO and the European militaries should be prepared for S&R missions, too. Senior NATO military authorities are aware of this need, and some European countries, such as Italy and Germany, are beginning to reshape their forces for S&R missions. But not enough countries are doing so, and even

if robust national efforts were under way, they would need to be brought together into multilateral formations to forge their capabilities into a cohesive whole. While many details must be studied carefully, NATO should perform this integrating function.

In some quarters on both sides of the Atlantic, concern exists that the act of creating S&R capabilities will draw the Europeans away from paying proper attention to the NRF and HRF for major combat operations. A close look suggests that this fear is unfounded. As shown in table 1–2, the entire *combination* of NSOF, NRF, HRF, and S&R assets would consume about 242,000 to 272,000 military personnel. This is only about 10 percent of Europe's total of 2.4 million active military personnel, and about 16 to 18 percent of Europe's active ground manpower, which totals 1.5 million troops. The Europeans can readily meet this requirement without drawing manpower away from other missions, including continental defense. Britain and France aside, several European countries could reduce their military manpower by sizable amounts and still easily meet these requirements. Creating S&R forces does not require large diversions of funds for equipment acquisition and modernization. The main task is one of reorganizing manpower, units, and forces that already exist in European combat support and combat service support structures.

NATO should create a special S&R command staff for establishing coordinated force goals for member countries and organizing S&R forces into multinational formations capable of prompt deployment into occupied countries. A command staff, for example, could quickly assemble forces and assets for contingencies such as Afghanistan, where laborious efforts were needed to bring together the few helicopters and infantry units needed to create Provincial Reconstruction Teams. How many European-manned S&R forces are needed? An initial estimate is that two division-size formations, composed of independent S&R brigades plus light infantry units, would be adequate. Such a posture would provide the necessary mix of S&R assets, as well as the flexibility and modularity to respond to a range of contingencies. For example, this posture would enable NATO to deploy fully six S&R brigades to a single large contingency, or to sustain indefinitely two brigades in a single smaller operation. If the United States also creates similar formations, between them enough S&R assets should be available for most situations.

Some European countries understandably will be reluctant to create special S&R units. Examples are Britain and France, whose scarce military manpower is needed to populate combat forces that will be critical to NATO warfighting strategy in expeditionary missions. But other countries

that provide fewer combat units may find opportunities in contributing S&R assets to NATO. Italy and Germany are examples, as are Poland and other new members from Central Europe. Southern region countries such as Spain, Greece, and Turkey also have the manpower to permit specialization in S&R functions. In addition, the Europeans need to consider how civilian assets can be mobilized for reconstruction missions that will not be performed by military forces. If Europe rises to the challenge, it should have little difficulty creating the necessary assets in a few years.

Table 1–2. Proposed European Ground Forces for Expeditionary Missions*		
	Brigades	Ground Manpower
NSOF	1	2,000
NRF	3	30,000
HRF for MCO	15–18	150,000–180,000
S&R	6	60,000
Total	25–28**	242,000–272,000

* Proposed by authors.

** A force of 25–28 brigades equates to about 8 or 9 division equivalents.

NATO Defense and Security Sector Development

Once the S&R mission is ongoing or has been effectively performed in an occupied country, there remains an additional requirement that is as crucial to long-term security: political and economic transformation to a viable, democratic, stable nation with accountable and competent governance. This requirement, which can take years or even decades, must include the creation of clean, lean, and able defense and security forces and institutions. *Clean* means forces and institutions that respond to governmental direction, respect democratic values, enforce the law fairly, and are free from internal corruption. *Lean* refers to the need for these forces and institutions to operate efficiently, free from bloating that can consume too many resources and strangle economic recovery. *Able* refers to their ability to perform their jobs of military security and law enforcement.¹¹

The need for NATO to help perform defense and security sector development is not confined to postwar situations. Indeed, it commonly arises in peacetime, when NATO endeavors to build partnership relations with countries that are trying to leave the past behind. As NATO considers its objectives and policies toward other regions, it may want to increase its involvement in this enterprise, and the opportunities may grow as well. After all, much of the world has yet to go through the democratic transformation that has occurred in Eastern Europe over the past two decades.

There is now overwhelming evidence—from places as diverse as the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, and Southeast Asia—that failure to overhaul defense and security establishments can retard, if not derail, broader political-economic transformation to democracy and market economies.

NDSSD is a complex enterprise that requires an adroit blending of carrots and sticks. Fortunately, NATO and some of its individual members have considerable experience in this arena. The bulk of this experience comes from the PFP effort to help the former communist nations of Eastern Europe and former republics of the Soviet Union develop capable, professional, accountable, and affordable defense establishments and military forces. Currently, NATO includes countries with experience in both giving and receiving this type of PFP support. In addition, the United Kingdom, relying on interministerial collaboration under its “global fund” program, has accumulated valuable experience in providing comprehensive security sector reform in a number of developing countries, such as Uganda, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka. The same can be said for France, which has longstanding ties to numerous countries in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. The United States, of course, has been in this business on a global basis for many years and brings the benefits of its successful experiences in Asia, where it has helped guide several militaries into the modern era.

One example of how an NDSSD capability might be used is in conjunction with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), an offer to establish military partnership relations with interested countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Persian Gulf. The ICI is meant to be different from the NATO Partnership for Peace, which has been operating successfully in Eastern Europe and adjoining regions for nearly a decade. For many participants, PFP became a process of preparing for entrance into NATO: all 10 new members participated in ways aimed at enhancing their ability to meet requirements for admission. By contrast, the ICI is not aimed at preparing Middle Eastern countries for admission into NATO. Instead, it is aimed at helping their military establishments carry out modernizing reforms and acquire legitimate capabilities in areas of mutual interest. For example, the ICI might help these establishments learn techniques for planning and budgeting, training and exercising, protecting borders, safeguarding against terrorism, carrying out hostage rescue, and performing disaster relief. Although the ICI is new and untested, it can provide a framework for interested countries to work closely with NATO members under Alliance auspices.

Even in peacetime settings, the difficulty of this enterprise should not be underestimated. In many countries, defense and security institutions may be change-resistant—indeed, more resistant than other sectors of their governments and societies. But unless military and other security institutions can be fundamentally transformed, efforts to train and educate individuals or small groups may be inadequate to prevent old cultures and practices from surviving. Large carrots and sticks may be needed to induce institutional reform, including leadership changes.


Whether as part of a wider political transformation or simply to develop more competent military and security institutions, NATO members must be capable of offering assistance in this arena. NATO can determine how and where to offer such efforts only on a case-by-case basis. To ensure that NATO performs effectively when called upon, it needs enduring capacity and options. NATO should concentrate on what it knows best, defense and military transformation, and leave reform of police and other security institutions to other agencies. NATO likely will need to expand upon its PFP staffs by creating assets to perform this function in regions outside Europe. It should begin by taking an inventory of its members to determine their relevant experiences, activities, and capabilities. (Some of the best talent and experience may well come from new members, having just gone through similar defense and security transformations themselves.) NATO then should make decisions about how capabilities should be organized collectively, how national capabilities can contribute, where NATO can make valuable contributions, and how improvements can be made.

Matching the NATO Defense Framework with U.S. and EU Efforts

As the United States and Europe seek to revitalize their partnership through defense collaboration, they should not focus on NATO military preparedness in isolation from the larger setting. They also will need to take stock of two other key issues: how the future U.S. military commitment to NATO and Europe can take shape in ways that contribute to NATO preparedness, and how emerging EU defense efforts can be channeled toward enhancing NATO military strength and cohesion. The goal should be to forge collaborative relations among NATO, the U.S. military, and the European Union so that all three not only perform healthy roles individually but also create a unified whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Because achieving this goal will not be easy, it will require sound planning and hard work by all participants.

The three-pyramid architecture illustrated below provides a conceptual framework for orchestrating this complex enterprise. If the defense preparedness efforts in the NATO pyramid, discussed above, and the U.S. and EU pyramids focus on creating similar types of forces, capabilities, and improvement priorities, the outcome can be a triangular relationship that works to the advantage of all three participants.

Figure 1–2. Three-Pyramid Architecture for Transatlantic Defense Collaboration



Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe

The United States maintains military forces in Europe both for national purposes and to meet NATO commitments and to help influence how NATO military forces undergo transformation. Careful attention must be paid to the future U.S. military commitment—not only U.S. forces in Europe but also NATO-committed forces stationed in the United States—because of the changes that will be taking place during the coming years. Since the early 1990s, the United States has deployed about 109,000 troops in Europe in multiple headquarters staffs, 4 heavy Army brigades and an airborne contingent in Italy, and over 2 U.S. Air Force fighter wings and support aircraft at various bases, plus Navy bases, mostly in the Mediterranean, to support regular deployment of a carrier battlegroup and an amphibious ready group. The purpose of this large, multifaceted military presence has been threefold: to help defend an expanded NATO in a period of uncertain change; to provide U.S. force contributions to NATO operations on Europe's periphery (for example, in the Kosovo war of 1999); and to provide forward-deployed forces for purely U.S. military missions, or for coalition missions outside NATO, in regions adjoining

Europe, including the Middle East, which is part of the U.S. European Command area of operations.

While this U.S. presence has served remarkably well over the past decade, it is about to undergo important changes. In fall 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced the results of a review aimed at better aligning overseas deployments with future missions and priorities. Total U.S. military manpower in Europe will decline to about 50,000 to 65,000 troops, although regular training and exercises by forces in the continental United States (CONUS) occasionally will raise the total temporarily. Headquarters staffs will be trimmed and consolidated. The four Army heavy brigades will be replaced by a single Army Stryker brigade, plus an airborne contingent in Italy. The Air Force presence will also be trimmed, but details are unclear, and some units may periodically deploy to Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and other new NATO members. Naval bases in the Mediterranean may also be consolidated, but the Navy will continue to maintain regular peacetime deployments of warships there.

The new presence will be smaller and distributed differently. While the U.S. military will retain main operating bases at traditional locations in Europe, it will develop new forward operating locations and cooperative security locations in Eastern Europe and the Balkans in order to enhance the capacity of the American military to train and exercise with new NATO members and to provide additional jump-off sites for power projection operations outside Europe. Although the United States will not permanently station large forces in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, small units might reside there, and increased training and exercises in Poland and other countries will result in temporary surges. As a result, the U.S. military center of gravity will shift from its Cold War locations in Western Europe toward the east and southeast, reflecting growing U.S. relations with multiple countries there.

Will this plan (actually, still a concept) properly support a parallel effort, partly led by the U.S. Government, to improve NATO and European military forces and capabilities for new-era expeditionary missions? If it does not, modification is likely as it undergoes further study and review.

The new U.S. military presence in Europe should be anchored in a coherent strategic concept that squares with ongoing NATO preparedness efforts and fosters close U.S.-European military ties. Accordingly, future U.S. forces in Europe should be designed to create a strike force similar to the NRF, when they are not a part of the NRF. That is, they should contribute to the NRF in normal rotations, but they also should field a separate, joint, brigade-size strike force so that NATO would have two quick

response strike forces—the NRF (in which U.S. forces participate some of the time) and a separate similar U.S. strike force assigned for NATO missions—that would double its options and flexibility in a crisis. In peacetime, these two forces could train and exercise together, thereby benefiting the transformation of both. Whether the DOD plan provides the ingredients for such a strike force can be determined only when details become available. The question arises whether a single Army Stryker brigade in Germany, plus airborne troops in Italy, is the best choice. Perhaps a better plan would be two composite brigade combat teams: a heavier brigade in Germany and a lighter brigade in Italy. Both brigades would be equipped with a mixture of assets for close combat, indirect fires, and long-range standoff fires. Such a revised U.S. ground presence might be better able to work closely with the NRF.

As the pyramid architecture of figure 1-2 suggests, the future U.S. commitment to NATO should not be viewed solely through the lens of peacetime presence. Additional commitments of CONUS-based forces should also be tailored to help support NATO defense preparedness efforts and priorities. CONUS-based forces will continue to be assigned to NATO war plans and provide reinforcements that can take part in NATO expeditionary operations. A regular program that deploys forces to Europe for training and exercises every year, as often occurred during the Cold War, can promote interoperability with European forces. Likewise, European forces could come to the United States more often for training and exercises, not only with NATO-assigned U.S. forces, but also with other forces. In the coming years, European forces may work closely with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces that perform missions in the Persian Gulf and surrounding regions. A closer European/NATO relationship with CENTCOM has begun to emerge recently and should grow in the coming years.

A formal U.S. commitment to NATO of two to three Army divisions (or Marine units), plus four to five fighter wings, and one to two carrier strike groups and amphibious strike groups would combine with strengthened European forces to give NATO a solid portfolio of diverse capabilities for expeditionary warfare, crisis response, and other operations. In addition, the U.S. military in CONUS should develop S&R forces that match those fielded by Europe to meet U.S. national needs while also giving NATO a sufficient portfolio of flexible assets for this important mission. Beyond this, the United States should develop civilian S&R assets and improved counterterrorism capabilities. For example, the proposed

Lugar-Biden bill aspires to create a permanent S&R agency within the State Department.

Finally, the U.S. counterpart of the NATO Defense and Security Sector Development consists of a set of capacities and activities associated with political-economic-institutional development. These functions are performed by the State Department, including the Agency for International Development and the Defense Department (for example, the Marshall Center and other international schools and institutions). In addition to building some multilateral capacity in this domain, NATO could provide tighter linkage between U.S. and European efforts.

Such a set of capabilities would enable the United States to meet its future commitments to NATO despite its smaller peacetime presence in Europe. It also would place the U.S. military in a strong position to help encourage European military transformation so that U.S. and European forces can work together to carry out future expeditionary missions with both sides making substantial contributions. A key point is that while Europeans must do their part in bolstering NATO for expeditionary missions, the United States must do its part as well, rather than focusing so exclusively on its own purposes and priorities that it loses sight of its still-important role as a leader of NATO.

EU Forces and Capabilities

The EU plans to create military forces and capabilities also should not be seen in isolation but judged in terms of the implications for NATO defense preparedness and the health of the Alliance. During the 1990s, the United States and many NATO officials mainly focused on ensuring that EU military efforts not impede, dilute, duplicate, or divert attention from NATO preparedness. This philosophy of damage avoidance offered no vision of how EU–NATO relations were to become collaborative. A positive step forward came when the “Berlin Plus” accord, initially forged in 1996, was finalized in 2002. Berlin Plus is a NATO–EU agreement that allows the European Union to draw upon NATO assets and capabilities, under the command of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (a European officer), for EU-led crisis operations that NATO declines to undertake.¹² EU forces, of course, can also be deployed without drawing upon NATO assets, by employing the “lead nation” concept that has already been used for some operations.

The initial EU foray into force development came in 1999, when its Helsinki Headline Goal envisioned creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) for the so-called Petersberg Tasks.¹³ The ERRF, declared op-

erational in June 2003, is a corps-size ground force and supporting air and naval units that is to be available within 60 days and could sustain operations for a full year. In 2001, the EU Council approved a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) that called upon members to improve their military capabilities for crisis response by remedying shortfalls in such areas as airlift, logistics, precision strike, rescue helicopters, and C4ISR. In 2004, the EU Council approved a new 2010 Headline Goal that called for efforts to acquire still-missing capabilities in many areas originally earmarked by ECAP. In addition, the EU Council also called for creation of a European Defense Agency to harmonize armaments acquisition, a European Airlift Command, an on-call military operations center for crisis management, and a number of small, deployable "Battle Groups" to be fielded by 2007. In addition, it called for an aircraft carrier to be made available to the ERRF by 2008, improved communications systems, and benchmarks for measuring progress toward the 2010 Headline Goal.

Although these declarations suggest the European Union is building a fully integrated military command and force posture, most of them have not yet been translated into reality. However, the EU is already engaging in overseas security operations: Operation *Concordia* in Macedonia in 2003, Operation *Artemis* in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, Operation *Althea* in Bosnia-Herzegovina to replace NATO forces in 2004, and the Rule of Law Mission to Georgia in 2004. While the EU has a considerable distance to travel before it reaches its ambitious goals, it can be expected to make progress slowly in the coming years. The central issue is determining the type of military forces and capabilities that it should acquire and how they should relate to NATO.

To avoid a potential problem of force availability during crises, European forces assigned to an upcoming NRF rotation and other top-priority missions should not simultaneously be assigned to EU units. If deconfliction measures are instituted, NATO preparedness and EU preparedness need not be at odds. Indeed, the expeditionary force enhancement measures contemplated here will expand the spectrum of usable European military capabilities greatly, thereby providing a larger pool of assets for both NATO and the EU to draw upon. Likewise, savings realized by retiring unnecessary forces, and channeling of these savings into investments in new-era forces, will reduce the risk that NATO and the EU will compete for scarce funds.

In an effort to help determine whether and how the EU can potentially contribute to NATO preparedness, our pyramid starts at the top with the new Battle Groups. Each of these formations is to be battalion-size,

with about 1,500 combat and support troops. The EU plan calls for 13 of them to be fielded, some as national units and others as multinational units. These Battle Groups are intended to be light infantry and easily deployable, ready to move within 5 to 10 days. The EU aspires to be able to deploy two Battle Groups at a time, perhaps under a United Nations mandate. Their mission is to perform limited crisis interventions in such places as sub-Saharan Africa to restore order to chaotic situations, prevent genocide, and protect European citizens and economic interests. Initial operational capability for some units is to be achieved in 2005, and full operational capability in 2007, with the entire force fielded by 2010 or thereafter. In their emphasis on swift reaction with small forces, these Battle Groups bear a resemblance to NATO NRF, but as yet, they are not being configured with the sophisticated networks, joint forces, and advanced weaponry to match the NRF. Even so, they could help contribute to NATO forces and capabilities for operations demanding a lesser response than the NRF. Regardless of whether they are made available to NATO, they will provide a useful addition to Europe's warehouse of new-era capabilities.¹⁴

Below the Battle Groups on the EU pyramid is the ERRF, which is intended to be a joint force, with a ground corps of 60,000 troops, plus air and naval assets that raise the total to 100,000. In a crisis, this force is to be assembled by drawing upon a large pool of forces made available by EU members; none of these forces are placed under EU command in peacetime. As originally conceived, the ERRF was intended to perform Petersberg Tasks of humanitarian assistance, rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management, and peacemaking. These tasks fall short of major combat operations in wartime. But ERRF forces configured for Petersberg Tasks could perform NATO missions that fall within the realm of their core competencies. This is an area where NATO has not specialized, and the Europeans have an opportunity to make useful contributions. The European focus appears to have shifted from the ERRF to the smaller Battle Groups, but the ERRF could again become the focus once Battle Groups are assembled. If the ERRF broadens beyond Petersberg Tasks to acquire greater combat capabilities, its portfolio of potential missions will widen.

At present, the EU is not focused on creating military forces and capabilities for S&R missions. But several EU members, such as France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands have good national police forces that can be used for constabulary missions. These five countries have developed a training program in Italy for constabulary forces that might be used in future EU or NATO stabilization and reconstruction missions. There are multiple other S&R endeavors where the EU would seem to

possess the potential to make major contributions. Beyond this, the EU could harness its civilian agencies and those of its members to perform important security functions that lie outside the realm of defense preparedness. For example, it could create civilian assets for S&R missions, defense and security sector development, counterterrorism, and counterorganized crime—all areas in which transatlantic collaboration will be important in the years ahead and in which the United States needs to do more.

Whether in S&R or in defense and security sector development, the European Union can tap into and shape immense European talent and capacity. In turn, EU–NATO links could ensure that EU contributions in this area are used in synergy with other NATO (including American) contributions. Thus, when it comes to helping in transforming and rebuilding countries that need and want Western help—creating security conditions that lower the likelihood of conflict and terrorism—the EU is every bit as important as the United States in Alliance efforts.

This brief survey thus suggests that current EU endeavors make military sense and that there are additional areas of capability that the European Union might be encouraged to pursue and even lead. Although its current military endeavors may be fledgling, the EU seems destined to grow in importance as Europeans continue their drive to unity and integration. Much will depend on how the European Union evolves, and whether it ultimately becomes a loose body of sovereign nations, a confederation, or a federation. In the interim, the EU can be a source of military integration that helps lessen Europe's principal weakness: the inability of its countries to cooperate closely to create multinational forces and to make efficient use of scarce defense budgets. If the European Union acquires a capacity to perform some military operations independently of NATO, this may take pressure off the United States and NATO to meet all plausible requirements in the coming years. If NATO and the EU can arrange a sensible division of labor that advances the interests of the United States and Europe, this step could be pursued. Beyond this, the European Union might be able to contribute directly to NATO military preparedness. There is no reason why future EU forces cannot be assigned important NATO missions, if they are properly prepared to do so. The Eurocorps has followed this path. It began as a separate endeavor but in recent years has been made available to NATO for certain missions. In theory, EU forces could follow the same path.

Conclusion

Like others, we have long argued for a “more equal, more global” U.S.–EU partnership, of which NATO would be the military arm. In such a true, new partnership, the Atlantic democracies would forge a strategy to induce orderly change in troubled regions and to use Atlantic power judiciously but, when necessary, decisively. The dangers of the post-9/11 world and intensifying strategic concern about the Middle East strengthen the case for such a partnership, such an Alliance, and such a strategy. However, despite a marked improvement in U.S.–European relations, there remain major impediments to realizing this vision. Moreover, neither the United States nor Europe has shown a willingness to do what is necessary to create such a partnership—the latter being reluctant to take on global burdens and risks, and the former being unsure of the value of limiting its freedom of action.

This does not mean that the Allies will fail to agree more often than not on when and how to use the array of capabilities at their disposal. For all the discord of late, publics and leaders on both sides of the Atlantic still applaud common action and success and are saddened by division and inaction. Therefore, it is imperative that NATO has a full range of options to act in union. Options require capabilities, not just thrown together in the event but “baked” together with common requirements, plans, programs, and training. To think that NATO can assemble whatever it needs when it needs it is to condemn the Alliance to ineffectiveness, in which case grand strategy will mean little.

NATO capabilities must be comprehensive, in the sense of leaving no major requirements unaddressed. Where there are gaps—as there are today in Special Operations Forces and Stabilization and Reconstruction Forces—they must be identifiable so that concrete initiatives can be taken to fill them. There must be accountability of members as well to do what their allies are counting on them to do. And they must be able to explain to their publics how their resources are being used to meet present dangers. For all these reasons, a clear, agreed, and comprehensive defense capabilities framework is needed, with or without a new strategic concept.

Notes

¹ Source: Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, and Richard Kugler, *A New Military Framework for NATO*, Defense Horizons 48 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2005).

² In the mid-1960s, a group of NATO-appointed “wise men” drafted the Harmel Report to bridge transatlantic differences over policies toward deterrence and détente.

³ The existing NATO strategic concept was issued at the Washington Summit of 1999. For an appraisal of the need for a new strategic concept and associated issues, see Michael Ruhle, *NATO at the Crossroads* (McLean, VA: The Potomac Foundation, March 2004).

⁴ See relevant NATO press releases in these areas for this period at <www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm>.

⁵ See *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: The White House, September 2002). See also *European Union Security Strategy* (Brussels: European Union, 2003), which cites the following threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. It calls for a close working relationship between the European Union and the United States.

⁶ For views of NATO Strategic Commanders, see Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General J.L. Jones, USMC, and Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, Admiral E.P. Giambastiani, USN, *Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge* (ACO and ACT Headquarters, 2004). For analysis of NATO military transformation, see Arthur K. Cebrowski et al., *NATO Transformation: Problems and Prospects* (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, April 2004).

⁷ The authors wish to thank RADM Raymond Smith, USN (Ret.), former deputy commander, U.S. Southern Command, for his contributions to this idea.

⁸ For more detail, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, "Transforming European Forces," *Survival* (Autumn 2002), 117–132; and Hans Binnendijk, "A European Spearhead Force Would Bridge the Gap," *International Herald Tribune*, February 16, 2002.

⁹ For details on European and NATO military forces, see *The Military Balance 2004–2005* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004).

¹⁰ For more detail, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, *Needed—A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force*, Defense Horizons 45 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, September 2004).

¹¹ For more detail on this mission, see David C. Gompert et al., *Clean, Lean, and Able: A Strategy for Defense Development*, RAND Occasional Paper OP-101-RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 2004).

¹² For an appraisal of European defense integration, see Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algeri, *A European Defence Strategy* (Guetersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation, May 2004). For a critical view of future EU–NATO relations, see Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, "Saving NATO from Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (November–December 2004), 111–120.

¹³ These are primarily peacekeeping operation tasks.

¹⁴ For analysis, see Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Europäische 'Battle Groups' ein neuer Schub für die ESVP?" ("European Battle Groups: A New Stimulus for the European Security and Defense Policy"), *Analysen und Argumente aus der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung* 2004, no. 15, December 15, 2004, at <http://www.kas.de/publikaionen/2004/5827_dokument.html>.

Transforming European Forces (2002)¹

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

NATO is embarking on a second round of enlargement while consolidating a promising new relationship with Russia. Yet these achievements have been overshadowed by growing concerns that the Alliance is becoming irrelevant. At the heart of these concerns is a yawning gap in military capabilities between the United States and its European allies. Thus, NATO's Prague summit in November 2002, in addition to inviting new members, will also be a 'capabilities summit'. When NATO's defense ministers met in June 2002, they agreed to develop a fresh initiative aimed at meeting requirements for missions arising outside Europe.² But what goals are to be embraced, and how are they to be pursued in Prague's aftermath? This question deserves an answer because what happens after Prague will be more important than any declarations issued there.

NATO summits have called for better European military capabilities before, yet progress has been lacking. This insufficient progress, compounding America's apparently diminishing interest in the alliance, has led critics to proclaim NATO's demise. But the Europeans have been slowly upgrading their militaries recently, and have gained combat experience in Kosovo and Afghanistan. As a result, they are now within range of becoming prepared for demanding operations in distant areas. While some countries are doing better than others, as a group, European NATO needs to make another strong push, backed by U.S. encouragement, to take the additional steps required. The Prague summit offers a golden opportunity to launch this effort. If it is allowed to pass, the transatlantic alliance risks sliding into irrelevancy even as its need for strength and responsiveness grows.

This article proposes a credible defense agenda for Europe, the United States, and NATO to pursue at Prague and afterward. Its intent is

not to rehash old complaints about European foot-dragging or American drum-beating. Nor is it a call for the Europeans to increase their Defense spending, or to buy American hardware, or to stifle the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), or to mimic U.S. Defense plans, or mindlessly to support U.S. policies around the world.

Instead, NATO's agenda should be twofold. First, a new defense initiative cannot be launched in a political and strategic vacuum. The United States and Europe should forge a stronger accord on developing better forces and capabilities with the expectation that they actually will be used in future crises—not always, but often. The United States and Europe should agree that, normally, they will act together against arising threats: departures from this norm should be the exception, not the rule.

Second, NATO should refocus its stalled Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) on using defense transformation to build a small 'Spearhead Response Force,' that is, a European force capable of being a lead-element in assertive NATO efforts to cope with new threats. A new defense initiative will make little progress if it merely streamlines the NATO command structure and pursues a compressed list of DCI measures in unfocused ways. There must be a clear focus on the specific forces to be used for new missions, which must be fully equipped with the necessary capabilities.

This initiative would entail the reorganization of existing NATO forces and command structures to create a small, elite, mobile expeditionary force. This small force would consume only a minor fraction of Europe's military manpower and defense budgets, but it could make a huge contribution toward enhancing NATO's preparedness for new missions. This is not to be a 'paper force' or a loose collection of units that seldom exercise together, but a real force maintained at high readiness, capable of swiftly projecting power to distant areas outside Europe and then conducting demanding combat operations with U.S. forces in a wide spectrum of contingencies. Its purpose is not to compete with the EU's 'European Rapid Reaction Force' (ERRF), but instead to complement it in ways that give NATO a broader portfolio of crisis response options. The United States could contribute to this effort by having its own spearhead forces train and exercise with European units.

This agenda provides both sides of the Atlantic with an opportunity to revitalize the alliance. By collaborating on a transformational plan that will greatly improve Europe's military capacity to work with U.S. forces in addressing new threats, the United States will get greater military help in crises plus enhanced legitimacy for its policies. Conversely, the Europeans will gain influence over how their interests are protected as well as

heightened credibility in the eyes of the United States and other countries. NATO's credibility will grow too, and its options will expand. The costs of this enterprise are moderate and affordable. Tangible progress can be made quickly, within a year to two, followed by bigger steps later.

An Alliance in Need of Remedies

Shortly after 11 September, NATO declared an Article 5 emergency that laid the groundwork for a multilateral approach to the war on terrorism. Many European political leaders urged prompt, decisive action. When the invasion of Afghanistan was mounted, British forces fought alongside U.S. forces, and later other European countries sent troops to help perform remaining missions. In June 2002, the NATO Defense ministers issued three communiqués calling for improved military capabilities for new missions, including demanding operations outside Europe.

Even so, the past year also has seen angry rhetoric flowing back-and-forth across the Atlantic, mostly in the media, that contrasts with NATO's upbeat communiqués. Americans have complained that the Europeans are perpetual free-riders or worse, and that the transatlantic alliance is a dying myth. Europeans have complained about alleged American unilateralism, militarism and hegemonism. This debate, though often more heated than enlightening, indicates that the alliance is in trouble. Because the stakes are high, this is a time to replace hot rhetoric with mature judgment. The alliance has been through stressful debates before and always emerged intact with improved policies. The same can be the case again, but only if successful remedies are found. The quest for remedies, in turn, must begin with a clear-eyed diagnosis of the multiple problems.

The alliance does not face extinction, but it could fall into disuse. This risk applies not only to NATO as an institution, but also for the pattern of transatlantic cooperation that has always marked the alliance. The alliance's main problem today is that, apart from the United States and to a lesser degree, the United Kingdom, it is ill-prepared to deal with the new threats that are sprouting along the so-called 'southern arc of instability' from the Middle East to the Asian littoral. True, NATO is proving adept at enlarging and otherwise supporting Europe's unification, while performing peacekeeping tasks in the Balkans. But if these operations are its sole purpose, it will become a loose collective security pact, not a true alliance with real military punch. Such a weakened alliance will not interest the United States, and in the final analysis, it likely will not interest Europe either.

Until recently, the new threats were seen as 'Article 4 threats:' menacing to common Western interests, but not the physical safety of NATO's borders and its military forces. The eleventh of September and the subsequent war on terrorism have altered this calculus. In a world of spreading technology and communications, the new threats of terrorism and WMD proliferation are capable of striking directly against the United States and Europe. Use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons could inflict horrific casualties, far exceeding the losses of 11 September. Other dangers along the southern arc—cultural clashes, ethnic warfare, extremist ideologies and rogue states—could menace vital Western interests and indirectly give rise to Article 5 threats.³

As a result, the old distinction between Article 4 and Article 5 is becoming obsolete. New threats that are mutually reinforcing and contagious simultaneously endanger the alliance's strategic interests, its democratic values and its members' physical safety. These threats are not transient, but are deeply rooted in a vast and troubled southern belt, and promise to be present, in mutating forms, for decades. The democratic community faces a prolonged struggle with multiple forms of chaos, turmoil and violence.

During the Cold War, Europeans were required to defend their continent while the United States carried a global load. During the 1990s, Europeans still had plenty of reasons to focus on their continent: war in the Balkans, the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe and uncertain relations with Russia. Today, Europe is becoming more peaceful and unified, while the United States often finds itself alone in facing nascent dangers in other regions—where Europe's interests are also at stake. True, U.S. military forces are often adequate to the task, but it is not fair that the U.S. carry the burden alone, and it needs the political legitimacy that allied involvements bring. Future threats may require European force contributions not only for political reasons, but for military reasons as well: U.S. forces might become too over-stretched to handle them.

In the past dozen years, three regional wars have demanded a collective response; yet the alliance as an institution has not been substantially improved in capabilities or coherence. This trend reflects not only the failure of European countries to rectify their military deficiencies, but also eroding American interest in the alliance as a vehicle of joint military action.

In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, NATO played an important background role, and several European countries, led by Britain and France, sent thousands of troops—including two ground divisions, over 100 combat aircraft, and 66 naval vessels—to help U.S. forces. Even so, the United

States provided about 80% of Western forces. The 1999 Kosovo War was fought by NATO within range of European airbases, yet the United States flew the majority of NATO's air sorties. When the global war against terrorism erupted in late 2001, NATO helped the United States recover its post-11 September balance in important ways, such as sending AWACs aircraft to patrol U.S. skies. But when the time came to defeat al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States turned down most offers of European combat forces and chose to strike on its own, aided by only British forces. Months later, several European countries sent troops as peacekeepers and to help root out remaining al-Qaeda and Taliban strongholds. This contribution does not disguise the fact that when the major battles were waged, U.S. and British forces did the fighting, and the other Europeans sat on the sidelines. This was the culmination of a decade-long trend in which NATO's military engagement in each conflict decreased even as its political commitment increased. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the United States fought a major regional conflict that directly affected Europe's safety without either NATO or the continental Europeans playing a serious role.

The problem is not that the Europeans have no usable capabilities for power-projection missions. British and French forces are modestly proficient, and several other European powers have at least a brigade or battalion of ground forces for this purpose, and comparable air and naval forces. Many European militaries have pockets of excellence, such as information technologies, modern fighter planes, powerful tanks and artillery, capable ships, special forces and smart munitions. What most of these countries lack is the full set of assets necessary for significant power-projection. Equally important, the Europeans lack the capacity to combine their forces to form an integrated team. As a result, they can only contribute small, fragmented capabilities to U.S.-led operations. They are not capable of carrying a big part of the load, and they fall far short of being able to mount a major crisis-intervention on their own. They are dependent upon the United States, and are limited to contributing at the margins.⁴

Europe's share of the blame for NATO's troubles goes beyond its declining defense budgets. During the Cold War, the Europeans' weighty contributions to NATO's defenses ensured them major influence over NATO's defense strategy of flexible response, which reflected American and European perspectives in balanced ways. That satisfying balance has gone. The new challenges lie outside Europe, and there the Europeans, owing to their military and political weakness, often come across as subordinate to the United States, not meriting an equal voice on basic strategy.

This dispiriting trend is not one that encourages Europeans to work with the United States.

While Britain and France think in terms of power projection, many other Europeans believe their proper role to be that of stabilizing their continent while the United States defends common interests elsewhere. Along with this 'continental mentality' comes an aversion to entanglement in messy regional affairs and controversial U.S. policies outside Europe. As a consequence, many European countries have purposefully shied away from preparing their military forces for power-projection. The effect has been to leave Europeans in a self-created, convenient trap: unable to project power because they lack the assets, and unwilling to acquire the assets because they are not eager to perform the mission.

Beyond this, Europe's preoccupation with unification and its growing aversion to American domination of NATO has resulted in an emphasis on building the ERRE, often advertised as a long-term solution to Europe's military drawbacks. However, the focus of the ERRE is on Petersberg tasks such as peacekeeping and limited crisis interventions on Europe's periphery; it is not intended for intense combat in distant areas.⁵ Moreover, it is designed to operate outside NATO and therefore will not likely be fully interoperable with U.S. forces. Since 11 September, many Europeans have begun to worry that the United States may sideline NATO. This may result in a forthcoming attitude toward a new Prague initiative. But the task of mobilizing a Europe-wide consensus is complex: not only Defense officials but skeptical political leaders, parliamentarians and finance ministries must be convinced.

American attitudes are also to blame for NATO's decline. Like any great power, the United States has a natural instinct to run crisis operations on its own. Despite long experience in working with allies, the growing supremacy of U.S. forces has lessened the incentive to seek their help.

The U.S. still has more multilateral security involvements than any other country. But when tough wars must be fought in strange new places, in cloudy political and military conditions, the United States has developed a distinctly utilitarian stance towards multilateralism. It is willing to cooperate with allies, but only when their presence enhances prospects for victory. When allied forces are too weak to matter, or are not interoperable with U.S. forces, the United States is inclined to use only its own forces rather than fight a 'war by committee.' Arguably this attitude is short-sighted; but right or wrong, it is a main reason why the United States has recently been viewing coalitions in conditional terms. The danger of NATO's growing irrelevancy is being magnified by the changes taking place in U.S. defense

strategy. Whereas the Europeans spend only about \$150 billion annually on defense and their real spending has been declining in recent years, the U.S. defense budget in 2003 has grown to \$380bn, and by 2007 it may swell to \$450bn. Increases in acquisition funds will allow force improvements to unfold far faster than during the 1990s. As new command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, and new sensors, munitions, tactical aircraft and other weapons enter the inventory, they will significantly increase U.S. combat capabilities. The new U.S. defense strategy, as laid out in the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), has shifted from an emphasis on waging two regional wars in the Persian Gulf and Korea to a flexible force structure that can be deployed in a wider range of geographic areas and contingencies, including strikes against terrorists and WMD proliferators.⁶ This strategy requires U.S. forces to be capable of forcible entry into crisis zones in the face of asymmetric tactics, followed by counter-sanctuary bombardments and rapid engagements. The U.S. armed forces are undergoing a process of transformation to better implement this strategy. Future U.S. forces will use a sophisticated 'system of systems'—for example, multiple integrated information networks—to carry out new operational doctrines that make use of air and mobile ground forces, and missile-firing naval forces to defeat enemies quickly and decisively. Future operations will be joint, dispersed, simultaneous, high tempo and deep-striking, employing modern platforms and smart munitions.

Already, U.S. forces can deploy to distant areas three times faster than most European militaries, and can strike two or three times more lethally. What if the U.S. margin of superiority exceeds five? What if the Europeans cannot participate in the U.S. 'system of systems' to the minimum extent necessary to operate on the same battlefield with U.S. forces? The ultimate risk is that future U.S. and European forces simply will be incapable of fighting together.

Closing this gap is less difficult and expensive than commonly thought. As mentioned earlier, many European countries have state-of-the-art weapons and 'pockets of excellence' within their armed forces. The biggest changes are required in relatively affordable areas as transport and logistics assets, secure communications, information technologies, WMD protection, targeting sensors and smart munitions. However, this task requires concerted effort of the sort not yet launched.

Unless the European allies take action soon, NATO's slide into irrelevancy may take the form of a dispiriting 'two-tier' alliance and a dysfunctional 'division of labor' that undermines the principles of shared risk and

responsibility that have been the alliance's foundation since its inception. In this event, U.S. forces will become so proficient at projecting swiftly and striking lethally that they will stand head-and-shoulders above nearly all other European militaries, to the point where combined operations would be possible only in limited circumstances. In an extreme case, the United States and Britain might be compelled to act as 'bad cops' charged with suppressing threats in dangerous regions, while the rest of European NATO act as 'good cops,' seeking reconciliation with adversaries while promoting their commercial interests abroad. Such an arrangement would be a prescription for the end of NATO as a viable alliance.

Short of this worst case, a division of labor might take other ineffective forms. Because U.S. and British forces will remain capable of working together—British forces are being better transformed than their European counterparts—they may acquire the mission of fighting major wars, aided by French forces as that government decrees. Meanwhile other European forces will take on the role of securing the post-victory battle zone to carry out occupation and peacekeeping functions. Alternatively, U.S. and British forces might bomb opponents from the air while other Europeans perform the messy infantry fighting on the ground. Although plausible on paper, neither model is a viable form of multilateralism. Successful coalition warfare requires a fair distribution of the burden. Furthermore, battles, and even wars could be lost because of disagreements over battlefield plans. Mutual dissatisfaction between the U.S. and Europe could result, ultimately, in NATO losing its political cohesion.

Pursuing a New Transatlantic Understanding

Those in Washington who think that the United States no longer needs allies are wrong. Political support from the Europeans adds legitimacy to U.S. policies and helps create the support needed for the United States to pursue its goals in peace, crisis and war. Militarily, the U.S. need for allies may seem less apparent, but it is still imperative. Fair burden-sharing is not the only consideration. U.S. military superiority stems from the high quality of its armed forces, not their quantity: U.S. forces are stretched thin. Allied contributions will be vital if U.S. forces are called upon to deal with more than one major crisis at a time. Even short of two crises at once, the current operating tempo is high and draining. European contributions to overseas missions can be important in lessening this strain, as witnessed in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

Europe, meanwhile, cannot expect to wall itself off from a dangerous world. The 11 September attacks were directed at the United States,

but their intent was that of a war against Western civilization. The sources of terrorism and other threats are close to Europe. Europe's economic involvements and political interests prevent its detachment from global security affairs. It cannot expect the United States to protect European interests, or to do the lion's share of work in maintaining global peace and security indefinitely. Nor can Europe defend its interests and values without strong U.S. help. By playing a constructive role in security affairs beyond its immediate neighborhood, Europe can better pursue its goals in concert with the United States as well as healing the breach in transatlantic relations.

The transatlantic alliance need not become global: for example, by performing formal security roles in Asia. But it does need enhanced capabilities to act in theatres near Europe, including the zone from the Middle East to South Asia. Future U.S.–European collaboration in distant areas cannot be solely military. The Western democracies must help to bring better democratic governance, market economies and functioning societies to trouble-ridden regions along the southern arc and elsewhere, including sub-Saharan Africa. Just as clearly, the United States and Europe must defend themselves against terrorism, WMD proliferation and other threats. Their ability to use military force against these threats is necessary not only to protect their own interests but also to help bring a climate of greater security to troubled regions: a necessary condition for progress.

The United States and Europe need to forge a new transatlantic consensus that defines their roles and responsibilities in the new, post-11 September strategic environment. Today's situation does not require a formal, detailed agreement of the sort that animated NATO during the Cold War, when each country made concrete commitments about the borders it was to defend. But a basic understanding of how the United States and Europe are to work together is both necessary and possible. A new accord should postulate that, in dealing with terrorism and other threats, Washington will regularly rely on multilateral approaches that involve the Europeans, and the Europeans will assume greater security responsibilities outside Europe. This understanding should neither ask the Europeans to support U.S. distant-area policies in set ways nor allow them to act as a brake on U.S.-led efforts. Nor should the United States be expected to seek a multilateral response when this course is not viable. In essence, an accord should create a framework that enables the United States and Europe to collaborate effectively through the vehicle of an evolving consensus driven by common aims and by their desire to keep their alliance relevant.

Future multilateral operations outside Europe can take a variety of forms: for example, under the NATO integrated command, as an 'ad-hoc' coalition or under U.S. military command. As a practical matter, the United States will lead most operations, but if the Europeans strengthen their contributions, their judgments will carry significant weight. Although critics allege that multilateral operations are doomed to fail because their decisions are made by committees, this accusation is wide of the mark. Five times during the twentieth century, the United States led coalition wars and won all of them—against authoritarian countries that scorned democratic practices. If participating countries share goals and use their debates to sharpen their strategies, they can turn multilateralism into an asset, not a liability.⁷

Any effort to forecast future crises and contingencies would be fruitless—the current era is too complex and unpredictable to permit planning on the basis of fixed blueprints. But a new accord must generate agreement on the need to build better European forces and capabilities for new threats. Such an agreement is critical: closing the transatlantic gap in military capabilities is indispensable to closing the gap in strategic policies. Unless the Europeans can provide the necessary military assets, there will be no coalitions worthy of the name, and the United States will have no option but to act either unilaterally or with the few countries able to participate. Adequate European force preparations, guided by NATO and assisted by the United States, are the recipe for a future policy of consistent multilateralism.

If the Prague summit is to adjust transatlantic defense-preparedness efforts to meet new threats, such a move would require a strategic concept. The 1990s NATO drumbeat theme of capabilities needs to be supplemented by that of transformation. The revolutionary advances in information technology, precision munitions and new operational concepts form the central dynamic in military affairs today. European defense preparations will not succeed unless they are anchored in transformation. The overriding goal is for the Europeans to develop better homeland defenses and new-era forces that can project power swiftly outside Europe, strike lethally using modern doctrines and work closely with U.S. forces. European forces do not need to match U.S. forces in technical prowess, provided they are sufficiently capable to play on the same team as U.S. forces. Nor need European force contributions be prohibitively large. In the future, most crisis operations will require only small-to-medium sized strike packages. The Europeans need only enough new-era forces to provide credible participation in crises.

Guiding Transformation: A Spearhead Response Force

A robust and successful European military transformation must be guided by clear goals and priorities. A key question is whether this effort should be directed at providing capabilities or forces. The answer is a combination of both. ‘Forces’ are physical assets: combat formations and support structures; ‘capabilities’ are attributes or performance characteristics. This distinction is important because command structures and forces must exist, and must have definable missions before the pursuit of capabilities can have clear meaning. The best approach is to identify the set of forces that are to be configured for new missions, and then to equip them with the capabilities needed.

This is the approach pursued by the U.S. military, and by NATO whenever it has been serious about performing a high-priority mission. For decades, NATO officials have known that an effective force cannot be cobbled together at the moment of a crisis. They also have known that if a mission is to receive proper attention in member states’ defense programs and budgets, it must have a specific force attached to it, to provide a focal point for investment. Today NATO has designated forces for many traditional missions, but it does not have a special force—a mobile deployable force—for power projection out-of-area and new-era missions. If NATO is to become truly serious about these missions, it needs such a force.

What About the DCI?

This is not the approach advocated by those who argue that NATO’s Defense dilemmas can be solved by compressing the stalled DCI to focus on a narrower set of capabilities, with no special focus on the forces being prepared. This view is based on the premise that the DCI created an undisciplined wish-list of over 50 measures that allegedly swamped European defense budgets, failed to establish priorities and resulted in NATO meeting only one-half of the relevant goals. Presumably, refocusing the DCI on a few measures will generate an emphasis on top priorities and thereby speed European improvements. This view correctly judged that the DCI has lacked a sense of priorities in ways that dissipated Europe’s attention. But the notion that a single-minded emphasis on streamlining the DCI will solve the problem is wrong.⁸

In reality, the DCI does not have an unduly large number of measures. Its five major categories are sound: deployability and mobility; sustainability and logistics; effective engagement; survivability of forces and infrastructure; command, control, and information systems. The truth is

that the DCI did a good job of designing a comprehensive list of measures without driving Defense budgets through the ceiling. By not focusing on a limited number of specific forces, however, it had the effect of scattering its measures across the entire European defense posture, including stationary forces. The forces that might be used for new threats did not receive the systematic improvements that were needed, nor were their training and readiness elevated in the necessary ways.

Short lists of improvement measures (that is, 5–6 measures) can be specific enough to have real programmatic impact, but they tend to leave important things out. A short list inherently suffers from a lack of forces to give it focus; it provides a theory of resource inputs but not performance outputs; it lacks clear goals and concrete requirements; and it provides no mechanism for integrating its various measures. These flaws make it likely that even after such measures are carried out, European forces will still not be capable of deploying swiftly and striking lethally—the main strategic purpose of the entire enterprise. At best, in times of crisis, NATO will still be cobbling together an untrained multinational force rather than drawing upon an integrated and flexible force that already exists.

Additionally, while a single-minded focus on ‘capabilities’ may appeal to military professionals, it will not attract the attention of political leaders or give them a clear roadmap. Skeptics might see such a focus as providing either a bureaucratic excuse to spend money without promise of a tangible result, or a convenient way to go through the motions of reforming defenses without committing to the new missions at hand. Moreover, if European countries strengthen their capabilities without any top-down guidance from NATO on overall force needs and national roles, each will be free to produce its own small slice of capabilities (a few aircraft from one country, a few ships from another). The assets that emerge might be usable at the margins of big U.S.-led operations, but they will not add up to a cohesive military posture and they will not enable Europe to play a big operational role. Thus, they would do little to lessen Europe’s dependence upon the United States.

The Europeans need more than technical arguments to motivate them. They will require an approach that speaks to their identity, their equal status with the United States and their credibility on the world stage.

An Alternative: A Special NATO Force

The idea of creating a special NATO force for new missions, and endowing it with the proper capabilities, provides a credible way to over-

come these problems. The result will be European forces that have a better capacity to operate on their own, that can be blended to form a cohesive posture, and that will have a visible European label attached to them—thus meeting Europe's political needs. The cost of this approach will be kept low not because few measures are being pursued, but because the number of forces being upgraded is small. This approach—with its emphasis on forces first and then capabilities—will be no more expensive than a compressed DCI, applied across the entire European force posture. But rather than produce many forces that are modestly upgraded, it promises to create a small but potent pool of forces that can perform new missions outside Europe and work with U.S. forces.

Appearances suggest that NATO could draw upon its ARRC to perform the new mission of power projection and distant expeditionary operations. But the ARRC will need to remain available for border defense missions and for use on Europe's periphery, including peace-enforcement in the Balkans. A better option would be to draw upon already-existing European units to create an entirely separate force for expeditionary missions and intense combat.

A 'NATO Spearhead Response Force' (SRF) composed of specially equipped and trained units could fulfill this requirement. This force would be 'standing' in the sense that it has an active command structure and is fully manned with experienced personnel, trained to high levels of readiness and proficiency, exercised regularly and immersed in modern doctrine. Small and mobile, it would provide joint assets that could respond quickly and proactively to fast-breaking emergencies. Such a force would be commanded by a senior general or admiral who reports directly to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and who is charged with developing, training and commanding it in crises. It would be fully networked with an advanced C4ISR architecture and capable of orchestrating highly integrated joint operations. Given the necessary manpower and technologies, one of NATO's existing combined joint task forces could perform this role. Most units for this force would be provided by Europe's best-armed countries, but smaller countries could make specialized contributions in niche areas. This elite European force would include 3–5 fighter squadrons and support aircraft, 7–15 naval combatants with cruise missiles, 3–5 mobile ground battalions with combined arms, and mission-tailored logistic support. Its personnel would include about 15,000–25,000 combat troops, backed up by 10,000–15,000 troops in support units. Small and light, this force could deploy quickly, yet pack a potent punch because

of its information architecture, modern weaponry, smart munitions and new operational concepts.⁹

This NATO Spearhead Response Force would be able to participate in one crisis operation at a time. Over time, NATO would have the option to expand its SRF capability to deal with simultaneous contingencies. The initial emphasis, however, is on building a single force to demonstrate its feasibility and effectiveness. This force might be embedded in a larger pool of units, drawn from NATO's 'high readiness forces'. This would allow for rotation of units, permitting the preparatory and recovery cycles that accompany high-readiness duties. In addition, this larger pool would provide flexibility and adaptability in selection of units and capabilities for the mission at hand. In a crisis, all or parts of this pool could deploy as reinforcements for the SRF. This pool might include several fighter wings, brigades, and surface combatants, but it too would be kept small.¹⁰

A Spearhead Response Force would greatly enhance Europe's capacity to contribute to new-era missions, without compelling the Europeans to buy American hardware or greatly elevate their Defense spending. Nor would it become a rival of the ERRF, given that the two forces have different missions. This European force would take a few years to be fully operational, but progress could be made within a year or two, and parts of it could be used in the meantime.

A hallmark of this force would be its flexibility. It could be used in a wide variety of missions:

- contributing to the war on terrorism, and in handling other crises and wars;
- in peacetime, it could serve as a vanguard of European transformation by training, exercising, and experimenting with U.S. forces;
- in a crisis, it could be deployed on its own—either under NATO command or as the military arm of a separate ad-hoc coalition;
- it could be combined with similar U.S. forces stationed in Europe to create a bigger multinational force for crisis response;
- it could be deployed to the Persian Gulf or elsewhere under U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), where it would function as a major European contribution to multilateral operations;
- it could be used as the cutting edge of NATO's defense strategy for crises in and around Europe that require major applications of NATO military power;
- when appropriate, it could be affiliated with the EU's ERRF force for Petersberg missions that require additional combat power

for demanding operations. It could establish a mutually enabling relationship with the ERRE, thereby ensuring that NATO and the EU have both expeditionary strike forces and Petersberg-mission forces at their disposal. When appropriate, European units could alternate assignments between the SRF and the ERRE, thereby further enhancing the complementarity of both postures.

This force need not be located at one base, but if it is dispersed, its training activities need to be networked and integrated. NATO might consider creating a special joint training and transformation experiment facility, perhaps in Poland or some other suitable country where European and U.S. forces could work together in developing common doctrines.¹¹ In addition to secure communications, it will need information grids for communicating among all echelons, surveying the battlefield and the enemy, orchestrating engagements, coordinating joint operations and managing logistics supply. It will need access to command-and-control aircraft such as airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and joint strategic airborne reconnaissance systems (JSTARS), multispectral sensors, ample stocks of smart munitions, and other technologies for fast air-ground maneuvers and precision targeting, including lethal striking of mobile enemy targets in near-real time. It will need modern weapons for all service components, plus such new technologies as unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) as they become available.

Strong ‘nuts and bolts’ assets in several key areas are essential. The force must be supported by sufficient transport assets to be able to deploy to a distant crisis zone in a matter of days or a few weeks. This will require commitment of long-range cargo aircraft and fast cargo ships, most of which can be acquired inexpensively by drawing upon commercial assets. In addition, this force will require adequate logistic support assets, especially in areas vital to long-distance missions: for example, construction engineers, mobile maintenance, truck transport, fuel supply and field hospitals. NATO could make use of its multinational logistics staff and prospective mobility command to help contribute in these areas.

The force will be readily affordable: most of the necessary assets already exist in European inventories. The task is primarily to organize them. Some new—relatively inexpensive—equipment will be required: C4ISR systems, sensors, smart munitions and specialized support assets. Other costs will be additional training and exercises, added construction and maintenance for new facilities and adequate war reserve stocks. These costs will not be exorbitant: an annual estimate is about 2% of current

European defense spending over the next several years.¹² These costs are not trivial, but they will produce high-leverage improvements, and European countries can readily afford them by either modestly increasing their defense budgets or by pruning expenses elsewhere. Germany and other countries have large border-defense forces that could be reduced with no meaningful loss to security. If Europe emerges with smaller border-defense forces but far better expeditionary strike forces, it will have gained hugely in the bargain.

The United States can contribute to this enterprise in several ways. It can provide the Europeans access to its thinking about transformation, and conduct joint training and experiments. It can invite the Europeans to play a key role at its Joint Forces Command (in Norfolk, Virginia), which is being assigned the new mission of transforming U.S. forces. This command should also be assigned the responsibility for assisting European forces in their transformation and coordinating their progress with U.S. forces. Also, the United States can establish multilateral coordination cells in its regional commands, including CENTCOM. It can contribute common infrastructure funds to help finance new facilities. It can set an example by redesigning the U.S. military presence in Europe for new-era expeditionary missions and by ensuring that these forces are at the front-end of transformation, not the tail-end. The U.S. forces in Europe would then become an engine for European transformation, creating a force multiplier effect for the United States.

In addition, the United States can create a small spearhead force from its overseas presence and affiliate it with European units, thereby promoting combined training and enlarging the pool of expeditionary assets assigned to NATO. The spearhead mission should not be exclusively European: one of its key goals is interoperability with U.S. forces. The United States also can make support assets available to the Europeans in such areas as transport, logistics, satellites and C4ISR until the Europeans gradually become self-sufficient. Finally, the U.S. should relax its export control laws to permit the Europeans greater access to new technologies in key areas that promote military transformation.

Conclusion

This proposed agenda of a new transatlantic accord, transformation and a NATO Spearhead Response Force offers an opportunity to solve NATO's strategic dilemmas—both politically and militarily. It supports U.S. interests and will enable the United States to lead the alliance in constructive ways. It offers the Europeans ample incentives: affordable mea-

tures; support for ESDP; increased influence with the U.S.; restored U.S. commitment to NATO; interoperable forces; and above all, a meaningful capacity to defend against new threats that affect Europe as well as the United States.

This agenda may sound too demanding for an alliance seen to be sliding into the doldrums and losing its way. But something must be done to restore the transatlantic bond and to mobilize the alliance for new dangers. The alternative is the withering of the alliance as a viable instrument in the face of emerging threats that could greatly damage the safety, interests and values of both the United States and Europe.

A European Spearhead Force would Bridge the Gap*

The war in Afghanistan reaffirms that the growing military gap between the United States and its NATO allies must be closed or the alliance is at risk. Closing that gap need not be excessively expensive, but it requires Europe to focus on the problem and the United States to share capabilities with its allies.

After the Sept. 11 tragedy, the United States' NATO allies in Europe showed unprecedented solidarity by invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, in essence declaring that they too had been attacked. Even Germany's center-left coalition was prepared to offer direct military assistance in a distant theater, but the United States declined the help because Europe was unable to contribute to the kind of high-tech, intelligence-based war that was ultimately fought.

In the wake of these events, new concepts are being formed that will affect the alliance. Secretary of State Colin Powell has suggested a division of labor, with the United States fighting high-intensity conflicts alone and its allies in charge of peace operations. But institutionalizing such a division of labor would mean ending the notion of common risk that has held NATO together for half a century.

How can we avoid having a gap in military capabilities that turns into transatlantic political divisions?

The most affordable approach would be to develop a European spearhead force that can participate with U.S. units in high-intensity conflict. All European military forces do not need to be transformed to match U.S. capabilities. In fact, a few brigades and air squadrons would do to get started.

To develop such a spearhead force and plug into the U.S. effort, European militaries need to concentrate on a few key capabilities

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such as sensors, secure data links, all-weather precision strikes and improved logistics.

In 1999 the NATO summit meeting adopted a defense capabilities initiative with more than 50 categories of equipment that Europeans needed to buy. Given low European defense budgets and the scope of this effort, the initiative has foundered. The NATO summit meeting in November ought to refocus this initiative on a spearhead force. The United States should not shy away from sharing its best technologies with its closest allies. A more liberal export control regime would be needed to enable this.

Once a European spearhead force is designated and equipped, it must exercise routinely with U.S. units. In fact, it should be part of the joint experimentation in which the U.S. military is engaged to design its new operational concepts. Europe cannot show up on the day of a conflict and expect to plug into U.S. battlefield operations.

Such an effort will require planning and practice. But if NATO cannot fight as an alliance, political differences will pull it apart.

***Hans Binnendijk. This article originally appeared in the *International Herald Tribune*, February 16, 2002.**

Europeans should say 'yes' to Rumsfeld*

NATO Response Force

NATO should embrace the Response Force proposed by Washington as a means to close the trans-Atlantic capabilities gap, transform militaries for new missions and gain a stronger European voice in alliance deliberations.

Some Europeans resist the concept, fearing that it will undercut the European Union's emerging Rapid Reaction Force or drag them into U.S.-led contingencies. But without agreement on this new NATO force, the November Prague summit could fail, and Americans would be further inclined toward unilateral rather than coalition operations. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld proposed setting up a NATO Response Force at the September ministerial meeting in Warsaw in an

effort to develop an alliance capability to conduct rapid crisis management and forced entry operations in distant theaters.

The U.S. proposal calls for a small, self-sustaining, highly lethal spearhead force of about 21,000 land, sea and air troops to be ready to deploy on about a week's notice and to be capable of sustaining operations for about a month. The United States envisions having the force fully operational by 2006.

The new force would draw on existing NATO programs and initiatives to establish this rotational pool of troops organized under a Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters. Troops already designated for NATO high readiness duty would populate it. Ongoing initiatives to enhance defense capabilities would be focused and accelerated to equip it. Most importantly, U.S. and European troops would train together as they prepare for their rotational assignments.

The entire effort should cost about 2 percent of Europe's overall defense spending. No major "buy American" program is needed.

With this proposal, Rumsfeld has in essence offered to share with the allies the fruits of the process of military transformation currently under way in the United States. The goal of the U.S. transformation is to use information and other new technologies to win battles rapidly and decisively with fewer casualties. Early evidence of the power of new military operational concepts being developed in the United States was on display in Afghanistan.

Thus far, the European allies have not been part of this transformation process, and as a result most did not participate until the late stages of the Afghan war. Without military effectiveness, NATO cannot long survive as a functioning alliance.

Creating a NATO Response Force with a capability for U.S.-European joint expeditionary operations can narrow the existing gap. The new force could serve as a model for further European force transformation.

In addition, Europe's voice will regain clout in trans-Atlantic diplomatic deliberations. Those in the United States who prefer unilateral action would be deprived of their principal argument—that the allies have nothing of military value to contribute.

As they consider Rumsfeld's proposal, the allies have expressed three concerns. All can be satisfied. First, they believe that the NATO Response Force should complement and not compete with the EU's Rapid Reaction Force. The two forces have different but complemen-

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tary missions. The NATO force is one-fifth the size of the European force. It is intended for high intensity conflict, while the European force is designed primarily for less demanding military tasks. The NATO force would be drawn from troops already earmarked for NATO. These forces are in the end national forces that over time rotate through various missions. As their capabilities are improved for the NATO mission, so they are eventually improved for the European force as well. Second, the allies want assurances that the Response Force would be deployed only at the direction of the North Atlantic Council, in which they all participate. Because the reaction force would be assigned to the NATO integrated command, by definition its deployment would require the council's approval.

Third, some allies want a "national opt out clause." Participation in the response force is voluntary and the pool of on-call and rotational forces would be large enough to accommodate a country that wants to withhold its troops from a particular operation.

The European allies want NATO to remain relevant. They want to strengthen their voice. They want to improve their military capability and keep up with America's transforming armed forces. Creation of a NATO Response Force is an inexpensive way to begin accomplishing these goals.

***Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler. This article originally appeared in the *International Herald Tribune*, October 24, 2002.**

Notes

¹ Source: Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, "Transforming European Forces," in *Survival* 44, no. 3 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 117–132.

² See "Statement on Capabilities," issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session; Brussels, Belgium; June 6, 2002. In his speech to the German Bundestag, President Bush called upon NATO to develop mobile deployable forces, new capabilities, and a new strategy for dealing with terrorism and other threats. See "President Bush Thanks Germany for Support Against Terror," May 23, 2002, Office of the Press Secretary, the White House.

³ Articles 4 and 5 are contained in the Washington Treaty that established NATO in the late 1940's. While Article 5 established NATO's collective defense pledge for border Defense, Article 4 provided a framework for common action against lesser threats. See *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 2001).

⁴ For more analysis of NATO's military assets and limitations, see David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1999). Together, the European members of NATO deploy about 2.4 million active troops, 55 divisions, 3,600 combat aircraft, and 300 naval combatants. For more details of European forces and budgets, see *The Military Balance, 2001–2002* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2002).

⁵ For an analysis of the ERRF's composition, missions, and implications, see Kori N. Schake, "Do European Union Defense Initiatives Threaten NATO?," *Strategic Forum* 184 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001). The ERRF is mainly a ground force supported by air and naval units: its total manpower is about 100,000 troops. By contrast, a NATO spearhead response force would be led by air and naval units, with ground forces playing a supplementary role: its manpower would be less than one-half that of the ERRE.

⁶ For an analysis of the new U.S. defense strategy and program, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, 'Sound Vision, Unfinished Business: The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001,' *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Winter/Spring 2002, 26, no. 1, 123–140.

⁷ Many analysts judge that future U.S.—European security operations will be carried out by 'coalitions of the willing' rather than NATO's integrated command. For example, the Gulf War of 1990–1991 was waged by a multinational coalition. The key point about such coalitions is that while they can be 'ad hoc' (i.e. created for a single event), they cannot be improvised. If they are to succeed, their military forces must be well-prepared before the event. Hence, NATO will continue to have the critical role of preparing European forces even if the integrated command is not used often to carry out actual operations.

⁸ For more information on the DCI, see 'Washington Summit Communiqué: An Alliance for the 21st Century' and 'Defense Capabilities Initiative,' NATO press release, 24–25 April 1999.

⁹ See Hans Binnendijk, 'A European Spearhead Force Would Bridge the Gap,' *International Herald Tribune*, 16–17 February 2002.

¹⁰ NATO's 'high readiness forces' include the ARRC, several multinational ground and air formations in Central Europe, select naval strike assets, and other units: essentially a compilation of NATO's reaction forces and high-readiness national defense forces.

¹¹ Poland might be a good candidate for a NATO transformation facility because of its available land-space, convenient location, infrastructure, and willingness to host such a facility. Of course, other countries, including new members, could be considered as well. The key point is that if multinational exercises and experiments in transformation are to succeed, most must be conducted on European soil, not in the United States.

¹² This cost figure is an authors' estimate based on standard U.S. and NATO planning factors regarding likely expenses for new equipment, infrastructure, personnel, training, and exercises. The costs will be low because most of the forces and equipment already exist in European inventories, and the number of forces being prepared for spearhead response missions is small.

The NATO Response Force 2002–2006: Innovation by the Atlantic Alliance (2006)¹

Richard L. Kugler

Introduction

Is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) capable of transforming so that it can be an effective military alliance in the early 21st century? Critics often deride the Atlantic Alliance as incapable of transformational innovations because of its political, military, technological, and budgetary constraints. Yet NATO's often cumbersome track record contains at least one recent departure that, most critics would concede, is an important innovation because it promises to strengthen the Alliance's capacity to perform new missions outside Europe. This departure is the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a wholly new NATO force for expeditionary operations that was proposed in late 2002 and came into being in the relatively short span of four years; it is scheduled to reach full operational capability (FOC) in late 2006.

The NRF is planned to be a small but potent force of about 25,000 distributed among a balanced combination of ground, air, and naval units. It is to be a joint force with the advantages of modern information networks and other assets that enable it to operate with high effectiveness. It is intended to perform a wide spectrum of demanding missions, to be interoperable with technologically sophisticated U.S. forces, and to help stimulate overall defense transformation within NATO. This case study examines the NRF, including the strategic circumstances that gave rise to its birth, the design concept behind it, its evolution during 2002–2006, and its problems and prospects. As the following pages show, the NRF is important not only in its own right, but also because it helps illuminate the conditions under which NATO transformational innovation can occur,

the leadership strategies that can help bring it about, and the process of implementing it.

This case study illustrates that, thus far, the NRF has been a success in the sense that it is now becoming operational and a usable option at NATO's disposal. Yet, as of 2006, it remains a work in progress because it has not yet acquired all of the information-era capabilities needed to fulfill its ambitious vision. Building the NRF to full maturity—the next goal of NATO's agenda for the NRF—likely will take several years and will require equipping it with modern, deployable, information networks as well as other transformational capabilities. As NATO pursues the twin tasks of keeping the NRF at high readiness and transforming it with new capabilities, it will need to meet several challenges that are discussed below. While the NRF has performed satisfactorily in exercises to date, the real test will come when it is employed for demanding missions, including combat and crisis response.

NATO's Slow Military Progress, 1990–2001

The origin of the NRF traces back to the frustrations that NATO endured throughout the 1990's because of the inability of European members to project military power beyond the continent. Unlike the United States, which has had a global perspective since the 1950's, the Europeans spent the Cold War mostly focused on defending their homeland borders against the Warsaw Pact threat. When the Cold War ended in 1990, the Europeans were left with large, well-armed forces—over three million troops—that lacked the strategic mobility and power projection assets to deploy to distant areas, including the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Their inability to respond to crises outside Europe became manifest in 1990–1991, when the United States led a large international coalition to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Only Britain and France were able to commit meaningful forces—a division apiece—to Operation *Desert Storm*. Other European countries contributed only token forces and were left frustrated by their inability to participate in defense of their own interests in distant areas.

Nevertheless, throughout the 1990's the Europeans did little to rectify their military shortcomings. The end of the Cold War allowed most European countries to reduce their defense spending and force postures by about 25 percent. Intent on gaining a peace dividend, few of them invested savings in power-projection assets for new missions outside Europe. NATO civilian and military leaders did their best to reconfigure the alliance's defense strategy and make its force posture more flexible by taking several steps. They streamlined the NATO military command

structure, created two Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters, and organized NATO's forces into four categories: Immediate Reaction Forces, Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces, and Augmentation Forces. NATO's Reaction Forces, led by the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and composed of a sizable pool of 10 divisions, 600 combat aircraft, and 100 naval combatants, provided a large posture for responding to crises. These forces, however, continued to lack the mobility assets; readiness; deployable command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; long-distance logistic support; and other features needed for power-projection and expeditionary missions. Little tangible progress was made toward acquiring usable capabilities in these and other critical areas because member countries did little to alter their military postures, weapons, and C4ISR systems for new missions outside Europe. Britain and France were partial exceptions, but even they labored under budgetary constraints and lack of public interest in defense modernization and innovation. Throughout the 1990's, the Europeans as a whole were capable of swiftly deploying forces only about one-tenth the size of comparable U.S. forces. Moreover, the large transatlantic gap in military capabilities was widening late in the 1990's as the U.S. military began acquiring smart munitions, advanced C4ISR assets, and modern information networks—areas where the Europeans were making little progress.

In political terms, NATO was making progress by expanding its reach into Eastern Europe and undertaking to quell ethnic warfare in the Balkans. The Europeans were able to support the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia that became necessary after the Dayton Accord was signed in late 1995. But the Kosovo War that erupted in early 1999 was another matter. In its military campaign to pressure the Serbian Army to withdraw from Kosovo, NATO relied entirely upon air power. Although Serbia and Kosovo were within range of NATO air bases, U.S. air and naval forces were compelled to fly the preponderance of air strike missions. The Europeans contributed only about 25 percent of air sorties because they lacked capabilities in such critical areas as all-weather and day-night operations, smart munitions, and secure communications. After the war ended, NATO sent ground forces into Kosovo for pacification, and the Europeans contributed importantly to this mission. But their failure to contribute more importantly to the air war was commonly seen as deeply embarrassing to European militaries.

At its Washington Summit of 1999, NATO tried to start rectifying this situation by adopting a new strategic concept and the Defense Ca-

pability Initiative (DCI). The new strategic concept called for NATO to become better prepared for newly emerging strategic missions, including crisis interventions outside Europe. The DCI called for an alliance-wide effort to upgrade European militaries in such critical areas as strategic mobility, long-distance logistic support, information-era C4ISR systems, modern weapons, smart munitions, air defenses, and other relevant areas. Some countries responded to the call for a DCI. Britain, for example, adopted a new defense plan with a focus on expeditionary missions. France reacted similarly. But for the most part, lack of investment funds and political indifference resulted in the Europeans and NATO making little progress during 1999–2001. Even though the DCI was designed to be modest and focused, it was often criticized for being too demanding and sweeping because even its limited demands exceeded the resources and political willpower of most European countries.

The terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001, suddenly created the need for a new strategic mindset. NATO declared an Article 5 emergency and offered to lend military support to the United States. Shortly afterward, the United States invaded Afghanistan. Several European countries offered to help, but they were stunned when the U.S. military refused the offers for the reason that most European militaries lacked the sophisticated capabilities to contribute to the new-era operations of precision strikes U.S. forces were waging. Some European countries contributed modestly in such areas as special forces and airlift support, but for the most part, the war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan was waged by U.S. forces in cooperation with friendly Afghan forces from the Northern Alliance. Once again, the Europeans were left on the sidelines and embarrassed by their lack of capabilities for new-era missions and wars.

The frustrations of Kosovo and Afghanistan made clear that, if NATO was to become relevant to new-era missions, it would need to improve its forces significantly. But what exactly was to be done? A wholesale defense buildup was not feasible, because European countries were not willing to fund the requisite increased military budgets. Overall, their defense budgets averaged only about 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and only about 20–25 percent of defense funds were available for investments. The DCI had been intended to work with existing defense budgets, but it had largely fallen flat because its efforts were scattered in too many different directions with decisive impact in few of them. Something different was needed. The NRF grew out of efforts to address this thorny issue by crafting a highly focused solution that would work because it was both politically feasible and militarily capable.

Birth of the NRF Concept—Prague Summit of 2002

The NRF owes its existence partly to the worried atmosphere that settled over NATO in the aftermath of the successful U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the growing awareness of the need to create a viable defense initiative for the upcoming Prague Summit in November 2002, but also to a specific organizational and political process of innovation advocacy that unfolded from January 2002 to the Prague Summit. The NRF was not an idea that bubbled upward from within the NATO bureaucracy, nor did it originate in Europe. Rather, it originated in the United States, where it was crafted by senior leaders, with the help of outside analysts, and then sold by American leaders to the Europeans.

Originally, U.S. senior officials were not thinking in terms of a concrete force proposal, such as the NRF. Instead they were listening to advice from Brussels that called for replacing the DCI with a smaller version of a generic capability-enhancement effort. This idea took shape as the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) and ultimately was adopted at the Prague Summit. But in January 2002, National Security Council (NSC) advisors to President Bush decided that they also wanted a bolder, more appealing and strategically meaningful initiative to accompany the PCC. They asked Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the National Defense University (NDU) to produce useful ideas. Binnendijk and Kugler wrote a short paper calling for the Prague Summit to focus on defense transformation and create a spearhead joint strike force of about 20,000–25,000 troops that could deploy swiftly to crisis zones and operate closely with U.S. forces.² In their view, this was to be a real-life force with a C4ISR structure and assigned combat units, not merely a disorganized troop list that would be pulled together when the need arose to use it.

Essentially, Binnendijk and Kugler envisioned the type of NATO strike force that could have deployed to Afghanistan and worked closely with U.S. forces there. Labeling it a “Spearhead Response Force,” they called for a force that would be large enough to be militarily meaningful yet small enough to be affordable and politically attractive to NATO’s members. Their proposed force was to include a headquarters staff, a ground brigade, a composite air wing, a naval strike force, and appropriate logistic support and mobility units. Such a force, they argued, would not only make military and strategic sense, but also provide NATO defense planners with a concrete focus and a set of distinct priorities, thereby avoiding the temptation of scattering scarce defense resources in differ-

ent directions and losing their effectiveness. Whereas the DCI had not been focused on any specific component of NATO's military posture, the Spearhead Response Force would compel intense focus on a small posture, thereby enhancing prospects for success.

Binnendijk and Kugler proposed that this force would be kept at high readiness (able to deploy within a week or so) and would have about 30 days of independent staying power, once deployed. They further recommended that it should be configured as a rotating force. That is, during any six-month period, one Spearhead Response Force would be on active duty, a second would be training for future duty, and a third would be standing down from recently completed duty. Basically this is the same practice the U.S. Navy follows in aircraft carrier rotations. Binnendijk and Kugler emphasized that this force should be multinational, with membership open to any NATO member wishing to participate and able to meet proper readiness standards. They called for the force to be mainly European, but for the United States to participate constructively, especially by providing critical enablers in such areas as C4ISR systems and mobility until the Europeans had acquired the necessary assets. They argued that this new force not only would provide NATO with a viable option for crisis response, but also help assure interoperability with U.S. forces while facilitating defense transformation across NATO's entire military posture.

The idea of creating this NATO joint strike force was consistent with emerging trends in U.S. military doctrine as envisioned in the Department of Defense (DOD) *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) of 2001, but it was a revolutionary departure for NATO and the Europeans. Most European countries had not been thinking in terms of either joint operations or expeditionary missions outside Europe. The idea of joint operations meant that the Europeans would need to fuse their ground, air, and naval forces to fight as a single entity, with all components working closely with each other on behalf of common plans. The idea of expeditionary missions meant that European forces must be able not only to deploy swiftly outside Europe, but also to wage war effectively in austere environments and a wide spectrum of unfamiliar conditions.

In the United States, NSC Advisor on European/NATO Affairs Ambassador Dan Fried liked the idea of a Spearhead Response Force and urged Binnendijk and Kugler to take their idea to DOD. At the Pentagon, Binnendijk and Kugler received a warm reception from two critical staffs: the NATO bureau of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA), headed by Ian Brzezinski, and the J-5 of the Joint Staff, headed by Army Major General George Casey. Their

support was garnered by March 2002, as was support from the Office of Force Transformation headed by retired Navy Admiral Art Cebrowski. At this juncture, momentum for the idea slowed when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and some of his top aides wanted it to be investigated thoroughly to ensure its feasibility, affordability, and military effectiveness. Once these issues were resolved, Rumsfeld embraced the idea, and presented it to NATO Defense Ministers in September 2002. With NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson backing the idea, it quickly gained acceptance throughout the alliance. The goal of creating this force, renamed the NATO Response Force, was unveiled at the Prague Summit and treated as a co-equal part of a major defense agenda that also included the PCC and creation of a new Allied Transformation Command. Following several months of study and evaluation, the NRF was officially approved by the NATO Defense Ministers in spring 2003.

What stands out from this historical experience is the successful manner in which the NRF was adopted at a time of mounting political tensions within the Alliance over Middle East policy. Fall 2002 was a period in which the United States and Britain were beginning to quarrel publicly with Germany and France over whether to invade Iraq in the near future. The effect of this growing quarrel was to split the alliance into two hostile factions. Notwithstanding this tense atmosphere, the NRF moved through the NATO consensus-building process and emerged with the support of the entire Alliance. The NRF design concept endorsed at Prague was virtually the same as the concept originally tabled by the U.S. government, and indeed, by Binnendijk and Kugler. Several reasons account for this successful outcome.

A main reason was that the United States strongly supported the NRF and acted skillfully in urging the Europeans to support it. Throughout its history, NATO has best succeeded at military innovation when the United States, the Alliance's strongest power and political leader, has favored the idea. In this case, the Bush Administration embraced the NRF concept because it made political and military sense, was a good vehicle for showcasing U.S. leadership, was affordable and feasible, offered the promise of creating a European force that would be interoperable with U.S. forces, and provided a vehicle to accelerate NATO transformation. During fall 2002, the Bush Administration made clear its support for the NRF and pursued a wide-ranging diplomatic campaign aimed at garnering support in NATO civilian and military headquarters and European capitals. While much of this diplomacy was conducted behind the scenes, it also had an important public component in the form of speeches, briefings, newspaper

articles, and journal articles directed at public opinion in both the United States and Europe.

While the Bush Administration did a good job of packaging and selling the NRF to make it appealing, the Europeans favored the NRF for their own reasons. Multiple countries welcomed the idea of acquiring a high-tech military force that would enhance NATO's relevance and allow it to participate in expeditionary operations outside Europe. Numerous members also welcomed the idea that creation of the NRF would help give them access to the modern doctrines, information networks, weapons and munitions, and organizational structures emanating from U.S. military transformation. Because of its small size, the NRF was affordable and would not upset other high-priority European defense programs. It also provided a vehicle for signaling European political willingness to participate in crisis missions in distant areas without necessarily supporting the United States in Iraq. Also important, the NRF posed no major threat to the European Union's efforts to pursue European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) for Petersburg tasks, such as, peacekeeping.

The bottom line is that the NRF was adopted with fanfare at the Prague Summit because it was a good idea whose time had come, and because both the United States and key European countries strongly supported it. Among the Europeans, not only did Britain and Germany support the idea, but so did France, a traditional naysayer to U.S. leadership. In this case, the NRF squared with France's notions of power projection, expeditionary missions, and transformation. Support from these three big powers provided a framework that permitted smaller countries, including old and new members, to join the enterprise with confidence that it would succeed and serve their interests. Across Europe, support for the NRF was especially strong among professional militaries, and it did not face serious opposition from foreign ministries, finance ministries, or parliaments. Had the United States not sponsored the NRF, it likely would not have been adopted, even if some European countries had favored the idea. Likewise, the NRF would not have been adopted, even though the United States favored it, if a strong coalition of European countries had opposed it. In this case, strong support on both sides of the Atlantic made this innovation a viable idea on which to mobilize widespread consensus.

Fielding the NRF—From IOC to FOC, 2003–2006

NATO defense innovation requires more than mobilizing political support for a new idea. It also requires a sustained effort to implement the

idea. Historically, other attractive ideas have fizzled within NATO because of weak implementation, so successful fielding of the NRF was not guaranteed. The Prague Summit envisioned concrete steps immediately followed by steady progress aimed at fully fielding the NRF over a period of 4–5 years. Although some problems were encountered, this effort proved generally successful. Two reasons account for this success. NATO's civilian leaders, including the new Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, continued to support the NRF despite the raging debates over Iraq during 2003–2006. They grasped NATO's need for enhanced deployable forces for multiple future missions, and many political leaders came to view progress on the NRF as a way to keep NATO together despite the debates over Iraq. Equally important, the NRF enjoyed strong support from Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), U.S. General James Jones, USMC, and his subordinate officers in NATO's new Allied Command Operations (ACO). In his long career in the U.S. Marines, General Jones had developed a keen appreciation for the importance of joint operations and expeditionary missions. He made successful implementation of the NRF a key priority of his tenure, and his strong leadership efforts played a major role in the events that unfolded. NATO's new Allied Command Transformation (ACT), led by U.S. Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, USN, showed interest in helping the NRF adopt transformation concepts. The combination of the two NATO commands working together on the NRF facilitated its progress, which proved faster than most observers originally predicted.

Even so, a great deal of hard work was required by NATO. The relatively small size of the NRF made the enterprise easier to launch than a bigger force would have been. Still, at any single time, three NRFs were required: one in training, one on duty, and one standing down. This necessitated full-time commitment of 60,000–75,000 troops, plus creation of an entirely new NRF every six months, a continuously challenging task. Adding to the challenge was the multinational nature of the NRF, which required mixing multinational units at lower command echelons than previously had been the case. This required a careful blending of forces from numerous countries to ensure their interoperability. Equipping the NRF also was demanding. Participating European forces typically possessed adequately modern weapon systems and munitions, but the NRF required specialized capabilities in multiple areas, including modern C4ISR networks. Acquisition of these capabilities moved slowly in several areas, and had not yet been fully accomplished as of August 2006.

Beyond this, NRF units require a high degree of readiness. When on duty, they are expected to be deployable after only five days of preparation.

By comparison, other active duty forces often are granted a full month to prepare to deploy. This means that a full training regimen must be accomplished before an NRF begins its six-month duty cycle, not during the cycle. ACO and ACT devoted considerable time to guiding the certification of readiness for each NRF through careful planning, training, and exercises. Indeed, they steadily increased the standards for certification as each new rotational NRF began its training cycle. This intensive activity took place mostly behind the scenes, and in this critical arena, NATO's military commands performed well at accomplishing these demanding tasks, thus making the NRF a viable entity in a relatively short time.

Progress on the NRF began to emerge in mid-June 2003, when the NATO Defense Ministers formally approved its speedy creation. In July, NATO's military leaders held a force-generation conference for the NRF and called for an initial NRF to be fielded during fall 2003. In mid-October, NATO officially launched the NRF, created an NRF headquarters in Italy, and placed it under the command of the NATO Joint Force Command in Brunssum, Netherlands. They also designated the first two rotational forces (NRF 1 and 2) to be prototype units that would test and develop concepts and practices for the NRF.³

Table 3-1 shows the composition of NRF 1, which included personnel from 15 nations. Of the 9,500 personnel, about 8,500 were airmen and sailors, and only 1,000 were ground troops. Its land component included a French paratroop battalion, a Greek airmobile company, and a Belgian commando company—enough troops for only about one-half a brigade. Lack of ground forces was a problem that continued affecting follow-on NRFs during 2003–2006.

NATO military leaders emphasized that the NRF could be used not only for major combat missions, but also for non-combat evacuation, humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, and crisis response, including counter-terrorism and embargoes. They further said that the NRF's IOC was targeted for fall 2004, and FOC was expected in fall 2006.

Upon launching of the NRF in October 2003, General Jones said:

Today marks one of the most important changes in the North Atlantic Alliance since the signing of the Washington Treaty over 50 years ago.... For the first time in its history, the Alliance will have a joint multinational force of air, land, sea, and special forces under a single commander and maintained as a standing rotation force.⁴

In that same month, another important event occurred: NATO's Defense Ministers and military leaders met in Colorado Springs, Colorado,

to hold *Dynamic Response '07*, a crisis management study seminar for examining how NATO could handle future challenges. The seminar pointed to such new threats as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the need for flexible and rapid NATO decision procedures. It also highlighted the important role that the NRF could play in providing usable military capabilities. In late November, NATO held its first NRF exercise at Doganbrey, Turkey. Conducting this exercise was NRF 1, which included the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey, the Spanish maritime high readiness forces, Allied Air Forces North Europe, and forces from 11 countries, including Britain, Germany, and France. The exercise was a success, but NATO officials acknowledged that it also unveiled critical shortages in such areas as strategic airlift, deployable communications, logistics support, and life-support systems.

Table 3–1. Force Contributions—NRF 1

Country	Troops	Main Assets/Capabilities
Spain	2,200	Ships, aircraft, helicopters
France	1,700	Army battalion, ships, aircraft
Britain	1,200	Ships, aircraft
Germany	1,200	Ships, aircraft
Turkey	600	Ships, aircraft
Italy	600	Military police, ships, aircraft
Greece	300	Army company, two ships
United States	300	Ship, aircraft
Belgium	250	Commando company, ship, aircraft
Netherlands	200	Ship
Norway	150	Ships, aircraft
Denmark	100	Ships, helicopters
Czech Republic	80	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) equipment
Poland	20	Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit
NATO	700	AWACS and Headquarters personnel
Total	9,500	

In January 2004, NATO senior commanders took part in *Allied Reach '04*, a special seminar designed to test the concepts behind the NRF. In May, Exercise Allied Action tested the activation of a Deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters for handling NRF operations in distant areas. In late June, operational responsibility for the NRF passed from Joint Force Com-

mand (JFC) Brunssum to JFC Naples, thus starting a process of rotating the NRF among NATO's three principal joint commands. In early October, the NRF participated in Exercise *Destined Glory '04*, a live-fire training and maritime exercise off Sardinia. In mid-October, Secretary General Scheffer and General Jones announced that the NRF had reached IOC, with a force of 17,000 troops. They emphasized that the NRF could be used for multiple missions, such as collective defense, consequence management, and initial entry into crisis zones. During 2004, elements of the NRF were deployed to help protect the Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, and to help support the Afghanistan presidential elections. For these reasons, the NRF's first year was judged successful by most observers. Similar to NRF 1, NRF 2 included forces from a variety of members, thereby signaling the growing popularity of the NRF among European militaries.

The year 2005 witnessed an intensified exercise program for NRFs 3 and 4, coupled with use of the NRF for disaster relief operations. In early February, NATO military commanders met in Exercise *Allied Reach '05* to conduct a seminar workshop on NRF plans, operations, and capabilities. In March, Exercise *Noble Javelin* resulted in the NRF deploying 3,000 troops to the Canary Islands to test long-distance force deployment and amphibious operations. In April, Exercise *Loyal Mariner '05* was held in the North Sea to test NRF maritime capabilities. Nineteen countries committed 85 ships and 30 aircraft to the exercise. During May, the NRF conducted naval exercises off Crete. In late June, command of the NRF was transferred from JFC Naples to Joint Command Lisbon. In September, the NRF helped provide disaster relief by airlifting supplies in response to Hurricane Katrina. In early October, Exercise *Destined Glory '05 (Loyal Midas)* was conducted in the Tyrrhenian Sea to test complex NRF sea operations. The forces from 10 countries included 8,500 personnel, 37 ships, and 57 aircraft. From late October 2005 to February 2006, the NRF headquarters was employed to guide NATO relief efforts in response to the earthquake in Pakistan. It commanded a diverse force of cargo aircraft, helicopters, engineers, supply troops, medical personnel, and other assets that were specially tailored for the relief effort.

In February 2006, NATO Defense Ministers met to discuss the steps needed for the NRF to achieve FOC by year-end. From March 24–April 6, Exercise *Brilliant Mariner* was held to test the readiness of the NRF naval component: 80 ships from 18 nations participated. During May 1–10, Exercise *Steadfast Jackpot*, a computer-assisted test of NATO's ability to command the NRF, was conducted. It was quickly followed in June by Exercise *Steadfast Jaguar*. *Steadfast Jaguar*, held in the Cape Verde Is-

lands, was especially important, because it was intended to evaluate NRF capability to become fully operational. It was the first exercise to employ simultaneously all three NRF components—ground, naval, and air. Over 7,000 troops carried out a variety of simulated operations: disaster relief, amphibious landing, precision fighter jet bombing, special forces assaults, and naval bombardment. Afterward, a NATO spokesman said that during this exercise, “the NRF passed its last test before it is due to become fully operational in October.” Celebrating the achievement, Secretary General Scheffer said:

You see here the new NATO, a NATO which has the possibility to be expeditionary, to project stability. The NRF is the most important tool to show in which way and how NATO has transformed and is transforming.⁵

Toward a Fully Mature NRF—Acquiring Transformational Capabilities

During 2003–2006, NATO focused on moving NRFs 1–6 from IOC to FOC. Future NRFs are intended to be granted FOC status and to be available for full-scale use in missions. Future NRF units will fully meet operational goals, however, only if manpower quotas are adequately met. As of spring 2006, SACEUR General Jones was publicly expressing concern that not enough troops, especially ground troops, were being assigned to meet NRF requirements. Assuming that manpower requirements are met, NATO documents state that when the NRF reaches its full size of 25,000 troops, it will be composed of the following main combat forces:

- ▶ A reinforced brigade combat team (2,500–3,000 troops) that will include three light infantry battalions (motorized or air mobile), plus one or more light armored battalions along with artillery, special operations, engineer, NBC defense, and logistic support elements.
- ▶ A rapidly deployable composite air group of about 40 combat aircraft, support aircraft, and helicopters capable of flying 200 sorties per day.
- ▶ A naval task force composed of a carrier battle group, an amphibious task group, and a surface action group, totaling 10–12 ships or more.
- ▶ This force composition, NATO authorities point out, is a general model for future NRFs, not a rigid blueprint. The NRF, they say, is to be a flexible creation that can be adjusted to meet chang-

ing circumstances. As a result, its size can be adjusted upward or downward, and its composition can change, too.

- ▶ NATO documents further state that the NRF is driven by the principle of “first force in, first force out,” and that it can be used whole or in part in the following ways:
- ▶ Deploy as a stand-alone force for Article 5 missions (collective defense) or non-Article 5 missions.
- ▶ Deploy as an initial entry force facilitating arrival of larger follow-up forces.
- ▶ Deploy as a demonstration force to show NATO’s determination and solidarity in a crisis.

Although achieving FOC status is an important benchmark for attaining NATO’s first goal of creating an expeditionary strike force, it merely means that the NRF is operational and ready to perform missions, if called upon. It does not mean that the NRF has completed the task of acquiring all of its requisite capabilities and solved all other problems facing it. Considerable effort will be required to ensure that a fully mature NRF eventually emerges. In the future, NATO will need to address its second goal: turning the NRF into a transformed force with the associated information networks and other information-age capabilities. Achieving this goal promises to be time consuming, because improvements likely will come gradually as NATO and the Europeans slowly acquire these assets.

An especially important task will be ensuring that the NRF is equipped with the information networks needed to make it a properly transformed force. Modern information networks include the following: networks for basic command, control, and communications, for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), for force operations, and for logistic support. When these networks exist and are integrated, they provide shared situational awareness, a common operational picture, and other benefits that allow forces at all echelons to operate with far greater effectiveness and efficiency than before, and to pursue modern doctrines as well as effects-based operations. Deployable networks are especially important to expeditionary forces, which must operate at long distances from the established information infrastructure of their home countries. The NRF will need sophisticated, deployable information networks to:

- ▶ achieve interoperability with U.S. forces based on a “plug and play” philosophy;
- ▶ facilitate its capability to operate as a joint, multinational force and to work closely with other NATO forces;

- ▶ magnify its own combat power, thereby using high quality to substitute for its relatively small size; and
- ▶ carry out modern doctrines and operational concepts that blend precision strikes and speedy maneuvers to defeat enemy forces.

U.S. military transformation is substantially animated by the principle of network-centric warfare (NCW), which holds that networks, not weapons platforms or munitions, are the centerpiece of modern force operations. By contrast, NATO force planning embraces the principle of network-enabled capability (NEC), which holds that networks, while important, are enablers of weapons and munitions, not the centerpiece of force structures and operations. NEC also implies a set of multiple, separate networks that are linked together, rather than a single, overarching design philosophy, such as the U.S. Global Information Grid (GIG). Currently, NATO and European militaries are several years behind the U.S. military in creating modern information networks and using them. Yet, the past few years have seen encouraging progress in several areas. Britain and France, in particular, have been building networks for modern force operations, including such communications systems as SOCRATE and Skynet, plus growing access to satellites for military purposes. Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy are also active in this arena, as is Sweden, which is not a member of NATO but could participate in future missions. Other countries vary, and a few seem unenthused about networking or unable to generate the investment funds needed to acquire networks.⁶

NATO has been pursuing force networking and has been making progress slowly in recent years. NATO has developed a substantial command, control, and communications capability for military operations for use by senior military and political authorities. NATO hardware and software encompasses the entire NATO territory and can connect forces from all components to senior decision makers through voice, data, messaging, and video teleconferences. NATO employs wireless networks, land lines, optical fiber, and digital radios, and relies upon the Internet as well as commercial satellites. NATO's goal is to create a C4ISR architecture into which member nations can plug their own command, control, and communications (C3) networks. The current system is criticized for being stove-piped and not facilitating horizontal communications between forces and governments. Even so, it entails such assets as the Automated Command and Control Information System (ACCIS), the NATO General Purpose Communications System (NGCS), a SATCOM system to provide global, broad-band transmissions, and CRONOS, a secure information

transmission system. NATO is also pursuing several improvement programs in this arena, including upgraded SATCOM, an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, and CAESAR, a development program aimed at linking together national ISR systems from a variety of platforms.

The AGS system is an example of NATO development activities in applied networking and associated force development. The AGS is intended to provide an “eye in the sky,” thereby enabling NATO forces to gather real-time intelligence of events on the ground. It is to be composed of manned Airbus aircraft, Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), a TCAR radar, and ground control stations. It is viewed as potentially a critical enabler for the NRF. The AGS system is to be produced by a transatlantic industrial consortium; NATO signed a study contract with this consortium in 2005. The AGS system is scheduled to reach IOC in 2010 and FOC a few years later. The NRF will not benefit from it for several years, but when it arrives, it will strengthen NRF combat capabilities significantly.

A principle NATO weakness has been lack of mobile, deployable C4ISR systems and information networks. Obviously this deficiency is an impediment to the NRF. NATO plans on employing Deployable Combined Joint Task Force (DCJTF) Headquarters for command and control of the NRF when it is performing an expeditionary mission outside Europe. Equipping these headquarters with a full C4ISR architecture and information networks will help significantly by providing a plug-and-play capacity for multinational forces assigned to the NRF. Yet, the forces themselves also must have appropriate C4ISR systems and networks that can be plugged into the DCJTF Headquarters. Thus, deploying British and French forces as part of the NRF might pose no C4ISR and networking problems, but deploying forces from less-endowed countries could raise difficulties. Providing NRF units with such practical assets as Blue Force Tracker, Predator UAVs, and better tactical radios could make an important contribution. NATO and European countries expect to make progress in this arena, but several years may pass before the NRF becomes fully networked.⁷

A similar judgment applies to NRF capacity to employ other critical, new-era capabilities for expeditionary warfare. Many European militaries possess adequately modern weapon systems, for example, fighter aircraft, but they often lack combat enablers in several areas. This includes precision strike systems, such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), tactical standoff missiles, and stealth fighters; close combat systems, such as light tanks and other light armored vehicles; force protection, such as NBC equipment and body armor, as well as theater missile defense; tacti-

cal mobility; and logistic sustainability, such as deployable trucks and utility helicopters; and strategic mobility, including long-range air transports, aerial refueling tankers, and amphibious assault ships. Many of these assets are present in ample quantities within the U.S. military, but less so for most European militaries. Acquiring these assets is proving slow, because European investment budgets are small and other priorities consume many funds; whereas the United States spends about \$150 billion annually for research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E), and procurement, the Europeans spend only about \$30 billion.

The implication is that the NRF quest for full force maturity is likely to take several years. Evidently, many NATO and European officials envision a phased NRF transformation program for acquiring these capabilities. The initial phase, covering the period 2006–2012, will focus on creating improved interoperability and will continue relying heavily upon the United States for such enablers as JSTARS, UAVs, ELINT aircraft, satellite reconnaissance, broad-band communications, and stealth aircraft. The long term, from 2013–2020, will focus on enhancing NRF joint force capabilities and attaining European self-sufficiency in a number of areas. If this timeline proves accurate, it suggests that the NRF will be undergoing a lengthy evolution that could take another 15 years or so. While surface appearances suggest that this is a long time, the U.S. military's transformation program has a similarly long timeline to build information networks and acquire such new weapons as the F-35 fighter, as well as destroyers, cruisers, and aircraft carriers.

The pace at which the NRF acquires new systems and capabilities will partly depend upon European and NATO acquisition programs. But it also will depend upon the willingness of the United States to release new military technologies to the Europeans. In theory, technology transfer can help serve U.S. national interests by fostering capable allied militaries. Yet, the process of gaining legal authorization to export sensitive military technologies is complex and laden with formidable barriers. In the past, even America's closest allies have had difficulty gaining access to sensitive U.S. defense technologies. If anything, U.S. export control laws and procedures have tightened in recent years. To an important degree, the NRF's future will depend upon U.S. willingness to expedite the technology transfer process for the Europeans.

Meeting Other Challenges

In addition to endowing the NRF with deployable information networks and other technologies that will create a fully transformed force,

NATO will need to address other challenges as it presides over the NRF's further maturation. One challenge is that of ensuring adequate funding for the NRF. For the most part, the NRF is not funded through common NATO accounts. Instead it is funded nationally by the countries that participate in each rotational NRF, with each country having to commit money in proportion to the forces provided. The effect has been to place a high financial burden on countries making major contributions, to free non-participants from any financial requirements, and to make it hard for countries with small defense budgets to participate. It also exposes the NRF to funding shortfalls, including when crisis response options must be launched. Common funding of a greater portion of the NRF, including a flexible contingency budget, would help alleviate these problems, while ensuring that each NRF has sufficient funds to accomplish its goals and missions. This issue is now being examined by senior NATO officials. The reality is that NATO members will need to consistently ensure that their defense budgets fully fund all NRF requirements, including the purchase of new equipment. Unless this is the case, NRF funds will continue to be at risk for being victimized by low European defense budgets and other priorities, including EU military departures.

A second challenge will be ensuring that NRF units consistently meet their demanding training and readiness requirements. The NRF is intended to operate much like a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), as a joint force that integrates air, ground, and naval components to provide expeditionary strike capabilities. And like an MEB, the NRF will need advanced training and exercises to attain its full capability. As suggested by Exercise *Steadfast Jaguar*, future NRF exercises likely will focus increasingly on joint operations rather than operations by individual components, such as naval forces. Such exercises will be critical to NRF future maturation, because they will have a major bearing on whether NRF units can operate jointly, as well as carry out new doctrines and operational concepts that emerge from the transformation process. Indeed, NRF joint exercises likely will become a test-bed for NATO's testing and experimenting with new doctrines and concepts to see whether they can be applied elsewhere to NATO and European force postures. Robust training and exercise programs will have a major impact on whether the NRF emerges as a highly effective force and retains that status in future years.

A third challenge is that of determining a proper role for U.S. forces in the NRF. The original theory was that the NRF would be a primarily European force, and that U.S. contributions would be limited to such enabling support assets as airlift, JSTARS, Global Hawk, satellite surveillance,

broad-band satellite communications, and theater missile defense. This U.S. stance helped place pressure on the Europeans to take main responsibility for fielding the NRF's combat forces during 2003–2006. But to some Europeans, it suggested a lack of firm U.S. commitment to building and using the NRF, and a lessening of incentives for the United States to do so. Recently, the United States has been considering options for committing significant combat units to the NRF, and it likely will do so in future years. Beyond this, there is an imperative need for independent U.S. forces (those not assigned to the NRF) to train and exercise with the NRF to help encourage interoperability for expeditionary missions in which both American and NRF units will be participating. The U.S. military presence in Europe can be used for this purpose.

A fourth challenge is that of determining what missions the NRF is to become capable of performing. An early design concept was to focus the NRF on high-tech, expeditionary, combat missions of the sort performed in the early stages of the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO spokespersons continue to endorse these missions and capabilities for the NRF, but they also speak of using it for a wide variety of other missions, including disaster relief, humanitarian interventions, and peacekeeping. Such non-combat missions are important and would ensure that the NRF is used regularly, thereby reducing its vulnerability to a “use or lose” philosophy. Yet, no single, small military force can be an asset for all seasons, that is, capable of performing nearly every mission imaginable. If such a force tries to be trained and ready for the entire spectrum of possible missions, it will run the risk of losing its prowess for its main purpose—in this case, being prepared for demanding combat missions. If the events of 2003–2006 are an indicator, NATO will face a continuing challenge of striking a proper balance between these two imperatives while ensuring that the NRF is always fully capable of major combat operations. Configuring other NATO forces for expeditionary missions, such as High Readiness Forces (HRF) and stabilization and reconstruction forces, is a viable way to ensure that the NRF does not lose its focus on its main purpose. Over the long term, NATO might want to create a second NRF, thus providing a capacity for two contingencies or greater staying power for a single contingency, if the necessary resources are available.

A fifth challenge is political: ensuring that NATO's decision procedures are sufficiently flexible and responsive so that the NRF actually can be used when appropriate circumstances arise. Achieving widespread North Atlantic Council (NAC) consensus to employ the NRF for Article 5 missions, for example, defense of NATO's borders, is unlikely to be dif-

ficult, but a different situation could emerge when the need arises to use the NRF outside NATO borders for non-Article 5 missions. The risk is that NATO's traditional practice of striving for unanimous decisions could result in a few countries paralyzing NATO's ability to employ the NRF. The solution to this problem is for NATO to forge a strong consensus on situations in which the NRF could be employed and to build greater flexibility and speed into its decision procedures so that action cannot readily be blocked by small minorities or delayed by cumbersome procedures.

A sixth challenge is ensuring that the NRF has access to the strategic lift assets needed to deploy it swiftly over long distances. Although the United States has sizable strategic lift forces, European countries mostly have not sought to acquire the lift assets needed to move sizable forces abroad, and NATO is not officially assigned any strategic mobility forces. Fortunately, the NRF is a relatively small and light force that does not require large lift assets. Its ships and aircraft can move on their own, and its ground combat brigade is composed mainly of light-weight units. Even so, deploying the NRF could necessitate the moving of about 50,000 tons or more of equipment and supplies. This amount could require commitment of, for example, 3–6 Ro/Ro cargo ships, plus 100 or more sorties of heavy air cargo transports. Although the United States in theory could provide the requisite lift, the NRF will not be a truly independent force until NATO and the Europeans can provide it. A few years ago, NATO signed a multinational agreement with several members that provides it access to commercial ships in a crisis. Likewise, NATO has signed a multinational agreement with Russia and Ukraine to gain access to several AN 124-100 air cargo transports. Thus far, NATO's long-term solution has been acquisition of the A-400M transport by European countries, but it will not begin arriving until 2010–2012, and it is a tactical, not strategic, transport. Indications that Britain and some other European countries might buy a few C-17's in the coming years provide hope for a partial solution. Regardless, the United States likely will need to continue providing airlift support to the NRF for some time.

Conclusion

The first four years of the NRF experience, highlighted by a series of exercises that demonstrated NATO's seriousness, have produced a force that is now operational but lacks important transformational capabilities for expeditionary operations and networked warfare. In this sense, the NRF glass is only one-half full. Yet the NRF is a real-life force that already has important assets that can be called upon for use in crisis response or

other missions. If today's NRF had been available in 2001–2002, it perhaps could have been deployed along with U.S. forces to Afghanistan and made a valuable contribution there. This capacity to participate with U.S. forces in expeditionary missions would be useful to NATO in the event a similar crisis occurs.

The NRF is a product of a successful NATO innovation that began in 2002, accelerated during 2003–2006, and continues today. Future success will depend upon how much effort NATO, the Europeans, and the United States invest in bringing this force to full capability and life.

Notes

¹ Source: Richard L. Kugler, "The NATO Response Force 2002–2006: Innovation by the Atlantic Alliance," *Case Studies in Defense Transformation* 1 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2006), available at < <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Case%20Studies/Case%201%20NATO%20Response%20Force.pdf>>.

² For details, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, "Transforming NATO's Forces," *Survival* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, fall 2002).

³ For more details of NATO's actions in fielding the NRF, see the official NATO website, <<http://www.nato.int>> including the "NATO Updates" section, which provides monthly and daily commentary on NATO activities.

⁴ Speech delivered October 15, 2003, at AFNORTH HQ, Brunssum, Netherlands, upon presentation of the NRF colors to General Sir Jack Deverell, Commander in Chief AFNORTH.

⁵ Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Media Day of NRF Exercise *Steadfast Jaguar 2006*, Cape Verde, June 22, 2006. Available online at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060623b.htm>>.

⁶ For an appraisal of the U.S. military approach to NCW, see Office of Force Transformation, *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January, 2005). For additional analysis of NATO and European developments in this arena, see Gordon Adams, et. al., *Defense and Technology Paper 5, Bridging the Gap: European CAISR Capabilities and Transatlantic Interoperability* (Washington DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, November, 2004).

⁷ For additional analysis, see Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl, *Defense and Technology Paper 18, The NATO Response Forces: Facilitating Coalition Warfare through Technology Transfer and Information Sharing* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, September, 2005).

Creating a NATO Special Operations Force (2006)¹

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith

Overview

In the post-9/11 security environment, special operations forces (SOF) have proven indispensable. SOF units are light, lethal, mobile, and easily networked with other forces. While the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have extensive SOF capabilities, these forces are not formally organized to collaborate with one another. There would be much to gain if U.S. and allied SOF trained to work together: national SOF assets would be improved, obstacles to effective combined operations would be removed, and a coherent Alliance capability would be readily available for NATO.

The Alliance can focus and grow its SOF capabilities by providing a selective and small combined “inner core” of NATO special operations forces for operations, while using an outer network to expand and improve SOF cooperation with interested allies.

Special operations forces (SOF) have proven invaluable over past decades and have become indispensable in the post-9/11 security environment. They can be used to prevent terrorist attacks, rescue hostages, train foreign forces for unconventional operations, seize critical facilities, scout in hostile territory and forbidding terrain, and pave the way for intervention by regular forces. Such versatility is possible because SOF combine physical fighting prowess with technological dexterity. They can use lasers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and global positioning system devices to spot enemy targets and then transmit the data to precision-strike air forces. SOF units are light, lethal, small, mobile, and easily networked with other forces. In addition, SOF are uncommonly enterprising and adaptable—important qualities in these fluid and unpredictable times.

While SOF operate in small units, there are proven advantages to organizing them to function across structural boundaries. In 1987, the United States created a joint U.S. Special Operations Command (US-SOCOM), made up of SOF from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with a unified headquarters and separate program budget to fund equipment and training requirements. This step has given the United States an exceptionally cost-effective instrument of military action and national strategy. Although the USSOCOM annual budget (\$6.5 billion) is only 1.5 percent of the U.S. defense budget, SOF are used in nearly every combat operation and are spearheading the fight against a transnational Salafist-terrorist insurgency—namely al Qaeda—around the globe in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, Africa, and elsewhere.

While the nature of SOF is such that their missions evolve with the environment, table 4-1 describes those missions for which U.S. SOF now organize, train, and equip. The recent Department of Defense *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) Report reveals a growing recognition in U.S. defense circles of the heightened importance of SOF for combating the global jihad and other irregular threats.

Most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies of the United States appreciate the value of SOF capabilities for such missions and possess them in one form or another and under one name or another.² Table 4-2 summarizes these forces.

In addition, some allies have high-performance commando and elite paramilitary forces that are not assigned to their defense ministries. Within Spain's *Guardia Civil*, for example, are some of the world's finest counterterrorism forces (reflecting Spain's long struggle with Basque separatists, who use terror tactics). While most allies have small forces to perform missions for which the United States has SOF, several larger allies, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Poland, have SOF-type forces in significant numbers capable of a wide range of missions. Quantitatively, the combined SOF-type capabilities of NATO allies are roughly half those of U.S. SOF. This represents significant capacity for global efforts, provided the forces can be organized to work and fight together against common threats such as al Qaeda.

However, the SOF of NATO members, including the United States, are not organized to collaborate for the purpose of improving capabilities, increasing preparedness, or operating jointly. NATO has on occasion requested U.S. and allied national SOF for specific Alliance contingencies, such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo. Moreover, some useful but minor U.S.-allied bilateral SOF cooperation in Europe is currently sponsored by

the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). But, other than allied SOF embedded in the NATO Response Force (NRF), NATO has no SOF capability, nor has the Alliance made it a top priority to expand, improve, and fit together member SOF capabilities.

Thus, what NATO does best—enhancing and melding multilateral capabilities for combined action—it has not done with regard to SOF. These scarce, high-value forces are increasingly essential to the shared security interests of members on both sides of the Atlantic, and SOF of all allied countries could benefit from working together. NATO can improve in this area and should.

Much could be gained through sharing of know-how and best practices, and interoperability could be forged through SOF exchanges, training, and exercises under NATO. National SOF could be improved, and obstacles to effective combined special operations could be removed. Beyond this, a strong case can be made for creating a NATO SOF force. If history since the end of the Cold War is a guide, most future contingencies in which NATO may elect to act with force *as an alliance* will require SOF. This argues for making U.S. and allied SOF assets readily available, not as disparate and disjointed ad hoc national contributions, but as a coherent, combined force. Because many allies have SOF, because SOF can be effective in small numbers, and because U.S. SOF have a tradition of working well with friends, creating a NATO SOF capability is a practical and affordable option.

In sum, the United States and its allies have an opportunity to enhance and use SOF collaboratively to the benefit of each and all. While NATO members are not the only countries with real or potential capabilities of this sort, the Alliance is the best mechanism to organize SOF cooperation and mount combined special operations. A way could be found for “partners” and other countries to join.

The goals of expanding, improving, and employing combined SOF capabilities in NATO are, however, up against a serious constraint. For the United States and others, these forces are treated as scarce (in Pentagon jargon, *low-density*), high-value, national assets with sensitive methods and means, unique abilities, and critical missions. This raises concerns about any initiative that could place SOF under other than strictly national control, reduce SOF availability for unilateral use, and share SOF know-how with any but the closest allies—concerns that a design for NATO SOF must address.

Against this background, the pages that follow aim to answer several questions:

- ▮ Why is this the moment to consider a SOF capability for NATO?
- ▮ What can be gained by creating NATO SOF?
- ▮ Given the aims and constraints, what form should NATO SOF take?
- ▮ What steps should the United States, allies, and NATO take to make it happen?

Why Now? The Fight against Terrorists

The urgency of the idea of NATO SOF lies in the particular relevance of SOF in the fight against transnational terrorism and the benefits of conducting this fight multilaterally, a declared goal of the United States and its allies. Generally speaking, SOF are more useful than regular military forces for finding and eliminating terrorists. They were successful against al Qaeda in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11 and continue to play an important role in Iraq, the Philippines, and other areas.

The terrorist threat from Salafist extremism has mutated since the collapse of the Taliban, becoming less centralized, hierarchical, coherent, and concentrated. While al Qaeda has been partly decapitated, disorganized, and scattered, its new form—unstructured, flattened, distributed, and ever-changing—is harder to locate, isolate, and destroy. The operational challenge associated with defeating terrorists is, as the Department of Defense (DOD) sees it, to find, track, and engage them, whether in remote and rugged terrain or in crowded cities.³ This is often best done by sophisticated nonmilitary means such as intelligence collection and operations, proactive investigation, and high-performance police-commando units. But there are cases and places in which the capabilities, concentrations, and methods of terrorists exceed the firepower and reach of nonmilitary services. In these situations, SOF provide a unique set of counterterrorism capabilities. Indeed, because terrorists are unlikely to congregate as they did under the Taliban in Afghanistan, conventional forces may not be as effective against them, making SOF the most important military counterterrorism capability. Counterterrorism is, in fact, now the number one SOCOM mission.⁴

Why are SOF so valuable for this task? Given the changing threat and operational problems it poses, counterterrorism action demands a particular package of qualities: readiness, deployment range and speed, inconspicuousness, stealth, daring, sensor-shooter integration, sure but discriminating lethality, initiative, ingenuity, opportunism, cognitive speed, comfort with local forces, flexibility (*antidoctinaire*), and adapt-

ability. Among military forces, SOF match up especially well with these demands.

The United States is not alone in regarding the al Qaeda threat as serious enough to justify special capabilities and operations beyond ordinary law enforcement. While our European allies have tended to stress police over military forces, the magnitude of the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London bombings, compounded by smoldering extremism in segments of Europe's Islamic population, has made allies aware that both police and military forces may be needed. Moreover, Europeans are acutely aware of the potential for North Africa to become a platform for terrorism. Under these circumstances, it should not be difficult to reach a consensus in NATO on the importance of having more specialized military capabilities for counterterrorist action.

Although counterterrorism is the most compelling reason for a SOF capability in NATO, such a capability would serve the Alliance in many other ways as it increasingly faces irregular, elusive, nonstate threats, as well as some state threats. The list of current U.S. SOF missions highlighted in table 4-1 suggests the broad and enduring value these forces could add to the Alliance in an uncertain future.

Table 4-1. U.S. Special Operations Forces Missions	
Counterterrorism	Disrupt, defeat, and destroy terrorists and their infrastructure
Direct Action	Raid, ambush, or assault critical targets in hostile or denied territory
Special Reconnaissance	Complement national and theater intelligence by obtaining specific and time-sensitive "ground truth"
Unconventional Warfare	With local forces, respond to guerrilla warfare, insurgency, subversion and sabotage
Foreign Internal Defense	Train, advise, and assist host-nation military, paramilitary, and civil forces to help protect free and fragile societies
Civil Affairs	Coordinate U.S. military activities with foreign officials, U.S. civilian agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations
Psychological Operations	Influence foreign views and behavior
Humanitarian Assistance	Deliver critical relief where and when others cannot
Search and Rescue	Extract personnel from enemy territory or denied areas when conventional combat search and rescue capabilities are insufficient
Information Operations	Interfere with adversary information and information systems while protecting U.S. systems
Collateral Mission Areas	Perform operations that include security assistance, counter-drug operations, and peacekeeping

What Is To Be Gained?

The United States and its allies can gain in three ways from creating a SOF capability in NATO: by enhancing allied (specifically, non-U.S.) SOF capabilities available for use against common threats; by expanding and regularizing the access of U.S. SOF to valuable and complementary experiences, techniques, and perspectives of allied SOF; and by creating the option of decisive NATO action using SOF. The following examples provide specifics.

Improved Allied Capabilities

It is certainly in the interest of the United States to increase the availability and quality of allied SOF for counterterrorism missions. While some allied SOF may compare well with U.S. SOF in specific skills and tasks, the following *core* U.S. capabilities may be viewed together as a “gold standard,” especially when it comes to finding, tracking, and eliminating terrorists:

- ▮ surveillance in dangerous and inaccessible areas
- ▮ urgent insertion and assault (by land, sea, or air)
- ▮ high but highly discriminating lethality
- ▮ rapid world-wide deployment and employment
- ▮ improvisation during operations
- ▮ self-sufficiency
- ▮ all-terrain capability (from mountainous to tropical to arctic to urban)
- ▮ information networked.

NATO SOF could both enlarge and improve allied SOF capabilities against this standard, thus increasing overall military capacity to fight al Qaeda, as well as to meet other national security goals. Because some allies already have significant numbers of SOF, the main benefit would come from orienting them more (but not exclusively) toward counterterrorism and upgrading their capabilities for that mission. Given global demands on U.S. SOF, enhancing allied capacity would be helpful, whether or not U.S. and allied SOF combine for operations.

Improved U.S. Capabilities

Though excellent, U.S. SOF are not superior in every mission or skill-set. They would be the first to admit how impressed they are when exposed to their allied counterparts, from British tropical commandos to Norwegian arctic rangers to French undersea divers. Collaboration

with NATO forces would better enable U.S. SOF to examine alternative approaches, innovations, and niche capabilities. It also might permit specialization, in that U.S. SOF would know where certain allied capabilities exist that they need not duplicate. In particular, allied SOF can expand the available linguistic skills inventory.

NATO SOF also would enhance the ability of U.S. SOF to operate in cultural settings known better to allies. Deep cultural awareness and access can be essential for SOF effectiveness in operations and in developing indigenous antiterror forces. This would apply anywhere in Europe, but also in parts of Africa and the Middle East, thus covering the three regions of main concern to NATO. Because Europe, Africa, and the Middle East are principal theaters of Islamist terrorist activity, U.S. SOF must make every effort to operate effectively in these regions.

An Alliance Capability

One of the tenets of NATO is that shared security interests endangered by common threats are best defended with effective unified action. A multinational response can bring more capabilities to bear as well as signal solidarity and collective will against enemies. Driving a wedge between the United States and its allies is a known priority for al Qaeda, as attacks in London and Madrid show. Unified action can also ensure the sharing of risk and responsibility—the political keystone of the Alliance. These principles are as crucial in the fight against al Qaeda as they were in the days of East-West confrontation. From NATO's least powerful member to its most powerful, all countries are better served operating within an alliance compared to operating alone or with just one or two other powers, provided effectiveness is maintained. Done right, NATO SOF could advance both unity and effectiveness.

The ultimate goal of NATO SOF should be to expand the capacity, improve the capability, and multiply the options for combined action, ranging from surveillance, to working with local forces, to direct assault. Although the United States has significant national SOF capabilities that can be used worldwide, operating with allied SOF could be advantageous. Certainly in Europe, and arguably in much of Africa and the Middle East, combined U.S.-allied SOF action is politically more acceptable and supportable than U.S.-only action.

If U.S. and allied SOF are called on for combined operations, their effectiveness and impact would obviously be greater if they were interoperable and trained to common standards of excellence. In addition, having high-quality allied SOF readily available to NATO would provide options

to act against al Qaeda or other enemies if U.S. SOF are otherwise engaged or, for some reason, not ideal for the need at hand. While the United States may not wish to count absolutely on the availability of NATO SOF, it is an option well worth having. By the same token, it would be advantageous for allies to have SOF capability of enough quality and quantity to join counterterrorism operations with the United States or to conduct such operations of their own when U.S. assets are unavailable.

It is crucial for governments to have public support in the fight against terrorism. NATO SOF would permit the Alliance to take swift, precise, proportional, and collective military action against terrorists, as well as other unconventional threats. Depending on circumstances, use of SOF in surgical operations may enjoy greater public support and international acceptance than large-scale intervention by regular ground and air forces.

To act decisively with SOF, NATO would need forces that are ready and able to work well together. This means that contributing allies, including the United States, would have to assign some SOF to NATO for training and employment. In other words, for NATO to be able to achieve both unity and effectiveness in combating transnational terrorism militarily, its members' SOF must prepare together and be organized to act together. Occasional contacts will not suffice. Herein lies the biggest challenge, given the national value and sensitivity of SOF.

Creating and Using NATO SOF

For the United States, as well as other prospective SOF contributors, the question is whether assigning such valued assets and sharing sensitive know-how via NATO would compromise national capabilities and limit national options. Therefore, the approach to creating SOF capability in NATO must maximize national and common benefits while minimizing national costs and risks. The key to this is a formula that provides a selective and small combined capability for critical operations while also expanding and improving SOF through cooperation among all interested allies—that is, both to *focus* and to *grow* SOF capabilities. To this end, NATO SOF should consist of a small inner core and a larger outer network.

Inner Core

The inner core could be a force of 500, with associated systems (for example, vehicles, weapons, information technology, and unmanned aerial vehicles). The force could consist of deployable command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) personnel and gear; assault units; and support capabilities,

such as lift and logistics. The number of actual assault troops could be between 150 and 200—a small number but with huge utility. The core force should focus initially on one or at most two vital missions: counterterrorism, as stressed here, and perhaps the related mission or submission of hostage rescue.

Counterterrorism missions go far beyond SOF dropping from helicopters by ropes at night into terrorist camps or storming occupied buildings. SOF must be able to function clandestinely for extended periods in areas where terrorists might lurk, collecting intelligence, strengthening local forces, and apprehending killers. Thus, NATO SOF could be very active rather than standing by for rare use. Nations deciding whether to contribute units should fully expect that they will be used.

The nature of the terrorism threat is such that the inner core of NATO SOF should be able to conduct protracted clandestine operations as well as to deploy urgently in the event of sudden dangers to Alliance members and interests. Except for a permanent command and control (C²) cell, the core force would be composed of *rotating* national SOF units, thus permitting high readiness, a manageable burden on individual allies, and wide learning. National units could rotate into the inner core every 3 months, possibly staggered to increase continuity and exposure to different allied SOF. Three months may seem short, but a longer period might burden unit and personnel planning, while a shorter period might harm effectiveness. SOF are highly trained and motivated troops who get to work quickly and produce results efficiently. Participating forces would be intensively trained to common high standards and chosen tactics. The need to train together and to be ready to operate together means that national forces comprising the core would need to be co-located in Europe or North America.

Organizationally, this inner core could be akin to the way the United States prepares and uses SOF for critical continuing missions. NATO could form a standing joint task force (SJTF) within Allied Command Operations to which assault teams, or units of action, and support resources are assigned rotationally and kept at a high level of readiness.⁵ This SJTF-SOF-C/T (for counterterrorism) would provide a focal point for planning, be responsible for results during rotational assignments, and serve as a deployable command and control to minimize reaction time.

For strategic, political, and operational reasons, the United States should participate substantially but not overbearingly. If the NATO SOF consisted of three assault teams at any moment, the United States might provide one and allies the other two. The two allied teams would rotate

from members that possess requisite numbers of high-quality SOF, for example, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland.⁶ A U.S. officer should have permanent (nonrotating) command of SJTF-SOF-C/T, with an allied deputy (rotating or nonrotating). Command of each assault team would lie with the country providing that team in rotation. While each team would come from one nation, interteam collaboration in training and operations is crucial. SOF assault teams must be able to rely on one another, especially in larger and more demanding contingencies.

With this formula, the total number of U.S. personnel assigned to NATO SOF at any given time would be about 100, including assault and support personnel. Army, Navy, and Air Force units should all participate. There are at least three ways the United States could meet its obligation while not detracting from—indeed, while enhancing—national SOF:

- ▮ In the first, the U.S. team in rotation to NATO SOF would come from those teams in the queue for high-readiness status for U.S. counterterrorism operations. This would mean that no increase in U.S. SOF would be needed for the counterterrorism mission. At the same time, it could increase the strain on U.S. SOF, which would have to be weighed against the advantages of having NATO SOF.
- ▮ Alternatively, if DOD deemed it useful to increase SOF specialized for counterterrorism based on its latest threat assessment, the additional U.S. capacity could satisfy the needs of U.S. participation. Even then, however, it would be ideal to rotate all or most U.S. counterterrorism teams through NATO SOF to expose them to allied capabilities and alliance operations.
- ▮ A third option would be to utilize the U.S. SOF that are already assigned to USEUCOM under Special Operations Command Europe to participate in NATO SOF (in effect, wearing a second helmet). While this would be the most practical option for the United States, it would forfeit the benefits of widespread exposure of U.S. SOF to NATO. Moreover, USEUCOM SOF are not dedicated to the counterterrorism mission, which would be a disadvantage insofar as NATO SOF should concentrate on counterterrorism.

Perhaps NATO and national planners, including USSOCOM, will devise other alternatives. If so, key principles to maintain include:

- ▮ substantial, as opposed to token, U.S. participation
- ▮ ready availability for operations under NATO
- ▮ capability for combined action based on common best tactics and co-training

- rotational assignments
- a standing command cell, headed by an American officer
- counterterrorism focus
- selectivity with the aim of effectiveness.

Each non-U.S. member contributing to the inner core would provide no more than 50 personnel—roughly an assault-team equivalent—during its rotation. Because standards for participation would be very high, and most allies do not have action units of sufficient size and capability for counterterrorism, only a few allies would likely participate.⁷ Very limited participation might ease concerns about the sharing of sensitive knowledge. Other allies could support the NATO SOF effort by participating in the wider network of cooperation and perhaps by joining the core force as their SOF become qualified for counterterrorism missions.

Even though the inner core would consist of a minority of NATO members, the combined force could act for the Alliance as a whole, in response to a request from the North Atlantic Council (NAC).⁸ There is ample precedent for this (for example, the few nuclear-capable members and the few in which intermediate-range missiles were deployed in the 1980s). By the same token, any member that does not wish to join NATO SOF at all should be satisfied not to participate in the establishment or use of the force, rather than to oppose what other allies wish to do.

Training would be multilateral and directed by the SJTF command. In addition, although SOF are not big consumers of airlift, adequate NATO airlift assets would need to be earmarked and readied for sudden and urgent missions. The whole system would be geared toward excellence, as defined above, and readiness for fast action, which is especially crucial in counterterrorism operations. The inner core would need to be ready to go within 24 hours of initial warning, upon the decision of the NAC. Once employed, NATO SOF—like national SOF—must have a high degree of operational decisionmaking authority. Micromanagement of an operation, after NAC has issued general mission guidance, would be self-defeating if not dangerous to SOF engaged in close quarters with terrorists. Rules of engagement would have to be as permissive as those under which national SOF operate.

Because of the tempo and danger involved in special operations, sharing tactical intelligence among units is integral and crucial. In combined operations with allies, tactical commanders will want to share such intelligence across national boundaries. Barriers will at best hamper and at worst endanger SOF and their missions. It is inherent in networking that

whenever information is shared—whether to allies or among U.S. forces—the risks of compromise increase. However, this consideration should not interfere with the creation or use of NATO SOF capabilities. Any ally that is trusted enough to participate in a critical and sensitive special mission is surely to be trusted with information that bears on mission success. Allied SOF are hardly likely to imperil themselves by mishandling intelligence. Moreover, tactical information in fast-moving special operations is fleeting, thus it is not easily exploited by the enemy. In any case, tactical SOF commanders are in the best position to decide whether the operational risks of sharing information outweigh the benefits. Any constraints imposed on them only limit their options.

Sharing intelligence information may involve some risk that sources and methods will be compromised, but SOF typically generate their own intelligence and are able to judge whether the risk of compromise outweighs the consequences of not providing and receiving tactically critical information. Apart from the matter of sharing tactical intelligence information, the objective of NATO SOF interoperability will require some commonality of C4ISR systems and protocols, at least for communications connectivity. Like any other technology sharing, the allies will need to decide whether the advantages of being able to combine SOF for critical counterterrorism operations justify such sharing.

The fundamental argument for having an available core force lies in the specific nature and broad value of SOF. Such forces are almost *always* needed—no matter what the contingency—and needed *early*, often with little warning and a premium on moving and acting with great speed. Unlike the NRF and NATO high-readiness forces, SOF may well be needed in far less than the time it takes to cobble together earmarked national forces. While the United States could, technically speaking, meet the need with its own SOF, to be able to do so *with allies*, and *as an ally*, is much more advantageous, especially if overall counterterrorism capacity is increased by developing U.S. and allied SOF to common standards and making them interoperable.

Notwithstanding the virtues, the idea of committing even a modest number of SOF to NATO, which implies nonavailability for purely national action, may not appeal to members. Conceptually, there is another approach: a de facto NATO SOF capability. It begins by setting as a goal the ability of NATO to deploy within 24 hours of first warning a U.S.-allied SOF counterterrorism force of high quality, common methods, and integrated C². Even if participants decline to commit to release their units of the force—something that is in any case not called for by the Washington

Treaty—all participating allies could agree to work assiduously to remove technical and procedural obstacles to that goal. They would agree to rotational co-location to permit common training and high readiness, form a SJTF with a permanent command, set and work toward high standards, and assign logistic and transport resources for deployment.

Table 4–2. Allied Special Operations Forces Capabilities

Country	SOF Capabilities
Belgium	1 para-commando brigade (2 paratroop/parachute, 1 commando, 2 mechanized infantry, 1 reconnaissance squadron, 1 artillery)
Bulgaria	1 special forces (SF) command
Canada	1 commando unit
Czech Republic	1 SF group
Denmark	1 SF unit
France	2,700 SOF: 1 command headquarters, 1 paratroop/parachute regiment, 1 helicopter unit, 3 training centers (48); 500 marine commandos in 5 groups: 2 assault, 1 reconnaissance, 1 attack wing, 1 raiding
Germany	1 SOF division with 2 airborne (1 crisis response force), 1 SF command (1 commando/SF brigade)
Greece	1 special operations command (including 1 amphibious commando squadron), 1 commando brigade (3 commando, 1 paratroop/parachute squadron)
Italy	Naval special forces command with 4 groups: 1 diving operation, 1 navy SF operation, 1 school, 1 research
Latvia	1 SF team
Lithuania	1 SF team
Netherlands	1 SF battalion
Norway	1 Ranger battalion
Poland	1 special operations regiment
Portugal	1 special operations unit; 1 commando battalion
Spain	special operations command with 3 special operations battalions
Turkey	SF command headquarters; 5 commando brigades
United Kingdom	1 Special Air Services regiment, 1 marine commando brigade, 1 commando artillery regiment, 1 commando air defense battery, 2 commando engineer units, 1 landing craft squadron

Source: All figures from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Dogged implementation of this alternative concept would lead to virtually the same practical efforts to form an inner core force as if NATO actually “owned” the force. It matters less whether members’ SOF are legally bound to the Alliance than whether every step is taken to provide for

effective combined operations when NATO and members individually decide to act. At the same time, commitment has merit, namely, confidence, credibility, and speed. From a U.S. standpoint, it is unlikely that a consensus of allies would want to commit SOF to a counterterrorism operation that the United States, as leader in the war with al Qaeda, would wish to avoid. By formally assigning NATO SOF to missions that U.S. SOF would most likely support or perhaps carry out, the United States and NATO both can increase available SOF capacity as well as their access to it. On balance, the concept of formal commitment is better than that of practical commitment, though the latter is well worth gaining.

Whichever of these two concepts is chosen for inner-core SOF, one of the most important contributions of NATO, based on its proven strengths, is to provide the organizational and logistic infrastructure needed to prepare for and mount effective combined operations. While the United States has substantial infrastructure for its own SOF, many allies do not, at least not for large or simultaneous demands. Of course, allies could make use of U.S. infrastructure, whether or not NATO has a SOF capability. But it is better for both the United States and allies if NATO can furnish and coordinate common support from a number of allies, including the United States. While each participating country could cover the expense of its rotating team, NATO should use common funds to pay for support, the cost of which would be modest because SOF require comparatively little infrastructure and service.

Wider Network

Surrounding this inner core would be a wider but much looser cooperative network of SOF from all allies committed to developing NATO SOF. In addition to counterterrorism and hostage rescue, this wider group could be enhanced through such cooperation to perform a fuller range of missions, including internal defense, counterinsurgency, intelligence gathering, peacetime advising of new partners, civil affairs, and information operations. The SOF assets of this outer network need not be co-located, but they would interact episodically and train to the same standards as the inner core.

Because this larger group would train with similar tactics and methods, it could be requested and assigned for employment by NATO in the same manner as other national forces. This would allow for augmentation of NATO's core SOF, in the event of large-scale or simultaneous demands. A successful program of cooperation would also give the Alliance the option to grow the inner core over time.

NATO members with more advanced SOF would have a responsibility to provide personnel in small numbers to help develop SOF in the wider program. Thus, even in the outer network, it would be necessary for U.S. and other advanced SOF to share some knowledge on tactics, methods, and threats, though the need for security would be much greater in the core than in the network. While each member, including the United States, would have to decide for itself what and what not to share, the advantages of elevating SOF capabilities among committed and trustworthy allies cannot be ignored. After all, if these allies are prepared to have their SOF fight shoulder to shoulder with U.S. SOF, the benefits of sharing could outweigh any risks, up to a point.

Such a two-part SOF offers the promise to add significantly—even dramatically, for such a small enterprise—to NATO's inventory of usable capabilities. The benefits lie in pooling, sharing, and expanding the circle of high-performance SOF. The cost of a headquarters, training facilities, and other infrastructure would be much less than the NRF. Very quickly, NATO could have high-quality SOF that could operate independently or work with NRF and other Alliance forces, and the number would grow. NATO's ability to handle critical situations and threats, including al Qaeda, would be greatly enhanced.

In addition to giving NATO an important new capability, the proposal offered here would give members improved options for combined coalition-of-the-willing SOF action. SOF of any of the inner core members, and perhaps of some of the outer network participants, would be able to operate with U.S. SOF or on their own, but with greater effectiveness in the fight against terrorism. In sum, NATO SOF would increase the special operations capabilities of both the Alliance and allies.

Conclusion

As soon as it is prepared, the United States should initiate discussions with the NATO Secretary General, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, and allies with significant SOF regarding the proposed objectives and two-tier architecture of NATO SOF. Even two or three nations (for example, the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany) could begin by developing plans for the inner-core force, with others joining in time. The United States and others might be more comfortable with a very tight inner core at first.

One of the first steps following a political decision to create a NATO SOF capability would be to create the standing joint task force and assign a commander and multilateral staff. Once that is done, this new cell can

be expected to come up with specific plans and proposals for Alliance and members' consideration. The creation of the SJTF would signal NATO's determination both to focus and build a capability that is indispensable in defending the Alliance against terrorism.

A good test of the value of such an initiative is whether it would worry al Qaeda. It should. Terrorists in Afghanistan have witnessed first-hand what U.S. and allied SOF can do. To them, the prospect of a high-performance NATO counterterrorism force, able to operate anywhere with speed, agility, and lethality, displaying Western-democratic resolve and unity, would be highly unwelcome.

Notes

¹ Source: David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, *Creating a NATO Special Operations Force*, Defense Horizons 52 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006).

² By NATO SOF we mean allied special military and paramilitary forces, commandos, rangers, and the like that have at least some missions and capabilities like those of U.S. SOF.

³ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow*, 2004, available at <www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>.

⁴ U.S. Special Operations Command Mission, available at <www.socom.mil/Docs/command_mission.pdf>. See "Vision Statement" in the U.S. Special Operations Command Vision 2004, available at <www.socom.mil/Docs/Vision_Final_2004.pdf>.

⁵ An important detail is where in NATO such a SJTF would be situated. One possibility is the standing joint headquarters in Lisbon, from which a sea-based JTF can be built and deployed.

⁶ Whether allies provide companies or platoons to form such assault teams is a detail to be worked out. The key principles are that the numbers are not excessive and that units of action should be national.

⁷ Participation in high-performance paramilitary (non-DOD) counterterrorism forces should not be excluded.

⁸ Per the Washington Treaty, NAC consensus is required for NATO action, and any country may decline to provide troops, even if assigned to NATO.

Needed—A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (2004)¹

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Overview

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO endorsed the further transformation of military capabilities to make them “more modern, more usable, and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions.” The Istanbul Communiqué especially called for continuing progress on the NATO Response Force and the Prague Capabilities Commitments.

To accomplish this, NATO needs a new initiative for its defense agenda: creation of better forces and capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations outside Europe, including the greater Middle East. The real challenge is to reorganize, refocus, and rebalance current assets so that NATO can respond promptly and effectively to future contingencies. This challenge can be met by creating a NATO S&R Force (SRF). This force would be a logical complement to the NATO Response Force, but would be structured differently. Instead of a small standing joint force, the SRF would consist of flexible and modular national forces totaling one or two division-equivalents, mostly ground forces, that could be assembled to generate the necessary mix of capabilities for S&R operations. In this new NATO defense concept, the combination of the NATO Response Force for rapid, forcible-entry missions, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps or other High Readiness Forces for major combat operations under a combined joint task force, and an SRF would provide a full-spectrum capability for the new strategic environment. NATO adoption of this three-pillar posture will constitute a major step toward preparing for future responsibilities.

Emerging Strategic Requirement

NATO faces a permanent need for improved stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) military assets. To launch S&R operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, NATO had to assemble forces on an ad-hoc basis. Improvisation worked in these cases because the operations made only modest demands on existing forces and because mobilization was not urgent. Future contingencies might not be so accommodating. Although many of the necessary S&R capabilities exist within NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) forces, they are not organized into deployable assets that can provide cohesive, effective response options. A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (SRF) would transform these disparate and distributed capabilities into trained and ready assets for future S&R operations.

The Istanbul defense agenda was a logical continuation of decisions made at the Prague Summit of 2002, which launched the NATO Response Force (NRF), the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC), and a new Allied Command Transformation (ACT). At Istanbul, political leaders endorsed further progress on these measures. They adopted new force goals, reformed the NATO defense planning process, and urged an intensified focus by members and the Alliance as a whole on creating usable forces and capabilities. These measures were embedded in a communiqué that called attention to growing security involvements in the zone from the Balkans to Central Asia. The same communiqué also pledged to expand NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, announced that NATO was prepared to help train Iraqi security forces, and offered the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to nations of the Greater Middle East. The effect was to make clear that NATO security and defense horizons will continue expanding outside Europe.

The Istanbul Summit set the stage for a focus on the next phase of NATO defense improvements. Requirements for S&R forces and capabilities are growing as NATO becomes more involved in military interventions requiring stabilization and reconstruction beyond Europe, especially in Central Asia and the Greater Middle East. In such contingencies, stabilization refers to the process of halting residual violence, suppressing remaining opposition, and bringing order and security to the occupied country. Reconstruction refers to early measures taken by occupying military forces to repair damage and restore such essentials as electrical power, medicine, and transportation before the arrival of civilian nation-building assets. Creating S&R forces requires focused effort because their capabili-

ties and assets are different from those of standard ground combat formations. Although they incorporate some combat units for security missions, they rely heavily on combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units and must be designed with synergistic capabilities and cumulative effects in mind.

An S&R operation can require as large a force as a major combat operation and involve such disparate capabilities as light infantry, military police, psychological operations, civil affairs, contract administrators, civil engineers, and medical teams. Often, combat and S&R forces will need to operate together. For example, combat medical units may have to care for wounded troops at the same time they are needed to restore hospital services to an occupied country or prevent the spread of infectious diseases. Similarly, combat engineers may be preoccupied with preparing defensive positions, removing mines, and keeping lines of communication open to military traffic at the same time they are needed to restore electrical power, sewage, and communications to occupied cities. S&R forces must be designed to perform such functions and be given the assets and staying power to perform them. Being prepared for S&R operations requires forces and capabilities in being, not a mobilization strategy to assemble S&R forces from scratch for each contingency.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003 shows the complications that can arise when major combat operations quickly give way to demanding S&R operations. The U.S. and British ground force of 5 1/3 divisions, which swept over Iraq in six weeks, fielded about 100,000 troops assigned to CS/CSS units. But most of these units were configured to support major combat activities, not S&R operations. Considerable time was lost as these forces tried to shift gears and as new CS/CSS forces were deployed from outside the theater. Had tailored S&R forces been available from the onset, the occupation of Iraq might have gotten off to a better start. NATO would do well to learn from such experiences.

NATO S&R Experience

Recent NATO experience with S&R operations illustrates the difficulty of the mission.

Albania

A successful S&R operation was conducted in 1997 when Italian forces intervened to stabilize a chaotic situation in Albania. Guided by a UN and Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) charter, the operation was launched with 8,000 troops after only 13 days of

preparation. The Italians initially focused on reestablishing law and order through policing operations that restored stability and set the stage for elections. They also distributed foods and goods, provided tent housing and medical aid, and repaired some infrastructure. Within 6 months, the mission was successfully completed and the forces withdrawn.

Bosnia and Kosovo

NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo have been more problematic. The missions broadly achieved the Alliance's security goals but have been less effective at nation-building. After the Dayton Accord was signed in 1995, a large NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops was deployed to Bosnia to enforce the peace and help establish a foundation of security upon which a unified state could be built. Initially, heavy combat forces were needed, but soon lighter forces equipped for a wide spectrum of S&R missions were required. Over time, IFOR became the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which gradually declined to 7,000 troops. Over the past 9 years, SFOR has succeeded in enforcing the peace, but has not been able to heal Bosnia's ethnic wounds.

In 1999, NATO deployed the Kosovo Force (KFOR) after Serbian forces withdrew from the province. KFOR began with 50,000 troops, but has declined to 20,000 or fewer. KFOR was called upon to perform a similar spectrum of missions: deterrence of further ethnic warfare, law enforcement, and reconstruction missions. KFOR has largely kept the peace for 5 years, but Kosovo remains divided by serious ethnic tensions. The long-term prospects for democracy and peace in both countries are unclear.

Afghanistan

Deployment of the all-European International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) into Afghanistan began in 2002, after the U.S. invasion and subsequent fall of the Taliban. NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003. Originally the 6,500 troops were to secure only Kabul, but the mission has expanded to include 5 of the country's 32 provinces. PRTs are being used to help carry out this larger agenda. Recently, NATO decided to reinforce ISAF with 2 rapid-reaction units of about 1,000 troops each for the Afghan elections. These 2 units will be backed-up by another 2,000 troops in Europe that could be deployed rapidly, if necessary. Performing combat operations elsewhere against lingering Taliban and al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan remains the task of U.S. and other forces. While Afghanistan is vastly different from the Balkans, ISAF has been called

upon to perform a similar wide spectrum of S&R missions, including security and reconstruction under a UN mandate. Since 2002, Afghanistan has made progress toward establishing a democracy, but the government remains weak, and local warlords and guerilla resistance mark the countryside and eastern provinces. Critics commonly charge that the European troop deployments in Afghanistan are too small to meet S&R requirements. A multiyear NATO deployment in Afghanistan seems likely, but again the prospects for a stable, democratic government are unclear.

Iraq

Whether NATO will become involved in Iraq remains to be seen, but a majority of NATO countries, led by Britain and Poland, are part of the coalition force, which today numbers about 150,000 troops. NATO is providing support to the Polish-led multinational divisions and has agreed to help train Iraqi security forces. Thus far, peace enforcement and security have been more demanding than in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan. Coalition forces have been called upon to deal with guerilla warfare and violence while simultaneously performing a wide variety of reconstruction missions, including restoration of economic services, medical support, and infrastructure repair. A multiyear presence through 2005 is envisioned, but may need to be extended. Much will depend upon whether an effective democratic government emerges and if the Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites can live together peacefully in one country.

Preparing for the Future

What lessons do recent S&R experiences hold for NATO? First, the requirement for S&R operations will continue, and the experience of NATO members in these types of operations needs to be institutionalized. Second, NATO may be required to perform several S&R operations simultaneously. Third, S&R operations likely will continue to be problematic and will require close collaboration of military and civilian organizations in the application of force, diplomacy, and economic aid.

To date, NATO S&R operations have been reasonably successful, but only modestly demanding of forces and missions. What will happen if NATO accepts greater responsibility for Iraq or must deal with an even larger contingency? If more demanding situations arise, NATO shortcomings will be exposed. Virtually all European forces now assigned to NATO as readily available formations are configured for major combat operations. The manpower and ready formations to generate a sizable sustained S&R response are lacking, as are a common doctrine and interoperability.

Additionally, NATO-assigned forces have capability shortfalls, including integrated logistics, modern C4ISR² networks, long-range strategic mobility, civil affairs, administrators, special operations forces, linguists, construction and civil engineers, medical units, and humanitarian assistance. Reducing these shortcomings and deficiencies is a key reason for creating improved NATO S&R forces and capabilities.

Reorganizing for S&R

The American Model

A framework for appraising European forces for S&R can be established by reviewing American forces and experience. Thus far, the U.S. military has chosen not to create specialized forces for S&R operations but to “re-role” combat forces for these operations. Since the invasion of Iraq, interest has grown in the idea of creating tailored S&R forces that can be deployed promptly as major combat operations subside. Such tailored forces have the potential to perform S&R operations effectively and efficiently, with perhaps half the manpower of a traditional combat force. To capitalize upon these advantages, a recent National Defense University study proposed creation of two S&R joint command organizations, one active and one reserve component.³

Roughly division-size, each joint formation would consist of a command staff and four subordinate or brigade-level staffs to provide command and control, including mission planning and execution. Each joint formation also would include S&R battalions in such areas as military police, civil affairs, engineers, medical support, and PSYOPs. When the situation merits, this joint formation of about 11,300 troops could be accompanied by a combat brigade and CS/CSS support command, raising the total to about 18,200 troops (table 5-1).

These two commands would provide modular capabilities that could be tailored to handle a wide range of situations. For example, two brigades could be dispatched to Central Command and two to Pacific Command. If necessary, the two commands could generate eight brigades that could be allocated to regional combatant commands. The effect would be to increase the U.S. military capacity to handle two medium-sized contingencies similar to Iraq. Alternatively, two such forces could be used on a rotational basis to provide an enduring presence for a single contingency.

A key of the National Defense University study is that NATO can create a viable S&R posture of two division-sized formations by organizing only 36,000 troops. This equates to only 2 to 3 percent of the 1.6 million

active-duty troops now fielded by European armies in NATO. There is ample manpower to create such a force without drawing away from the NRF, the High Readiness Forces (HRF), or other priority forces for major combat operations. Such a posture would not meet all plausible S&R requirements, but it would enable NATO to meet most requirements. Multinational integration could be pursued at lower levels than commonly is the case for major combat operations as forces using lower technology can perform many S&R missions. Indeed, S&R operations provide lower-tech militaries a way to perform valuable missions for NATO. Militaries from the southern region and Eastern Europe thus could participate, as could PfP countries. A brief analysis of some of the forces available follows:

Table 5–1. Illustrative U.S. S&R Joint Command

Standard Formations	Number	Manpower
Headquarters Staff	(5)	725
Military Police Battalions	(4)	2164
Civil Affairs Battalions	(4)	584
Construction/Civil Engineer Battalions	(4)	2692
Area Medical Battalions	(4)	1442
PSYOP Battalions	(4)	1000
Other Battalions	(6)	2407
Sub-Total		11,314
Combat Reinforcements		
CS/CSS Command	(1)	2957
Stryker Combat Brigade	(1)	3937
Total		18,208

Italy

Among the Europeans, Italy has been a leader in preparing for S&R missions. The future, all-professional Italian army will consist of 10 brigades: three heavy, four medium, and three light. These brigades will be designed to provide modularity and task-organization and will have attached CS/CSS units for dual use in combat support and S&R missions. Important units for S&R missions include an ISTAR-Electronic Warfare Brigade, Civil/Military Cooperation Group South, engineer units, a nuclear biological chemical regiment, and a PSYOP regiment. Italy has established a crisis response and S&R training center focused on doctri-

nal development, conceptual advancement and application, and lessons learned.

Germany and Poland

The German Bundeswehr is undergoing a major transformation to enable power projection. The future German military will consist of about 250,000 uniformed personnel, of which about 30,000 will be tasked to major combat units for assignment to the NRF, other NATO formations, and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). An additional 70,000 troops will be assigned to stability operations, thus providing a rotational capacity to support deployments of 14,000 troops. Remaining personnel will be assigned to CS/CSS units, some of which could be employed for S&R operations. The Polish military also is well-suited to make contributions to NATO S&R missions. The Polish army has 120,300 personnel in 6 combat divisions and associated units. Poland currently maintains no forces exclusively designated for S&R missions, but it does field CS/CSS, CIMINC, humanitarian, and intelligence units that could be employed for this purpose.

Britain and France

Both countries are NATO leaders in preparing their military forces for the information age and power-projection operations. Britain's relatively small army of eight brigades will remain primarily configured for high-tech combat operations as part of the NRF and Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and in partnership with U.S. forces. Britain takes seriously the need to be prepared for peacekeeping and S&R operations, but it plans to rely on re-roleing and dual training of combat forces, because its small force does not permit specialization in S&R operations. The downsized French army of several maneuver brigades is intended mainly for major combat operations as part of NATO forces or the ERRF. France is transforming its military to achieve a high-tech combat force. It plans to rely primarily on re-roleing of combat formations for S&R missions.

Netherlands and Canada

Both of these countries have long-standing records of participation in NATO peacekeeping missions. The Netherlands military includes 55,000 active personnel, with a marine brigade and an army of 23,000 that fields 3 brigades, plus special operations units. The Netherlands military has relevant S&R capabilities in such areas as military police, intelligence, civil affairs, CIMIC, medical units, and transport. Because the Netherlands military is designed to provide a joint combat force, it has long resisted

schemes for it to specialize in any niche area. It probably will make some contributions to NATO S&R forces and capabilities, but not at the expense of altering its basic structure or orientation. The Canadian army suffers from budgetary shortfalls that complicate the task of funding expensive international deployments. As a result, Canada will resist any specialization schemes that strip core military competency from its army of 19,000 troops. Still, Canada could contribute S&R assets in areas such as military police, judicial experts, and election monitors.

Spain and Sweden

Although the recent changeover in Spain's government clouds the situation, the Spanish military has a positive attitude about participating in S&R operations within the limits of its forces and budgets. The Spanish army of 92,000 troops is organized into traditional combat formations that include a rapid reaction division and a mechanized division. These formations have a standard allotment of CS/CSS units, some of which could be made available for S&R missions. Spain will need NATO guidance on how to prepare for S&R operations. While Sweden is not a member of NATO, it is a PfP member with a willingness to participate in some NATO missions. It possesses a small but modern and well-armed military that could take part in NATO or EU/ERRF military operations. Its army of 19,000 active troops includes armored and infantry regiments supported by standard CS/CSS units.

Other European militaries also possess assets and capabilities suited to S&R operations, but only a few have undertaken detailed analysis and planning of how they could best contribute. Some countries can provide a wide spectrum of units; others will be able to make only niche contributions. All will need guidance from NATO on strategic concepts, force-design standards, and programmatic priorities.

Of the nations surveyed above, Italy, Germany, and Poland seem the best candidates for organizing dedicated and specialized S&R forces. All three countries possess relatively of traditional combat forces large armies with diminished border defense missions. Preparing for S&R missions appears to be a logical next step for them, while they continue to contribute to the NRF, ARRC, and other NATO combat formations. S&R contributions would enable them to preserve force structures and budgets as well as to contribute to NATO strategic preparedness. Italy already is moving in this direction, Germany is starting to do so, and the Polish military seems willing. Spain may fall into this category, depending on the strategic policies of its new government. The Netherlands, Canada, and Sweden provide

examples of countries with small but well-prepared militaries that have a forthcoming attitude toward participation in traditional peacekeeping missions, but also must remain prepared for major combat operations. They likely will be willing and able to make limited contributions to S&R operations, but will resist specialization in this area.

When this group of 9 NATO and PfP members is generalized across the Alliance, some judgments stand out. Beyond question, European countries as a whole possess considerable military manpower and relevant assets for creating S&R forces and capabilities, although constraints and impediments must be overcome. Because of the need to retain combat preparedness, many countries will be able to devote only a small portion of forces to S&R preparedness. Continued reliance by some countries upon conscription, coupled with the need to retain large rotational pools, also will limit the number of troops available for S&R deployments at any single time. Many European militaries judge that they already are being stretched by today's relatively small NATO deployments in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Management changes will be needed to enlarge on the pool of usable NATO military forces.

Fortunately, many of the core European assets already exist. They are scattered throughout European militaries in service of traditional combat forces for border defense, many of which are not critical to NATO's preparedness for major combat operations. The task is mainly one of reorganizing, refocusing, and rebalancing these assets so that they can be brought together and harnessed in service of S&R missions. Performing this task may take time, but it does not promise to be highly expensive because S&R is a low-cost enterprise. Some new equipment and training will be needed, but most changes likely can be accommodated within existing budgets if savings from ongoing manpower cuts are applied to investments. With top-down management guidance from NATO, considerable progress seems achievable over the course of a few years.

Launching S&R Force Development

Some observers may judge that NATO can meet its emerging S&R needs merely by planning to re-role traditional combat forces for this mission and provide them extra training. A sense of perspective, however, is needed here. Re-roleing can be part of the solution, but it is not the solution. Traditional combat forces must remain focused on main war-fighting missions. Inevitably, they will be marginal and inefficient performers in large S&R operations, which are demanding and require unique skills of

their own. NATO needs designated forces and capabilities for these operations that can be used alone or augmented by traditional combat forces.

If the strategic requirement for NATO S&R forces is clear-cut, what about the concerns posed by some observers? One concern is that an S&R force might interfere with progress on fielding the NRF. A second concern is that the United States might not participate adequately in NATO S&R missions. A third concern is that a NATO S&R force might drag the Europeans into Iraq and other conflicts from which they would prefer to remain aloof. All three concerns fade when stock is taken of the situation. NATO has the manpower and wealth to field an SRF as well as the NRF and should do so. Indeed, if an SRF is not fielded, pressures might arise to employ the NRF for S&R missions, thus detracting from its original purpose. Likewise, the United States will be able to contribute strongly to such missions if it creates S&R forces of its own. Creation of a NATO SRF does not mean that Europeans will be dragged into unwanted endeavors: their membership on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) will continue to provide them veto power over such commitments. The conclusion thus is that, although a NATO S&R Force gives rise to some issues of concern, these issues are resolvable through sensible coalition planning.

Charting the future can begin by addressing four issues:

- What operational concept should guide NATO planning for S&R operations?
- How will NATO's military command structure be affected by S&R operations?
- What options does NATO have at its disposal to guide force preparations?
- How should NATO act in the aftermath of the Istanbul Summit?

Flexibility, Modularity, and Capability

An initial step toward creating an operational concept can be taken by positing how S&R and major combat operations might work together in a scenario commonly used for NATO defense planning. Suppose a major crisis erupts outside Europe that requires NATO to deploy sizable combat forces rapidly to long distances for war-fighting. NATO likely would respond by first deploying the NRF to conduct initial strike operations. Then, it might deploy the ARRC, a corps-sized HRF that can forces must remain operate four combat divisions, along with commensurate air and naval forces, under overall command of a Combined Joint Task missions and Force (CJTF). If necessary, more HRF forces could be deployed.

This joint force would be responsible for performing the major combat operations needed to achieve NATO's wartime goals. As the combat operations approach completion, the next phase of the campaign begins: war-termination and occupation of enemy territory that requires S&R operations for several months. At this stage, NATO S&R forces enter the picture. Two division-sized formations might deploy into the occupation zone before combat operations are complete. As the transition from combat to S&R operations occurs, S&R forces might replace two of the original ARRC combat divisions, which would be withdrawn. The resulting force of 2 combat divisions and 2 S&R division-equivalents might remain in the occupation zone for 6 months or more. If a longer deployment is needed, other forces generated by NATO during this period could replace these S&R forces.

The chart below portrays a notional NATO three-tier ground posture for a major operation outside Europe. This deployable posture is a small portion of the total posture endorsed by NATO military authorities for all missions, including in-place forces for border defense.

Table 5-2. Illustrative NATO Force Capabilities for New Missions Outside Europe

Type of Force	Size of Posture
NRF	1 brigade
HRF for Major Combat Operations (HRF/MCO)	4 to 8 divisions
SRF	2 divisions

This operational concept, one of several different possibilities, helps illuminate strategic priorities for building and employing S&R forces. The key point is that S&R forces should not be viewed as separate from NATO warfighting forces. Rather, the two forces should be viewed in integrated terms, with warfighting operations taking place first and S&R operations following. S&R forces should be operationally capable of working closely with combat forces in situations where a mix of hostilities, war-termination, and peace establishment is taking place. This concept also indicates that readiness levels for S&R forces need not be as high as for the NRF, which is ready to deploy within 7 to 30 days. But S&R forces should be ready within 30 to 90 days, which is the readiness standard of normal HRF, rather than the 90 to 180 days of Forces of Lower Readiness (FLR). As for sustainment, S&R forces should have 6 to 12 months of staying power—long enough to provide a bridge to the NATO process for generating additional forces.

This operational concept, however, need not function as a strait jacket for designing S&R forces to fit only one contingency. In today's world, S&R forces must be able to operate effectively across a wide range of contingencies. In one case, a brigade- or division-equivalent might be needed; in another, the entire S&R posture of two division-equivalents and eight brigades might deploy to a single crisis location. Indeed, three contingencies might erupt concurrently: one requiring a brigade-size force, another two or three brigades, and yet another four or five brigades. Or a single contingency might require one S&R division-size force for 6 months, followed by a second division-size force for another 6 months.

Ultimately, a NATO SRF must be flexible, adaptable, modular, and versatile: capable of being deployed in a variety of force packages designed to carry out the operations at hand. NATO should be able to draw upon the entire SRF posture to uniquely tailor each brigade. For example, one brigade might require a standard allotment of forces, another a large concentration of infantry forces and military police for security missions, and still another mostly engineers, medical units, and similar CS/CSS assets. Each of these brigades might require expertise in different areas, plus tailored assets.

Command and C4ISR Architecture

If NATO is to be serious about building S&R forces, a NATO SRF will need its own command structure. S&R missions require special leadership skills and many special, civil-oriented staff skills unique to stabilization and reconstruction. In most cases, S&R forces will deploy under command of a NATO CJTF, which will be directed by one of NATO's Joint Force Commands under the overall control of Allied Command Operations (ACO). If this happens, S&R forces will not need to operate on their own. Yet situations could arise in which SRF forces are the only NATO forces deployed, and a CJTF is not available. Then, an SRF force will need a deployable headquarters of its own. Even in situations where SRF forces are commanded by a CJTF, they might be entrusted to operate autonomously, which will require an independent joint command structure. Similar to the NRF, the act of becoming capable for S&R operations requires not only commanding S&R forces in contingencies, but also developing them in peacetime. An SRF command structure will be needed to perform this critical function as well as be capable of working under the guidance of both ACO and ACT.

A NATO SRF also will need a C4ISR information architecture to conduct demanding operations in distant locations. This architecture must

be capable of operating with NATO forces and other international forces, civilian agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Such an architecture—composed of integrated information networks for communications, intelligence, force operations, and logistic support—will provide a central framework upon which to build a NATO SRF for the information age. The SRF C4ISR architecture must allow it to “plug and play” into a CJTF with its combat forces. It also should provide SRF commanders with assets for commanding multinational formations that may be integrated down to the battalion level or lower. Such a C4ISR architecture and its interactive networks will need to be designed with the multifaceted nature of S&R operations in mind, including security and reconstruction. Future systems and their technologies should be designed and upgraded with these performance parameters in mind.

Three Options for NATO

If S&R forces and capabilities are to be built, key decisions on important choices will have to be made. The issue is more than how much is enough. A determination also must be made as to how responsive and effective S&R forces should be. The decision should be governed by four criteria:

- ▀ Military effectiveness: ensuring that S&R forces can perform their missions.
- ▀ Feasibility and affordability: respecting what the traffic will bear.
- ▀ Cost-effectiveness: pursuing measures with benefits that match or exceed costs.
- ▀ Tradeoffs and opportunity costs: not interfering with other priority programs.
- ▀ With these criteria in mind, NATO has three strategic options:

Option 1: Minimal Preparedness: Identification of potentially available forces; no special command structures would be created or NATO-directed force preparations undertaken. A NATO center of excellence might be created to help orchestrate doctrine and policies, while ACO would conduct general S&R planning and exercise objectives. The forces would be expected to meet NATO readiness and performance standards for FLR, and force development would be entrusted to the participating members.

Option 2: ACO and Regional Command Operational Planning for Mission-Assigned S&R Forces: Identification of NATO commands to conduct planning and exercises for S&R operations and employment of NATO standard planning machinery to provide guidance for a posture of

assigned forces whose readiness, training and force development would be the responsibility of individual members, as with other NATO earmarked forces. These forces would be expected to meet the readiness standards and other performance characteristics of average HRF.

Option 3: NATO-Directed Creation of a Flexible, Modular S&R Force. Creation of a NATO command structure responsible for both operational planning and S&R force development, as in option 2, and an integrated, flexible, modular S&R force similar to the NRF, whose development would be proactively managed by ACO and ACT. These forces would be expected to meet the readiness standards and other performance characteristics of top-line HRF.

Option 1 outlines the minimum steps to enable NATO to assemble forces and capabilities for S&R missions. It would provide an S&R option, but with a capability that falls well short of the best NATO combat forces. Essentially, it aims for a third-tier force that can be activated over 3 to 6 months. As a result, this S&R force option does not rise to the readiness standards of an HRF. Member nations would nominate sufficient forces to meet or surpass S&R needs of one to two division equivalents. NATO would maintain the troop list, which NATO military commands could use in designing operational plans. This option would establish no new command structure might to conduct operational planning or S&R force development. Subject to broad NATO strategic guidance, responsibility for force development would reside entirely with the member nations. During a crisis, these forces could be assigned to the NATO command, but NATO would have little to say about their training, equipment, doctrine, and other characteristics.

Option 2 aspires to meet the standards now employed to maintain NATO's average HRF at adequate preparedness levels. Its goal is to create S&R forces that could complement the NRF and ARRC, but would not match them in readiness or other performance characteristics. This second-tier force could be readied in 2 to 3 months. It establishes a special NATO S&R command structure that would work closely with combatant commands to develop operational plans, doctrines, C4ISR architectures, and interoperability standards. It would employ existing NATO planning mechanisms—ministerial guidance, force goals, and country plans—to assist member nations, who would be responsible for force development. A multinational force of sufficient size would be created and the assigned forces would retain this affiliation permanently unless changes were sought by member states. There would be no regular rotation of forces through the S&R force.

Option 3 aims to match the readiness standards of the top-line HRF. The goal would be to create a force that could operate alongside the NRF and ARRC as a comparable performer in readiness and other characteristics. In addition to a special S&R command structure, it would create an integrated but flexible and modular S&R force with high-level performance capabilities. ACO and ACT would work closely with the S&R command in developing schools, readiness, equipping, training, interoperability standards, transformation goals, doctrine, exercises, and sustainment for the SRF. NATO common investment funds would be allocated, and a rotational scheme would be used. National forces assigned to the force would remain on duty for 1 to 2 years, and then be replaced by new forces.

The benefits, limitations, and tradeoffs of these three options are apparent. Option 1 moves NATO into the S&R business with minimal disruption to existing defense arrangements and few costs in budgets and resources. However, the resulting forces would have relatively low readiness, multinational integration, and overall preparedness, unless individual members pursued improvement measures on their own. Option 2 takes significant steps to create a command structure and an S&R force similar to average HRF forces. Clearly it poses higher costs in budgets, resources, and commitments than option 1. Option 3 offers the highest level of preparedness, multinational integration, and capability: the S&R force would not match the NRF in readiness, but it would acquire a status equal to top ARRC units and would benefit from the types of attention now being given by ACO and ACT to the NRF. Of the three options, it poses the highest costs and would have the biggest impact on other NATO defense priorities.

In essence, option 1 makes sense only if nothing better is realistically achievable. While better than nothing, it does not provide a way for NATO to meet its military requirements promptly. Option 2 offers an affordable alternative by providing NATO with an S&R force that operations not be top-line, but could be drawn upon in a crisis when 2 to 3 months of warning and mobilization are available. Option three is a first-rate S&R force that can be drawn upon on relatively short notice. Judged on military merits, option 3 is clearly the most attractive option if political support and budgetary resources can be mobilized.

These options, however, are not mutually exclusive. Option 1 can be pursued as a near-term expedient in the next 1 to 2 years. Option 2 can be pursued in the mid-term, 2 to 4 years—if nothing better is achievable. If option 2 is adopted for the mid-term, option 3 can be pursued over a

longer-term of 5 to 6 years. Such a time-phased approach might enable NATO to create viable S&R forces and capabilities steadily while avoiding any interference with the NRF, top-line ARRC forces, and other high-priority defense initiatives. Conversely, if NATO is willing to cut back in some areas, option 3 can be pursued on a faster timeline, yielding a completed effort in 4 to 5 years.

Regardless of which option NATO chooses, leaders should concentrate equal energy on the creation of the civil capabilities essential to the prosecution of S&R operations. Basically, what NATO would create is a deployable operations cell of requisite civil reconstruction expertise to accompany its military headquarters. This civilian operations cell would be appended to the SRF Headquarters to provide the experts necessary to help rebuild civil government institutions and basic services and infrastructure. The longstanding Civil Emergency Planning Directorate of the International Staff is the appropriate agency to steer this undertaking. Skills such as agricultural and industrial planning, transport and civil aviation planning, medical and communications planning, and civil protection are examples of areas in which NATO has cultivated civil-sector expertise for decades. New areas that should be under study are global cultural, ethnic, religious, and legal specialties. The Cold War era Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee already has revitalized its agenda and is in a strong position to steer this effort for the NAC. A deployable civil cell might come from the International Staff as well as from NATO members, or even in collaboration with the EU, which has longstanding civil expertise in many key areas, especially border and customs control, multinational legal institutions, and civil policing.

Post-Istanbul Agenda

In the coming months, NATO's defense ministers and military leaders can undertake a study aimed at creating an S&R concept plan and implementation agenda for consideration at future ministerial session, perhaps in spring 2005. A 6-month study should perform these functions:

- Assess current S&R forces and capabilities in the inventories of NATO members. Analyze current and future requirements for NATO S&R operations.
- Analyze the capacity of NATO and its European members to strengthen S&R forces and capabilities without undermining the NRF.

- ▶ Review alternative options for better organizing NATO S&R forces and capabilities and otherwise meeting future requirements.
- ▶ Provide recommendations for how NATO should act in the coming period.

Once this agenda is endorsed, programmatic implementation can get underway. As in the case of the NRF, membership in the SRF should be voluntary. Most likely, some NATO members will see advantages in participating in an SRF, especially those members who cannot provide top-line combat forces for the NRF and ARRC, but have the military assets to play meaningful roles in S&R. Viable S&R forces could have a major impact on NATO's strategic effectiveness in the coming years.

Notes

¹ Source: Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, *Needed—A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force*, Defense Horizons 45 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004).

² command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

³ Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2004).

Constabulary Forces and Postconflict Transition: The Euro-Atlantic Dimension (2005)¹

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Key Points

There is a growing need for an international paramilitary police force that can fill the security gap between the end of military combat, peace support, relief operations, and the start of restoration of civil authority.

Several governments of the European Union, drawing on longstanding paramilitary national police forces, are creating a multinational European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), which could fill some of the security gap. With a permanent headquarters based in Italy, the EGF would act as light expeditionary forces, configured to serve both as keepers of public order (so-called substitution missions) and as advisers and trainers of local police (strengthening missions).

The United States needs to consider the best way to develop these kinds of capabilities, which it does not possess today. While the American military should retain its multimission character, the U.S. objective should be a mix of capabilities that allow for a seamless shift from ground combat to operations of a law enforcement character.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union should establish liaison and training relationships that allow for regular military forces, constabulary forces, and civilian police and law enforcement officials to explore techniques, training, and procedures for stabilization missions that permit adoption of best practices and facilitate coordination, cooperation, and planning.

Since the early 1990s, multinational stabilization efforts in the wake of conflicts or major natural disasters have repeatedly encountered problems in filling the so-called security gap. In places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, outside interveners have faced a compelling need to use specialized capabilities that can fill the gap between the point where military operations—whether for combat, peacekeeping, or counterinsurgency—leave off and community-based policing activities pick up. In particular, ensuring a capacity to manage and defuse civil disturbances and other threats to public order has become a *sine qua non* for overall mission success.²

A number of European countries—most notably France, Italy, and Spain, but also Portugal and the Netherlands—have long possessed such capacities via their well-established national constabulary services. But the United States has not made comparable investments in this kind of capability for its own needs and consequently has been slow to embrace this requirement in overseas venues. Nonetheless, pressures are growing to embrace creatively the necessary transformational shifts in U.S. military organization, doctrine, equipping, and training. Among other groups, the prestigious U.S. Defense Science Board documented the inadequacy of U.S. postconflict capabilities in detail in its seminal 2004 study, *Transition To and From Hostilities*.³

American consideration of European capabilities in this area has often been subordinated to policy reservations regarding the European Union's (EU's) nascent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the quasi-operational European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), and low European defense spending. When it comes to avoiding unintended duplication with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), such concerns are understandable. Yet it would be unfortunate if Washington overlooked a unique and valuable European contribution in providing this intermediary support to postconflict stabilization—in essence, filling the gap between what are not quite combat operations and yet not exactly peacekeeping activities as traditionally defined by the United Nations.

This essay explores the factors that give rise to the need for constabulary capabilities in fragile postconflict settings, assesses EU efforts to develop greater capacities via the newly formed European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), discusses the implications of these developments for U.S. defense transformation, and proposes ways to strengthen Euro-Atlantic cooperation in this vital area.

Hammer vs. Scalpel

As military missions in Bosnia and Kosovo have demonstrated, postcombat operations reflect one of the most complex and challenging phases of the conflict spectrum.⁴ Part of the reason for recognizing this as a new phase is that, although organized hostility has ended, order has yet to be restored. The local authorities usually are too weak and unable to govern without external support. Judicial and legal institutions are broken, nonexistent, or illegitimate. The transition period from warfighting to peacekeeping and reconstruction is particularly tenuous because it represents the nexus of two different axes: the military-civilian axis and the external-internal axis.

Along the military-civilian axis, one expects to see a changing relationship between military and civilian actors throughout the life cycle of a postconflict operation. At more advanced stages, civilian agencies should be assuming greater responsibility for residual law-and-order duties while the military components assume a lower profile. The external-internal axis refers to the changing relationship between external security actors and internal or domestic security actors. Here the problem revolves around the inability, at least initially, of local authorities in postcombat environments to establish law and order, provide basic security for the population, and govern their own territory. To avoid turning failed or recovering states into international dependencies, the international community recognizes the need to transition effectively from externally provided security—whether military or constabulary—to security provided by local actors once the latter have been adequately empowered.

This transition period is the most critical for the conclusion of a successful mission. The aftermath of both Kosovo and Bosnia highlighted the need for the United States and its NATO allies to develop capabilities to cope with demanding, high-intensity, yet still localized threats to public order. These tasks are best suited for constabulary units than for either traditional combat soldiers or community police. In the end, all are prerequisites for successful reconstruction.

In simple terms, military forces are trained for war—force-on-force engagements against other military or armed adversaries. While the military is able to mobilize and deploy rapidly in large units, most are uncomfortable with, ill suited to, and not generally trained for police tasks that are central to postmilitary conflict operations (for example, riot control, border control, domestic surveillance, securing/protecting sensitive sites). As an analyst has noted, the military is a “blunt instrument” that is “capa-

ble only of imposing a most basic, rigid form of order,” involving attempts to “deter and limit loss of life and destruction of property, but that is about all.”⁵ Most U.S. and allied military forces are not trained to intervene directly to deal with crime or civil violence in postconflict situations. In a sensitive period of occupation, one false step by a soldier using excessive force can have catastrophic consequences.

Recent history has illustrated that an effective response to crises along the full spectrum of conflict requires at least three types of security forces: high-end combat forces to neutralize hostile, organized adversaries; constabulary or paramilitary forces to handle crowd control and lower levels of organized violence; and community-based law enforcement organizations (police, judicial, and penal authorities) to rebuild legal and judicial institutions. So far, the U.S. Armed Forces have proven to be best suited to address high-end conflict operations. This does not mean infantry and light infantry forces and various U.S. reserve units have not done excellent work when pressed into service as peacekeepers in places such as the Balkans and Sinai. It does mean that in recent operations, the United States, for lack of better options, has routinely turned to elite Special Operations Forces (SOF) or traditional military police to address stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) tasks.

Using SOF to conduct messy postconflict operations and low-end security has overstretched these units and forced a higher than desirable operations tempo, jeopardizing other priority military missions for which only they are trained and equipped. The training that military police receive in some of the skills required for stabilization is not focused on creating competency in the full range of constabulary skills. Rather, police training emphasizes a general familiarity with tasks, relying heavily on in-the-field operational training. In addition, both special operations and military police units generally lack the full gamut of specialized equipment (lethal and nonlethal) to deal with lower levels of stabilization and nationbuilding.

The European gendarme forces have evolved beyond their historic role of meeting domestic needs. They have conducted numerous constabulary and law enforcement operations in many parts of the world. For example, between August 1998 and January 1999, the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) in Bosnia, headed and staffed largely by Italian Carabinieri, was employed in 243 reconnaissance patrols, 87 information-gathering missions, and 33 public order interventions.⁶ The MSU dealt with refugee returns, organized crime, and terrorism. The French Gendarmerie has been involved in peace operations in Haiti, El Salvador, Cambodia,

Western Sahara, Somalia, Rwanda, the Balkans, and elsewhere.⁷ Likewise, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish forces have been deployed in various operations in Africa and the Balkans. Our European allies have substantial experience in the use of forces with the kind of training, organization, and equipment that is directly relevant for future law enforcement missions in S&R operations. There is much Washington could learn from its allies to overcome the temptation that elite SOF, military police, or special Army/Marine units can do the job alone.

Constabulary Forces

The term *constabulary* refers to “a force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment.”⁸ Europeans often describe constabulary forces as “police forces with a military status.”⁹ They are trained in military skills, but their focus and equipment is on minimal/nonlethal use of force and tasks normally associated with police functions. Unlike traditional soldiers, the goal of constabulary units is to defuse potentially violent situations through negotiations and conflict management, rather than to “neutralize” the enemy or destroy a target. While constabulary forces vary by country, they can provide order and security in a postcombat area of operation after military forces have been relieved and redeployed but before local or law enforcement institutions have been restored.¹⁰ Often, they wear national police uniforms, so as not to be confused with those who have just done the fighting, but they are armed and ready, if necessary, to use lethal force.

Though serving as police, constabulary forces are highly skilled in the tactics and doctrine of light infantry, including rapid deployment and an ability to sustain themselves logistically. The Dutch *Marechaussee*, for example, can deploy a 50-person detachment as a rapid-response unit within 48 hours.¹¹ These forces also are highly trained. For example, the Italian Carabinieri, serving as part of Kosovo Force, averaged 10 years of specialized training, about twice the time of their military counterparts.¹² Other training includes martial arts, use of firearms and light weapons, intelligence-gathering and interrogation techniques, international law, negotiation, social skills, use of communications equipment, and foreign languages and cultures. Most European constabulary forces also have specialized dog units and sniper teams. Their equipment reflects a hybrid of police and military gear as well: flak jackets, shields, batons, tear gas, and automatic weapons.¹³ They are able to secure and protect traffic routes, facilitate the introduction of civilian rebuilding and assistance, set up and

manage prisons, and establish and train certain types of national police and law enforcement institutions.

Constabulary forces serve a vital role along the conflict spectrum between warfighting on the high end and local law enforcement on the low end. While combat forces are effective in neutralizing hostile forces and providing initial stability to the environment, such units are typically neither trained nor equipped to handle long-term security problems such as looting, rioting, crowd control, crime, civilian disturbances, restoring basic services, and local law enforcement, all of which require increasingly nonlethal countermethods. These latter types of critical skills can often make the ultimate difference between mission success and failure.

Yet, as the Defense Science Board study noted, the U.S. military has not yet embraced S&R operations as an “explicit mission with the same seriousness as combat operations.”¹⁴ Planning for these types of activities is often considered a requirement that falls outside the traditional role (or interest) of the U.S. military. While the Armed Forces have considerable latent S&R capacity, it is embedded in other mission priorities and impeded by the low-density/high-demand problem, resulting in deployments without appropriate training or equipment. Despite this dawning recognition, the military finds itself in a conundrum: the requirement for S&R forces is real, yet no tailored S&R force or capability exists. Washington has not devoted the resources to develop these skills within the U.S. military or sought more effective ways to tap Europe’s expertise appropriately.

European Capabilities

Since the end of the Cold War, but most significantly after the St. Malo declaration in December 1998, EU member states have attempted to develop complementary military capacities.¹⁵ While the lack of tangible improvements in military capabilities or significant increases in defense spending is widely criticized by commentators in the United States, less noticed—or discussed—have been efforts to develop civilian crisis management capacities, including tailored and deployable constabulary and police units.

What kind of constabulary forces do the Europeans possess? Individually, there are unique, national capabilities (for example, the Italian Carabinieri and French Gendarmerie). Beyond the national level, Europeans have proven their ability to merge capabilities multilaterally, most notably in the MSU in the Balkans. In fact, the first EU crisis management operation was in January 2003, when the European Union Police Mission

(EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina took over from the United Nations (UN) International Police Task Force.

Most recently, Europeans have sought to develop multinational constabulary capacities within a more institutionalized framework. On September 17, 2004, the Dutch EU presidency announced that five EU member states (France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) had agreed to form a European Gendarmerie Force, with a permanent headquarters in Vicenza, Italy. Intended to be operational by late 2005, the 900-person force would be tasked to ensure security and public order, fight organized crime, advise and train local police forces, as well as fill the postconflict security gap as military forces transition to peacekeeping. Other EU member states could participate as much as they were willing and able.¹⁶

The EGF's main purposes are substitution and strengthening missions.¹⁷ *Substitution* refers to missions where the local police either do not exist or are totally incapable of maintaining public order. *Strengthening* missions involve advising and training local police to perform public order duties, such as urban operations, crowd control, patrimonial site protection, and combating terrorism and organized crime. For example, in Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, French Gendarmes deployed alongside military peacekeepers and helped reestablish the local police force.¹⁸ In Bosnia and Kosovo, Italian Carabinieri conducted joint patrols with local police. Their presence reassured fledgling local police and gave skittish refugees confidence that they could return to their homes unharmed. The Carabinieri also used their investigative skills (including plainclothes covert surveillance, crime mapping, and link analysis) to help the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia counter organized crime.¹⁹

European officials envision the EGF to be deployed either along with or immediately after a military operation to maintain or establish public order and safety. The advantage of the European Gendarmerie Force is that, although it is considered a police asset, it can be placed under military command. In other words, EGF forces have the training, equipment, and background to work in a military command environment.

According to the EGF "declaration of intent," its flexibility is the ability to deploy at every phase of a conflict:

- ▶ initial phase: along with military forces to perform various police tasks
- ▶ transitional phase: either alone or with a military force, coordinating and cooperating with local or international police units

- military disengagement phase: facilitate the handover from military to civilian authorities, whether local or international.

On December 14, 2004, the European Union announced that the first EGF commander would be French Brigadier General Gérard Deanaz.²⁰ He reports to a High Level Interdepartmental Committee that is responsible for strategic management and political control, although if the EGF is used for an EU mission, the political control would fall under the EU Political-Security Committee plan.²¹

The commander heads a staff of about 30 planners at the EGF permanent headquarters in Vicenza. Planners are expected to work closely with the EU military staff and civilian crisis management planning cell in Brussels. Among the EGF headquarters' tasks are monitoring at-risk areas; planning contingency and operational maneuvers; arranging and directing combined exercises; evaluating and implementing lessons learned; and, as necessary or if requested, providing guidance to strategic decisionmaking. Thus, the goal is to incorporate EGF capacities into the ESDP so that the European Union eventually will be able to respond to the full spectrum of crisis situations, from preventive diplomacy to postcombat nationbuilding.

The EU vision of the integrated police unit (IPU) allows for Europeans to perform "robust police missions" under less stable conditions, even if this involves temporarily being placed under military command. Since the expected area of operation is likely to be characterized by the absence of internal authority, the IPU concept is a critical part of the larger framework linking EGF to EU contributions in building the country's law enforcement and judicial institutions. As illustrated by international experiences in the Balkans and East Timor, the deployment of police forces alone does not help to create stable conditions unless there are other means to process criminals and administer justice.²²

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has aptly described the EU effort as trying to create an intervention force that is "something between the neutrality of traditional UN peacekeeping and NATO's cruise missiles."²³ The Dutch stress that the EGF—through its training and its pre-organized unit structure—would serve as a viable framework in which other nations with similar types of police forces may choose to participate. Any EU member state possessing "a police force with a military statute" may take part in the EGF. Candidates (including Turkey) that have such constabulary forces may obtain "observer status" and detach a liaison officer to the EGF headquarters. For instance, the contribution of the roughly

150,000 Turkish *Jandarma* may help the European Gendarmerie Force eventually solve manpower constraints, as well as facilitate EU-Turkish relations in general. Because of its unique capabilities, the EGF also may be a positive venue for repairing European relations with the United States.

Assessing the EGF

The organizing framework of the European Gendarmerie Force is new, so it will take time to develop. However, several issues must be addressed in three main areas: training/rules of engagement, deployment, and links/relationships with other organizations and states.

The gendarmes in the EGF are part of the existing pool of personnel committed to civilian crisis management.²⁴ EU members participating in the EGF plan to use the same forces as those already pledged in the 2001 Helsinki Headline Goal catalogue. Under the police category, the European Union aimed to have a cadre of 5,000 police officers by 2003, of which 1,400 would be able to deploy within 30 days. In November 2001, at a Police Capabilities Conference in Brussels, EU members reached (at least on paper) their targets, including 13 rapidly deployable integrated police units.²⁵ The European Union already has two rapidly deployable headquarters at its disposal, one from the French Gendarmerie and the other from the Italian Carabinieri. The EGF thus seems rather similar, although less ambitious than just several years ago.

Table 6–1. European Gendarmerie Capabilities

Country	Force	Personnel	Committed to EGF
Italy	Carabinieri	111,800	800
France	Gendarmerie	101,399	600
Spain	Guardia Civil	73,360	500
Portugal	Republican Guard	26,100	160
Netherlands	Marechaussee	6,800	100
TOTAL		319,459	2,160

Source: Institute for International Strategic Studies, *Military Balance*, 2003/04.

At a civilian capabilities commitment conference on November 22, 2004, EU member states (including the 10 newest members) updated the 2001 catalogue and pledged more than 5,700 police for participation in crisis management operations. Consequently, because the European Gendarmerie Force will draw from this same pool rather than raise new forces, it creates a potential dilemma with respect to deployability.

The EGF initiative stemmed from French domestic politics but reflects internal EU dynamics and new 21st-century operational demands. In 2003, French Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie proposed a multinational unit that could be deployed rapidly to assist in police duties. At the time, Alliot-Marie reportedly was in a bureaucratic battle with the French finance and interior ministries. By proposing the establishment of such a force, the French defense minister might have hoped to gain additional budget resources, as well as maintain control over the use of the *Gendarmerie*.²⁶

The Italians, meanwhile, who have a great deal of overseas experience with their *Carabinieri*, saw an opportunity to promote their country as one of the major powers within the European Union. Since Germany (for political and historical reasons) had a strict rule of separating military and police functions and Great Britain did not possess these unique types of forces, Spain also saw an opportunity to raise its profile in EU circles. The French, still smarting from EU enlargement (primarily to the East), considered the EGF as a natural fit to maintain leadership of a southern group of member states, perhaps entice the new members with these low-end specialized capabilities, and tout the embryonic ESDP. Knowing that the European Union could not compete on high-end military tasks (and seeing Washington distinctly uncomfortable with nationbuilding and struggling with S&R operations in Iraq), the French and other EU participants considered the EGF a perfect answer to filling a security niche. It also complemented other ongoing efforts on the military side of ESDP, such as developing battlegroups, taking over the NATO mission in Bosnia, and establishing a European Defense Agency to coordinate weapons procurement.

The British media immediately lauded the September 17, 2004, declaration with such hyperbolic headlines as “EU flexes muscles.”²⁷ The BBC noted that the EGF would be sent to “places where law and order has deteriorated but not completely broken down, or where a conflict has subsided and heavily-armed troops are no longer needed.”

While the concept is clear and the need is compelling, EU members nevertheless face real challenges in making this initiative work. There is no question the forces that will comprise the EGF are capable. But unanswered questions remain: How deployable are the units? What will the stress points be? Will EU governments find themselves overstretched? How long are the deployments? Where will units be sent? Whose training standards and operating procedures will dominate (French *Gendarme* or

Italian Carabinieri)? With the demand for these types of forces growing, Europeans need to find answers quickly.

The political-military challenges are not dissimilar to those faced by NATO as it develops the NATO Response Force. EGF coordination and strategic direction belong to the high-level interdepartmental committee. However, if the EGF is used for an EU mission, the responsibility will shift to the EU Political-Security Committee. In this committee, all 25 EU members have a voice and a potential veto. Since only five EU members participate in the EGF, it remains to be seen how the other members would pursue the politics with respect to a proposed mission. In addition, each EU-5 member state retains the right to decide whether its units would participate in an EGF operation. Such uncertainty places additional demands on force planners, since one cannot be certain that earmarked units might not be withdrawn or not made available for political or other reasons.

In the end, national needs, available funding and personnel, and prestige will determine the depth and durability of national commitments to the European Gendarmerie Force. Since EGF availability and deployability are tied to meeting national requirements, there may be a gap between the numbers earmarked in a database and the actual number available for a mission. Not only are the raw numbers of forces listed small, but many of these forces are also being double-counted for the European Union, United Nations, and elsewhere. Consequently, conducting simultaneous operations may be out of the question. What happens if French gendarmes assigned to a UN mission are required for a separate EGF mission? Hard political choices would have to be made, and European allies might have to think through difficult trade-offs with other security priorities.

In 2001, EU governments established a small police unit within the Council Secretariat (under Common Foreign and Security Policy High Representative Javier Solana). The unit consists of only about 8 police officers and civilians, which is dwarfed by the EU Military Staff of over 150. It is not yet clear how the EGF headquarters will interact with the Council Secretariat's police unit or the EU Situation Center. Presumably, there will be liaison officers to coordinate EU efforts. In late 2003, the European Union was working on developing a broad civil-military coordination concept that would integrate the myriad EU elements both in Brussels and in the field, but specific parameters have yet to be worked out.²⁸

Again, the EGF is scheduled to become operational late this year. Nevertheless, numerous questions remain that the EU-5 will need to address in the coming year. Likewise, American operations are driving questions as to the ability of current U.S. military forces to meet the in-

creasingly diverse challenges of the 21st century, and more specifically, questions regarding the disposition and transformation of American forces to meet these security gap requirements.

Struggle and Challenge

The likelihood of American or NATO involvement in a great power conflict requiring massive troop numbers in the next 15 years is low. However, weak governments, lagging economies, and religious extremism will continue to place increasing demands on Western powers for stabilization, reconstruction, and nationbuilding operations.²⁹ Despite recognition of the growing and critical role constabulary forces could play in meeting these demands, the U.S. and NATO militaries are reluctant to address constructively the need for developing such skill sets.³⁰ In documents as recent as the newly drafted U.S. Joint Operating Concepts for 2005, the range of interim operations identified in spectrum-of-conflict operations continues to reflect the traditional spectrum of tasks.³¹ Likewise, in the NATO Defense Planning System, the emphasis centers on combat forces to the exclusion of identifying constabulary requirements or close combat urban warfare.³²

Winning wars and winning peace require unique and varied capabilities. Since the 1990s, U.S. military forces have been reduced overall, including the Army, which has been cut by 40 percent to approximately 485,500 (plus 355,000 Army National Guard and Reserves), while the operational demands (every 18–24 months) have doubled, as well as the duration of operations.³³ Similar trends are reflected in NATO efforts to reduce, professionalize, and deploy its militaries. The belief that the traditional military remains the best institution to deal with new world operational requirements needs to be challenged seriously. Although the military can quickly bring to bear large forces, equipment, and organization, the cost—both in terms of dollars, as well as scarce and highly specialized combat resources—has become increasingly high. Operational expenses in Afghanistan and Iraq alone exceed \$4.5 billion a month. The debate over what type of force is required to fill the security gap is at the heart of the discussion.

The United States cannot expect Europeans to assume responsibility for constabulary operations in all the areas where they are presently needed (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq). While European constabulary forces have the training and valuable expertise, current numbers are far too small to provide the extensive long-term support that the United States and NATO need to cover the growing operational security gaps in foreign

postconflict operations. European governments are also unlikely to opt out of combat and peacekeeping missions in favor of specializing in overseas constabulary missions. They will continue to strive to maintain a balance of capabilities in conflict situations. On the American side, the solution does not rest in simply increasing the number of combat, SOF, or military police forces. It lies in better tailoring existing forces within the United States to these new security missions in postconflict environments.

The United States is wrestling with its own military transformation and force restructuring efforts to be better positioned to respond to threats and challenges. The Department of Defense defines *transformation* as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, peoples, and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities.”³⁴ These efforts were reflected in the mid-1990s interest in a “revolution in military affairs,” as well as the latest efforts in 1997 to centerpiece transformation in the first Quadrennial Defense Review.³⁵

Despite these efforts, U.S. defense transformation efforts are bound to be flawed if we hold to outdated conceptions about war in the 21st century. The days of a preponderance of conventional force-on-force operations have given way to more complex challenges of asymmetric warfare, urban counterinsurgency, extensive civil affairs/public diplomacy work with the state’s publics, stabilization, reconstruction, and nationbuilding. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been regularly engaged in one form or another of nationbuilding activity. Our greatest enemy is complacency with old stereotypes of conventional attrition warfare coupled with misplaced faith in advanced, technically superior military forces (based on concepts of network-centric war, space-based battle stations, and long-range precision strike) and overwhelming weak, incompetent enemies. Despite this mismatch, the new threats are testing the Nation’s ability to react to and prevail over enemies in the kinds of day-to-day struggles currently faced and to do so at acceptable costs.

Some analysts in Great Britain and elsewhere argue that forces to fill the security gap are central to the military’s responsibility and that the military should be duly trained and equipped.³⁶ In 2002, the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies categorized four broad areas of tasks to be addressed by security gap forces: security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic development, and participatory governance. If our transformation efforts are to succeed, we must develop creative force capabilities that better meet these evolving op-

erational requirements.³⁷ The Armed Forces must be flexible and capable of seamlessly shifting focus from combat operations to dealing effectively with the rigors of political, legal, economic, and social requirements, establishing security and law and order, and providing the prerequisites for successful nationbuilding.

We are not suggesting that the U.S. Army be reconfigured to operate exclusively as security gap fillers. Conventional war is still a risk, but, ideally, this additional capability simply reflects yet another step in the Army's transformation, which could be accomplished by tailoring a small part of its 51,000 infantry into high-quality/specialized units that possess constabulary-like training, organization, and equipment. The transformed units would be mobile, have their own unique force protection, intelligence, and civil affairs, and have adequate firepower (lethal and nonlethal) and specialized training and skill sets to support police, local security force training, and nationbuilding activities. Introducing novel approaches to organization structures, realistic training scenarios, directed technology (communications, weaponry, personal protective gear, and armored vehicles), and modularity are indispensable anchors in enabling these new units. This transformation would also require tailored rules of engagement that allow forces to shift seamlessly from a combat role to a stand-alone capacity to work with local police units.

A Way Ahead

Knowing the new era of operational demands and the need for the U.S. military and NATO to transform, how can European constabulary capabilities both help resolve this military shortfall with real capability and also provide a concrete step toward rebuilding the transatlantic relationship?

Further capacity-building is essential. Europeans should—either through NATO, the European Union, or bilaterally—establish combined training relationships and opportunities for U.S. Armed Forces, civilian police, and law enforcement officials. Slots should be reserved for Americans to attend courses at European training facilities in Italy and France. In fact, this is an area where Italy in particular—with its rich Carabinieri tradition and historic transformation of its armed forces—could take the lead. Washington should provide proper incentives for Americans—both civilian and military—to learn from the Europeans.

Reaching out multilaterally to civilian organizations is also vital. The EGF should establish liaison relationships with the Department of State's Office of Civilian Police and Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction

and Stabilization and the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program, as well as the Department of Defense. Such interaction would permit adoption of best practices and facilitate coordination, cooperation, and planning.

The United States should take steps to promote interoperability. For example, as the United States debates its own approach to mounting more effective stabilization and reconstruction operations,³⁸ it should consider permitting and encouraging European constabulary forces to participate in American military academies, service schools, and think tanks. NATO's Allied Command Transformation and Joint Forces Command can play integral roles in facilitating inclusion in both NATO and the U.S. training centers. In addition, the United States should capitalize on its combat/stabilization/reconstruction experiences by creating a cadre of expert military trainers; this cadre would be comprised of individuals returning from operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq who have experience in SOF, military police, or civil affairs, but have retired from active-duty service or no longer meet military worldwide deployability criteria due to injuries or inadequate active-duty time remaining. Capturing this expertise and focusing it on the transitional skill set requirements from combat experiences to constabulary skill to local security forces would benefit and complement EU expertise.

The United States should encourage European constabulary forces to participate in the postcombat phase of multinational military operations. Ideally, this would mean that EU constabulary functions are incorporated into U.S. (and NATO) military planning as part of an integrated whole. America would assist in providing European constabulary forces with necessary transport and intelligence support. If successful, this collaboration could become the prototype for a new multinational instrument and a firm counterbalance to perceptions of American unilateralism and European irrelevance. Such transparency at the planning stage would allow the United States (and NATO) to focus on comparative advantages, while spotlighting European strengths and skills in postcombat operations. Consequently, the political costs of persuading others to follow a U.S. military course of action would be lowered, as the European leaders can justify the policy to their respective parliaments and publics. Europeans and the EU once again can feel (and rightfully so) that they are working side by side with the United States as equal partners capable of successfully meeting the demands of crisis operations in the 21st century.

Conclusion

We are at a critical fork in the evolution of warfare. Old concepts and organizations are no longer adequate in dealing with the asymmetric and nontraditional enemies that U.S. forces are facing in new-era conflicts. We need to develop capacities to respond to the full spectrum of conflict, from precrisis diplomacy to postconflict peacekeeping and then to nationbuilding. In the face of stabilization and reconstruction demands in Afghanistan and Iraq, both the United States and the international community must creatively embrace this transformational shift in national and multinational military organization and training. Despite the overwhelming challenges, America, NATO, and the European Union face a unique opportunity to cooperate and collaborate as equals on addressing the security gap.

Notes

¹ Source: David T. Armitage, Jr., and Anne M. Moisan, *Constabulary Forces and Postconflict Transition: The Euro-Atlantic Dimension*, Strategic Forum 218 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2005).

² The phenomenon of a security gap is well established in the literature on postconflict transitions. Michael J. Dziedzic has characterized this problem as the byproduct of three gaps: a *deployment* gap (in which intervening forces are mismatched to public security requirements); an *enforcement* gap (in which international police elements lack the authority or capacity to enforce law and order); and an *institutional* gap (in which the host nation lacks capacity to perform key law and order functions). See Michael J. Dziedzic, "Introduction," in *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, ed. Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), 8–16.

³ Defense Science Board 2004, *Transition To and From Hostilities*, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004.

⁴ The terms postconflict and postcombat are used interchangeably.

⁵ Dziedzic, 8.

⁶ Robert Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?* (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2004), 161–162.

⁷ See "Coopération internationale," available at <www.defense.gouv.fr/gendarmerie>.

⁸ Erwin A. Schmidl, "Police Functions in Peace Operations: An Historical Overview," in *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, 22.

⁹ See European Gendarmerie Force, "Declaration of Intent," September 17, 2004, available at <www.eu2004.nl>.

¹⁰ Perito, 34.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹² Interview with Italian defense official, January 12, 2005.

¹³ Perito, 158; interview with Italian defense official.

¹⁴ Defense Science Board 2004, vi.

¹⁵ For background on ESDP and the holistic EU approach to security, see Jolyon Howorth, *European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge?* Chaillot Paper No. 43 (Paris: WEU-ISS, 2000); and Michael J. Brenner, *Europe's New Security Vocation*, McNair Paper No. 66 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002).

¹⁶ European Gendarmerie Force.

¹⁷ Interview with Italian Carabinieri, December 2, 2004.

¹⁸ Interview with French Gendarmerie official, December 2, 2004.

¹⁹ Perito, 170–171.

²⁰ See “Un general français, chef de la gendarmerie européenne,” December 14, 2004, available at <www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/gendarmerie/actualites_et_dossiers>.

²¹ The High Level Interdepartmental Committee (HLIC) is composed of representatives from the countries' various ministries. France, Italy, and the Netherlands have representatives from their respective defense and foreign ministries. Portugal has representatives from its interior and foreign ministries, and Spain has representatives from all three (defense, interior, foreign) ministries. In addition to managing the politics of the EGF, the committee will set the operational standards of the units. The EU Political-Security Committee is composed of ambassadors from all 25 EU members and charged with advising the Council of the European Union on EU foreign and security policies.

²² Based on the Civilian Crisis Capabilities Conference in November 2004 that incorporated contributions from the 10 newest member states, the EU civilian crisis capacity includes policing (members have pledged 5,761 police officers); rule of law (members have pledged 631 judges, prosecutors, and other rule-of-law experts); civilian administration (562 administrative and infrastructure experts have been pledged); and civil protection (4,988 specialists in rapid response following natural disasters). Ministerial Declaration available at <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/82760.pdf>.

²³ See BBC News, “EU Launches Crisis Police Force,” available at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3665172.stm>> and Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), “EU States Set Up New European Military Police Force” (September 17, 2004).

²⁴ Interview with Dutch embassy official, November 15, 2004; interview with French Gendarmerie official, December 2, 2004.

²⁵ See Caroline R. Earle, “European Capacities for Peace Operations: Taking Stock” (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, March 2004), available at <www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Earle-Eu-EuropeanCapacitiesforPeaceOperations-TakingStock.pdf>.

²⁶ Interview with French Gendarmerie official, December 2, 2004.

²⁷ For example, see BBC News and FBIS.

²⁸ Earle.

²⁹ Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, *Mapping the Global Future*, 1–13.

³⁰ At the June 2004 Group of Eight (G–8) Summit at Sea Island, Georgia, the G–8 launched an initiative to establish a center to train personnel in constabulary operations. Although collocated at the EGF headquarters in Vicenza, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units is distinct from the EGF in that it is geared toward training (mostly) Africans to enhance African capacities in such operations.

³¹ For example, there are no specific constabulary requirements listed in NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire.

³¹ The exception is the basket of activities associated with homeland security: critical infrastructure protection, consequence management, military assistance for civil disturbances, and counternarcotics support. See Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 225.

³² For example, there are no specific constabulary requirements listed in NATO's Defense Planning Questionnaire.

³³ Karen Sudkamp, “Constabulary Forces Issue Paper,” June 2004, 17.

³⁴ Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees, “Military Transformation,” December 2004.

³⁵ NATO has parallel efforts transforming its forces, with Allied Command Transformation in the lead.

³⁶ See Andy Salmon and Mary Kaldor, *Principles for the Use of the Military in Support of Law Enforcement Operations, First Draft for Berlin Meeting* (The Centre for the Studies of Global Governance, May 18–19, 2004).

³⁷ See Thomas E. Ricks, "Army Contests Rumsfeld Bid on Occupation," *The Washington Post*, January 16, 2005.

³⁸ For example, see Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004).

Transforming NATO Command and Control for Future Missions (2003)¹

Charles L. Barry²

Overview

No military function is more critical to operational success than effective command and control (C²). There also is no more daunting military function to get right when it comes to the employment of complex multinational formations in the fast-paced arena of crisis response. Since the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—unique as an alliance with a permanent standing C² structure—has ventured into a broader spectrum of missions and across a wider geographical area of operations, posing far greater C² challenges than the single-mission, fixed-territory defense of the past. Threats to NATO interests have increased, demanding military structures and capabilities that can be employed on shorter notice and further outside NATO territory. At the same time, more sophisticated information-based battle systems and technologies are driving the need for increasingly interoperable forces. A key factor for success in this new environment will be a more agile, flexible, and responsive NATO C² architecture for the 21st century.

The NATO summit at Prague in November 2002 was a major milestone in the evolution of alliance command structure and future military force posture. Prague decisions outlined a new arrangement that will take several years and significant investment by both NATO and each member state to put in place. Although many details must still be worked out, early momentum toward the Prague goals is strong and encouraging. Those efforts should not falter at a time of new and proximate threats to NATO member territory and citizens, or collective interests.


Alliance military commanders direct their organizations through the architecture of the distinctive NATO political-military process called consultation, command, and control (C³). Although C³ is a single NATO process, consultation is focused on the political process of consensus decisionmaking among allies, while command and control (C²) is a military function achieved through the full array of NATO military command and force structures, doctrinal command relationships, and technical standards and interoperability agreements. NATO C² is also underpinned by a multifaceted communications and information system (CIS) that provides the connectivity and networks to conduct military operations. Related but separate NATO doctrines cover the functions of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The Prague Summit

The Prague NATO summit decisions were major steps in moving NATO toward C² capabilities to accomplish the future military tasks of the alliance. NATO leaders agreed that a new military command structure, while still capable of Article 5 collective defense, is to be reorganized and optimized for the more immediate mission of crisis response. A far smaller command structure will be decided upon by June 2003, one that will also be more mobile, flexible, and prepared than the current 1997-era structure. NATO leaders also decided to create by October 2004 a NATO Response Force (NRF) of “technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force(s)... to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council.” In addition, NATO intends to accelerate its investment in common-funded communications and information systems that are essential to an operational, network-centric response force to be ready within 2 years.

What makes Prague more compelling than earlier post-Cold War summits at Washington, Madrid, Brussels, and Rome is that it was preceded by a genuine sense of transatlantic convergence on two points. First, members agreed on the need for a smaller military structure designed around minimum military requirements. Second, the allies foresaw that proximate future threats, such as terrorism, require the availability of a small but potent force capable of engaging in combat operations on short notice at far greater distances than before, perhaps well outside of Europe. Harmony on these points signaled the end of a long migration from exclusive focus on collective defense to full investment in military capabilities to respond to threats well beyond NATO borders—a painstaking and contentious evolution that has taken more than 10 years.

Figure 7-1. Current NATO Command Structure (1999)



Legend: CUSRPG = Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group; SC = Strategic Command; RC = Regional Command; CC = Component Command; JHQ = Joint Sub-Regional Headquarters; CJF = Combined Joint Task Force; STRIKFLTANT = Striking Fleet Atlantic; SUBACLANT = Submarines Allied Command Atlantic

The Prague summit declaration offered refreshing words of commitment to field specific capabilities and renewed determination to end the long downturn in defense investments. Under an initiative called the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), NATO members signed up for specific capabilities improvements, including more than 100 commitments related to C² and information systems. The United States is watching anxiously for hard evidence from each of its allies in the vital areas identified in the PCC. At least at the NATO level, the two common-funded accounts that support C²—the military headquarters structure and the communications and information systems that support them—should realize higher priority and new resources in the budgets just ahead as a result of the PCC.

The post-Prague NATO challenge is to maintain momentum on the twin goals of producing a new command structure and creating the NRF by the end of 2004—a short period in terms of achieving decisions in a consensus-driven alliance. Past initiatives are testimony to the difficulties of consensus decisionmaking on matters related to military capabilities. The 1997 command structure revision was 5 years in the making and is still not entirely in place even as NATO has chosen to make sweeping additional changes. The 1994 initiative to create Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) is finally to be made operational 10 years later. The burden of creating an operational NRF by 2004 falls most directly on old-line European

NATO nations rather than on either the United States, which already has forces ready to participate, or on newer NATO members, who will mainly provide niche capabilities and from whom less will be expected initially.

Command Structure through 2004


The 1990s saw NATO evolve gradually from a one-mission alliance into a European region emergency response agency. Along the way, the alliance reduced its Cold War military structure from a completely fixed-site, 4-tiered, 65-headquarter hierarchy to a more manageable 3-tiered, 20-headquarter structure with demonstrated capabilities to deploy C² headquarters and sizable forces to the Balkans to conduct stability operations, crisis response, and even combat operations. By 1999, crisis response just beyond NATO borders had become the primary mission of the integrated military command. In the interim, military ingenuity had to create many ad hoc C² solutions to meet crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. The 1997 command structure also saw a shift in focus from the strategic level of operations to the regional level. In many respects, what NATO achieved in this period both met the needs of new missions and represented a substantial shift in thinking for so ponderous an organization.

However, the array of missions—peacekeeping (by the Stabilization Force in Bosnia), peace enforcement (by the Implementation Force in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force in Kosovo), preventative deployment (Operation *Amber Fox* in Macedonia), embargo enforcement (Operation *Sharp Guard* in the Adriatic), and actual combat (Operation *Allied Force* over Serbia and Kosovo)—their sudden nature, and the proximity of additional missions even further from NATO territory all threaten to stretch the still-mainly-fixed NATO C² apparatus beyond its design limits. Furthermore, the third tier of the current command structure, organized ostensibly to foster jointness and multinationality at seven joint subregional commands (JSRCs), is failing. Some JSRC headquarters are seriously understaffed, as nations give higher priority to deployed headquarters in the Balkans and to high readiness forces at home. Moreover, the JSRCs have little authority over other activities, such as Partnership for Peace requirements. In short, they have few day-to-day missions of real substance. Low funding and sparse training or exercise opportunities reportedly is causing morale to deteriorate. Due to these factors and the press to prepare for future missions, many de facto changes are likely to be in place before the new command structure is due to be operational in 2004.

NATO and Transformation

Command structure decisions taken at the Prague summit set a course toward a leaner structure of greater future utility. Two different strategic commands, one operational and one functional, will dominate the structure. A single Allied Command for Operations (ACO) based in Europe will provide C² over all NATO operational forces and will lead a far more streamlined command structure. The other strategic command will be the first-ever NATO functional command, a new Allied Command Transformation (ACT), with the mission of transforming NATO military capabilities into a much more interoperable and network-centric force. NATO staffs are to flesh out the rest of the structure by June 2003 following the criteria contained in the Minimum Military Requirement document agreed by defense ministers in September 2002. NATO leaders have not yet officially named the new strategic commands beyond the general references in the Prague Declaration; however, a number of important details about each command have been decided.

Figure 7–2. Future NATO Command Structure



Legend: CUSRPG = Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group; ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS = NATO operational command; ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION = NATO Transformation Command; NRF = NATO Response Force; CJTF = Combined Joint Task Force. HQs/Forces in white boxes are nonpermanent elements of NATO C²; JF COMD = Joint Forces Command

Allied Command for Operations

The Prague agreement directed that an allied command for operations would have two subordinate joint force headquarters (JFHQs), each

able to generate a land-based CJTF, and a third joint headquarters, able to launch a sea-based CJTF. The two JFHQ commands will be supported by three component (multinational but single service) commands comprised respectively of land, air, and maritime forces. The peacetime mission of the component commands will be both to strengthen interoperability and to train and exercise forces and command elements for commitment under CJTFs and the new NRF. There are also to be fewer combined air operations centers (CAOCs) than the 11 now maintained within the air forces of NATO members.

The final details of the future military structure are to be approved by defense ministers in June 2003, with implementation, including location decisions and command billet allocations (always a sensitive matter in NATO), likely by the end of 2004. Figure 7-2 depicts the two future strategic commands. Allied Command Operations is structured with land, air, and maritime component commands under two JFHQs, plus a separate maritime joint force headquarters. Three CJTFs and one NRF indicate the expected organizational locations of the most ready response forces. The future of the longstanding Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group was not addressed at Prague, so it is shown in its old position, but all elements of the old structure are subject to review as NATO moves toward a leaner force.

The missions for ACO, which will be NATO's only operational strategic command, include collective defense across an expanded NATO territory (the enduring Article 5 mission), Partnership for Peace activities, conducting NATO training and exercises with member and partner forces, Balkan operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, responding to the Prague political commitment to deepen contacts with Mediterranean Dialogue countries, and support of United Nations (UN) operations in Afghanistan. Added to this substantial list of activities will be the Prague mandate to be prepared to respond to crises well beyond NATO territory, mainly by deploying and employing NATO CJTFs and NRFs as directed by the North Atlantic Council. Already, NATO has agreed to support Polish-led forces in Iraq. The large and diverse ACO mission portfolio suggests the need for a highly capable command, one that is fully automated, expertly staffed, and well supported by modern, redundant, and secure communications. The command will need the agility to engage in planning, training, and operating across the full spectrum of NATO engagement, at times simultaneously.

Allied Command Transformation

The strategic command for transformation will be responsible for maintaining momentum in the transformation of NATO forces and for deepening interoperability. Its specific tasks are still being defined. However, based on early staff planning and the similarity of the ACT transformation missions to those of U.S. Joint Forces Command (the commander of which is likely to be dual hated as the commander of ACT at some point in the future), the command will have several important doctrine, force, and concept development roles. It will be setting guidelines, identifying benchmarks, and acting as the executive agent for NATO military authorities on transformation. It will be expected to assist in transformation planning by the militaries of allies and partners. The command will be in North America at the current location of Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), but it will also have a prominent presence in Europe to help shape transformation alliance-wide. Much of ACT resources and energies will be directed into experimentation and to working with ACO to achieve readiness objectives, exercise goals, and training standards.

Four other significant missions can be foreseen for ACT. The first is to engage in bringing transformational concepts into the design and execution of partnership activities, especially in the fulfillment of individual membership action plans. A second mission will be to establish a high-fidelity, rapid feedback alliance center for transformation lessons learned to identify concepts useful not only to NATO planners and decisionmakers but to national force and doctrine developers as well. The third area is for Transformation Command to assert influence on funding priorities for NATO testbeds and laboratories, especially at the testbeds and laboratories of the NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Agency (NC3A) where future communications and information technologies are researched. Finally, ACT will oversee the incorporation of transformational doctrine and concepts into official NATO military materials and school curricula, the outcome of which will be the education and training of a new generation of NATO officers for future missions.

ACT may also be asked to provide direct guidance to nations in terms of enhancing interoperability and network-centric capabilities through review of nation contributions to the alliance under the NATO force planning process. As the command most responsible for furthering the effects of interoperability as well as transformation, it would make sense for ACT to comment on the state of progress toward these goals in national as well as NATO-funded programs. Such objective assessments by

ACT would help NATO know where to place future emphasis, and it could also help defense ministers to argue more successfully for resources to meet NATO interoperability and transformational guidelines. Along these lines, ACT might eventually produce forward-looking NATO transformation and interoperability planning guidance for use by nations in meeting NATO force goals.

Carving out a substantial, productive ACT role will require solid backing from NATO political leaders. As a first-ever functional command within the alliance, other national and NATO entities already address, in varying degrees, the functions that ACT is expected to gather under its mandate. The most important relationship to work out is between ACT and ACO with regard to transformation, interoperability, and measuring the degree to which NATO capabilities meet those goals. A significant signal will be sent if ACT is assigned a key role in the defense planning process to review national force contributions and to provide a report to NATO political leaders on transformation. Within NATO common-funded procurement, ACT should have a similar influential role in making interoperability evaluations of requirements documents, especially CIS hardware and software.

CJTF and NATO Response Force

The CJTF headquarters concept requires a deployable C² capability embedded within the design of nondeployable regional headquarters. When activated, preselected staffs from the parent command, subordinate commands, and sister commands assemble on a permanent nucleus staff and constitute a deployable CJTF headquarters. The CJTF headquarters (HQ) can control a force up to a corps and similarly sized air forces and naval task forces. The forces under a CJTF are drawn from the readiest national forces of NATO members and partners. NATO plans call for a land-based CJTF embedded at each of the two current regional commands of Allied Command Europe (ACE) and a sea-based CJTF under the Striking Fleet Atlantic of ACLANT. The same three CJTFs will be in the new command structure; however, all will be under Allied Command Operations (see figure 7-2). CJTFs are to become the primary NATO means for future crisis response, yet they are also able to meet Article 5 collective defense requirements. NATO has indicated it may have two CJTFs deployed concurrently, although the traditional six-month NATO rotation concept would make that a daunting scenario. A variant of the NATO CJTF concept is to provide a CJTF headquarters and support assets to the European Union (EU) for EU-led operations.

Command and control arrangements for the NRF, at this writing, are still being deliberated by NATO. Several options are under consideration: deployment under a permanent NATO command, such as one of the Joint Force HQs; as a separate coalition force under a headquarters provided by a NATO nation; or under a NATO CJTF. Most NRF deployments are expected to be under the last scenario, with a CJTF HQ providing command and control. Since a CJTF HQ is designed to provide C² for a force three times the size of an NRF, the NRF can also be characterized as the lead element of a larger follow-on force under a CJTF HQ, thereby affording NATO the ready option to expand operations as necessary. Another advantage of using a CJTF HQ for command and control of the NRF is that its sizable structure includes a Multinational Joint Logistics Center (MJLC), which will be essential to sustain the NRF as well as follow-on forces, since the NRF is likely to deploy with limited supplies.

For the NRF and CJTF concepts to work in tandem, the developing NATO NRF concept will have to harmonize response times and other factors with existing CJTF criteria (or CJTF yardsticks may be modified). The response criterion for a CJTF is 60 days, and mission duration is planned to last up to 2 years. As NATO collaborates on the NRF design, U.S. advocates are proposing a pool of between 21,000 and 28,000 high-readiness forces from which a combined joint task force of variable size can be tailored and deployed within 5 to 30 days, accompanied by 30 days of logistical sustainment. There are numerous ways CJTF and NRF C² and other readiness criteria can be harmonized, but more guidance is needed for military planners to draft common deployment plans. One C² issue will be whether the existing CJTF design, which is a large headquarters of almost 2,000 personnel (when logisticians, communicators, security, and support elements are included), will need to be modified to incorporate a more austere and agile tactical C² element that can deploy quickly with an NRF. Guidance will also be needed with respect to the deployment of two CJTFs. For example, if an NRF deploys, will a second, on-call NRF be stood up along with a second (likely sea-based) CJTF?

A related task in standing up the NRF is to identify both the resources and support elements that a successful NRF employment will require. For example, with only 30 days of sustainment, an NRF would need some support forces to be deployable in a time frame to provide replenishment as on-hand supplies are consumed. In fact, any NRF mission will require an array of support forces—such as embarkation support assets, strategic and tactical transport, long line communications providers, strategic intelligence resources, air defense, combat search and rescue,

medical evacuation, and other assets—to be in almost as high a state of readiness as the NRF itself.

Both NRF and CJTF will place new demands on the most ready forces of member nations. The highest readiness forces of nations are few and are also those called upon for stability operations in the Balkans, NATO exercises, Partnership for Peace activities, and (recently) support of UN operations in Afghanistan. These enduring missions and NRF and CJTF will increase competition for scarce forces and resources, at least during periods of NATO exercises and national training.

Table 7–1. Supported Future Reaction Forces

Reaction Force	Size (up to)	Response Time (days)	Duration	Strategic C ²	Missions	Joint Combined	Initial Operation Ready	Beyond Europe
CJTF	60,000	60	2 years	NATO or EU	Humanitarian relief operation (HUMRO), peace-keeping operation (PKO), crisis response	Yes	2004	Possible
NRF	21,000	5–30	30 days +	NATO or coalition	Crisis response	Yes	2004	Yes
ERRF	60,000	60	1 year +	EU or NATO	HUMRO, PKO, crisis response	Yes	2003	No (initial)

The vintage 1996 CJTF headquarters concept will require updating as it is melded to the newer NRF concept. Recent exercises indicate that when an embedded CJTF is deployed, it decimates the parent regional headquarter C² capability until it can be reconstituted by substantial staff replacements. In addition to the impact the current concept has on its parent headquarter capabilities, the time lag in standing up the CJTF and the reality that the CJTF staff may be able to exercise together only once every 2 years must be considered. When activated, having limited experience in working together will be a significant factor in early staff performance for crisis response. All these factors suggest that a more permanent arrangement may work better in the long run. NATO may find that merging the CJTF concept and the parent JFHQs operational concept into a single standing headquarters along the lines of U.S. combatant commands is the best solution.

An EU Military Role

In December 1999, EU members agreed to have the ability by June 2003 to deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least 1 year, land forces up to corps size (60,000) plus comparable air and maritime forces. The stated purpose of this force is to give the Union a military capability to respond to international crises by conducting humanitarian, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement operations when the alliance as a whole is not engaged. The forces that EU NATO members have committed to the Union in most cases are dual-tasked for similar NATO operations under the NRF and CJTF. For that reason, the European Union employs NATO standard operating procedures.

The European Union is committed to not duplicate unnecessarily the assets and capabilities that can be made available for its operations by NATO. That principle is reflected in the EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) C² concept, which is based on commands provided by nations and is not an in-place C² structure like NATO. During contingency planning, EU members indicate two types of headquarters elements that they would be willing to commit for a particular plan. One is a non-deploying operations headquarters (OPS HQ) that would oversee the operation and provide the political-military interface to the EU Council and Military Staff. The other is the deployable and subordinate Force Headquarters (Force HQ) responsible to the OPS HQ for mission execution. NATO also has offered an OPS HQ capability to the European Union, which would be comprised of the Deputy Allied Commander, Operations (who is always a European) and designated European members of NATO staffs. The NATO arrangement would facilitate the provision of other NATO assets and capabilities, though the OPS HQ would respond to the EU Council rather than NATO authorities. In March 2003, the European Union launched its first operation in Macedonia using a NATO OPS HQ. Many aspects of the NATO-EU arrangement will have to be fine-tuned, not least of which are the circumstances under which C² assets will return to NATO.

NATO and the European Union have declared that the ERRF and the NRF are complementary, however the two organizations will have to collaborate on priorities so that conflicts are averted. Most observers expect that NATO CJTF and NRF will respond to missions potentially involving combat operations, and that, at least for the next several years, the EU force will focus on less taxing humanitarian and peacekeeping operations while the Union gets its systems and processes up and running smoothly. That division of labor should deconflict requirements for front line forces

(even though the EU Helsinki Force Catalogue includes most of members' best combat equipment), but perhaps not for support forces that provide capabilities common to both missions areas. It must be noted that neither the Helsinki commitment nor the 1992 Petersburg Tasks limit the European Union to missions of any specific size, region, or mission category. However, as one EU official noted, the Union has to learn how to walk first, even if eventually will run too.

Regardless of how missions are assigned, demand will overlap on limited high-value resources such as C² elements, communications, transportation, logistics, and funding. Part of the solution may be for the Union to create more of its own support capabilities, such as strategic lift and communications, assets that would also benefit NATO if the allies were to act under the alliance. However, since the European Union has agreed to act only when NATO is not engaged, the immediate issue (by 2004) will be to coordinate both NATO and EU training goals within the time and resource constraints of fewer, smaller exercises.

NATO Force Structure

Although NATO has a permanent command structure it has few standing forces in peacetime. Most permanent personnel are assigned to the command structure already described. The rest are assigned to a few standing naval forces and in-place planning staffs, communications elements, or air defense and air surveillance units. The bulk of NATO forces are committed on a mission-by-mission basis by member nations, usually as preplanned under the NATO biennial force planning process. The forces provided by nations comprise the extension of NATO command and control down through the tactical level, primarily through single-service headquarters commanding organic troops, flights and ships.

An agreed NATO Force Structure document (called MC 317/1) lets nations know what NATO expects from their force contributions in terms of readiness, unit size, deployability, rotation durations, and sustainment, as well as command and control. This guidance helps nations determine the number and readiness requirements for tactical C² headquarters for land, air, maritime, and certain specialized forces. Current NATO guidance calls for nations to designate certain deployable land and maritime headquarters as High Readiness Force (HRF) headquarters, and other C² elements as Forces of Lower Readiness (FLR). HRF headquarters constitute the NATO crisis response C² under the NRF and CJTF concepts. At present NATO has access to only one deployable air headquarters, a Com-

bined Air Operations Center (CAOC) from the United States, however more are planned.

Table 7–2. NATO Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Environment

Manager	NATO Command, Control, and Communications Agency (NC3A)
Operator	NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA)
Standards (approved December 2000)	NATO Command, Control, and Communications Technical Architecture (NC3TA)
Major Features	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Includes several major systems upgrades ▶ Contains COTS-based hardware and software ▶ Addresses need for mobility ▶ Integrates networks (for example, LAN and WAN) but still hierarchical and not network technologies
Conclusions	NATO moving on the correct path and needs to stay the course NATO members must invest in NATO standards, procurement of upgradable technologies, and interoperability

Promulgating NATO standards for C² readiness and interoperability is as important for nations as it is for the alliance. Nations use the NATO force structure guidance as input in prioritizing their forces for resource planning. The NATO force structure document establishes criteria for both national and multinational forces.

Communications and Information Systems

Military command and control, along with all political and military business of the alliance, is supported by a NATO-wide architecture of communications and information systems (CIS)—better known outside NATO as command, control, communications, and computers (C⁴). NATO CIS support for command and control is comprised of systems’ hardware and software, as well as the policies and architecture that define how CIS connects and supports NATO land, air, and maritime forces.

CIS connectivity must reach across the whole of NATO territory and wherever forces are deployed (for example, at sea or in the Balkans) and must also tie NATO headquarters in Brussels to all member capitals and link appropriate headquarters of the integrated military structure to national military commands. The system incorporates voice, data, messaging, and video teleconferencing in both secure and clear channel modes. Information and communications traffic is passed via terrestrial lines, surface-based wireless networks, and satellites. NATO CIS has kept pace with the rapid evolution in information age conduits, including use of local area

networks (LANs), wide area networks, intranets, and the Internet itself, in addition to digital radio and optical cable means to transmit voice, data, and video information. A significant portion of NATO CIS is deployed on commercial equipment.

CIS is a defense support function overseen since 1996 by the NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Organization (NC3O). That reorganization of the alliance CIS function was undertaken to posture NATO for the growing application of information systems to C², in particular for mobile network development. The NC3O develops the technical architecture, standards and protocols, and overall system design from the military tactical level to the political strategic level. The NATO CIS general purpose environment is characterized as having two interoperable domains, a NATO-wide network domain that links fixed and mobile users into a set of common systems, and a users domain made up of LANs, tactical wireless communications, leased lines, and similar systems. This bi-fold environment provides communications and information connectivity in peacetime, crisis, and conventional war. A separate special purpose segment is reserved for a nuclear operational environment.

Table 7-3. Major Communications and Information Systems
Supporting Military Command and Control

Allied Command Europe (ACE) Automated Command and Control Systems (ACCIS)	One of the two strategic military C ² systems. Provides automated C ² support for commanders throughout ACE using common hardware and software. Services include collaborative software tools, Web services, and Microsoft Office/Windows 2000. Decision support software allows assessment and exchange of a combined air, land, and maritime NATO-wide operational picture. Baseline fielding is due for completion in 2004.
Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS)	Second strategic C ² system. Has been operational at more than 60 sites for some times due to a much earlier initiative by ACLANT and the U.S. Space and Warfare Command. COTS-based open architecture system operating over all command levels with proven interoperability. Chosen as the platform for initial NATO Command Operational Picture.
NATO General-Purpose Communications System (NGCS)	Future backbone architecture. Will tie all military C ² elements together. Deployment began in 2002 in three commercial components, including data, voice, and real-time semipermanent bandwidth on-demand. Communicates via telephone, message, wireless, and satellite links; can be both secure and nonsecure, using military and commercial leased systems.

Table 7–3. Major Communications and Information Systems
Supporting Military Command and Control, *continued*

NATO Integrated Communications System (NCS)- Comprised of four main subsystems	<p>Initial Voice Switched Network (VSN) is the present telephone network for only about 12,000 subscribers. Will be transitioning to a NATO-wide future system of switched digital networks for voice, data, and video transmissions in the near future as a part of NGCS.</p> <p>NATO Message System (NMS) is replacing the Telegraph Automatic Relay Equipment (TARE) over the next 2 years. State-of-the-art email and secure message system that incorporates a client-server COTS-based military message handling system able to run on either a Windows or Unix.</p> <p>Terrestrial Transmission System is an operational-level network (approximately two-thirds NATO-owned and one-third civil-authority-owned) of tropospheric scatter and microwave links extending from northern Norway through central Europe to eastern Turkey.</p> <p>NATO IV Satellites (IVA [1991] and IVB [1993]) are the latest deployed NATO satellites and make up the satellite communications "leg" of NICS. Each has a 10-year planned life cycle. SATCOM post-2000, the next generation NATO satellite, is scheduled to replace IVA and IVB by 2004 for global wideband video, voice, and data links.</p>
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTID—also called Link 16)	<p>Link 16 is updated late 1970s technology brought to full production in 1997. Currently fielded on NATO airborne warning and control systems and among a few NATO member forces (United States, United Kingdom, France) on tactical aircraft, ships, and land forces. Acts as a jam-resistant, spread-spectrum, secure communication identification and navigation system for automatic data and voice links among land, air, and maritime forces in real time. Each terminal receives the overall tactical situation automatically in real-time updates. A newer, smaller version of JTIDS, the NATO Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) was fielded for installation in smaller fighters (such as the F-16). Thousands of additional units are programmed for installation by NATO allies, significant boosting alliance network-centric warfare capabilities. Considered a key future network-centric system.</p>
Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Systems (CRONOS)	<p>Windows NT Information System initially developed for Implementation Force in Bosnia. Still used with over 1,000 mailboxes and several thousand workstations. Secure connectivity up to NATO Secret between CRONOS and several national and coalition systems.</p>
NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS)	<p>Facilitates planning, tasking, execution, and surveillance of all air operations over NATO member territory. Additional ACCS capabilities available to support a CJTF out of area. Based on open system architecture and emphasizes COTS components. First level of operational capability (ACCS LOC1) to be completed by 2005.</p>

Since its establishment, NC3O has pushed CIS toward greater mobility and interoperability, and toward the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and systems. It does this through its authority to invest in user-oriented laboratory test bedding and field prototyping, techniques that involve operational users in assessing technologies that might improve NATO operational capabilities. NC3O uses evolutionary acquisition procedures to assess and field new systems and equipment that can be clearly specified, competitively procured, and implemented with low risk. One such program was the sourcing of COTS information technologies to equip NATO peace-support operations in the Balkans rapidly with essential CIS support systems.

NATO CIS serves two broad, overlapping spheres: political consultation and military C². At the strategic political-military level, the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS) is the primary backbone for connectivity from the strategic military commands to NATO headquarters staffs and to alliance member capitals for collective decisionmaking, including nuclear matters. The military side of CIS provides connectivity from the strategic military commands to lower-level commands, down to fixed sites and deployed units (such as CJTFs), providing for alliance-wide operational C², albeit still through a hierarchical rather than a peer-to-peer architecture.

Along with political consensus on future missions and a new command structure, NATO has also agreed to a new technical architecture (see section below on setting CIS standards) to provide the standards for CIS that will push investment toward transformational networks and systems. Together, these initiatives fulfill a strategy for complete C² redesign. When they are substantially in place, NATO forces will be poised to respond to crises well beyond NATO territory and to perform a wide range of military tasks, from peace operations to combat operations. Attention now shifts to the commitment of national and NATO funds for expeditious fielding of new and upgraded CIS capabilities. Some of the most critical systems and their status are described in table 7-3.

New missions and technologies have forced new concepts and architectures on the NATO CIS managers at every level. The most central shift is toward what NATO calls “network-enabled capabilities” embedded in far more capable and further dispersed forces. The goal is to link commands and forces in a peer-to-peer network, not just at the top of hierarchical structures. There would be universal access to a common operational picture for all elements—a ship, aircraft, ground unit, or a headquarters at any echelon or component. The added value of networks

is substantial, affording alliance commanders faster, more complete battlespace information and force synchronization. That reality lies at the core of the future NATO CIS concept. The potential of network-enabled capabilities has been validated during NATO operations in the Balkans and has set the azimuth for the NATO CIS investments.

For network enabled capabilities to move from the drawing board to operational use in complex joint and combined scenarios, NATO must meld complex technological standards, alliance CIS doctrine, and operational employment concepts. More than seven years of research, experimentation and ad hoc operational solutions have to coalesce into flexible, open-ended operational concepts that identity specific investment goals. The new NATO C³ Technical Architecture also must be put into place. The next major step is for NATO members and partners to prioritize with some urgency the operational CIS needs of the alliance. Then the hardest part will come, committing steady, substantial investments to CIS; enough resources to field “reach down, reach across” network connectivity that truly operationalize recent agreements and standards. Only more investment can push expansion of the network. Finally, as a system materializes, vigorous attention to lessons learned will identify the gaps and limits of network centric command and control, and effective new capabilities will emerge. Already, experience shows NATO will have to grapple with some of the risks of networking, such as information overload and the tendencies toward centralization of decisionmaking and loss of individual initiative at the tactical level.

C² Relationships and Procedures

A comprehensive analysis of military command and control must include a discussion of command relationships. NATO has a well-established menu of carefully defined command relationships (see table 7-4) that provides both military and political flexibility and triggers clear lines of responsibility between commands as well as between the alliance and its member forces. NATO used unique command relationships to overcome early Russian sensitivities to providing its national forces for peace operations under NATO in the Balkans. Command relationships identify the specific authorities that higher commanders are given over subordinate units, such as whether they are responsible for positioning subordinate forces and whether they are authorized to subdivide assigned units.

The sometimes confusing domain of longstanding NATO C² relationships, responsibilities, and procedures is usually given too little attention in designing future networked C² systems and flexible structures.

After all, the agreed command relationships will determine how new command structures and communication systems will be employed in future missions. Command relationships compose the essential fine print that allowed General Michael Jackson, British commander of forces in Kosovo, to refuse the order of General Wesley Clark, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to deploy to Priština airport ahead of advancing Russian forces in 1999.

Table 7-4. NATO Commander Relationships: Cold War to Present

Operational Command	Assigns missions, deploys units, reassigns forces, and retains or delegates operational or tactical control
Operational Control	Directs forces to accomplish specific, limited missions (including deployment) and delegates tactical control of units but not of their components
Tactical Command	Assigns tasks to forces under command to accomplish missions assigned by higher authority
Tactical Control	Controls local movement or maneuver of subunits to accomplish specific missions assigned by higher authority
Coordinating Authority	Coordinates actions of units of two or more countries, services, or forces. Can require consultations but cannot compel agreement

The present NATO menu of command relationships dates back to the early 1980s, and the definitions may be more suited for lawyers than commanders in battle (see table 7-4). Moreover, they were agreed principally to protect national prerogatives over how and for what purposes forces handed over to NATO would be employed in strict pursuit of a narrow alliance purpose—for example, collective defense of allied territory.

What is clear from these definitions is that they were suited for a formal, vertical command structure engaged in the single, well-defined mission. However, NATO may be outgrowing these stiff arrangements as the allies employ multinational formations in Bosnia well below the division level. Lingering emphasis on national prerogatives, many of which nations are ill equipped to execute—such as logistics support—creates a situation in which field commanders act more as coordinators than commanders. The more NATO adopts network-warfare concepts and rapid response roles, the less appropriate the current menu of command arrangements becomes.

Another concern arises out of more diverse NATO missions and command arrangements. Rapid response impacts the timing of force turnover from national to NATO control, as well as from one command to another. When a commander actually takes command determines whether he is really directing or only coordinating such essential mission functions as operational training, deployment readiness, and logistics

planning. Sensitive command relationships and national versus multinational responsibilities are genuine issues, yet, without streamlining, they will encumber rapid action and could endanger both mission and forces. The need to address outdated modalities and to agree to arrangements more suited for new NATO missions of time-critical deployments and crisis response has already been demonstrated. In essence, the allies need to push down controls and accept more decentralized operational and tactical decisionmaking.

Interoperability

Interoperability goals are as old as the alliance, but they have never been more important or more arduously pursued. As national forces transform and improve their readiness, it will be even more essential that NATO standards related to interoperability of command networks and communications systems become a priority design specification for every affected national system. In the past, NATO interoperability features included in U.S. and allied equipment designs were easy prey when faced with trimming systems to meet budget constraints. In a future networked force, interoperability of forces and headquarters at every echelon becomes even more critical. American systems now include interoperability as a key performance parameter; however, interoperability is defined as within U.S. forces, not NATO interoperability. The United States and its allies have more work to do before national and NATO standards are sufficiently harmonized.

Command and control is the most crucial medium for interoperability. As NATO shifts toward network-centric operations, demanding closer cooperation among more dispersed forces, the importance of interoperable C² grows exponentially. Forces that expect to operate together must at least be able to communicate with each other via both voice and data formats, even though they are not yet equipped with other systems that are at or close to the leading edge of technology. NATO has a new command structure, standards, and equipment in the pipeline for its international headquarters that will satisfy these requirements. What hampers NATO is the lack of national investment of member states in the costly proposition of conversion to NATO architectures and standardized equipment. European NATO members are reluctant to invest in national systems that are NATO compatible in addition to being compatible with non-NATO national systems. Every additional interface represents increased cost. The United States is also guilty of assigning NATO interoperability a lower priority in equipment design and technology transfer decisions. As a re-

sult, present NATO interoperability languishes at a modest level of manual connectivity and mainly procedural interfaces. In the NATO hierarchy of interoperable force capabilities, this means most of NATO interoperates at Levels 1 or 2 (see figure 7-3).

The NATO military structure has always sought (and in some measure achieved) interoperability by linking C² structures at the top. It is now pursuing the means to work more closely and effectively together down through organizations, where sensors and shooters, logisticians and intelligence specialists, operate together. The future promises still greater demand for interoperable networked command and control. In addition to the great complexity of incompatible national C² systems already in place and the significant cost associated with adopting NATO standards, interfacing, and direct links, the chief obstacle is also that nations have not given sufficient priority to proliferating NATO-compatible gear across national systems and nodes that increasingly need secure, high-speed, broadband voice/data communications with allied counterpart systems and nodes as well as with NATO.

Fortunately, the goal of networking allied military forces fits into the natural, continuous modernization of both NATO and national C² systems. Equipment is becoming obsolete at a faster pace, and the programming of replacements is almost continuous for many defense budgets. Through targeted and protected investment, backed by both political and military determination, much of NATO can move from Level 2 to Level 3 interoperability and genuine networking, at least through interface protocols.

The NATO interoperability vision should be a robust, flexible structure sharing high volumes of information almost instantaneously among many nodes that are more technologically sophisticated, and doing so effectively even under the stress of long-range, short-notice operations characterized by rapidly changing command and force geometries. The rigid C² hierarchy of years past must transform to be characterized by greater flexibility and more direct, lateral connectivity. The core function of command and control—the art and science of conducting military operations over joint, multinational forces—will remain fundamentally the same, executed through a familiar hierarchical structure. However, the information flows for C² will become a networked system that requires new C² doctrine—new ways to take advantage of opportunities for action. The information structures required for success under the new doctrine will bear little resemblance to those of the past. To realize the potential of these information-based concepts, it will be essential that interoperable connectivity be much faster and more reliable than in the past.

Figure 7–3. Communications and Information Systems Interoperability Snapshot

Interoperability is the ability of alliance forces and, when appropriate, forces of partners and other nations to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.

The four levels of CIS interoperability are

- Level 4:**
seamless sharing of information—integrated data transfer applications
- Level 3:**
seamless sharing of data—common data exchange model
- Level 2:**
structured data exchange—manual and automated read
- Level 1:**
unstructured data exchange—manual read only

Most NATO CIS elements interoperate at Level 1 or 2 (for example, secure email, and automated secure message traffic).

Level 4 requires full access across national systems—unlikely due to member prerogatives to maintain some information behind national firewalls.

The realistic goal should be Level 3—national systems with common data exchange architectures or surrogate interface applications can share appropriate data but are not intrusive.

Setting CIS Standards: NC3TA

In December 2000, the alliance approved the NATO Command, Control, and Communications Technical Architecture (NC3TA). The new technical architecture is an open system, COTS-focused design aimed at achieving near-term interoperability requirements. For example, NC3O worked with manufacturers to promulgate NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4591 on Narrow Band Voice Coders (i.e., commercial cellular telephones that incorporate NATO-standard encryption technology). Providing industry with information such as STANAG 4591 speeds CIS interoperability by defining a user market and encouraging manufacturers to provide the latest technology at competitive prices.

Technical standards play a crucial if inconspicuous role as systems are modernized or transformed. Without adherence to standards, ever more complex arrays of information systems will mean more is worse rather than better. NATO has more than 1,700 standards in nearly 1,000 agreements across all domains and has close to 300 more under development, many addressing information architectures. NC3TA identifies the services, building blocks, interfaces, standards, profiles, and related products, and it provides the technical guidelines for implementation of NATO C³ systems. These represent the minimum rules governing the

specification, interaction, and interdependence of the parts of the NATO C³ system, the purpose of which is to create interoperability.

The new NATO architecture focuses on supporting standardization of information services at the boundaries between NATO Common Funded (NCF) systems and national systems. These service boundary standards can be used with partners and by members for nation-to-nation interoperability, as well as among and with NCF systems. One example cited is that NATO might specify the use of the joint photographic experts group file format to transmit graphics between systems, but nations may use other formats (such as bitmap) as an internal preference.

In November 2001, NATO published its plan for selection of technical services and standards that must be available at the boundaries (interface) between systems. For example, NATO mandates that Web services be exchangeable using hypertext transfer protocol, but it does not tell nations or staffs that they must use the Windows 2000 operating system. By elaborating on a minimum set of boundary services, NATO reduces the expense (and often eliminates time-consuming debates) of meeting NATO standards within a system focused on interface standards and not complete system standardization. The boundary architecture is based on the concept of a federation of fixed and mobile systems and networks that together comprise a NATO intranet. The system has the Internet standards and Internet protocols at its core, including the four-layer Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol stack that many commercial applications (for example, e-mail) use. As the use of Internet standards and accepted protocol stacks testifies, NATO is committed to the adoption of commercial standards wherever possible. Although off-the-shelf may be militarized by virtue of fitting it in reinforced housing or adding military-specific accessories, COTS equipment itself remains unmodified as much as possible when incorporated into the NATO CIS inventory.

The NATO consensus decisionmaking processes can be too tedious for reaching timely agreements on CIS standards, particularly for information systems. Dramatically shortened life cycles for new products have become the rule, not the exception. Some standards arrive well after NC3O is near acceptance of the next system. To deal with this reality, NATO seeks military-specific CIS standards only when a significant benefit can be derived and where a desired level of interoperability can be achieved. NATO looks for evidence of a near-term standardization benefit and sufficient scale of application. Wherever possible, existing systems standards or open standards (that is, COTS standards) are the default.

However, standards remain difficult to put in place, and, even when agreed, interoperability often proves elusive. Standards can be ignored or adoption delayed due to prohibitive cost of transition. Therefore, the NATO goal of developing, implementing, and sustaining a fully interoperable information system will demand priority resources by both NATO and national budgets. Agencies such as NC3O have to keep working for better solutions. Software programmable radios, as one example of a potential technical solution, are exciting but still expensive and untested. However, such systems offer hope and point the way to ultimate success in the goal of interoperable NATO forces and transformational command and control in the future.

Conclusion

NATO has been adapting its C² structures, CIS, and related policies steadily since the end of the Cold War and can take satisfaction in agreements on a leaner command structure, more ready forces, selective investment in state-of-the-art communications and information systems, and new standards that make genuine interoperability more likely in the future. However, decisions at and since the Prague summit signal that it is now time to bring the new networked C² concept on line. That means more funding and tough choices. Nations will have to realign investment priorities away from large, relatively unneeded force postures and toward a transformed command and control capability that can be employed soon in places like Afghanistan. This is a challenge at the national level, where investment and convergence on new concepts for command and control—including network-centric operations—still require far more emphasis from military commanders, civilian leaders, and legislatures. Funding should be re-prioritized toward networked interoperable C², and to the extent shortfalls still exist, additional funding should be allocated at the first budgeting opportunity. It will soon be true that if you cannot network your national C² at every level with other allies and the alliance, you will not be able to participate in NATO's military structure, even for Article 5 missions.

Though fully networked C² is the linchpin for future alliance operations, NATO will not be able to transform all of its C² structure at once. Even with off-the-shelf technologies and increased national funding, it will take time and money before an alliance-wide transformational, network-centric C² can be achieved and sustained. The immediate priority should be to establish these capabilities in the NATO Response Force and in appropriate CJTF HQs responsible for NRF employment. As NATO's chief operator, Allied Command Operations commanded by U.S. Marine

General James Jones has already identified the NRF as “Priority One” for C² investment. The next step will be organizing, equipping, and training the NRF and external commands essential to its deployment and employment. That will require NATO’s other strategic command—ACT, under British Admiral Ian Forbes, and soon to be led by U.S. Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, the commander already responsible for all U.S. transformation at Joint Forces Command—to collaborate with ACO on a rigorous exercise and training program that will transform alliance doctrine and concepts along with new structures and hardware. At least for the near term, the NRF will be the focal point of NATO C² transformation for both strategic commands.

Moreover, C² transformation cannot be delayed. Allied Command Operations’ C² capabilities will be tested beyond any previous deployment when NATO assumes full responsibility for the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, in August 2003. NATO learned during its years of political struggle over CJTF that not having one did not mean not needing to deploy one on short notice in the Balkans. Both strategic commands must know that deploying an NRF, to Afghanistan or some other area of collective interest, is a distinct near-term possibility. NATO members must be equally seized with this prospect as they go about fulfilling their specific Prague Capabilities Commitments that will transform command and control for future missions.

Notes

¹ Source: Charles L. Barry, *Transforming NATO Command and Control for Future Missions*, Defense Horizons 28 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2003).

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Part II: Political Transformation

Dual-Track Transformation for NATO (2003)

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler¹

Overview

Recent strains between the United States and some European allies have raised concerns that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is becoming irrelevant or even headed toward extinction. A breakup of the Atlantic Alliance would severely damage the United States and Europe as well as prospects for global peace. As an urgent priority, NATO must restore its unity and strengthen its capacity for common action in the Greater Middle East. But how can this goal be achieved in today's climate?

The solution is a new dual-track NATO strategy of military and political transformation that could be launched at the Istanbul Summit next spring. The military track should further strengthen efforts to field a NATO Response Force and otherwise prepare European forces for expeditionary missions. The political track should aim to create a common transatlantic vision for the Middle East, while enhancing capacity to act flexibly and constructively there in peace, crisis, and war.

Such a strategic realignment is not mission impossible. The Alliance has survived previous trans-Atlantic stresses by adopting dual-track strategies that harmonized American and European interests. For example, almost forty years ago the Harmel Report reconciled detente with deterrence and defense. A new Harmel Report is needed to forge a similar reconciliation of U.S. and European policies toward the NATO role in the Middle East. In addition, the Istanbul Summit can take other practical steps: a NATO resource commitment to increase defense investments as force structure is reduced, a NATO defense transformation roadmap to guide force improvements, and a new "Partnership for Cooperation" that would pursue ties with friendly Middle Eastern militaries. A bold summit

agenda of this sort offers NATO an opportunity to replace recent debates with a common approach for making the alliance more secure and effective in a troubled world.

Most U.S. and European leaders want to heal the rift over Iraq by restoring NATO unity and effectiveness. But how can this worthy goal be accomplished? This urgent question requires a credible answer. Some observers argue that because the United States and Europe cannot agree on security policies outside Europe, they should limit their cooperation to such soft-power issues as economic trade, foreign aid, and combating HIV/AIDS. While common action on soft-power issues is useful, this strategy would leave NATO—the transatlantic community's premier military alliance—with no serious role to play in the ongoing struggle against terrorism, tyrants, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and radicalism in the Islamic world. Something better is needed: a constructive security strategy for NATO that also employs hard power in sensible ways, and that both Americans and Europeans will agree upon.

Need for a New Dual-Track Strategy

We believe that such a strategy can be crafted if the United States and Europe recall how they solved similar serious problems during the Cold War. On earlier occasions, the Alliance successfully coped with an assertive American military agenda that troubled many European countries for political reasons by creating dual-track strategies that combined military modernization with new political endeavors. The first case arose in the mid-1960s, when the Alliance used the Harmel Report to mate deterrence and defense with *détente*. The second case occurred in the early 1980s, when NATO agreed to deploy Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) on European soil while also pursuing nuclear arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. After the Cold War ended, NATO successfully pursued a third dual-track strategy by engaging Russia diplomatically while enlarging into Eastern Europe.

A new type of dual-track strategy should be pursued today. NATO already has crafted the first half of this strategy: a visionary defense transformation agenda for enhancing military preparedness. Adopted at the Prague Summit of 2002, this agenda aims at fielding a new NATO Response Force (NRF) and other measures to prepare for new missions outside Europe. This forward looking defense agenda must now be pursued vigorously by promptly fielding the NRF, creating a transformation roadmap, and designing a new U.S. military presence in Europe. As an

urgent priority, NATO now needs to craft the second part of this dual-track strategy: an accompanying political transformation agenda for strategic realignment. The goal of this political agenda should be to achieve consensus behind fresh, well-constructed policies and decision processes for applying power in the Middle East and other regions to deal with emerging threats and strengthen relationships with friendly countries. Such an agenda of political transformation should include four measures that, along with military transformation, would produce a major strategic realignment of NATO:

- Writing a new Harmel Report that would help lay out a common strategic vision of threats, goals, priorities, and standards for using military force and other instruments in the Middle East.
- Reforming the decisionmaking process to create greater flexibility and responsiveness in performing missions outside Europe in peace, crisis, and war.
- Finding ways for NATO and the Europeans to play larger roles in post-war situations where stabilization and reconstruction operations must be launched.
- Creating a new “Partnership for Cooperation” (PFC) to help foster cooperative military ties with friendly Middle Eastern militaries.

This new dual-track strategy of defense transformation for military preparedness and political transformation for strategic realignment can be adopted at the NATO summit in Istanbul in spring, 2004. Prompt and vigorous implementation is vital, so collaboration among leading NATO powers is essential. The United States and Britain must work constructively with Germany and France, and vice-versa. The times are too dangerous to permit internal quarrels that leave the Alliance divided and adrift. If the Alliance is to be salvaged, the United States and Europe must want to do so. Nothing in this dual-track strategy implies that the United States and its close friends should cede the option to act outside NATO when the situation merits. Yet, both the United States and Europe will benefit if the Alliance can be consistently employed as a preferred instrument of choice. The new dual-track strategy is meant to make this practice possible.

Why Save NATO?

To experienced hands, the proposal that NATO pursue transformation will sound familiar. NATO has been undergoing transformation for at least a decade; Europeans began using this term long before it became popular in the U.S. military. But the transformation of the early 1990s was

different from that of today. Then, NATO was trying to shift from being a Cold War defense alliance toward one helping to create a Europe that was stable, whole, and free. NATO was filled with optimism and hopeful visions of a bright future for itself.

Today, transformation involves a quite different type of strategic realignment: preparing to project power and purpose not on the European continent, but into the Middle East and other distant areas. The environment also is different. NATO is filled with misgivings about its future as it tries to recover from a badly damaging debate over Iraq that shook its foundations.

In today's troubled setting, the idea of crafting a bold political-military transformation for strategic realignment runs counter to the instincts of those who are content to see NATO lose relevance or disintegrate. Those Americans who have given up on NATO judge that the United States should act unilaterally, with only Britain and a few "cherry-picked" European allies by its side. Similarly, some Europeans see NATO as an impediment to casting off American domination and becoming independent on the world stage.

Critics on both sides of the Atlantic are right about one thing: letting NATO wither would be easier than keeping it alive and healthy. Why, then, should the Alliance be saved? The perfunctory answer is that an effective NATO will enable both the United States and Europe to preserve security within and beyond Europe. This truism, however, has been cited so often by NATO advocates that it has become worn and unpersuasive. A more effective way to set out what is at stake is to ask the question, "What would the world be like without NATO?"

Some observers claim that the choice is not between transforming NATO and losing it. They argue that the Alliance can cling to the status quo while doing little of consequence outside Europe, apart from providing a launch-pad for U.S. forces and preparing a few allies to participate in ad-hoc coalitions led by the United States. This mistaken judgment, however, is a prescription for NATO to slip into irrelevance. The United States and Europe would lose interest and would not be able to prevent its demise. A big organization without purpose eventually loses its legitimacy and will to live. After that, a slow death is inevitable.

The collapse of the Atlantic Alliance might not bother those in the media and the general public who see little value in NATO. It might please those Europeans who view the United States as an arrogant superpower. It might also please those Americans who dismiss Europe as a decadent civilization. But when the dust settles and realization grows that the world's

oldest, most successful democratic alliance has been lost, a different reaction might settle in. The widespread response might not be applause, but instead anger at the short-sighted governments on both sides of the Atlantic that allowed this travesty to occur. Such governments might not stay in office for long. Even if they endured, their reputations for wise stewardship would suffer a grievous blow. Nobody would emerge a winner in the court of public opinion or the verdict of history.

Loss of NATO would damage not only the reputations of ruling governments, but also the enduring interests of the United States and Europe. A first casualty would be the war on terrorism. Although the main event has been the invasion of Afghanistan, this war is mostly being fought in the twilight, behind the scenes, and with many instruments other than military force. Tracking down small, dispersed terrorist cells across the globe requires extensive multilateral collaboration in many areas—diplomacy, intelligence sharing, law enforcement and extraditions, disruption of terrorist finances, homeland security, training and aid to foreign governments, and strikes by special forces. Moreover, the conquest of Afghanistan is now requiring peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts aimed at preventing the Taliban from regaining power. Today NATO is providing this multilateral collaboration or creating a framework for it to occur. If NATO vanishes, much of this cooperation would be lost, and terrorists would be given a new lease on life.

The damaging effects of the collapse would extend far beyond the war on terrorism into the strategic realm of traditional security affairs. For the United States, loss of NATO would be a more serious setback than advocates of unilateralism realize. At a minimum, the United States would lose influence over Europe's evolution and would face even greater anti-Americanism. In other regions, the United States might not have its wings clipped to the degree envisioned by some Europeans—a global superpower has many other friends—but it would suffer from the loss of political legitimacy that European and NATO support often gives to its endeavors in the Middle East and elsewhere. Although France, Germany, and a few others criticized the U.S. and British invasion of Iraq, fully 75 percent of current and prospective members gave vocal political support to it. Such strong support would be less likely in a world without NATO. Militarily, the United States would lose valuable infrastructure in Europe that is helpful in projecting power to distant regions. The United States also would be damaged in crises and wars that require allied force contributions. In theory, the United States could still draw upon friendly European countries to create ad hoc coalitions of the willing. But if the

Alliance were to end, fewer countries might be willing to join U.S.-led coalitions. Also important, their military forces might be less able to work closely with U.S. forces because NATO no longer would provide them the necessary interoperability.

The biggest loser would be not the United States but Europe. NATO collapse would result in a major U.S. political and military withdrawal from the continent. The United States might retain a foothold through bilateral ties with Britain and other countries, but it no longer would play a multilateral leadership role. Along with this withdrawal would come removal of the many valuable strategic roles that the United States plays behind the scene. The United States continues to provide extended nuclear deterrence coverage over virtually all of Europe, a still-vital protection in this era of nuclear powers and proliferation. As shown in the Kosovo war, U.S. conventional forces provide about three-quarters of NATO military power-projection assets for crises and wars on Europe's periphery. These nuclear and conventional contributions, moreover, enable Europe to defend itself with annual defense budgets that are \$100-150 billion smaller than otherwise would be the case. In effect, the United States is helping fund the European Union, because these savings equal the EU budget.

Perhaps the Europeans could fund a big defense buildup to compensate for loss of American military guarantees, but the price could be quite high, because a European buildup absent NATO would be costlier than a buildup under its auspices; NATO offers many economies of scale and opportunities to avoid redundancy through integrated planning. In addition, a European military buildup would be controversial. How would Europe erect an umbrella of nuclear deterrence? How would it prepare for crisis operations on its periphery? What would be the European reaction if Germany were compelled to build nuclear forces and a large mobile military?

A European military buildup, however, seems unlikely. Is there any reason to believe that European parliaments would surmount their current anti-military attitudes to fund bigger defense budgets? Their reaction might be to slash budgets further on the premise that the collapse of NATO made defense strength less necessary and that Europe could avoid war through diplomacy. As a result, Europe might withdraw into a disengaged foreign policy. Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious forces

for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C⁴ISR, strategic lift, and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.

In addition to these adverse military consequences, American political contributions to European unity, peace, and prosperity would decline precipitously. For the past fifty years, America's constant presence has assured small European countries that they will not be dominated by powerful neighbors. It also has helped guarantee that the continent will not slide back into the competitive geopolitical dynamics that produced two world wars in the 20th Century. The U.S. presence helped Germany find a welcome role in an integrating Europe and permitted leadership by the so-called "Quad" (the United States, Britain, Germany, and France) in a manner that gained the support of other NATO members. Recently, the United States has been a leading advocate of NATO enlargement and European unification. In the absence of NATO, the European Union itself might be weakened, especially if the United States decided to selectively seek allies among EU members. Nor would EU influence on world affairs be likely to increase. Indeed, the opposite could be the case.

A NATO that can project power and purpose outside Europe will greatly enhance the odds of preserving world peace while advancing democratic values. The simple reality is that the United States cannot handle the global problems of the contemporary era alone, and neither can Europe. Together, however, they can succeed. This is a main reason for keeping NATO alive and healthy, and for transforming it in the ways needed to perform new missions. The challenge facing the Atlantic Alliance is to pursue these goals in an effective manner that both the United States and Europe will support.

The First Track: Carrying Out Prague Defense Transformation Agenda

Pursuit of these goals is the main reason for adopting a new dual-track strategy aimed at defense transformation and strategic realignment. Fortunately, a strong foundation for the military component of this strategy already exists. The Prague defense agenda consisted mainly of three measures: 1) A new NATO Response Force (NRF) to be fielded by 2006; 2) A Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) to replace the stalled Defense Capability Initiative (DCI); and 3) A streamlined integrated military command plus a new Allied Transformation Command (ATC) to guide

European military transformation. While the NRF was showcased at Prague, all three initiatives are important. As experience shows, agreeing to these measures is only the first step in a long process. What comes now is the tedious, time-consuming process of pursuing them to completion while making appropriate adjustments. In today's climate, success cannot be taken for granted. The situation calls for NATO political and military leaders to pay sustained attention to these measures to ensure that they unfold as planned. The Prague Summit agenda now needs to be modified in ways that will sharpen its focus and take into account new issues. A revised NATO defense transformation agenda should include the following three elements:

- ▀ Vigorous efforts to field the NRF promptly and in ways that overcome hurdles along the way.
- ▀ Preparation of a NATO Transformation Roadmap that, along with the PCC, will help provide focus and direction and encourage speedy progress toward transformation.
- ▀ Design of a new American military presence in Europe that supports NATO defense transformation and can work closely with the NRF in preparing for expeditionary warfare.

Strategic Motivations for Defense Transformation

The Prague agenda was the product of four developments: 1) the frustrations of the 1990s, when European forces made little progress toward remedying core deficiencies in power-projection; 2) growing perceptions of a widening transatlantic gap in new-era military capabilities; 3) the disappointments of the war in Afghanistan, when the United States declined offers of European help because most allied forces lacked the necessary capabilities; and 4) the acceleration of U.S. defense transformation in ways that open the door for European forces to acquire capabilities for expeditionary warfare.

The 1990s began with NATO sitting on the sidelines during the Persian Gulf War, but with Britain, France, and other countries contributing to the U.S.-led coalition. The victorious Desert Storm campaign ended with widespread recognition that European and NATO forces needed to improve in many areas to contribute more effectively to future conflicts. Declining defense budgets and withering public support, however, sent European improvement efforts into a prolonged stall. When the Kosovo war was waged in 1999, the United States contributed 75 percent of NATO forces. In that airpower-dominated campaign, shortfalls in European

forces were exposed in such areas as C⁴ISR, smart munitions, defense suppression, and all-weather/day-night assets.

In response, the Washington Summit of 1999 produced a new NATO strategic concept and a Defense Capability Initiative (DCI) aimed at strengthening European capabilities in multiple areas. Several countries, including Britain and France, announced long-range plans to upgrade their forces, but little progress was made. During 1999-2001, knowledgeable observers fretted about a growing transatlantic gap in military capabilities for new-era warfare. While the United States had long been better than Europe at rapidly deploying forces, it was now pulling ahead in capabilities for waging war once forces arrive at the scene. Indeed, the U.S. military was creating a new form of network-centric warfare anchored in precision fires, fast maneuver, and close integration of air-ground fires. The aim was to replace the old emphasis on massed forces and separate operations by components with integrated joint operations conducted by dispersed, high-tech forces. Most European militaries were not embracing this new form of warfare. Indeed, they were moving toward a growing emphasis on peacekeeping, thus creating a widening gap not only in capabilities and budgets, but in strategic missions and burden-sharing as well.

The invasion of Afghanistan starkly confirmed the need for NATO military transformation. After NATO invoked Article 5 to wage the new war against terrorism, many European governments wanted to participate in Afghanistan. But except for Britain, the U.S. military turned aside these offers with the explanation that European militaries lacked the precision-strike assets for this new form of warfare. Only European SOF forces proved useful in the battles. After the major fighting ended, European forces performed peacekeeping. Later, NATO acquired a formal role in this mission, but this development only reinforced the growing impression that, while NATO might be helpful in cleaning up the mess afterward, it is not an instrument for serious war-fighting.

The U.S. defense transformation effort, accelerated shortly after the Bush Administration took power, opened the door to NATO defense revival for unintended reasons. The original purpose was to prepare U.S. forces for the Information Age by equipping them with advanced information networks, new weapons platforms, ever-smarter munitions, and exotic, futuristic technologies. To fund this effort at enhancing force quality, a big increase in the American defense budget was authorized. Initially it seemed that accelerating American military transformation would leave Europeans in the dust and thereby further magnify an already-big gap in transatlantic capabilities. But closer inspection showed that the Europeans

did not need to mimic U.S. forces in new technologies and structures. Instead, they merely needed to develop the capacity to “plug and play” into the “system of systems” (integrated information grids) being created by U.S. forces. Moreover, many core operational concepts of transformation could be applied to European forces: e.g., the emphasis on joint expeditionary warfare, networked forces, littoral missions, close integration of air and ground fires, high-speed maneuvers, and simultaneous operations with dispersed forces.

Thus, although the Europeans were unlikely to match high-tech U.S. forces soon, they could embark upon their own form of transformation aimed at facilitating interoperable, complementary operations with U.S. forces on modern battlefields. Moreover, they did not need new, expensive weapon platforms (e.g., tanks and fighter aircraft) to become better at swift power projection and lethal strike operations. Instead, they needed improvements in such areas as joint planning, C⁴ISR, smart munitions, combat support units, mobility, and long-distance logistics for missions in austere areas. Acquiring these assets did not promise to be cheap, but if only a modest number were needed, they were affordable for European budgets. This promised to be the case if NATO and the Europeans focused on transforming only a small portion of their forces rather than their entire posture, which exceeded the size of U.S. forces by more than 50 percent.

Bringing the NRF to Life

The idea of fielding the NATO Response Force responded to this imperative. This idea was suggested by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in reflection of a proposal from the National Defense University, and it quickly took hold in NATO and European military circles. At the Prague Summit, it was adopted with widespread acclaim as the centerpiece of the new NATO plan for defense transformation. By spring, 2003, it had been equipped with a strategic concept and implementation plan by the NATO Military Committee. SACEUR General James Jones promised quick progress—fielding of initial units by fall, 2003, instead of 2004 as originally envisioned.

Why the response force for an alliance that already has many formations for many purposes? In the eyes of its American creators, the NRF reflects an effort to plug a serious hole in the Allied military posture for new missions. Before the NRF, NATO mainly relied upon the ACE Mobile Force (AMF) and the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) for such missions. Both of these formations suffered from flaws. Originally conceived for limited emergencies, the AMF was too small and lightly equipped

for intense combat operations too focused on continental contingencies. Moreover, NATO had already reached a decision to disestablish the AMF because it seemed unsuited to most contemporary missions. By contrast, the ARRC is a huge force of 4 heavy divisions backed by 300 combat aircraft and 100 ships that is too big and ponderous for swift deployment outside Europe. What NATO needs is an expeditionary force big enough to make a difference in high-tech strike operations alongside U.S. forces, but small and agile enough to be deployed swiftly. The modest-size but potent and deployable NRF is designed to fill this need while also enabling NATO and the Europeans to focus intently on a top-priority force rather than dissipating scarce resources in other directions.

The defense concept behind the response force is simple but breaks new conceptual ground for NATO. Prior to the NRF, SACEUR defense planning was mainly anchored in large ground formations, with air and naval forces playing supporting roles. While this concept made sense for old-style continental warfare, it makes considerably less sense for new-era expeditionary warfare, which requires heavy doses of air and naval power and relatively fewer ground forces. Accordingly, the response force concept calls for a truly joint posture of about 21,000 military personnel. It is to be composed of a single well-armed ground brigade task force, one or two tactical fighter wings, and a naval flotilla of 8-10 combatants with aircraft, cruise missiles, and other strike assets. These forces will be designed to operate jointly in carrying out new-era operational concepts and to be highly interoperable with U.S. forces owing to plug-and-play C⁴ISR systems as well as similar doctrines, weapons, and smart munitions. Equally important, the NRF is to benefit from advanced training in new-era operational concepts that will not only elevate its own combat capabilities, but also help introduce such skills into other European forces, thereby helping them pursue transformation as well.

The NRF posture is to be capable of being used in multiple different ways, e.g., as a stand-alone force for limited contingencies, as the spearhead of a later-arriving deployment by larger NATO forces, or as a NATO contribution to an ad hoc coalition led by U.S. forces. It would have been ideally suited for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, two very different military operations. It thus promises to greatly enhance Allied capability, flexibility, and adaptability in an era that requires such characteristics for operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. Meanwhile, it promises to be a cutting-edge leader of European force transformation by exposing response force units to U.S. initiatives and by helping develop new NATO doctrines through training, exercises, and experiments. As the

NRF learns the lessons of transformation it can transmit them to other European forces. Over time, successive cohorts of European units will pass through the response force experience, thereby steadily enlarging the pool of forces that have directly experienced transformation for new missions. While Northern European forces will benefit, the forces of new-member East European countries and the southern region will benefit also. For example, Polish forces will learn how to operate with their European and American allies, and will thereby become better providers of security, not just consumers.

The NRF should not be merely a NATO force configured to pursue the U.S. military way of war. Instead, it should embody a synergistic blend of American and European approaches; both sides have something to offer in creating this force and its operational doctrines. Above all, the force should be capable of performing a wide spectrum of operations, not merely high-tech strikes with missiles and smart munitions. If such a flexible, multifaceted force is to be fielded, the Europeans will need to take it seriously. The same applies to the United States, which likely will need to loosen export control restrictions on some technologies.

By design, this force will not interfere with the EU European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). The missions of the NRF and ERRF are different. Whereas the NRF is intended for high-intensity combat and expeditionary strike missions, the ERRF currently is slotted primarily for peacekeeping and other Petersberg tasks. The NRF is also to be smaller than the ERRF and differently structured. Whereas the NRF will have only 21,000 personnel, the slowly evolving ERRF will have 60,000 ground troops and enough air and naval assets to bring the total to 100,000 personnel. The biggest difference is that, whereas the NRF always will be assigned to NATO integrated command, the ERRF will not be committed to fulfilling NATO missions. As a result, NATO will still need the NRF even if the ERRF eventually comes to life with better capabilities than now envisioned. Because the response force will be a small posture, its budget costs will be low, totaling \$3-4 billion per year for investments. Extra spending on manpower and operations will not be needed, because the forces to be assigned to the NRF already exist and therefore do not have to be freshly created. While the Europeans will have to set priorities, they possess the manpower and budgets to support both the NRF and the ERRF, and therefore do not have to choose between them. Care will have to be taken, however, to ensure that "dual-hatting" of forces does not result in conflicting assignments for crisis response. As a general rule, European units assigned to NRF duty or preparing to assume this duty should not have additional assignments

elsewhere, including to the ERRF. When these forces come off response force duty, standard practices for dual-hatting can be followed.

The NRF is to be a ready force that can deploy within a week to a month and have 30 days of sustainment in intense combat. It is to be anchored in a rotational readiness scheme. During any six-month period, a full-sized response force of 21,000 troops is to be on duty, ready to deploy on short notice. Meanwhile, another force will be going through advanced training and exercises to prepare for its upcoming tour of duty. Concurrently, a third force that has recently completed its tour will be standing down. Thus, at any moment, three different response forces will be operating to one degree or another, but for different purposes. Each NRF is to be composed of multinational NATO forces, with the exact mix to be determined by national contributions and operational requirements. For example, one force might be manned largely by British and Dutch forces, and another by French and Italian forces. The NRF is a volunteer posture. It is meant to provide opportunities for participation to all NATO members who are willing and able to meet its operational requirements. The composition of each force might vary from one duty cycle to the next, thus enabling many European militaries to participate over the course of a few years.

The NRF will draw its combat and support assets mainly from NATO High Readiness Forces, the pool of forces that includes the ARRC, the Eurocorps, the German-Dutch Corps, and other top-tier ground, air, and naval formations. Thus, it will employ only forces that already are strongly committed to NATO integrated command and will not interfere with other European military priorities. While the NRF is to be mostly an all-European force, the United States will need to commit assets in such important enabling categories as C⁴ISR, strategic mobility, defense suppression, and logistics until the Europeans become self-sufficient in these areas. The NRF will be assigned to the new Allied Command Operations (ACO), with operational command rotating among its two new Joint Force Commands (JFC's) and one maritime Joint Force Headquarters. The effect will be to make all three commands skilled at employing the response force and engaging in expeditionary strike operations.

The NRF is off to a good start. An initial, small version of it will be fielded in 2003 with an emphasis on SOF assets. Many European countries, including France, have committed to joining the force as it is fielded. Whether the response force will meet its 2006 goal of full operational capability, however, is uncertain. The requisite air and naval forces seem likely to be fielded, but ground forces may be a different matter because

of changes that must be made in many areas. The NRF needs to be a properly transformed force with the requisite technologies, networks, and digitization required to perform its missions alongside U.S. forces. As the force comes to life, care must be taken to ensure that operational readiness is its first priority. Otherwise, it might fall victim to a dynamic aimed at including too many forces from too many nations under its mantle, thereby weakening its combat power. Likewise, the NRF should take part in transformation, but not at the expense of participating in so many experimental changes that it loses its focus on being ready to fight wars on short notice.

NRF command arrangements also bear watching. Each JFC must have a deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters that can command the NRF on distant battlefields. Another issue is the U.S. role. While the United States initially should provide support in critical enabling areas, the Europeans should be encouraged to acquire self-sufficiency as soon as possible. In the long run, the NRF should become a mainly European force with the United States contributing on a normal rotating basis. If the force becomes dominated by the United States and Britain, its purpose will have been defeated. Likewise, if the NRF is populated by forces from countries that might refuse to participate in its missions at the moment of need, its credibility will be compromised. Whether the response force needs an opt-out clause can be debated, but opting-in by making firm commitments must be the dominating imperative. For these reasons, NRF success cannot be taken for granted. It will need careful management attention from senior NATO political and military leaders for the foreseeable future.

Preparing a NATO Defense Transformation Roadmap

The Prague decision to create an Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in dual-hat status with the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is a major innovation. It offers the promise of bringing U.S. expertise to bear in focusing and accelerating European transformation for expeditionary warfare. If ACT is to succeed, it must be given a major role not only in exploring new ideas, but also in ensuring that, as European forces train and exercise with U.S. forces, they learn new operational concepts. The more fundamental challenge, however, is to ensure that NATO defense transformation is guided by a sound intellectual vision and a powerful program of coordinated measures to ensure that it succeeds on schedule. The PCC can help in this regard, but it needs to be supplemented by a NATO Defense Transformation Roadmap. It also needs to be supplemented by an Istanbul Summit “Transformation Reinvestment Commitment” to apply savings

from European force reductions to enhanced investments in readiness and modernization for the forces that remain.

Although fielding the NRF will be the top NATO priority, the PCC's progress deserves support. The original impetus behind the PCC was to slim down and prioritize the DCI, which allegedly was bulging with its five major categories and 54 specific measures. When the PCC emerged, however, it was even bigger than the DCI, with eight major categories and 450 accompanying measures. The eight categories include such measures as C⁴ISR, WMD defense, interoperability, information superiority, combat effectiveness, mobility, sustainment, and logistics. Their main effect is to provide NATO leaders with a useful top-down view of force improvements. Meanwhile, the many accompanying measures provide a bottom-up perspective that NATO members can use to develop specific programs. NATO has created a special committee of two Assistant Secretaries General to monitor the PCC with a view toward focusing it on the NRF. Progress on this goal is being briefed every three weeks to the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

Only a few months after its adoption, the PCC already seems in trouble because, for predictable reasons, it is making slow progress. Critics are dismayed, but the truth is that the PCC is a sensible creation, provided that its limited role is kept in mind and a sense of realism guides expectations. The PCC is another in a long line of NATO efforts that focus on functional categories of military activity rather than forces and missions. It was preceded by the Long-Term Defense Plan (LTDP) of the 1970s, the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI) of the 1980s, and the DCI of the 1990s, all of which used functional categories to generate a detailed look at European forces in key areas. By spelling out a host of worthy NATO-wide improvement measures covering all members, the PCC provides a valuable instrument for helping guide NATO force goals, resource guidance, and country plans. Nor is it too large and encompassing as a tool for broad-scale program and budget management. Comparable Pentagon tools, such as the FYDP and Service POMs, are bigger and include even more measures. But because it is so big and wide-ranging, the PCC is not a good tool for focusing on key forces and top strategic priorities and for propelling NATO transformation forward.

What is to be done? The answer is not to junk the PCC or ratchet it downward. Nor is the answer to try to bolster NATO Ministerial Guidance, which is too vague and general to guide the specifics of force development. Nor are better NATO Force Goals the answer because they result in a dissipated appraisal of NATO individual members in ways that often

see only parts of the whole, not the whole itself. All of these long-standing instruments of NATO military planning help provide a comprehensive overview of many endeavors by a huge alliance, but they do not provide an intense focus on new force-building efforts or transformation. Indeed, their main effect is to encourage a business-as-usual emphasis on incremental change, not bold leaps into the future.

To solve this problem, NATO should follow the Pentagon example by writing its own Defense Transformation Roadmap supplemented by a Transformation Reinvestment Commitment. Confronted by ponderous FYDPs and POMs, senior Pentagon leaders instructed each Service to write a focused roadmap spelling out how they propose to pursue transformation and to set their priorities accordingly. The resulting roadmaps helped focus attention on the meaning, essence, and prospects for U.S. military transformation. In particular, they helped highlight not only where the Services are succeeding, but also where they can do more to pursue transformation jointly and where troubles are likely to be encountered. As a result, U.S. military transformation now has a better sense of direction and purpose, and senior leaders are better-equipped to guide it.

A NATO transformation roadmap can help perform the same function for the Alliance. As the U.S. experience shows, the process of preparing such a roadmap will encourage NATO and the Europeans to review, revise, and integrate their defense plans and programs. Such a roadmap should provide meaningful guidance, not vague abstractions. It should identify key strategy goals and operational concepts for guiding transformation. It should focus on outputs: the forces and capabilities of old and new members that will be needed to perform each major strategic mission. It should show how NATO members can act individually and collectively to field the necessary forces and capabilities. It should portray budget requirements and force development priorities. It should identify the types of transformation initiatives that are needed, including new weapons and technologies, new doctrines, and new structures. It should encourage innovation and experimentation. Without pretending to design a fixed blueprint, it should establish an evolving transformation strategy for the near-term, mid-term, and long-term. A mid-term focus is particularly important because it provides a connecting bridge between the tangible near-term and the foggy long-term.

Above all, a transformation roadmap should establish clear strategic goals and priorities for NATO. The urgent task is not border defense and peacekeeping in absence of anything else, but instead, as MC 317/1 says, becoming better-prepared to conduct joint expeditionary warfare. An

expeditionary war involves a deployment for a specific purpose to a distant place outside Europe. It requires Allied forces that can deploy swiftly, operate jointly, and strike lethally. Because NATO lacks such assets, its transformation roadmap should focus on fielding the NRF as quickly as possible. The transformation roadmap should specify the assets that must be acquired, a program for acquiring them, the coordinated roles to be played by country plans, and tasks for common investments and the integrated command.

Once such an NRF program is established, a NATO transformation roadmap can address how to improve and transform other high-priority forces. Because NATO HRF forces will provide NRF assets and otherwise be important for power projection, they should be treated not as static legacy assets, but as candidates for transformation in the mid-term. Gradually modernizing the HRF forces with new weapons and doctrines is necessary, but new organizational structures also should be examined. This especially is the case for ground forces. In the Information Age, ponderous divisions and corps with massive logistic support tails need to give way to smaller, agile, and modular formations with lighter support. The U.S. military needs to change in this area, and so do European forces. Simply stated, expeditionary wars will not need the big sustainment assets needed for the Cold War. Recognition of this new-era reality can help pave the way toward high-leverage innovations at affordable cost.

Likewise, the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq show that U.S. and European militaries will need improved assets for post-war occupation, stabilization, and reconstruction. European forces are a natural for these important missions, but not to the exclusion of remaining well-prepared for combat. Some observers mistakenly judge that continental European forces should focus on peacekeeping missions while relying upon high-tech U.S. and British forces to do the war fighting. This prescription is wrong because it underestimates what European forces can achieve and would perpetuate an unhealthy division of labor. During the Cold War, many European militaries were highly proficient at combat operations. They can be made fully capable of modern-era combat if they merely acquire new assets and doctrines in achievable ways. Similar to the U.S. military, European militaries can be capable of both winning wars and winning the peace afterward. While pursuing sensible role specialization, a transformation roadmap should point European forces in this twin-hat direction.

A NATO transformation roadmap should pay attention to other military forces and capabilities for old and new members, including counter-terrorism, missile defense, and establishing a network of bases, facilities,

and schools for helping the new ATC perform its job. But once this goal is accomplished, a transformation roadmap should set stiff priorities by showing how NATO members can economize to extract greater strategic mileage from their defense budgets. Accordingly, it should call for major reductions in European border defense forces that no longer have critical roles in NATO defense strategy or other important national missions. Today, only 10-20 percent of European ground forces can deploy outside their borders. A transformation roadmap could endorse reductions of 30-40 percent in existing European force structures, while shifting toward deployable capabilities. This step would reduce Europe's forces to about 1.6 million military personnel, 35 divisions, 2100 tactical combat aircraft, and 200 naval combatants. Ample forces would remain for performing NATO missions and national missions.

The advantage of such a steep reduction is that it could free large funds—\$20 billion or more annually—for investments. As a result, European spending on research, development, and procurement could increase by 50 percent, thereby propelling transformation forward at a significantly faster pace. The Europeans would have more funds for spending not only on the NRF and other combat forces, but also on homeland security and missile defense, both of which are important priorities. Such an intensified transformation will be possible, however, only if the funds freed from force reductions are retained in national defense budgets. A NATO transformation roadmap should endorse this budgetary strategy as the *sine qua non* for Alliance health. Its goal should be to convince European governments and parliaments to embrace the prospect of bolstering NATO military preparedness without driving defense budgets through the ceiling, rather than trying to capitalize on a new peace dividend that would not bring peace at all. At the Istanbul summit, NATO leaders could issue a pledge to reinvest for transformation. “Transformation Reinvestment Commitment” would be a logical partner to the “Prague Capability Commitment” provided both are focused on transformation, the NRF, and other top force priorities.

Designing a New U.S. Military Presence in Europe

With the United States now poised to begin altering its military presence in Europe as part of a global reshuffle, the act of ensuring that a sensible presence results is a final priority for the NATO defense transformation agenda. For the United States, the goal should not be to punish long-standing allies for their opposition to the Iraq war, but instead to craft a new European presence that supports both U.S. defense strategy and NATO strategic priorities. This goal can be accomplished, but only

if care is taken along the way. The United States needs to act wisely after consulting with Allies, and European countries will need to have a proper understanding of the reasons why they should support forthcoming changes. The core reason for change is that while the status quo is a recipe for stagnation, a newly designed U.S. presence can be a vehicle for leading NATO toward an era of relevance and performance.

The officially declared U.S. military presence in Europe is about 110,000 troops. This number, however, is not always what it seems. It does not include troops on peacekeeping duty in the Balkans or the 10,000-20,000 sailors and marines aboard the CVBGs and ARGs that regularly patrol the Mediterranean. Today's typical presence thus is about 130,000 troops, somewhat higher than the roughly 100,000 troops deployed in Asia. In addition, the U.S. military commitment to NATO and Europe is measured not only by peacetime presence, but also by other forces that would deploy to Europe in a war. In the Kosovo War, for example, large U.S. air and naval forces converged on the scene. Counting forces in both categories—peacetime presence and wartime reinforcement—the total U.S. military commitment to NATO and Europe is about 350,000 troops. This total commitment seems unlikely to change appreciably so long as a legitimate NATO requirement exists for it. What is mutating today is not this total commitment, but merely the portion permanently stationed in Europe.

Designing an effective future U.S. presence in Europe begins with remembering why the current presence was chosen a decade ago. When the Clinton Administration took power in early 1993, it inherited a presence of 150,000 troops—well down from the Cold War posture of 330,000 troops. The Administration decided to reduce this presence to 100,000 troops. Of this number, fully two-thirds were stationed in Germany at old Cold War bases, and the remaining troops were mainly based in Britain and Italy. The reason for retaining 100,000 troops in Europe was not because this figure had special meaning, but because this number was needed to field the forces deemed necessary for political and military reasons.

A posture of this size enabled the United States to deploy a balanced, multi-mission force of sizable headquarters staffs, four heavy Army brigades stationed in Germany, two or three Air Force fighter wings, and naval bases in the Mediterranean supporting 6th Fleet operations. These forces enabled the U.S. military to maintain its influence in NATO, to preserve a hedge against reappearance of threats to alliance borders, to prepare for new mobile missions as mandated by NATO then-existing strategic concepts, and to conduct training and exercises with allied forces. Since then, the U.S. force presence has been altered in minor ways, such as

deployment of a light Army brigade and more prepositioned equipment in Italy. But for the most part, the U.S. presence has stayed remarkably constant, even though NATO, Europe, and the entire world have changed a great deal. Recognizing the need for fresh thinking, the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001 called for a new approach to global overseas presence in Europe and elsewhere. But apart from suggesting redeployment of some ships to the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, it left the details of the future European presence to further studies. Such studies are now underway.

Today, new strategic priorities are altering the calculations taking place in Washington. Because threats to European borders no longer exist and the U.S. military has become better at power projection from the United States, there is no longer a need to station large ground combat forces in Germany, which is now one of Europe's safest regions. Many of these forces could be put to better use elsewhere in ways that will benefit not only the United States and Europe, but Germany as well. New strategic requirements for American forces and missions elsewhere in Europe, however, are emerging. A vital new mission will be to ensure that the U.S. military in Europe can work closely with the NRF in peace, crisis, and war. Likewise, U.S. forces in Europe must remain capable not only of fulfilling their other defense commitments to NATO, but also of deploying off the continent swiftly to carry out operations of their own. The same applies to American bases and facilities in Europe, which should provide hubs for power projection. Another mission will be to signal continued U.S. engagement and leadership of NATO to old and new members in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the northern and southern regions. Guarding the Mediterranean and its sea lanes against new threats will remain critical. Yet another mission will be to maintain interoperability between American and European militaries. A final mission will be to help keep U.S. and NATO defense transformation on parallel tracks.

All of these missions should be taken into account in designing the future U.S. military presence in Europe. American missions for NATO suggest that while this presence can be smaller than now, the United States should take care not to reduce too far. The future presence should be neither tiny nor purely symbolic. It will depend in part on the size of U.S. force deployments in the Gulf region. The American forces that remain should disperse outward from current bases in Germany to positions in Eastern Europe and along the southern region, locations where new-era requirements are growing to perform both multinational integration and power projection missions. The United States will no longer require four Army brigades in Germany, but it likely will need two clusters of ground

forces in Europe. One cluster should be composed of heavy forces in Northern Europe for promoting NATO interoperability and transformation. The other cluster should be composed of light forces in Italy and elsewhere in southern Europe for swift power projection to the Middle East and other regions. The same calculus applies to designing U.S. air forces in Europe: current bases in Germany (e.g., at Ramstein), Britain, Italy, and elsewhere will remain valuable. As for U.S. naval forces, existing bases and facilities will still be needed to support the 6th Fleet, but its Mediterranean deployments may be smaller than during the past and likely will vary as a function of changing conditions.

What do these imperatives mean when they are added up? Future U.S. manpower levels will need to be determined on the basis of analysis, but the more important consideration is the type of forces deployed, their locations, and their missions. Manpower levels should stem from these considerations, not the other way around. Indeed, the manpower level may be a variable, not a constant. The future U.S. presence will rely more heavily than now on forward operating locations and prepositioned equipment rather than fixed bases occupied by stationed forces. During times of training and exercises, U.S.-based forces will temporarily deploy to Europe, thereby elevating manpower well-above normal levels. After they leave, troop strength will recede until the next deployment cycle. Regardless of their manpower levels, the forces that remain in Europe, or are newly deployed there, should be designed to support U.S. interests and to help enhance NATO strategic effectiveness. Provided this is the case, the new U.S. presence may be smaller and significantly altered, but it can be a powerful instrument for pursuing a bright future for the Alliance.

The Second Track: Pursuing Political Transformation for Strategic Realignment

For all its importance, a vigorous NATO defense transformation agenda will lack a compelling strategic purpose and will not be fully effective unless it is accompanied by the second part of a dual-track strategy: political transformation for strategic realignment. Whereas the Afghanistan war demonstrated the need for defense transformation, the war in Iraq highlighted the Alliance need for strategic realignment by exposing fault-lines that can cripple ability to act in politically unified ways outside Europe. Defense transformation is unlikely to succeed unless political transformation also occurs, and vice-versa. These two enterprises thus go hand in hand.

What does “strategic realignment” mean? Basically, it means a process of change by which the Alliance enhances its political-military capacity to project power and purpose southward into the Middle East and adjoining areas. As stated earlier, strategic realignment can best be pursued through the following four-fold agenda that, along with defense transformation, will produce a more unified and effective Atlantic Alliance:

- Creating a common vision of threat perceptions, goals, strategy, and standards for using military force
- Reforming decisionmaking to create greater flexibility and responsiveness for handling security issues outside Europe
- Organizing military forces for stabilization and reconstruction operations
- Creating a new Partnership for Cooperation in the Greater Middle East.

These four measures should be considered not only on their individual merits, but also in terms of their combined impact. The first two measures aim at strengthening NATO political capacity to forge united and effective policies for the Middle East and other regions. In the aftermath of the Iraq debate, opportunities have opened for the United States and Britain to work closely with Spain, Italy, Poland, and other new members. Whether the “Quad” can be recreated is to be seen, but NATO clearly cannot function effectively if the United States and Britain are always at loggerheads with Germany and France in ways leaving other members torn between them. The first measure of creating a common vision aims at bringing these four leaders closer together so that NATO will be better able to act as a unified alliance. Conversely, the second measure of reforming decisionmaking aims to provide the Atlantic Alliance with the flexibility to act when lack of unanimous consensus threatens the capacity of mission-responsible countries to defend common interests.

Whereas the first two measures address internal politics, the last two measures seek to enhance NATO performance in situations other than war-fighting. Obviously the Alliance needs the ability to fight wars at long distances. The defense transformation measures discussed earlier will provide the requisite capabilities and are a part of strategic realignment. Yet NATO will be a limited alliance if it can only fight wars but do little else. It also needs a better capacity to address post-war situations and to become active in the Middle East in peacetime. The third measure aims to provide the Alliance with a stronger role in post-war situations, such as the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. The fourth measure creates a

peacetime outreach program, similar to the Partnership for Peace (PFP) in Eastern Europe, that would pursue improved ties to friendly Middle East militaries. Together, these four measures are intended to strengthen NATO cohesion and performance in mutually reinforcing ways. If they are all adopted, along with a robust set of military measures, they will produce a new Atlantic Alliance that is strategically realigned in the best sense of that term.

Writing a New Harmel Report to Help Establish a Common Strategic Vision

The damaging confrontation over Iraq makes the importance of this measure crystal clear. The Atlantic Alliance badly needs to forge a common strategic vision that will narrow the cavernous gap between the United States and key European countries—especially Germany and France—on the issues surrounding the use of strategic power outside Europe. Otherwise, similar confrontations may erupt in the future, and the next one could destroy NATO, not merely damage it. The term “common strategic vision” does not mean that the United States and Europe must agree on everything. But it does mean that they must agree on the strategic basics, possess a shared framework for cooperative action, and respect each other in areas where disagreements still exist.

Some observers judge that now is not the time to debate these issues. Their understandable reason is fear that a high-profile debate will do more harm than good by widening the gap in visions rather than narrowing it. They argue that, since an eerie calm has settled over NATO in the aftermath of Iraq, the prudent choice is to let wounds heal. Today’s calm in Brussels, however, is illusory. The bitter divide on strategic policy is not caused by differences at NATO Headquarters, where most people think alike and want to keep NATO alive. Instead, the divide is caused by sharply differing views in national capitals, the media, and public opinion. Ignoring the divide will not close it. It will reappear with the next crisis. The only way to lessen it is to grapple with the core issues in ways that produce a better transatlantic understanding.

The bitter flare-up over Iraq occurred because a gap-closing dialogue had not taken place earlier. Such a dialogue was attempted in 1999 when the new NATO strategic concept was adopted at the Washington Summit, but this compromise document largely papered over unresolved differences that lay hidden for the next three years and surfaced at the United Nations. The terrorism of September 11, 2001, exacerbated the problem by deeply alarming the United States while leaving Europe less worried.

Because the current interlude between crises may be temporary, it may be a last opportunity to resolve these issues before they can no longer be addressed in a civil manner. The gap between Americans and Europeans is not so great that it cannot be closed or at least appreciably narrowed. The United States grasps that the use of military force in the Middle East and elsewhere must be tempered by mature political judgment and respect for international law. The Bush Administration has made clear that it anticipates no additional wars in the Middle East, that it will use diplomacy to address remaining problems, and that military force will be a last resort. Most European governments grasp that sometimes military power must be used against dangerous threats arising from these regions. The EU interim report by Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe for a Better World," provides a good basis for a sensible dialogue. Many European foreign ministers acknowledge that on occasions of imminent threat, preventive war sometimes is necessary. The grounds for a meeting of minds exist by forging a sensible blend of these positions.

Confidence in success also comes from history. This is not the first time NATO has been divided. Indeed, stiff debates arose during the Cold War. An especially bitter debate erupted in the early 1960s when the United States wanted to shift NATO defense strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response, and the Europeans resisted out of fear this step would weaken deterrence. The debate resulted in Germany threatening to develop nuclear weapons and France leaving the integrated command. But it was finally resolved when Americans and Europeans rolled up their sleeves, began talking calmly, and showed the patience to analyze the complex issues carefully. They eventually agreed upon a new strategy of flexible response that bolstered conventional forces but preserved the option to climb the ladder of nuclear escalation if the initial defense failed. The common strategy adopted then proved to be highly successful. It laid the foundation for growing NATO defense strength that helped win the Cold War. A successful outcome of this sort is possible again, if the Alliance merely recalls its own history and its mechanisms for consensus-formation.

Exactly what is to be done? How can the Alliance transform the bruised feelings and deep suspicions over Iraq into a constructive dialogue that results in a meeting of minds? The answer is not for NATO to engage in an official study, for this step could result in many governments digging deeper into entrenched positions. A better idea is to prepare a new Harmel Report akin to the original report written in 1967. Such a report would be written by a team of independent European and American thinkers. They would have the freedom to examine the issues outside the glare of pub-

licity and pressures from their governments. When their judgments and recommendations were finalized, NATO would be free to accept, reject, or modify them. The good features of their analysis could be adapted as official policy to help harmonize American and European perspectives.

The Harmel Report was named after Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, who proposed the idea. It sought to blend detente with deterrence and defense in ways that maintained NATO solidarity. It was commissioned in early 1967 and written over a period of six months. Although it was conducted under the auspices of NATO Secretary General, its four sub-groups were led by senior rapporteurs from outside NATO, who spoke for themselves and did not take official instructions from their governments. When their final report was issued, it was reviewed by NATO headquarters and national capitals. Many of its arguments were adopted by NATO ministers in December 1967, and the entire document was issued as an annex to their communiqué. As the logic of the Harmel Report became established throughout NATO in the following months, the effect was to help provide the Alliance with stronger footing for handling a troubled future.

Today, a new Harmel Report could be drafted using a similar procedure. Its goal should not be a bland compromise that submerges differences, but an intelligent blend of American and European views that resolves these differences and produces coherent strategic concepts acceptable to both sides of the Atlantic. The EU Solana report takes future threats seriously and calls upon the EU to play an assertive role in global security affairs in partnership with the United States. Although Solana's study does not put forth an agenda for NATO, it could become a launch pad for a group of European and American wise-men to create a new Harmel Report.

What issues should the new Harmel Report address? First, it should focus on establishing a common definition of future threats. Whereas today the United States is deeply worried about threats posed by terrorists, tyrants, and WMD proliferation, Europe has less fear of them. If a shared understanding of threats can be forged, the United States and Europe will have a stronger basis for acting jointly and be better able to elicit support from parliaments and publics. However, it must offer more than an intelligence estimate. It must also provide a coherent sense of common goals, strategies, and actions not only for combating these threats but also for eradicating the conditions that generate them. Thus, it must address how the United States and Europe should work together to promote democracy and markets across the Middle East and elsewhere.

Likewise, the report should forge a common understanding of the strategic roles that the United States and Europe are to play in carrying burdens and accepting responsibility in the coming years. It should aim for a relationship in which both sides work together in exercising soft and hard power, rather than rely upon a dysfunctional division of labor in which Europe provides the soft power and the United States the hard power. Finally, it must help forge a shared understanding of standards for employing military force against threats. Many Europeans cling to the Westphalian concept that military power should be employed only after aggression has occurred. By contrast, the United States has adopted a new doctrine of preventive war when threats are "grave, gathering, and imminent." NATO cannot survive in the face of a militant America and a pacifist Europe. A similar mindset on this critical issue is vital if NATO is to remain united in the coming years. If this difficult issue is discussed sensibly, an alliance-wide standard for going to war can be found.

A new Harmel Report need not result in a NATO strategy that either hamstrings the United States or compels Europeans to blindly support decisions from Washington. Instead, it can help ensure that both sides of the Atlantic work closely more often to strike a wise synthesis of restraint and the muscular use of power. Before and after a new Harmel Report is written, both sides of the Atlantic can take other steps to encourage a respectful dialogue. The United States can do a better job of consulting with European governments. It also can mount a public relations campaign to explain its foreign policy to Europeans, including its many still-important contributions in Europe. Meanwhile, Germany and France can rediscover the importance of acting as counterparts of America and Britain, not counterweights. Other European governments can do a better job of explaining the benefits of cooperating with the United States to their publics in ways that counter the simplistic, erroneous messages often conveyed in their media. Such steps would help cool the temperature of what has become a fevered relationship, thereby allowing calm heads to prevail.

Reforming NATO Decisionmaking

Even with a common strategic vision, making decisions to project NATO power into distant areas does not promise to be easy. During the Cold War, NATO achieved consensus behind defense plans for responding quickly to aggression against its borders. In the current era, swift responses may also be needed against threats that emerge outside NATO borders, and even normal peacetime activities often will not permit extended delays. Difficulties will especially arise when gray-area situations create

legitimate debates over how best to respond. Such situations typically arise under Article 4, when the use of NATO power is discretionary, rather than under Article 5, when alliance borders are threatened and using military power is virtually mandatory. In such situations, NATO must be able to perform two key functions: to debate options thoroughly and then to act decisively. NATO today is good at the former, but not the latter.

Most democracies value both debate and action. This is why they make most policy decisions by majority rule, not unanimous votes, which are a prescription for paralysis. NATO, however, is not a normal democracy in this regard. Today's problem is that France and Germany oppose key features of how the United States and Britain are acting in Iraq. But a big underlying problem will remain, even if these four countries patch up their current differences. The problem is that NATO is a big alliance with a proclivity to act only when its members unanimously agree on the action. Because NATO already has 19 members and will soon have 26, unanimity could become a scarce commodity in the years ahead.

True, a single, stubborn country will normally be hard-pressed to use its veto power to block NATO action. But as the debate over defending Turkey in the weeks before the invasion of Iraq showed, a small group of dissenting countries can cause serious problems. While that problem ultimately was solved, in the future such a group could prevail in damaging ways by stubbornly standing its ground. The risk is that NATO will be plunged into paralysis when assertive activity and regular gear-shifting are needed. When unanimity does not exist, NATO could be prevented from responding in crises and wars. Equally bad, mission-responsible countries—those willing to accept responsibility for performing demanding missions outside Europe—will lack the peacetime authority to work with the integrated command to prepare the forces and plans that must be invoked in crises. If advance preparations are not made, quick and decisive NATO action at the moment of truth may be impossible, even if members unanimously agree to act. This risk is not hypothetical and futuristic: it already exists in spades because the integrated command cannot prepare full-scale plans and programs unless the NAC unanimously authorizes it to do so in each case.

NATO has finessing mechanisms that can help circumvent the unanimity rule on occasion, but all of them are thin reeds to rely upon in today's world. One such mechanism is the "silence procedure," whereby a member who disagrees with a widespread consensus chooses to abstain from voting, thereby allowing the consensus to carry the day. Another mechanism is to shift decisionmaking from the NAC to the Defense Plan-

ning Committee (DPC). This allows NATO to make decisions without France, which belongs to the NAC but not the DPC. A third mechanism is for the Secretary General to claim to speak for a unanimous consensus without taking a formal vote. This mechanism was employed in the Kosovo war and helped enable NATO to conduct military operations even though some members had misgivings. A fourth mechanism is that SA-CEUR and other commanders can prepare informal defense plans.

The problem with these finessing mechanisms is that they only work sometimes and can easily be overturned by a small number of members intent on having their way. Such members can refuse to stay silent, can insist the NAC be used, can deny the Secretary General the authority to speak for NATO, and can block military commanders from planning informally.

Today's situation requires decision processes that are more flexible and responsive. NATO can gauge how to create them by recalling its history. The use of unanimous voting is a recent practice. It began in the early 1990s, when France was objecting to emerging NATO policies in the Balkans, and the Alliance wanted France and others on board for this new out-of-area operation. During the Cold War, NATO employed unanimity when making major decisions about core strategic concepts or such controversial nuclear matters as deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles. But in conventional defense planning, the Alliance acted differently. It wisely delegated considerable authority to those countries that were mainly responsible for key missions in different areas. For example, it permitted the nine countries responsible for defending FRG borders to carry out their important business without interference from other members. The same practice applied in the north Atlantic, northern Europe, and southern Europe, where defense plans and forces were built by even smaller coalitions of responsible contributors. The bottom line is that NATO has shown flexibility in the past, and there is nothing in the Washington Treaty that mandates unanimous voting practices.

What can be done to create more flexibility in ways that avoid paralysis yet preserve healthy debate and widespread consensus-formation? The guiding principle should be to craft new decision procedures whereby members who regularly accept responsibility for new-era missions are granted reasonable discretionary authority to act in proper ways yet are still subjected to scrutiny by the rest of the alliance to ensure that they are acting wisely. An initial step toward this model can be taken by allowing the Secretary General to authorize the integrated command in peacetime to prepare contingency plans for potential contingencies. The Secretary General could take this step in response to requests from a threatened

member, from SACEUR, or from members that could be called upon to perform NATO missions outside Europe. These planning activities would be supervised by the Secretary General and the Military Committee. Provided they are consistent with NATO strategic concepts and Ministerial Guidance, they could not be vetoed by the NAC and DPC. Likewise, NATO military leaders would be authorized to prepare the necessary forces under the Secretary General's guidance by using the standard force-building process in consultation with participating members. These steps would have the advantage of enabling NATO to prepare for future responses, thereby helping ensure that the Alliance has the necessary wherewithal when the need arises.

Along with this practice, a bigger step would be to depart from the unanimity principle at the NAC for making decisions in crises. While alternatives need to be studied, NATO might consider a variation on decisionmaking by the U.N. Security Council. Only the five permanent members of the Security Council have veto power. When these five agree, it takes only majority support from the Security Council as a whole, which has ten non-permanent members, for the U.N. to act. The U.N. does not have a reputation for impulsive conduct, but unlike NATO, it can act despite limited internal dissent, and it has done so in the past. If NATO adopts such a model, it should not create "permanent members" who always have veto power. Instead, it should grant veto power only to those members who regularly commit substantial resources and efforts to each key mission. When these countries agree to act in their area of responsibility—for example, by using the NRF—voting by the rest of the NAC would be conducted by simple majority rule or a two-thirds rule. Normally, this practice would mean that a solid NAC majority of 15-20 members must vote in favor of an action. Such a practice would ensure review by the NAC, yet allow for action even if a few countries disagree.

Perhaps this U.N.-like model could be applied to the NRF. If it proved its worth, it could be expanded to other NATO forces and bigger operations. This model does not imply creation of a single coalition of members for carrying out all actions. Most likely, it would result in multiple coalitions or "committees of contributors," each of which would handle a different mission or region.² These coalitions would vary in composition, size, and orientation. A coalition handling North Africa might differ from one handling the Persian Gulf. Often, the United States and Britain would lead these coalitions, but not always. Regardless, all NATO members would be welcome to join coalitions of their choice. But to join as a full-fledged member, a country would be required to commit significant resources and

to prove its mettle as a worthy, reliable partner. Its influence within the coalition would be a function of its resource commitments and its willingness to accept responsibility for missions.

This model is not a prescription for liberating the United States and Britain from the shackles of Germany and France, who still could recruit supporters when they dissent. Moreover, if these or other countries want veto authority, they merely must establish demonstrated track records of accepting responsibility in the mission-areas of their choice. Germany, France, and other countries thus would be free to participate in missions of importance to them and would wield substantial influence over how these missions are handled. Indeed, they may find themselves leading some NATO missions and thereby value their enhanced discretionary authority.

Would the United States lose its veto power? The answer is that if it wants veto power, it merely needs to be a leading contributor to missions of its choice. In most cases of NATO power projection, the United States will be such a contributor. What about the matter of identifying who should possess veto power within each coalition? To prevent countries from making small contributions to gain veto power with disruptive purposes in mind, a standard should be established whereby veto power is granted only to those members who make significant contributions and establish consistent track records for responsible conduct. Such standards were applied in the Cold War. When France withdrew from the integrated command, it lost its right to major influence over NATO forward defense plans, even though it still made forces conditionally available for rear-area roles. By contrast, the FRG and other members maintained their influence at high levels because they never flagged in their forward defense duties.

Table 8-1. Changes to NATO Decisionmaking

NATO Decision	Cold War	Today	Proposed
<i>Contingency Planning</i>	Continuous	NAC-Directed	SACEUR –Authorized with Oversight by NATO Secretary General
<i>Force Preparations</i>	Ongoing	NAC-Directed	NATO Secretary General-Authorized Through Consultations with Members
<i>Crisis Response</i>	When Attacked	NAC-Directed	U.N. Security Council Model
<i>Overall Process</i>	Automatic	Road-Blocked	Flexible and Responsive

This new style of NATO decisionmaking would be more complex than the current practice of unanimity across the board. (See accompanying table.) NATO still would require unanimity for such encompassing decisions as its strategic concept, core goals, strategy inside and outside

Europe, decisions to admit new members, and generic standards for using military force. But it would have greater flexibility to prepare contingency plans and engage in necessary pre-crisis force preparations. When crises erupt, it would make decisions in a manner similar to the U.N. Security Council, and thus would have greater flexibility in handling them. It no longer would face the type of paralysis that threatens its relevance and effectiveness.

Involving NATO in Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction

Creating a common strategic vision and adopting flexible decision-making processes will strengthen the Atlantic Alliance for the years ahead. But concrete steps are also needed to broaden NATO activities in the Greater Middle East and elsewhere for the near-term. What can be done? Decisions in this arena should be guided by the principle that NATO must become an alliance that has a full spectrum of capabilities.

When the time is right, NATO clearly should become involved in the post-war task of stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq. Performing this task seemingly will require a sizable military presence for a considerable time. Today, the United States is contributing most of the forces for this duty, yet it will face strong pressures to trim its presence in the months ahead. Britain, Poland, and other NATO countries are already present in significant numbers, but larger European forces will be needed. If the NATO integrated command is called upon to help, it could provide the leadership architecture needed to guide multinational forces.

In addition, NATO should broaden its thinking beyond Iraq. Crises and wars that mandate NATO participation may occur elsewhere. As a result, NATO should develop a better organized standing capacity for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions. These missions involve such activities as securing still-troubled zones, establishing police forces and the rule of law, restoring public services in electrical power, water and sewage, repairing damaged bridges and roads, cleaning up war destruction, and building democratic governments. These diverse functions require specialized military and civilian assets, such as military police, construction engineers, medical personnel, and civil administrators. European governments have such assets. New NATO members could make major contributions. But these assets need to be organized so that they are ready when needed. NATO can work with members to prepare for such missions by either the integrated command or ad-hoc coalitions.

Some Americans blanch at the idea of NATO becoming regularly involved in S&R missions. They fear a loss of U.S. influence and bungled

operations. In this arena, however, NATO already has proven its mettle in the Balkans and is now taking over the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. In Iraq, much will depend upon whether participating NATO members agree upon the strategic goals for reconstruction. In other cases, a common vision will be equally necessary. Provided consensus exists on strategic goals, NATO can be an effective instrument for this important mission.

Creating a Partnership for Cooperation in the Greater Middle East

NATO could helpfully involve itself in peacetime affairs of the Greater Middle East by creating a Partnership for Cooperation (PFC) that would seek to establish constructive relations between NATO and friendly militaries there. NATO already has a "Mediterranean Dialogue" with some North African countries, but it is mostly confined to diplomatic exchanges and does not cover the entire Middle East and Persian Gulf. A PFC might be part of the existing PFP in Eastern Europe and surrounding areas. Alternatively, it might be an entirely separate creation, with a mission and administrative staff of its own. The tradeoffs between these two models need to be examined. Expanding upon the PFP would be the simplest, easiest, and least-costly alternative. Yet dealing with the Middle East will be quite different from dealing with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This argues for a separate effort.

Regardless of the option chosen, a PFC would not be intended to prepare Middle Eastern countries for admission into NATO. Instead, it would aspire to build ties with Middle Eastern militaries in peace-building efforts that strengthen their roles in the war on terrorism, encourage their democratization, familiarize them with the United States and Europe, and enhance their utility for self-defense missions. A PFC might provide collaboration in such areas as law enforcement, disrupting terrorist cells, budgeting and programming, peacekeeping, search and rescue, disaster relief, and border control. Such a PFC must be focused on enhancing regional stability, not fostering military competition. The PFC must not endanger the security of any country, including Israel. It could begin small, with such already-friendly countries as Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf Co-operative Council States. Afterward, it could gradually expand to include other countries.

A PFC would be intended to initiate a process of growing dialogue and cooperation between NATO and Middle Eastern Countries. This PFC would not be a one-size-fits-all creation. Instead, each participating country would be able to craft a PFC program suited to its tastes, in

consultation with NATO members willing to work closely with it. Thus, PFC programs might differ appreciably. The NATO PFP in Eastern Europe pursued flexible arrangements from the onset, which helps account for its considerable success over the past decade. East European countries were able to approach NATO at a scope and pace of their own choosing. The same philosophy would apply to a PFC for the Middle East.

A PFC would be a historic departure for the Alliance. It would be a valuable new mission and would involve NATO in the visionary task of bringing peace, security, and democracy to a big region that, even after the victory in Iraq, promises to be troubled for years to come. It could begin by taking stock of comparable efforts already being pursued by NATO members that act unilaterally in various Middle Eastern countries. It could ascertain how efforts by additional countries could be added to forge a multinational NATO program with each PFC member. Each PFC member thus would benefit from help provided by a team of NATO countries.

How effective can a PFC be? Especially in its initial stages, it likely will be considerably less effective than was the PFP in Eastern Europe. At the time PFP appeared, East European countries had recently been liberated from communism and the Soviet Union. They were struggling to adopt democracy and market economies. They wanted to join NATO to gain security and the EU to become prosperous. Their militaries wanted collaboration with NATO militaries to adopt new doctrines, weapons, and practices that clearly were better than those of the Warsaw Pact. For all these reasons, their governments wanted to belong to the Western Club, and their publics mostly agreed with them. As a result, many rushed to embrace PFP because it was a vehicle for pursuing these larger goals, not because of specific measures.

Middle Eastern conditions today are vastly different. The Israel-Palestinian conflict could inhibit many Arab governments. Most Arab states are ruled by monarchies or traditional regimes that are chary of democratic reforms, even though they recognize the advantages of market economies. Still animated by nationalism, many governments also are suspicious of western countries, fearing American domination or renewed European imperialism. Islamic societies vary in their fundamentalism, but few hold much love for western culture, which is seen as too secular and materialist. Their militaries likely will see significant technical attractions in a PFC that allows them to strengthen their capabilities in useful areas. But they will not want NATO to control their defense strategies and forces, or even to acquire full knowledge of them. These attitudes are impediments to quick success of a PFC.

Whether initial success by a PFC would produce a wholesale shift toward pro-western Arab foreign policies is another matter. NATO members might find themselves laboring in PFC vineyards for a long period while questioning the merits of the enterprise. Yet, gains might be made in such important areas as counter-terrorism and in softening the sharp edges of Islamic fundamentalism. Likewise, PFC might help nudge the Middle East toward greater stability and help plant seeds of democratization. If such gains are achieved, they could make PFC a sound investment even if they do not transform the Middle East in the ways that Eastern Europe has been transformed. As a result, NATO needs to be realistic in its expectations, yet assertive in pursuing an idea that makes sense.

Conclusion

Is this dual-track strategy of political and military transformation for strategic realignment needed by an Atlantic Alliance in deep trouble? Yes. Will it be adopted and will it succeed? That remains to be seen. One thing can be said. Ten years ago, a common refrain was that NATO must “Go out-of-area or go out of business.” The Alliance responded by moving eastward but not southward. For the good of the United States and Europe, it now needs to move southward. The larger meaning of the war on terrorists and tyrants is that the United States is now coming ashore in the Greater Middle East in a historic attempt to bring peace, democracy, and freer markets to that troubled region. NATO also needs to do so because the United States cannot handle this ultra-demanding task alone. If NATO fails to respond, this time it truly will go out of business.

Notes

¹ Source: Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, *Dual-Track Transformation for NATO*, Defense Horizons 35 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2003).

² The “Committee of Contributors” model is developed in Leo G. Michel, NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?, *Strategic Forum* 202, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, August 2003).

NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule? (2003)¹

Leo G. Michel

Key Points

Since its creation in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has developed a tradition of making decisions by consensus. This requirement for general agreement among all members on positions or actions taken in the name of NATO has survived serious internal rifts and four rounds of enlargement.

Yet influential Americans are asking whether the consensus rule impedes the ability of NATO to make rapid and effective decisions—especially on military operations. Concerns predate the agreement reached in November 2002 on a fifth round of enlargement involving seven Central and East European states, but they have also been fueled by resentment over intra-Alliance divisions related to the war in Iraq. In May 2003, the Senate gave voice to these concerns by asking the Bush administration to raise the possibility of changing the consensus rule and “suspending” a NATO member before the North Atlantic Council.

Options exist to facilitate decisionmaking on the planning and conduct of operations that would not fundamentally change the role of consensus, a procedure whose advantages should not be underestimated. However, a judicious balance needs to be found between the desire for efficient military action in response to common threats and the need to ensure that all members have a chance to be heard. Moreover, if the United States were to seek changes, it would face a Catch-22: the consensus rule can only be altered by consensus.

It should come as no surprise that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials are fond of citing Mark Twain's retort to doomsayers that reports of his death were greatly exaggerated. Having survived many rough tests since its birth, the 54-year-old alliance is still working to recover from a bruising disagreement among its members over the decision by some to oust Saddam Hussein's regime. Its services, however, are still very much in demand:

- ▶ About 37,000 NATO-led military personnel remain on crisis management duty in the Balkans.
- ▶ NATO recently launched its first out-of-Europe operation, taking command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
- ▶ In July 2003, the Senate voted unanimously to encourage the Bush administration to seek help from NATO in Iraq.
- ▶ Several prominent Members of Congress and nongovernmental experts have called for a NATO peacekeeping mission between Israelis and Palestinians.

But how does NATO make such commitments? Will a large—and enlarging Alliance be capable of planning and managing potentially complex military operations in the future? Or do the drawbacks of running a “war by committee” (as some have described the 1999 Kosovo air campaign) make NATO an unwieldy instrument for managing modern coalition warfare? All of these questions revolve around the perceived ability of NATO, or lack thereof, to make timely and effective decisions to respond to 21st-century threats in a way that equitably shares the risks and responsibilities of Alliance membership.

Consensus: A Primer

Although international security affairs cognoscenti often refer to the NATO consensus rule, the North Atlantic Treaty does not specify how collective decisions are to be made, with one exception: the Article 10 provision that “unanimous agreement” is necessary to invite a state to join the Alliance. Absent any explicit voting procedure, NATO has developed a set of customary practices.

Most decisions are based on draft proposals circulated to all Allies by the Secretary General, who chairs the North Atlantic Council (NAC), or by the chairperson (always an International Staff [IS] official) of one of the hundreds of NATO committees and working groups. These draft proposals may be initiated by the Secretary General, the IS, or individual Allies.

Written proposals generally are preceded by consultations in a variety of forums, including bilateral or multilateral discussions in allied capitals, allied missions at NATO Headquarters, the NAC, and committees and working groups established by the NAC. Such consultations are useful—in some cases, critical—to identify possible concerns or objections among Allies and to craft mutually acceptable solutions.

When a written decision or statement of position is deemed necessary, but some or all of the Permanent Representatives (PermReps) or their alternates cannot provide their respective authoritative national positions at the time of a specific NAC or committee meeting, the Secretary General or relevant committee chairperson may opt to circulate the draft proposal under a silence procedure.² If no Ally *breaks silence*—that is, notifies the IS in writing of its objection before the deadline set by the Secretary General or committee chairperson—the proposal is considered approved. However, if one or more Ally breaks silence, the proposal is normally referred back to the relevant body for further work to reach consensus. As a rule, NATO does not publicly identify which countries break silence, although national positions may be leaked (sometimes by the country breaking silence) if the issue is contentious. Moreover, as there is no formal voting procedure, there is no formal abstention procedure, either.

The Secretary General routinely aids consensus building through informal discussions at NATO headquarters with individual Allies or groups of Allies. He also can influence Alliance deliberations through his public statements and private meetings and correspondence with senior officials, legislators, or opinion leaders of allied governments. However, the Secretary General or other senior IS officials cannot overrule an Ally's position. Indeed, any perceived effort by a NATO official to run roughshod over an Ally's objections is apt to provoke sympathetic objections from other Allies who are wary of any precedent that could diminish their future prerogatives.³

The Power of the Rule

The consensus rule represents more than a mechanistic decision-making procedure. It reflects the NATO structure as an *alliance of independent and sovereign* countries, as opposed to a *supranational* body, and exemplifies for many the “one for all, all for one” ethos of the organization's collective defense commitment.⁴ NATO decisions are the expression of the collective will of its member governments, arrived at by common consent. Under the rule, no Ally can be forced to approve a position or take an action against its will. This is especially important for decisions on the

potential use of military force, which are among the most politically sensitive for any Ally.

Even Article 5, the treaty's key collective defense provision, stops short of mandating the type of assistance to be provided by each Ally in the event of an attack against the territory of another.⁵ It is important to recall that the United States insisted on qualified language in this article largely to assuage concerns in Congress that its constitutional power to declare war not be ceded to any multilateral organization.

At the same time, the consensus rule allows NATO to respect distinctive national legislation that may bear upon the ability of Allies to contribute to certain NATO operations. For example, Norway and Denmark do not allow peacetime stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons. Similarly, German law requires a simple parliamentary majority to approve military deployments outside Germany, whereas Hungarian law requires a two-thirds majority. Iceland, for its part, does not have a national military force. Through the rule, NATO can build political and military solidarity through the Alliance as a whole without imposing one-size-fits-all standards on its diverse membership.

The consensus rule forces Allies to undertake the widest possible consultations to build support for their ideas. No Ally, large or small, can be taken for granted. Despite its prominent role in the Alliance, the United States also relies on the consensus rule to protect its interests, to shape the views of others, and to integrate ideas offered by others to improve its proposals.

While sacrosanct in principle, the rule has proved flexible in practice. Three examples illustrate this point.

The French Connection. Following France's decision to withdraw from the NATO Integrated Military Structure in 1966, the other Allies turned increasingly to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) to consider and decide upon most defense matters and issues related to collective defense planning. Created in 1963, the DPC was seldom used before the French withdrawal. Similarly, a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), with the same membership as the DPC, was established soon after the French withdrawal to discuss specific policy issues associated with nuclear forces. Although remaining active in the NAC, France was neither bound by, nor did it seek to impede, decisions made by consensus in the DPC or NPG.

In 1992, as NATO considered whether to launch its first out-of-area crisis response operation—maritime and air surveillance operations in the Adriatic in support of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 713, which imposed an embargo on arms deliveries to Yugoslavia—

the DPC allies agreed by consensus to discuss the issue in the NAC. This move eased the way for French participation in the operation, which was favored by Paris and broadly welcomed by other Allies. This also set the precedent for the de facto leading role of the NAC (versus the DPC) in subsequent crisis response operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Thus, while remaining formally outside the Integrated Military Structure, France has been a major player in decisionmaking and planning—as well as a leading force contributor—for all three of those non-Article-5 NATO operations. It also took part in the April 2003 NAC decision to bring the ISAF in Afghanistan under NATO command and control in August 2003. (French forces have participated in ISAF since its formation in January 2002.)

Kosovo. The 1999 NATO air campaign, Operation *Allied Force*, against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been widely described—and decried by some—as a “war by committee.” Accounts differ regarding the NATO decisionmaking process during the campaign, but few challenge the existence of severe intra-Alliance strains; these ranged from issues regarding the legitimacy of NATO military action without an explicit UNSC resolution to the military strategy and tactics pursued during the conflict.⁶ On balance, however, the consensus rule probably did more to help than hinder an ultimately successful NATO effort.

The rule allowed Allies with differing views—some emphasizing the humanitarian crisis and human rights abuses, others worried by the precedent of NATO “offensive” action against a sovereign state—to find enough common ground to endorse, or at least not to block, *Allied Force*. The rule was particularly important for the Greek government, which ultimately decided not to break silence on key NAC decisions authorizing the use of force despite polls showing that some 95 percent of its public opposed NATO intervention. At the same time, Greece opted out of direct involvement in the combat operations.

The nuance between a decisionmaking procedure that allows an Ally to acquiesce in a collective decision (despite its public or private reservations) and a procedure that would oblige that state to cast a yea or nay vote in the NAC may appear, at first blush, insignificant. In practice, the nuance matters enormously. If PermReps had been required to “raise hands” to approve *Allied Force*, the Greek government may not have been able to resist the domestic political pressure to vote against it. Such a move by Greece might have made it easier for one or two other reluctant Allies to follow suit.

The inherent flexibility of the consensus rule also was demonstrated in decisionmaking on the timing, strategy, and tactics of *Allied Force*. For example, during the crisis, the NAC frequently decided not to engage subordinate committees. This kept sensitive NAC discussions as private as possible and facilitated its rapid decisions, normally with a 48-hour (or less) turnaround. Then-Secretary General Javier Solana played a key role in reconciling divergent views within the NAC using a “summary of discussions,” one of several techniques devised to avoid putting any single Ally “on the spot.” Furthermore, the NAC delegated to Solana the authority to implement, suspend, or terminate the Limited Air Response—the first phase of the air campaign. In this way, the NAC ceded (by consensus) the decision to Solana to initiate a preapproved spectrum of airstrikes. There were differences later among Allies over target selection and mission assignments, but these generally were solved through bilateral channels outside NATO and involved only the parties directly concerned.

In sum, while extraordinary efforts were required to maintain consensus throughout *Allied Force*, these arguably were vital to preserving NATO solidarity and ultimately achieving its stated objectives in Kosovo.

September 11. The consensus rule did not prevent NATO from acting quickly—that is, within 24 hours of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001—to invoke, for the first time in its history, Article 5. Although the immediate operational impact of that action was negligible, the NAC decision was a powerful political statement of solidarity that was warmly welcomed by the United States. After all, the shock of the attacks was soon compounded by warnings of additional, imminent, and potentially catastrophic terrorist strikes.

Did the existence of the rule, however, prevent NATO from assuming a more prominent role in the campaign against terrorism, especially during the first several months after September 11? Probably not. Other factors clearly motivated the U.S. approach, such as America’s unquestioned right to self-defense in response to a direct attack on its territory; an early recognition that NATO could not coordinate all the tools—diplomatic, intelligence, economic, financial, law enforcement, as well as military—needed for a sustained campaign against organizations such as al Qaeda; and the need to enlist and maintain support from the vast majority of non-NATO and Muslim states who reject terrorism. (The latter goal made it critical to avoid sending any public signal that the campaign was NATO’s war against terrorism—or worse, NATO’s war against Muslims.⁷) An additional factor in U.S. thinking with respect to the campaign in Afghanistan was the limited capability of most Allies to support long-range power

projection. Thus, the United States supported an important but not lead role for NATO.

Still, the rule's existence did have some effects. It probably facilitated the October 4, 2001, NAC agreement on eight specific measures of assistance requested by the United States, including the deployment of five airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and crews to help defend U.S. airspace. The consensus procedure allowed every Ally to contribute to the collective effort in areas identified on the approved menu but did not obligate Allies to take action in every area. On the other hand, the consensus rule allowed one Ally (not the United States) to block a proposal in the NAC in late 2001 that would have directed NATO military authorities (NMAs) to develop planning options for NATO support to humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan.

Concern over the Rule

If the consensus rule is not broken—at least not severely—why fix it? Proposals to reexamine the NATO decisionmaking process reflect two broad types of future-oriented concerns: the anticipated effects of enlargement and the prospect of a growing number of impasses over the planning and launching of NATO operations. While these concerns are interrelated, there are notable differences in their presumed *targets*.

Enlargement Jitters. Before September 11, key Members of Congress and some in the Executive Branch were of two minds on the breadth of a fifth round of NATO enlargement, although there was little doubt that the Alliance would issue invitations to at least a few Central and East European states at its November 2002 summit in Prague.⁸ On the one hand, the geopolitical rationale for a robust enlargement to help complete a “Europe whole and free” was widely accepted.⁹ On the other hand, Congress repeatedly signaled its concern—as it had prior to the 1997 invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—that the Prague invitees must be prepared politically and militarily to become security *providers*, not just security *consumers*, vis-à-vis NATO.

The political jitters were symbolized by the so-called Meciar problem in the Slovak Republic. In 1998, Vladmir Meciar, the authoritarian and corrupt Slovak prime minister since 1992, was ousted by a broad coalition of opposition parties, but he remained an influential political force. Would NATO risk embarrassment, some in Washington wondered, if Slovak voters returned Meciar or his party to power once their country was invited to join? Worse, following Slovak accession to NATO, would a new Meciar-dominated government hesitate to abuse the consensus rule and paralyze

the Alliance if it served his narrow political interests? Moreover, Meciar was not a unique case; similar concerns were voiced, for example, regarding former Romanian and Bulgarian political figures.

The ability and willingness of some NATO aspirants to meet their defense capabilities commitments to the Alliance also worried American lawmakers and officials. The so-called burdensharing debate was as old as NATO itself, and Members of Congress were well aware that several long-time Allies—as well as newer Allies such as Hungary—had disappointing records when it came to providing the forces and capabilities the Alliance required. Would a robust enlargement, some worried, bring more free riders into the Alliance, eroding its military effectiveness? The consensus rule clearly was not the cause of any Ally's military deficiencies. Yet it did complicate efforts to exert peer pressure within NATO on weak performers, who not surprisingly resisted efforts by the United States, the Secretary General, and some other Allies to publish more data on the defense capabilities performance of individual members.

In the months following September 11, such political and military concerns about enlargement receded as the aspirants demonstrated support for the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism and, in most cases, willingness to address defense reform and modernization issues. During their 2002-2003 hearings on enlargement, Senate and House committees turned to other issues. Would the addition of several new members, albeit well-intentioned, slow down the urgent transformation needed to give NATO the capabilities and structures to meet 21st-century threats such as terrorism, its state supporters, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Or would enlargement make it even harder to reach a consensus on threats to the Alliance, the strategy and capabilities necessary to meet those threats, and—most of all—a decision to take military action promptly, perhaps preemptively, to protect common security interests?

The Rule under Fire. If enlargement jitters first focused congressional attention on NATO decisionmaking, the contentious intra-Alliance dispute over Iraq in early 2003 apparently convinced some Senators that the consensus rule must be changed.

The dispute was an extension of differences at the time within the UNSC. The United Kingdom, with American support, favored a new UNSC resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq, while France and Germany opposed such a step. When the U.S. PermRep first suggested in late January that NMAs begin planning for the defense of Turkey in view of the potential threat from Iraq, Belgium, France, Germany, and (initially) Luxembourg balked. Such planning, they argued, was

premature at best; at worst, in their view, it would send a harmful political signal that NATO accepted the “logic of war” with Iraq, thus prejudicing their nations’ positions at the United Nations.

The dispute came to a head with Turkey’s formal request, on February 10, for consultations in the NAC.¹⁰ As part of those consultations, the Chairman of the Military Committee briefed the NAC on the potential Iraqi threat and explained the timelines necessary to prepare plans to reinforce Turkish defenses. When Turkey’s PermRep requested that the NAC direct the NMAs to prepare such plans for consideration by the NAC, three allied PermReps—soon revealed to be those of Belgium, France, and Germany—again objected. Secretary General George Robertson quickly circulated a formal decision sheet, whereupon those three Allies formally broke silence.

The now very public argument lasted several more days before Belgium and Germany agreed, for a variety of reasons, to a face-saving compromise: Turkey’s request was moved from the NAC to the DPC, where France is not represented. The DPC quickly reached consensus, on February 16, on guidance to the NMAs to prepare plans to help protect Turkey through, for example, the deployment of NATO AWACS and support to Allied deployments of theater missile and chemical and biological defense capabilities. The NMAs completed the planning in the next few days, and on February 19, the DPC authorized the NMAs to implement the agreed assistance to Turkey.

Although NATO officials understandably tried to put the best face possible on the incident—Secretary General Robertson described it as “damage above, not below, the waterline”—its impact, particularly in Washington, should not be underestimated.¹¹ For some, at least, the consensus rule appeared to have outlived its usefulness. As Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) told his colleagues on May 8:

First, I agree that we must eliminate the “consensus rule,” the antiquated requirement in the NATO charter that nearly prevented NATO from protecting one of its own members, Turkey, before the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. ...Secondly, I support the need for a new rule in NATO that authorizes the members of the alliance to suspend the membership of any country in NATO which no longer supports the ideals of the alliance. The recent refusal of support on the part of some of our NATO allies during the build-up for and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom has shown the need for such a change.¹²

The Congress Speaks

Senator Reed's remarks were delivered in the context of Senate floor action on its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the treaty protocols on NATO enlargement. The resolution, which passed 96-0, contains a "Sense of the Senate" amendment sponsored by Senators Carl Levin (D-MI), Pat Roberts (R-KS), and John Warner (R-VA). While the amendment does not endorse Senator Reed's prescriptions, it clearly reflects an undercurrent of impatience with customary NATO decisionmaking procedures. In brief, the amendment recommends that the President place on the NAC agenda for discussion, by late 2004:

- ▮ the NATO consensus rule
- ▮ "the merits of establishing a process for suspending the membership in NATO of a member country that no longer complies with the NATO principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."
- ▮ The amendment also provides for a Presidential report on such discussions to the appropriate congressional committees. The report would describe, *inter alia*:
 - "methods to provide more flexibility to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to plan potential contingency operations before the formal (NAC) approval of such planning"
 - "methods to streamline the process by which NATO makes decisions with respect to conducting military campaigns."

Additional legislative action related to the consensus rule followed over the summer. Specifically, the fiscal year 2004 Defense Authorization Bill pending before Congress was amended to require the Secretary of Defense to report to appropriate committees on his recommendations for "streamlining defense, military, and security decisionmaking within NATO." At least some sponsors of the amendment appear to favor increased, perhaps exclusive, reliance on the DPC (versus the NAC) for any decision affecting Alliance defense capabilities and force structures, to include the NATO Response Force (NRF) now being set up.¹³

The administration's next steps on these congressional suggestions are not clear. Before the May 8 Senate action, however, Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed the administration position: "We believe that the current decision-making procedures work well and serve United States interests. ...NATO is an alliance, and no NATO member, including the United States, would agree to allow Alliance decisions to be made on defense commitments without its agreement."¹⁴

Possible New Approaches

In view of past experience and Congressional expectations, how might NATO streamline its decisionmaking process?

To begin tackling this question, one must first appreciate that NATO makes literally thousands of decisions annually, each of which is tied, directly or indirectly, to a consensus procedure. With few exceptions, these decisions fall into five broad categories:

- ▀ broad political and military strategies, which are reflected in documents such as the Alliance Strategic Concept and Ministerial Guidance and in decisions regarding enlargement
- ▀ military structure and planning functions, covering areas such as the NATO command and force structure, capabilities development, and contingency operational planning related to potential military missions
- ▀ authorizing, monitoring, and adjusting collective defense and crisis management operations, such as Article 5 assistance to the United States following September 11 and NATO-led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan
- ▀ organizational and management concerns, to include defining the responsibilities and overseeing the operations of the IS, International Military Staff, and various NATO agencies
- ▀ resource and budgeting issues involving NATO collective assets, personnel, infrastructure, and operational funding.

The possible approaches outlined below will focus on the issues of contingency operational planning (options 1 and 2) and the approval and conduct of military missions (options 3 and 4), as these involve the greatest political sensitivities for Allies. It should be noted, however, that NATO has taken modest steps over the past year to streamline its decisionmaking process in other areas—for example, by reducing the number of its committees and increasing the Secretary General's authority in day-to-day management and budgetary decisions. Additional steps are under consideration to include revamping the “defense planning” process that identifies NATO-wide capabilities requirements and establishes commitments by individual Allies toward meeting those requirements.

Option 1: “Threatened Ally” Rule. Broadly speaking, under existing rules, the NMAs prepare only those contingency operational plans for which the NAC has provided political guidance. Historically, this has constrained formal contingency operational planning to a relatively small number of Cold War-style Article 5 scenarios, although a few years ago,

the Military Committee (MC) was given limited authority to initiate contingency planning covering a range of medium- and longer-term threats. The NAC, however, has retained the authority for initiating and approving all operational plans developed in response to an actual or fast-breaking crisis. As seen in the February 2003 dispute, the existing consensus rule can slow that initiation process if, for example, one or more Allies fear this planning authorization will send an unwelcome political signal.

Under a “threatened Ally” rule, any Ally (or combination of Allies) could request that the NMAs prepare contingency operational planning options if it sees a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. The request would be automatically approved by the NAC, unless a consensus of other Allies objects.

Pros: This option would be consistent with Article 4 of the Treaty.¹⁵ However, while respecting the principle of consensus, the option shifts the burden of proof from the “threatened” to the “nonthreatened” Allies. The latter would require a consensus to determine that such contingency operational planning was unneeded or unwise—a high threshold for most Allies to cross. For example, had such a rule existed in February 2003, Turkey’s request that NATO begin planning for possible defensive assistance would have been approved quickly and an embarrassing public stalemate might have been avoided.

By abbreviating the NAC role in authorizing the start of contingency operational planning, NATO gains a potentially faster turnaround between the appearance of a threat and the NMA preparation of military options. At the same time, the NAC would retain its power to decide by consensus whether any of the planning options is modified or eventually adopted.

Cons: For some Allies, this option might appear to carry a risk of politically provocative planning requests by one or more Allies to deal with imagined or grossly exaggerated threats. Those threats might reflect deteriorating relations between Allies or between an Ally and a neighboring country that is outside the Alliance. However, the history of NATO should be very reassuring on this point: there is no precedent of an Ally making a frivolous proposal to undertake contingency operational planning. Moreover, any Ally contemplating such a move would run a high risk of receiving an embarrassing rebuff from the rest of the Alliance, including the United States.

Option 2: “SACEUR’s Discretion” Rule. Under this option, the NAC would grant broad discretionary authority to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), to prepare and update, as necessary, contingency operational plans for a broad range of potential NATO military mis-

sions. The SACEUR would keep the Secretary General and MC informed of such plans.

Pros: This rule would adopt at NATO essentially the same approach used by the United States for its unified combatant commanders. The latter are expected to keep fully abreast of evolving threats in their areas of responsibility and to develop and maintain contingency operational plans to counter those threats. Such planning is considered prudent business as usual and in no way prejudices the President's decisionmaking authority to commit U.S. forces to a specific operation.

As in option 1, the NAC would retain its power to decide whether any of the planning options are executed. However, the availability of contingency operational planning by the SACEUR likely would shorten the time needed by the NAC to consider its response to a fast-breaking crisis. This option also would have avoided the February 2003 impasse over planning for Turkey's defense.

The rationale for such a move is especially compelling in light of the Alliance's decision to create the NRF. The NRF, as envisioned by most Allies, is to be capable of initiating a deployment to wherever it is needed within several days of a NAC decision. To meet such an ambitious response time and maximize NRF effectiveness, considerable contingency operational planning will be necessary, recognizing that any such advance planning will always need to be adjusted in light of the actual crisis at hand.

Cons: Such an option might raise two main concerns: first, it departs from longstanding NATO practice that the NAC (or DPC) must, as a rule, agree on political guidance to the NMAs before they undertake operational planning options; and second, to some Allies, it might appear to delegate too much discretion to the most senior U.S. military officer in the Alliance.¹⁶

To address the aforementioned concerns, the option might be modified to give the Secretary General (by tradition, always a European) the authority to direct the SACEUR to prepare contingency operational plans based on the Secretary General's sense of the NAC, that is, without recourse to a formal NAC decision. This arrangement—similar to that used by Secretary General Solana during the Kosovo crisis—could achieve the desired practical results, while preserving some political wiggle room for those Allies who might be hesitant, for a variety of reasons, to have such planning initiated by the NAC. Of course, if the Secretary General is not an activist personality, he or she might be reluctant to exercise such discretionary authority.

Some Allies might argue that such an option is unnecessary, as they assume that informal contingency operational planning is ongoing and would be available quickly in a crisis. This is not, however, a convincing argument. It implicitly acknowledges the usefulness of greater planning flexibility but sends a confusing “don’t ask, don’t tell” message to the multinational military planners. Indeed, Allies who are European Union (EU) members logically should favor a broad spectrum of contingency operational planning by NATO, as the EU has assured access to NATO operational planning capabilities under arrangements finalized in late 2002. More robust planning within NATO would benefit the EU ability to mount crisis response missions where NATO as a whole has decided not to engage.

Option 3: Empowering “Coalitions within NATO.” Under this approach, a NAC consensus would continue to be required to authorize a NATO operation. In a departure from current practice, however, the NAC could mandate a NATO committee of contributors (NCC), chaired by the Secretary General, to carry out the operation on behalf of the Alliance. This committee would be comprised of those Allies prepared to contribute forces or capabilities to the operation, and it would enjoy full access to NATO common assets and capabilities (for example, NATO AWACS and communications systems) and the NATO command structure. It would approve the concept of operations, rules of engagement, military activation orders given to the SACEUR, and other needed steps to implement the operation. The Secretary General would periodically brief Allies who are not members of the NCC on significant developments affecting the operation, but those Allies would not participate in determining the daily management of the operation. Finally, those Allies who have elected not to belong to the NCC could not by themselves reopen its mandate in the NAC; to do so, they would need support from some threshold (for example, at least one-third) of the NCC membership.

Pros: This option would preserve the consensus rule for approving NATO operations. It would track with past practice, whereby an Ally with reservations about a particular operation will not break silence if there is overwhelming sentiment in the NAC to proceed. It also would take into account the potentially greater difficulty of reaching common threat assessments among all Allies where non-Article-5 crises outside the Euro-Atlantic region are involved—especially as such crises might have very disparate impacts on interests of individual Allies and, as a result, their willingness to employ military force.

The NCC would make it easier for those Allies who do share a common threat assessment to draw on NATO assets and proceed with the Alliance's political blessing to implement non-Article-5 crisis response missions. By removing the ability of those who are not engaged in the operation to influence its day-to-day conduct, this approach could accelerate decisionmaking and avoid the image of war by committee attributed to Operation *Allied Force*. The NCC also would be inclusive rather than exclusive: no Ally could block another's participation, and Allies who are unable to contribute at the outset would retain the option of joining the NCC at a later stage. Finally, the NCC might be particularly appealing to Allies who are also EU members, as a similar "committee of contributors" arrangement exists in the EU European Security and Defense Policy to accommodate the potential contributions of non-EU members to EU-led operations.¹⁷

Cons: The option would raise some important practical issues. For example, NATO presumably would need to agree on relatively transparent standards that discourage some Allies from providing a minimal contribution (in relation to their national capabilities) simply to secure a seat at the NCC table. The issue of ensuring rough parity between an Ally's practical contribution to an operation and its influence over operational decisions is not new, but past NATO practice has been to deal with this behind the scenes on a case-by-case basis.¹⁸

A more difficult question is whether an NCC approach would erode the NATO "one for all, all for one" ethos. For example, this option conceivably might make it easier—that is, politically more respectable—for some Allies to opt out of NATO-led operations. This in turn could weaken their incentives to develop the military capabilities needed to support a range of potential NATO missions.

Moreover, any NCC option would need to avoid inflaming some Allies' suspicions that Washington views NATO essentially as a toolbox from which the United States selects a few partners to join in U.S.-led coalitions of the willing. The toolbox notion is deeply troubling to other Allies, as it implies that their forces and capabilities would become instruments for policies and military operations decided by the United States with minimal, if any, real consultation within the Alliance. None of the other Allies would find it politically possible over the long term to sustain such a position. An NCC that ensured Allies a significant role in decisionmaking, commensurate with their contributions, would alleviate such concerns.

Option 4: "Consensus Minus" Rule. Under this rule, a NAC consensus would remain the preferred decisionmaking mechanism to authorize a

NATO operation. However, if consensus were not possible, the NAC could authorize an operation by a process similar to the EU qualified majority vote (QMV).

Under the QMV process, the EU Treaty assigns each member a number of votes weighted on the basis of its population, with a correction factor to give some added protection to members with the smallest populations. The current 15 EU members have a total of 87 votes, with individual allocations ranging from 10 votes for each of the 4 largest—Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy—to 2 votes for the smallest, Luxembourg. A proposal subject to QMV must receive at least 62 votes for approval, which effectively prevents the 4 largest countries from forcing through a measure opposed by all the others and similarly prevents any 2 of the largest from blocking a measure supported by all the others. Under its draft constitution, which is under review by an intergovernmental conference, the QMV allocations must be changed to reflect the EU enlargement from 15 to 25 members in 2004. It is important to note, however, that the existing EU Treaty and the draft constitution specifically exempt “decisions having military or defense implications” from QMV procedures.¹⁹ Such decisions must be made unanimously, although EU members have an option to abstain.

Pros: There is no inherent contradiction between a QMV procedure, if agreed among all Allies, and the principle that the NAC must authorize any NATO operation. Depending on its modalities, a QMV procedure could make it very difficult, perhaps impossible, for one Ally or a small number of Allies to block an operation desired by others. This option could be combined with option 3, allowing an NCC to be mandated by QMV.

Cons: This option would represent a radical break with NATO tradition and carry the highest risk of undermining its political and, eventually, military cohesion. The task of designing and negotiating a QMV system appropriate for a political-military alliance of sovereign states would be daunting, at best, and bitterly contentious, at worst. A population-based formula similar to that of the EU would be unacceptable to a number of small and middle-sized Allies, some of whom are among the most solid contributors to NATO-led operations. Formulas based on indexes such as defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product or the size, readiness, and capabilities of national forces available for NATO-assigned missions would be complicated and need adjustment on a regular basis.

Moreover, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to gain NATO approval for a QMV formula that did not provide at least a theoret-

ical possibility that the United States could be outvoted in the Alliance—a possibility that the Congress certainly would find intolerable. Similarly, it is hard to see why Allies (including the United Kingdom and Spain) who have strongly opposed a QMV procedure for military and defense matters within the EU would find it easier to swallow in NATO. As United Kingdom Minister for Europe Denis MacShane stated in June 2003:

After a great deal of blah blah, foreign policy often ends up with a decision on whether a soldier is to risk his life somewhere. The idea that an institution in Brussels can at the present time send out a young man from my constituency or from a German or Spanish town to risk his life, or even to die, is unthinkable for me. When we now send our boys out, this has been decided by our government, answerable to parliament.²⁰

Although Minister MacShane was responding to a question about QMV in the EU, his remarks almost certainly reflect broader European sentiment with regard to NATO as well.

In sum, options exist to facilitate decisionmaking on the planning and conduct of operations without fundamentally changing the consensus rule, but none is cost-free. Only option 4 is clearly beyond the pale—for both the United States and its Allies.

The Suspension Issue

As previously noted, the Senate recommendation that the NAC discuss “a process for suspending the membership in NATO of a member country” appears to be a shot across the bow of two groups: current Allies (Belgium, France, and Germany) who disagreed with the U.S. invasion of Iraq; and the seven countries invited to join the Alliance in Prague. In addition, some Senators might have wanted to put down a warning marker to several NATO aspirants beyond the Prague invitees, such as Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia. Regardless of its motivation, the Senate resolution raises a number of fundamental issues on NATO ability to sanction the behavior of its members.

The North Atlantic Treaty itself is silent on the question, although Article 13 provides for an Ally to withdraw voluntarily 1 year after depositing a “notice of denunciation” with the United States. Still, the Alliance has dealt with members whose governments have not always supported democratic values. When such situations arose—for example, with Greek and Turkish military regimes in the late 1960s and early 1970s—other Allies effectively isolated or excluded them from sensitive discussions. In

those instances, suspending either or both would have risked sparking a nationalist backlash against the Allies—or possibly a war between the two long-time adversaries.

In contrast, the EU Treaty contains a detailed, three-stage process for suspension: first, a determination that there is “clear risk of a serious breach” of basic EU principles, including “respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”; second, a determination that a serious breach has occurred; and finally, a decision (under QMV procedures) to suspend certain rights, including voting rights, of the EU state in question. The EU has never invoked the suspension process, although its members agreed to limited political sanctions against Austria in 2000.²¹

It is not clear that the EU offers a useful model for NATO. While there can be no guarantee that a corrupt or authoritarian leadership will never come to power in one of the states recently invited to join the Alliance, chances of this happening in the foreseeable future appear relatively slim—thanks, in part, to the NATO Membership Action Plan for aspirant states. Similarly, if the Senate intended to underscore its concern that incoming Alliance members follow through on pledges to modernize their military structures, the resolution’s language misses the mark. It does not address the issue of several current Allies who are solid democracies but lackluster performers in terms of providing relevant military capabilities to NATO.

Ultimately, any presumed benefit in raising the suspension issue now must be weighed against the downsides of telling incoming Alliance members, in effect, that the United States is worried enough about their future performance that it might favor changing the rules of the game just as they are entering the Alliance. Such a perceived message might undercut strong pro-NATO sentiment in the aspirant countries and risk a backlash against Washington not unlike that generated against Paris when President Jacques Chirac scolded the new EU invitees in February 2003 for “having missed a good opportunity to shut up” when they expressed support for U.S. policy on Iraq.²²

As for the three Allies who openly differed with the United States (and, it should be recalled, with many of the other Allies as well) on Iraq, it appears that bilateral relations, while still problematic, have thawed somewhat since the Senate crafted its resolution. This may, over time, reduce Senate interest in pressing the administration to explore ways to sanction those three, especially France, through NATO mechanisms.

Indeed, there are good reasons for thinking twice before proceeding down this path. Even those Allies who supported the United States on Iraq will resist any move to systematically marginalize French involvement in major NATO decisions—as envisaged, for example, by the aforementioned amendment to the FY 2004 Defense Authorization Bill. France remains a prominent force contributor to NATO-led missions in the Balkans and to ISAF, a major proponent of improving European defense capabilities, and a potential serious contributor to the NRF. Moreover, its key political and economic role within the EU makes it an indispensable—albeit sometimes difficult—partner for all other EU members. More broadly, it is difficult to imagine any Ally—or new invitee—would be willing to endorse the notion, however masked, that a policy disagreement with Washington could be grounds for suspending a member from the Alliance.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill's celebrated remark about democracy, the consensus rule is perhaps the worst way to manage the Alliance—except for all the others. Yet the rule, as practiced thus far, has not paralyzed the Alliance in the Balkans or Afghanistan. With some relatively straightforward adjustments—for example, according greater contingency operational planning authority to the SACEUR or Secretary General, or establishing a NCC option—the rule, like NATO itself, can continue to adapt to the 21st-century security environment.

No Ally, however, will agree to change current decisionmaking procedures in a manner deemed contrary to its interests. This is a Catch-22 for NATO: consensus will be needed to alter the consensus rule. Thus, if United States were to seek to change the rule, it would need to build an alliance constituency to do so.

Notes

¹ Source: Leo G. Michel, NATO Decisionmaking: *Au Revoir to the Consensus Rule?*, Strategic Forum 202 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2003).

² Each Ally is represented on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) by an ambassadorial-level Permanent Representative. Normally, the NAC meets at least once a week, and, depending on the issue, some permanent representatives may need guidance or approval from higher authorities in their capitals. The NAC meets regularly at the foreign minister and defense minister levels and holds periodic summits at the heads of state/government level. The consensus rule applies as well to decisions made and statements issued at ministerial and summit meetings.

³ Similar customary practices apply to the NATO military authorities (NMAs), headed by a Military Committee (MC). The MC includes a military representative from each Ally, and the chairman of the Military Committee reports to, and receives political guidance from, the NAC. The International Military Staff, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation, and various headquarters commands are part of the NMA structure.

⁴ The rallying cry “one for all, all for one” is found in Alexander Dumas, *The Three Musketeers*.

⁵ Article 5 reads, in part: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary [emphasis added], including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

⁶ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), offers the most extensive account to date on decisionmaking during the Kosovo air campaign.

⁷ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz discussed these points at the September 26, 2001, NATO Defense Ministerial. A transcript of his press conference remarks can be found at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2001/t09272001_t0926na.html>. It should be noted that none of the other allied ministers suggested that NATO assume leadership of military operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban.

⁸ Since 1949, the Alliance has grown from 12 to 19 members in 4 rounds of enlargement, adding Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999. At Prague, NATO issued invitations to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

⁹ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, remarks by the President in an address to faculty and students of Warsaw University, Warsaw, Poland, June 15, 2001, accessed at <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html>>.

¹⁰ Article 4 of the Treaty states: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." A similar situation arose before the 1991 Gulf War. In that case, NATO deployed AWACS to eastern Turkey shortly after the invasion of Kuwait but was slow in responding to a subsequent Turkish request to deploy NATO airstrike assets to protect against potential Iraqi threats. The latter issue was resolved without a Turkish invocation of Article 4.

¹¹ Secretary General Lord George Robertson, speech to the European Institute, Washington, DC, February 20, 2003, accessed at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030220b.htm>>.

¹² U.S. Congress, Congressional Record—Senate, May 8, 2003, S5882.

¹³ At the Prague Summit, NATO leaders agreed to create an NRF "consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the (NAC)."

¹⁴ Colin Powell, letter to Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 5, 2003.

¹⁵ See endnote 9.

¹⁶ The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), is General James L. Jones, USMC. Like his predecessors who have served as NATO SACEUR, General Jones is "dual-hatted" as Commander, U.S. European Command.

¹⁷ Barring any surprises in the ongoing NATO and EU accession processes, 19 Allies will be among the 25 EU members by mid-2004.

¹⁸ Clark, *Waging Modern War*.

¹⁹ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article 23; accessed at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_325/c_32520021224en00010184.pdf; draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Chapter II, Article 40, para. 4; accessed at <http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en3.pdf>.

²⁰ Interview in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, June 20, 2003, 6.

²¹ At issue was the conservative government's decision to form a coalition with the right-wing party headed by Joerg Haider. By most accounts, the sanctions, which lasted several months, were more an embarrassment than a success for the European Union.

²² Press conference of President Jacques Chirac at the EU Summit, February 17, 2003, accessed at <<http://www.elsee.fr/documents/discours/2003/CP030217.html>>.

Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership (2007)¹

Franklin D. Kramer and Simon Serfaty

The physical distance from the Fulda Gap in Germany, the main focal point of the old NATO, to the Latvian capital of Riga, where the new NATO held its most recent summit, is 700 miles. Measured politically and psychologically, however, the distance from the old to the new NATO covers light years. In traversing such a space for the NATO Summit meeting that was held in November 2006, the countries of the Alliance demonstrated they had met the first significant challenge of the post-Cold War world—achieving stability and security for a free and gradually whole Europe. This accomplishment has, in turn, extended the conditions necessary for Europe's complementary institutional development, as shown by the consequent widening and deepening of the European Union (EU).

In Riga, however, the main topic of discussion was not Europe but Afghanistan. On the map, the distance from Riga to Kabul is three times as great as from Fulda—but even greater in terms of the political, economic and security requirements for producing results comparable to those seen in Central and Eastern Europe. Peace and stability in Afghanistan's part of the world are far from assured. Moreover, the challenges of stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan are only one among several significant tasks facing the Alliance, many of which were only lightly touched upon, if at all, at the Riga summit.

Meeting the challenges of the 21st century will require new approaches and concerted efforts by the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. Unlike the concept of stability in Europe, which the Alliance, by history and proximity, was well-positioned to support, the challenges now faced by the nations of the Alliance—most pressingly those of failing states, radical militant Islam, energy security and structural economic competition—are often exceedingly complex and incompletely

understood, offering few demonstrable short-term results and even fewer certain solutions.

Both the structures and capabilities of the Euro-Atlantic community will need revision if such challenges are to be met—and the development of new capacities will demand not only resources, but also commitment. This paper sets out a way forward, recommending a broadened strategic focus for the Euro-Atlantic community which explicitly encompasses the four issues listed above, in combination with a reform of Euro-Atlantic structures to make cooperation more effective.

The Main Problems

By many measures, the Euro-Atlantic community is succeeding brilliantly. In terms of per capita GDP, it includes 17 of the top 20 countries in the world, and as many as 18 of the top 20 in terms of quality of life. Yet, by other standards the Euro-Atlantic community also faces fundamental challenges that raise critical security, political, economic, and social concerns.

For the United States, traditional security concerns are increasingly bundled into circumstances that cannot be addressed by military power alone. Iraq and Afghanistan top the list of security issues that demand immediate attention. Yet, Iraq and Afghanistan overlap into larger questions of stabilization and reconstruction, rogue regimes, failing states, and radical militant Islam. These problems are further linked to the issues presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a subject currently dominated by the ambitions and defiance of Iran and North Korea. For most Americans, having suffered the shock of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax attacks, the potential significance of these states acquiring WMD is clear enough, despite the intelligence debacle of Iraq. Nevertheless, U.S. military preponderance can be only one element in a comprehensive approach needed to counter this mixture of interrelated threats.

Additionally, the United States faces longer-term issues that have the potential to become critical and urgent concerns in the years ahead. Approximately 40 percent of U.S. energy comes from oil, a commodity whose susceptibility to economic and geopolitical instability has been regularly demonstrated in the past several decades. Natural gas, too, is increasingly subject to worldwide instabilities affecting U.S. allies and partners, as Russian and Bolivian actions regarding supply to neighbors have shown. Under such conditions, and with fossil fuels in finite supply, energy security must feature more prominently on the U.S. agenda. Energy security, however, cannot be separated from environmental issues, as the genera-

tion of carbon dioxide and other hothouse gases from the consumption of fossil fuels portends an eventual climatic disaster. As a result, energy security achieved the wrong way may well lead to problems of an even greater magnitude.

Third, the United States faces concerns stemming from the changing structure of the world economy. The global market, especially the impact of the low cost, high quality producer exemplified by the paradigmatic “Chinese manufacturer” and “Indian service provider,” may divide the interests of American capital from American labor in a way not easily subject to remedy by regulatory mediation. The path to adapting the U.S. economy to these new conditions without affecting current standards of living for future generations is not entirely clear.

Europe, of course, faces these issues as well, arguably even more acutely than the United States. For most European countries, the impact of radical militant Islam is not only an external issue but also one of domestic concern. Unlike the United States, it is Europe that is within the range of Iranian missiles. When Russia puts its thumb on the gas pipeline, it is Europe whose energy is affected. And while the global markets have the potential to hurt the United States, Europe has already been enduring relatively high unemployment and lower growth rates for some time. In all these manifestations, Europeans face much the same issues as Americans do. Reflective of this fact, the European Security Strategy put forth by the Union and the U.S. National Security Strategy are remarkably, but not surprisingly, parallel.

In responding to the issues, however, the European and American processes are often different. This stems from an additional critical question faced by Europe—namely, the institutional finality of the EU. The Union (and the broader issues surrounding it) continues to raise serious questions of identity for Europeans, reflected in numerous levels of torn sovereignty, parallel structures, and political steps that have moved forward (the euro) and back (constitutional treaty). The EU, originally an economic project with political consequence, is now far more—a legislative and judicial sovereign entity (though not always with sovereign power), a diplomatic actor (though with parallel and often superior actors in member states), and a military power (though with quite modest assertion so far). Thus, the Union is both sovereign in itself and composed of sovereign member states, which have not given up their economic capacities, their diplomatic endeavors, or control over security and military policy.

Therefore, unlike the United States, which has a basic single sovereignty in the international arena, the different actors within Europe often

espouse substantively different positions on many global issues. With a European Union presidency, an EU High Representative, and an EU bureaucracy with involvement in key international issues that national prime ministers, foreign ministers and parliaments are also involved in, European policy in international affairs can be very complex. In the end, Europe may now have a telephone number that the United States can call, but the answer is often that of a voice mail with references to the various national parties that populate the Union.

How then can Americans and Europeans work together to ensure that tomorrow's solutions are effective? What should be the substantive focus of the Euro-Atlantic partnership? What does the complexity of European sovereignties and the potential for further change mean for transatlantic interaction? History has given us today's starting point, but how shall we seek to shape the future?

The Road From Riga: The Question of Structure

While the fact of the NATO gathering in Riga was a success in itself, the summit did not generate many answers to the problems described above. One of the key reasons for this is that there are substantial disputes within the Euro-Atlantic community over the proper roles for NATO, the EU, and individual states, respectively.

The question of how to structure Euro-Atlantic cooperation is critical to future effectiveness, as weak institutional structures will significantly inhibit the generation and implementation of substantive solutions. As a starting point, the debate over the proper role for NATO is characterized in what is reasonably described as a U.S.-French dispute (although, in truth, all countries of the Alliance face this wider question). The opposing viewpoints are succinctly captured in President Jacques Chirac's pre-Summit "Vision for NATO," which reaffirmed "the preeminent role" of the Atlantic alliance as "a military organization, guarantor of the collective security of the allies, and a forum where Europeans and Americans can combine their efforts to further peace."² The fundamental issue is whether to place the emphasis on "military organization"—as now favored by France—or, rather, on a "forum where Europeans and Americans can combine their efforts to further peace"—the view currently promoted by the United States.

In the latter vein, Chirac's call for a "more substantive political and strategic dialogue" between the United States and the EU, including "closer relations between NATO and the EU" appears helpful—but actual progress is limited. Admittedly, the Riga communiqué undertook to "strive for

improvements in the NATO-EU strategic partnership as agreed by our two organizations,” but it took no steps toward deepening a NATO-EU relationship that has been less than adequate, especially for two organizations that share as many as 21 members. Indeed, under the cover of the Turkey-Cyprus impasse, NATO and the EU have thus far been unable even to agree to a joint discussion of broader strategic issues.

Thus, coming out of Riga, the issue of where the Euro-Atlantic community assembles for “more substantive political and strategic dialogue” remains entirely unsettled. In terms of the main issues facing the community, there is no obvious forum to discuss, among other things, responses to radical militant Islam, energy security, or the impact of global markets. Even issues with obvious security consequences, such as Iran’s nuclear program, are being handled in an ad hoc fashion, and the fact that President Chirac had to call for a contact group for Afghanistan nearly five years into the war again shows the limited fora available not just to discuss but, most importantly, to implement responses to key issues.

The three separate dialogues that now occur—within NATO, within the European Union, and between the United States and the Union—need to be substantively and procedurally intertwined in a more effective manner. The bureaucracies of the two organizations need greater high-level political direction instructing them to collaborate. The formal establishment of a council, including all EU and NATO members, as well as the EU itself, since it is an entity of sovereign consequence, would create the appropriate forum for the discussion of the critical challenges to the 21st century Euro-Atlantic community. The NATO Secretary General would also be offered a seat at the table to enhance communication and implementation. This council could be called the Euro-Atlantic Forum.

Such a Forum would eliminate the need to define the respective competencies of the EU and NATO, as well as the role of individual states within each. There are no more trivial and debilitating types of questions than, for example, “whether NATO has the competence to engage in civilian tasks in support of its military missions”—especially as its member countries plainly have that competence—or “whether the EU has the capacity to undertake a military mission,” when most of its members are also members of NATO, the most powerful military alliance in the world.

Rather than being beset by such trivial self-imposed limitations, the new forum could simply, with all parties present, decide upon the necessity of a military action, determine how best to implement it, and approve the appropriate implementing organization.³ When, as surely will almost always be the case in the future, a combination of security, political, and

economic measures are required, their implementation could be organized in a complementary, rather than disjointed, or even competitive, fashion. And when conflicting approaches are suggested, as, again, surely will be the case, a forum will be available to arrive at consensus and cooperation.

Creation of the new forum would not mean that either NATO or the EU would be abandoning their respective missions, their structures or even their futures. It would mean that they would be able to operate in a coordinated fashion allowing maximization of effort and resources, eliminating the self-imposed limitations created by focusing on procedure over substance. The new forum would act as a strategic coordinator of the efforts of the Euro-Atlantic community, pooling all available security, political and economic strengths.

Creation of the appropriate new institutional structure is only the first step. As indicated above, the Euro-Atlantic community's combined focus must move past traditional security questions to face the more difficult and complex issues raised by failing states, radical militant Islam, energy security, and structural global competition. These issues are discussed below.

The New Comprehensive Agenda

The fundamental joint agenda of America and Europe demands an effective and comprehensive inter-national approach that goes beyond traditional security questions. Maintaining rigid distinctions between security, political, and economic aspects of the global challenges we face often acts as a barrier to achieving successful outcomes. NATO often fails to be effective because it is too limited to the military side. The EU, too, often has little political punch because it has too limited a security dimension. The United States too often fails to create adequate partnerships with allies and partners—and, conversely, the latter with the United States. New initiatives will be necessary to generate the concepts, resources, and commitment necessary to success—and the proposed new forum needs to serve as a catalyst and driver in this process.

Failing States and the Problems of Stabilization and Reconstruction

The problem of failing states as a threat to peace is well recognized in the security strategies of both the United States and Europe. But solutions have been elusive, and responses remain fundamentally ad hoc.

Afghanistan is representative of the problem. After nearly five years, there is a general consensus that progress in the stabilization and

reconstruction of Afghanistan is far from satisfactory. A recent report of the UN Security Council mission to Afghanistan concludes that “progress in 2006 ... has not been as rapid as had been hoped ... [and has] tempered the legitimate hopes of Afghans with signs of despondency and disillusionment.”⁴

Other interventions do not suggest that Afghanistan is an aberration. Based on the existing record, the Euro-Atlantic countries can hardly guarantee that their involvement in future interventions will necessarily resolve any given situation. Bosnia is still far from an effectively functioning state; East Timor has had significant problems; Haiti remains a miasma. Somalia and Iraq are worse. Kosovo is yet to be resolved. Each of these interventions has had significant international involvement, substantial resources, and long-term commitments. But none has had clear success.

To be sure, there are examples of positive results—the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo put an end to significant killings, and, despite the difficulties since then, those instances had great benefit for that reason alone. But Bosnia and Kosovo show the difficulty of moving from humanitarian efforts—“halt the killing”—to the broader requirements of creating a functioning polity; and other cases, such as Somalia and Iraq, show that interventions do not even always result in the end of killing (though, of course, non-intervention can result in a great deal more, as in Rwanda and now Darfur).

There is little doubt that stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) efforts inherent in dealing with failing states require more than a military approach. The U.S. Department of Defense has officially reaffirmed this point with Directive 3000.05, which states that stability operations, including political and economic requirements, are a DoD task on a par with warfighting. Yet, for such recognition of the multidisciplinary nature of the task of S&R, there is little to show, as the above list of interventions demonstrates, by way of actual results, in terms of building up functioning, stand-alone countries.

Needless to say, failing states differ from one another, and the demands of stabilization and reconstruction efforts will likewise be different in their particulars. In order to bring about more successful interventions, there needs to be a far greater appreciation of the political situation in each state in question, compared to that of past cases. Concomitant with this is a necessity to understand how to provide the internal parties with enough incentives to make peace and stability in their interest. This requires a carefully coordinated approach in which security, political, and economic efforts are properly prioritized and implemented.

A major Euro-Atlantic initiative that gives greater attention to what factors and approaches make a difference in the outcome of a range of intervention scenarios could provide important grounding relevant to succeeding in specific contexts. Simply continuing to do with greater vigor the ad hoc approach that has characterized past interventions suggests that future outcomes will only be more vigorous and, if not precisely failures, then “non-successes.” The first great task of the Euro-Atlantic community is to generate a more effective approach to failing states and stabilization and reconstruction.

Radical Militant Islam

The issue of radical militant Islam—the force that generated September 11 and the Madrid and London bombings in March 2004 and July 2005, respectively—presents the Euro-Atlantic community with the challenge of creating a long-term and multi-faceted response to an ideology that will use violence, but also political and economic activities, to advance its agenda.

The Euro-Atlantic community has a completely valid conceptual approach to respond to this movement—one that is reflected in the concepts of democracy and individual rights, including tolerance for the practice of religion. That approach is incorporated in many national constitutions, as well as in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and is largely accepted worldwide.⁵ It also hardly needs stating that the Euro-Atlantic community also possesses great political, economic, security, and social strengths with which to counter the spread of radical militant Islam. The issue is how to bring all these capabilities to bear.

In doing so, the Euro-Atlantic community must again face a dilemma of the Cold War: promoting democracy and human rights, on the one side, versus establishing stability, on the other. Cold War strategy did not simply abandon democracy promotion in order to ensure stability—rather, it made use of intelligent diplomacy, combining the efforts of private with public institutions. President Gerald Ford’s recent passing recalls the brilliance of the Helsinki Final Act, which framed the democratic aspirations of many then-Warsaw Pact nations while providing a platform for the West. It is true, of course, that during the Cold War not every possible action was taken in favor of democracy—but the fact is that democratic promotion and the generation of stability existed simultaneously as coordinated, common, and central values. It should again be a task of the Euro-Atlantic community to promote both goals in this new century.

In a globalized and interconnected world, withdrawal from the struggle with radical militant Islam is not an option. As noted above, radical militant Islam is an internal issue for many European countries: as September 11, Madrid and London demonstrate, and to paraphrase an earlier revolutionary, even if you are not interested in radical militant Islam, it is interested in you. The Euro-Atlantic community needs a shared commitment to meet radical militant Islam head-on—but head-on in an effective, resourced, and strategic fashion.

It will take a long time to resolve this problem, and it will require a comprehensive, adaptable approach. Politics must lead, but economic and development strategies will be crucial, and security activities—external and internal—will also play an important role. The proposed new forum of the NATO and EU countries plus the European Union itself and with the NATO Secretary General would have the appropriate resources to direct such an integrated effort mobilizing the political, economic, and security assets of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Iran nuclear question dominates the concerns of the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole regarding the issue of weapons of mass destruction, but the prospects of Al Qaeda acquiring such weapons—as well as North Korea—are also of important consequence. Fears of the “worst weapons in the hands of the worst people” go beyond technical questions of non-proliferation, overlapping with the issues of how to deal with rogue states and radical militant Islam.

Again, there is no forum in which to bring the countries of the Euro-Atlantic community together to discuss such issues. Iran and North Korea, for example, have each been addressed by ad hoc groupings, and each case has escalated to the United Nations Security Council. In neither case does the prospect of successful negotiations, leading these countries to abandon their nuclear ambitions, appear likely (although negotiations have not necessarily run their course). Dealing with countries that fail to abide by international norms is of great consequence for the Euro-Atlantic community. The failure to do so in a coordinated fashion in the case of Iraq cut deeply into the cohesion of the community on many issues, and was an important contributor to some of the failures in the Iraq engagement. In the case of Iran and North Korea, the prospect of using force to eliminate nuclear programs also raises deep political and military issues—ones that deserve significant discussion.

For example, there seems a significant prospect that a “containment” or “containment-plus” approach may be the least worst option. Senator John Warner, when chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, specifically called in a speech for consideration of deterrence with respect to Iran, and others are seeking to evaluate the options of continuing sanctions, engaging in various forms of containment, and employing military force. Whether containment is the proper approach or not, it is important for the community to work together to develop a common strategy if the problems are to be effectively dealt with. These issues again raise crosscutting political, military and economic questions and again could best be considered in a forum where the countries of NATO and the EU seek to generate a common approach.

Energy Cooperation

The developed world depends on the availability of reasonably priced and readily available energy, a requirement that has generated issues tied to rising costs, security of supply, and environmental impact.

As is the case for the above issues, there is once again no integrative forum in which the countries of NATO and the EU can cooperate to meet these challenges. NATO’s Riga communiqué (paragraph 45) took the step of proposing “to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security” and to “support a coordinated, international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructure.” There is nothing wrong per se in this approach—other than the obvious point that it is a proposed study, not an action plan— but even if the study were completed and an action plan developed, it would hardly meet the problems of assuring energy supply.

Moreover, even in terms of security, as a recent report by senior U.S. chief executive officers and retired four-star officers noted, the problem of protecting energy supply goes far beyond those of securing critical infrastructure in developed nations. As the report states:

“In light of military threats to the global oil infrastructure, the U.S. should, where appropriate:

- ▮ Encourage burden sharing with U.S. allies and partners, including producing and consuming nations, in defense of global oil flows;
- ▮ Foster formal and informal security arrangements on multilateral, regional, and bilateral bases...;
- ▮ Provide diplomatic support as well as counter-terrorism training and military aid so that oil-producing nations can better assist in protecting petroleum supplies;

- Offer assistance to producing countries in their efforts to develop attractive investment climates backed by stable civil societies.”⁶

While the report is directed to the American people and therefore is U.S.-centric, there is precedent for NATO to undertake some of the proposed activities. However, most of the recommended actions are not operations undertaken by NATO. For example, military, counterterrorism, and other security aid to countries are generally arranged on a bilateral basis. Many of the NATO countries have been patrolling in the Gulf, but either under UN auspices or on an ad hoc basis. While NATO does have the Partnership for Peace and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which include key security-minded countries that are not NATO members, neither the Partnership for Peace nor the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative has a mandate for dealing with energy security.

Even more importantly, there are numerous energy security issues that do not lend themselves to military action. The very tight supply-demand situation in the oil markets has led to an overall rise in prices in the past several years, with periodic spikes to levels of serious concern. How to allocate oil in crisis circumstances is a question on which the countries that have worked together to develop stockpiles under IEA auspices have had substantial discussions. But plans to deal with an immediate crisis that would necessitate opening stockpiles into the market do not deal with the much more important issue of how to ensure reasonable supply at reasonable prices over the longer term.

Similar to the issue raised by the inelasticity of the oil market is the issue of an enforced cutoff of supply, currently punctuated by concerns over Russian energy policies. Russia supplies about one quarter of Europe's gas requirements, and this number is expected to rise to about 40 percent by 2030. In the context of this substantial dominance, numerous voices have raised the question of whether the Euro-Atlantic community should pre-determine a collective response if, say, supplies to one country were cut off.⁷ But, again, planning what to do in a crisis, while obviously quite important, does not resolve the substantive issues that generated the crisis in the first place. A longer-term strategic approach is required, and yet there is no appropriate forum for the Euro-Atlantic community to formulate such cooperation.

Environmental concerns similarly lack a Euro-Atlantic forum for discussion. The role of the Kyoto Accord, the U.S. decision not to join, and the question of whether the Kyoto protocols are in any way alleviating the nearly-universally acknowledged threat of global warming are

well-known. A more effective approach is required, but again there is the issue of how to bring that discussion into full play in a way that is likely to generate a useful result.

A first step is to put the issue on the agenda of the Euro-Atlantic community and to undertake its review in the context of discussions seeking consensus, rather than in the context of negotiations that generate countervailing pressures. The proposed new Euro-Atlantic Forum would be an appropriate coordinating body for such discussions.

Global Structural Competition

One of the fundamental challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic community is posed by economic competition from parts of the world whose technical competencies now match those of the West, but whose labor and, often, capital costs are much lower. As noted above, these challengers are generally characterized as the “Chinese manufacturer” and the “Indian service provider,” but the reality is that increased educational levels, spreading technical competencies, and enhanced transportation, communication and information capabilities have made much of the world competitors in what until only recently were largely Western preserves.

The situation is analogous to that faced in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s when much industry moved from the northern “Rust Belt” to the southern “Sun Belt.” Over the long term, the U.S. economy as a whole has benefited from these changes, and the northern states developed new sources of jobs replacing those that moved. But, in the shorter term, the dislocations created significant local hardship, and some areas never recovered.

In the international arena, companies aiming to maximize profits will seek low cost production. Likewise, new companies that can be low cost producers will move into industry. The lower wages and capital costs to be found in developing countries almost guarantee that there will be continuing disruptions of ongoing enterprises in developed countries. The ultimate scale of such disruptions is not yet clear, and the exact timing and pace of these shifts is difficult to predict. Over the long term, the benefits to the world are clear enough—lower costs benefit consumers and, if the developing world generates a per capita GDP even remotely approaching that of the developed world, the developing world will find much to purchase from the developed world.

But the rub is what is meant by the “long term”? If it takes more than 50 years—and it almost certainly will—for the developing world to start to meet developed world income levels, what will be the impact on in-

dustry and jobs in the developed world? The results are likely to be problematic, given the fact that the developing world has a significant surplus of labor, mostly on rural land, whose movement into industry is likely to keep labor costs in those countries quite low. In addition, developing countries face issues of instituting the costly social welfare requirements of the developed world, such as labor standards, health care support, and retirement pensions.

There is also a national security aspect to these questions. Research and development tends to conjoin with manufacturing, and as and if industry settles away from the Euro-Atlantic community, research and development, which might be expected to breed innovation to keep developed countries competitive, may also display changing patterns. The West has had the benefit of all technological change over the past 800 years, but what will happen when technology develops elsewhere again is less than fully clear.

There are no short answers to these issues, but currently the Euro-Atlantic community lacks any substantial forum in which even to contemplate them in a useful fashion. The proposed new Euro-Atlantic council could fulfill that need.

The Euro-Atlantic community faces new and different challenges in the 21st Century. A new focus and new organizations will be necessary to meet those challenges. Making the problems of failing states, radical militant Islam, energy/environment, and global structural economic competition the focus of the community's effort and creating a new forum in which to discuss and act upon those issues will enable the community to achieve the same success in the 21st century as it did in meeting the challenges of the Cold War.

Notes

¹ Source: Franklin D. Kramer and Simon Serfaty, *Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 1, 2007.

This paper draws from the discussions of a group of leading experts on NATO and the European Union which met for a pair of two-day seminars, in Riga, Latvia in September 2006 and Berlin, Germany in December 2006. We are grateful to the European Commission for its support of the broader CSIS project on "The European Union, the United States, and NATO," which served as a framework for these seminars. Additional publications developed for this project and related to this paper include "Moment of Reflection, Commitment to Action" (August 1, 2006) and "The NATO Riga Summit: A Renewed Commitment to Transformation" (October 2, 2006).

² Jacques Chirac, "France's Vision for NATO," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 28, 2006.

³ Since this new Euro-Atlantic Forum would be a coordinating group, it could not bar any of the sovereigns—EU or nations (including the U.S.)—or NATO per decision of its members from going forward if they wished, but coordination would be the fundamental approach, not the afterthought.

⁴ Report of the Security Council Mission to Afghanistan, 11 to 16 November 2006 (S/2006/935), at summary page, available online at ReliefWeb.

⁵ Though, in some places, more as a normative goal than actuality. (For example, the communist Chinese government has issued a white paper on democracy—although the actual Chinese practice is considerably less than democratic.)

⁶ Securing America's Future Energy, "Recommendations to the Nation on Reducing U.S. Oil Dependence" (December 2006).

⁷ The Polish Defense Minister raised the issue in the context of the proposed pipeline being built from Russia to Germany, which will bypass Poland. One of the co-authors proposed in a pre-Riga conference in September 2006 that a sufficient "limitation on one be treated as a limitation on all" which could trigger a support mechanism. Senator Richard Lugar proposed that the NATO treaty be considered the basis for a collective response in an important speech just before Riga.

Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era (2004)¹

Jeffrey Simon

Key Points

By the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will have enlarged to 26 countries, with 10 of the original 24 Partnership for Peace (PFP) partners having achieved full Alliance membership. This transition marks the end of an era and raises questions about PFP direction and long-term viability.

The original strategic rationale for the partnership, enhancing stability among and practical cooperation with the countries along the NATO periphery, has become even more compelling in the context of further Alliance enlargement, the war on terrorism, growing Western interests in Southwest and Central Asia, and the rise of authoritarian and neoimperialist sentiments in Russia. That said, the key incentive that once animated engagement in the partnership has been diminished since the remaining partners are either not interested in membership or unlikely to join for many years.

To retain its relevance and effectiveness, the Partnership for Peace must be transformed, adequately resourced, and better integrated with bilateral and regional efforts to address new security challenges. The Istanbul Summit could launch an initiative to promote new, tailored PFP programs in the Balkans, greater Black Sea region, and countries of Central Asia.

NATO should also link Balkan partner membership accession to the completion of specific NATO acquis with a time horizon of roughly 5 to 8 years and offer intensified dialogue with Ukraine as a prerequisite to initiating membership discussions.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faced a strategic challenge: how to shape the post-Communist reform process in Central and Eastern Europe in ways that would foster stability and allow for cooperation on common security problems. NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 to promote dialogue on common security concerns with these countries and the former Soviet Union. The NACC dialogue bridged the former East-West divide and illuminated opportunities for practical cooperation. The council also helped Central and East European politicians understand that defense requirements are best rooted in democratic politics and that national security encompassed civil emergency planning and a broader range of concerns, not just the military.

PFP Evolution

The Partnership for Peace (PFP), which built on the NACC, has undergone enormous change since it was launched in January 1994. The PFP was designed to allow for practical cooperation between NATO and non-members on a bilateral and multilateral basis and to prepare aspirants for entry into the Alliance, which was not *yet* ready to accept new members. Though many aspirants initially saw the partnership as a “policy for postponement,” it did address some of their security concerns and established the norm that partners should make contributions to common security.² Continued partner pressure for membership and political shifts in the West led NATO to initiate a *Study on NATO Enlargement* that made clear to all that the partnership was the best path to NATO membership.³

Within 6 months of launching PFP, there were roughly two dozen partners, including most of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. PFP architects wrestled to identify the most useful forms of cooperation and found military exercises and training generated great interest. Initially, about a dozen partners participated in the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium, to coordinate and plan military exercises for search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations. The PCC terms of reference expanded to include “peace enforcement operations” after the December 1995 Dayton Accords and the NATO decision to allow partners to deploy peacekeepers in the Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR)⁴ and follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR).⁵ Another focal point was internal defense reform—the so-called Planning and Review Process (PARP).⁶

The July 1997 Madrid Summit invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join the Alliance and “enhanced” the partnership to

be more relevant and operational.⁷ The summit also debuted the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced the NACC, and the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and NATO-Ukraine Commission to enhance consultation and cooperation with Russia and Ukraine.

By the April 1999 Washington Summit, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland had just become the first PFP partners to join the Alliance, which was then heavily engaged in a bombing campaign of Serbia. In the follow-on Kosovo Force (KFOR), 16 PFP partners contributed to the operation,⁸ in addition to the 3 new Allies. The summit approved the new Alliance Strategic Concept, which underscored the importance of partnerships and launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative to improve operability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between Alliance *and* partner forces in operations not falling under Article 5 (the collective defense provision of the Alliance). It approved a third PARP cycle that further enhanced partner force planning procedures to make them more closely resemble the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire.⁹ The 1999 summit also introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as a visible manifestation of the NATO "Open Door" (Article 10) policy with a clear set of Allied expectations from prospective members.¹⁰ The MAP Annual National Plans generated by the nine¹¹ aspirant partners would allow each to set its own objectives and targets on preparations for possible future membership. This framework and experience prepared the partnership well for the challenges of the war on terrorism.

Post-9/11 Challenges

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, NATO and many partner governments have struggled, with varying degrees of success, to reshape their defense capabilities to deal with the new risks posed by global terrorism. In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States increased defense expenditures by \$48 billion (a sum equal to the entire defense budget of the United Kingdom). In contrast, the defense budgets of most other longtime Allies have remained unchanged and the overall capabilities gap between America and other Allies has widened further since the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Yet in the aftermath of 9/11, NATO committed itself to a broader functional and wider geographic area of engagement. After invoking Article 5 on collective defense on September 12, NATO airborne warning and control systems flew over the United States while its naval forces operated in the eastern Mediterranean.

Still, as NATO began to “plan” operations in and around Afghanistan, PFP demonstrated its utility in bolstering and facilitating NATO operations in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Moreover, at their first meeting after the 9/11 attacks, EAPC defense ministers affirmed their determination to utilize the partnership to increase cooperation and capabilities against terrorism. Consistent with the NATO realization that it must place greater emphasis on meeting the challenges of asymmetric warfare, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council approved new PARP ministerial guidance¹² and adopted an Action Plan 2002-2004 and the Civil Emergency Action Plan regarding possible chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) attacks.

Although the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan commenced in January 2002 with the participation of several Allies and PFP partners, NATO did not assume command until April 16, 2003.¹³ In addition, many Allies (to include two new ones—Poland and the Czech Republic) and six PFP partners¹⁴ rendered substantial assistance in Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan. Finally, after Saddam Hussein was toppled in Iraq, NATO provided intelligence and logistical support to the Polish-led multinational division,¹⁵ comprised of many Allies and 11 partners, which is engaged in stabilization efforts as part of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.¹⁶ It would not be beyond imagination that NATO *might* assume command of the Polish division sector at some point. Allies and partners are likely to be engaged in these areas for years to come.

To better address these challenges, the November 2002 Prague Summit approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment, NATO Response Force, and new NATO command structure. Its centerpiece is the creation of the small NATO Response Force with high-tech capabilities for expeditionary missions that would allow European Allies and partners to contribute small niche units (for example, police, engineering, de-mining, chemical decontamination, alpine, and special forces) with secure communications, ample readiness, and the capability to deploy, sustain, and operate with U.S. forces through the entire conflict spectrum. If implemented, these initiatives would provide a more constructive burdensharing arrangement for NATO in the post-9/11 risk environment.

The Prague Summit also endorsed the military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism that calls for “improved intelligence sharing and crisis response arrangements [and commitment with partners] to fully implement the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan ... against possible attacks by ... chemical, biological or radiological agents.”¹⁷ So, too, the

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council adopted the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism on November 22, 2002, which commits partners to take steps to combat terrorism at home and share information and experience.¹⁸ Although this plan has not yet achieved very much, it does establish a framework upon which to build necessary functions.

A Vision for PFP Revival

To keep the Partnership for Peace relevant and effective over the next decade, partners need to focus on developing capabilities to combat terrorism and other transnational threats. New programs could focus on making interior ministries, police, and border guards more effective. A revived partnership needs to improve its intelligence cooperation to include sharing of interior (police and border control) and finance information. Finally, the PFP budget and functions need to be reexamined and updated to support future counterterrorist operations to include the counterproliferation efforts and missile defense systems outlined in the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism.

Added to these broader functional and wider geographic challenges facing the Alliance, the relationship between NATO members and PFP partners is changing dramatically. With 7 MAP partners acceding to membership in 2004, there will soon be more Allies (26) than partners (20)—including Russia and Ukraine, who, while PFP members, have special bilateral relationships with NATO. Allies will be struggling with the transformation of their own armed forces and security sector institutions and with completing the integration of the 10 newest members. The 20 remaining partners have diverse security interests, and the majority of them have much weaker defense establishments and governmental institutions than those joining the Alliance.

Given this context, the Istanbul Summit should articulate a new strategic vision for the partnership to ensure its ability to support NATO commitments to a wider geographic area and broader functional engagement. The summit will mark 10 years since the inception of the Partnership for Peace, and 10 partners will have joined the Alliance. During this period, many subregional partnerships and regional groupings have emerged and contributed substantially to confidence, stability, and security. A revived partnership needs to build on and help extend the benefits of this subregional cooperation.

But for NATO to succeed in reenergizing the PFP at the Istanbul Summit, the partnership will need to be tailored to the security concerns and interests of the remaining 20 NATO partners and 2 PFP aspirants

(Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro) who fall into the following 8 distinct groups with very diverse needs, interests, and capacities:

- ▮ 5 “advanced” partners—Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland—with no interest yet in joining the Alliance
- ▮ 3 MAP partners—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—who do aspire to membership and for whom NATO must keep its Open Door “credible”
- ▮ 2 Balkan PFP aspirants—Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro
- ▮ 3 Caucasus partners—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
- ▮ 5 Central Asia partners—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
- ▮ 2 relatively inactive partners—Belarus and Moldova
- ▮ Ukraine, which claims to be an aspirant with an “Action Plan” and hopes to join the Membership Action Plan
- ▮ Russia, which does not aspire to membership but maintains a special relationship in the NATO-Russia Council established in May 2002.

The incentives for PFP participation vary widely. Russia, which is not interested in formal membership, and Ukraine, which aspires to join NATO, are special cases. While Moldova and Belarus remain relatively inactive in the partnership, their role could change as they adjust to their altered geostrategic environment after enlargement. The partnership also provides incentive for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro because it remains their one near-term pathway to Euro-Atlantic structures and legitimacy. So, too, the remaining 16 PFP partners, who fall into 4 categories, are likely to embrace a reenergized PFP.

Advanced Partners. All of the five advanced partners¹⁹ (except Switzerland) are already in the European Union (EU) and remain outside formal NATO membership by choice. Their increased participation in the PFP in recent years has focused primarily on the Balkans and serves as an example of partnership participation as being important in its own right and not necessarily being a route to membership. These partners (along with NATO members) should be encouraged to establish a “buddy” system with Caucasian and Central Asian partners (as Sweden and Finland have already done with the Baltic states and similar to what Lithuania has been doing with Georgia). This may not be easy, as the advanced partners have been more active in local Baltic cooperation and Balkan peace support operations that have been inexorably shifting to the European Union.²⁰ Hence, it will be a challenge to keep these partners engaged in

wider NATO geographic interests. One way to engage them might be to make preparation of NATO exercises in the Caucasus and Central Asia more flexible, allow the nonaligned partners to take a greater part in their planning, and encourage their security sector expertise in a revived partnership.

Balkan Stability and Security. NATO enlargement, the MAP process, and Partnership for Peace have played a very important but underappreciated role in enhancing Balkan stability and security. Slovenian, Bulgarian, and Romanian membership in NATO forms a stable security foundation. The MAP (as long as the Open Door policy remains credible) keeps Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia positively engaged in activities consistent with NATO principles, and the incentive of PFP membership keeps Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro productively focused. Their continued successful engagement has become increasingly important in light of the transfer of the NATO Operation *Allied Harmony* in Macedonia to the European Union (*Concordia*) and will become even more important after the likely transfer of the Dayton implementation missions conducted by NATO SFOR to the European Union later in 2004.

If PFP were to become moribund or lose credibility, Balkan security would be severely undermined because some nations might be tempted to move in unconstructive directions.

With this in mind, the Istanbul Summit could establish more precise goals that need to be achieved in order to keep the NATO Open Door credible for the three remaining MAP members, particularly Albania and Macedonia, which have been in the partnership for almost a decade.²¹ If NATO is unprepared to offer membership soon to these countries, it needs to establish the *prospect* of it. NATO might consider some version of a "regatta concept" linking Balkan MAP partner accession to the completion of specific, well-defined NATO *acquis* built into the MAP Annual National Plans and with a notional time horizon of roughly 5 to 8 years.²² While the regatta concept was rejected for the 2002 Prague Summit invitees because member governments wanted to keep membership a political decision rather than linking it to completion of fixed criteria, it may be the only way to maintain interest in the partnership among these three countries still recovering from recent conflicts. PFP programs should be coordinated with EU assistance to security sector reforms to tackle the new security threats outlined in the EAPC Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism.

PFP programs need to be better integrated with the successful subregional Southeast European Defense Ministerials (SEDM) process (which should also be broadened to include interior and intelligence functions),

the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to combat trans-border crime, and the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) in the Balkans. If this proves difficult in the Balkans (as it likely will beyond), then the PFP mandate, consistent with the Prague Summit Action Plan Against Terrorism, *ought* to be broadened to include Partnership Goals with police activities as it already has been with border guards. The objective is the improvement of interagency coordination and cooperation within and among Balkan states.

This integration could be accomplished within the annual SEDM meetings that began in 1996²³ and have succeeded in enhancing transparency and building cooperation and security in Southeastern Europe. In 1999, the Southeast European Defense Ministerials approved the creation of the Southeast European Brigade that comprises a 25,000-troop force that can be assembled as needed by brigade commanders. There is speculation that the SEEBRIG *might* be deployed to Bosnia sometime in the future.

It is now time to build further upon SEDM successes to deal with the new risk environment consistent with NATO guidance. The Southeast European Defense Ministerials should be broadened to include civil emergency planning and interior and intelligence ministers to become an annual Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial (SEDIIM). The new SEDIIM should be encouraged to coordinate further its work with the SECI,²⁴ which broadened its activities in October 2000 to combat transborder crime involving trafficking of drugs and weapons, prostitution, and money laundering. Since Moldova, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina are SECI members and the latter two are also PFP aspirants, they should all become SEDM observers, with the goal of ultimate membership in the broadened SEDIIM process.

Balkan stability can be maintained and security further enhanced by fine-tuning the Partnership for Peace and MAP process to keep the program credible and members and aspirants engaged, coupling PFP goals to a broadened functional SEDIIM and SECI with a more inclusive participation by initially extending observer status to Moldova, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Caucasian Partners. The greater Black Sea region has acquired increased strategic importance to NATO in recent years, particularly since the Alliance assumed ISAF command in Afghanistan and support of the Polish-led division in Iraq. However, regional security dialogue and cooperation have been complicated by lingering disputes, weak governance, and other problems. While there

has been dialogue on economic cooperation in the region, Black Sea defense ministers have never met. It is time to apply the successful lessons of security cooperation in Central and Southeast Europe to the greater Black Sea region. The first step to regional stabilization is to build understanding through discussion of security risks and then to build greater cooperation through implementation of military activities in support of a transparent agenda. What options should the participants consider?

The successful Balkan cooperation initiatives—SEDM (and potential SEDIIM), SECI, and SEEBRIG—could serve as models for the Caucasus and also extend their benefits throughout the greater Black Sea littoral.

The Central and East European experience since the late 1980s provides several successful examples of using military cooperation to build confidence and regional security among wary neighbors that could be applied to improve interstate relations in the greater Black Sea region. These include Romania-Hungary military contacts to improve otherwise cool political relations in the early 1990s; the continued deployment of the Czech-Slovak battalion in the United Nations (UN) Protection Force and UN Command Humanitarian Relief Operation during and after the January 1993 “velvet divorce”; the Polish-Ukraine Battalion in Kosovo (and now Iraq); and the formation of the Baltic Battalion and SEEBRIG to foster regional cooperation in the Baltics and Balkans. Adapting some of these experiences as models for application within the Caucasus and with the three new Black Sea Allies (after 2004) and partners and other willing Allies (coupled with a U.S. Black Sea presence), under a revived PFP, could go a long way in advancing greater Black Sea cooperation and stability and NATO security interests.

There are some foundations upon which to build security cooperation in this region. Six Black Sea littoral states established the Black Sea Force in April 2001 for search and rescue operations, mine clearance, environmental protection, and promotion of goodwill visits by naval forces.²⁵ One can envision the creation of a Black Sea Task Force to deal not only with civil emergency contingencies, such as the earthquakes that perennially strike the region or potential CBR incidents, but also to interdict the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans, particularly if Ukraine and Russia participated.

Since the continued engagement of Ukraine in the partnership is important, the Istanbul Summit might consider commencing intensified dialogues with Ukraine as a prerequisite to joining the MAP, assuming Ukraine’s presidential elections are held as scheduled in October 2004 in

accordance with standards set by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and adhere to Ukrainian constitutional procedures.

In addition to interstate cooperation, U.S. policy can help improve Black Sea cooperation and stability. The likely new U.S. presence in Bulgaria and Romania can be leveraged to improve interoperability through development of joint training and logistics facilities and to build a joint expeditionary Black Sea Task Force. Coupled with Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey—now the three Black Sea Allies with a rich experience in SEDM and SEEBRIG—the U.S. presence could be beneficial in fostering wider Black Sea cooperation under a revived PFP program.

Although all three Caucasus partners were PFP signatories in 1994, their participation has varied considerably and only recently has become more prominent. This has been particularly evident with the PARP, which remains the core of transparent defense planning, accountability, and democratic oversight of the military, and provides the foundation to enhance subregional cooperation. After 9/11, all three Caucasus partners joined the PARP.

Though Armenia participates in the Partnership for Peace, cooperation with NATO remains controversial because of unresolved problems with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia has good relations with Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania and remains very close to Russia. An original signatory of the May 15, 1992, Tashkent Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty with Russia, Armenia was the only Caucasus state which renewed its commitment for another 5 years on April 2, 1999.

While Azerbaijan and Georgia signed the CIS treaty in 1993, they withdrew from it in April 1999. Azerbaijan's principal security concerns are its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and problems with terrorism, drugs, crime, and human trafficking. Azerbaijan cooperates with the United States in counterterrorism and participates in post-conflict efforts in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Georgia participates in KFOR and Black Sea regional cooperation and wants NATO to play a role in solving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts on Georgian soil, and in September 2002, its parliament adopted a resolution endorsing the goal of NATO membership. The United States has assisted the Georgian armed forces through the Train and Equip Program and in establishing control over the Pankisi Gorge near the border with Russia.

The United States has greater influence among Caucasian (and Central Asian) partners than NATO (and EU) structures per se because the Alliance has been more hampered by what it can offer in terms of assis-

tance.²⁶ But this could change if the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) was more directly focused on the region and the PFP Trust Fund was made more robust.

Central Asian Partners. While it was hoped that NACC and partnership participation by the Central Asian states would maintain their ties to the West and encourage democratic developments, the results have been mixed. PFP cooperation did facilitate NATO moves into Central Asia to support operations in Afghanistan in 2001; however, the politics of the region remain largely authoritarian. Security cooperation was also complicated by the fact that four of the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) were among the original signatories of the CIS Collective Security Treaty with Russia and Armenia. When the protocol extending the treaty was signed on April 2, 1999, Uzbekistan dropped out of the treaty. Four of the Central Asian states were among the PFP signatories of 1994, but only after 9/11 did Tajikistan finally join. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also joined PARP in December 2001.

Though none of the Central Asian partners participated in any of the Balkan operations (IFOR, SFOR, or KFOR), they have supported U.S.- and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have provided basing rights and overflights for U.S. and coalition forces in Operation *Enduring Freedom*, and Kazakhstan supported Poland with de-mining troops in Iraq and permitted the overflight and transport of supplies and U.S. troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Increasingly, these activities have irritated the Russians. Hence, encouraging the active participation of Russia in a revived PFP, as well as consultations in the Russia-NATO Council, will be increasingly important to reduce the inevitable frictions and explore options for cooperative Russian engagement.

Istanbul Initiatives

The foregoing analysis illustrates the increasing importance of effective cooperation with PFP partners to NATO ability to meet its wider geographic and functional needs. A revival of the partnership would also provide an opportunity to promote democratic governance, defense and security sector reforms, and subregional cooperation in the Greater Black Sea region and Central Asia, steps that will enhance long-term security of the entire Euro-Atlantic region. While PFP must continue to adapt to the requirements of the post-9/11 era and a changing NATO membership, its original charter to promote good neighborly relations, democracy, free enterprise, equitable treatment of ethnic minorities, and democratic oversight and effective management of the armed forces has enduring value.

To give new momentum to the Partnership for Peace on departure from Istanbul, a number of actions should be considered to ensure PFP vitality.

First, the United States and its Allies should devise a PFP strategy to link Balkan MAP partner accession to the completion of specific NATO *acquis* with a time horizon of roughly 5 to 8 years and offer intensified dialogues with Ukraine as a prerequisite to joining MAP.

Also, consistent with existing PFP guidance, the Southeast European Defense Ministerials should be broadened to include civil emergency planning and the participation of interior and intelligence ministers to become an annual Southeast European Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial; its cooperation with SECI should be encouraged; and the provision of observer status to Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia-Montenegro in the SEDIIM should be promoted.

Further, programs of subregional cooperation in Southeastern Europe could be adapted to or extended across the Black Sea. The United States and others could work with SEDM participants to sponsor the creation of a Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Black Sea Task Force to deal with civil emergency contingencies and interdiction of illegal trafficking.

An action that the United States should take is to announce its willingness to support a *new* Istanbul Initiative with roughly \$80 million to \$100 million to promote basic PFP objectives in the Balkans, greater Black Sea region, and Central Asia. The funds would support military education and training programs and broader security sector reforms, and provide the catalyst for promoting necessary subregional cooperation and institutional development. The United States should challenge other Allies to offer proportional funding, including support for Central and Eastern European members to transfer the lessons of their security sector transition to these other partners.

After the launch of PFP in 1994, when it became obvious that resources were lacking, the United States started its Warsaw Initiative with \$100 million in annual funding. By the 2004 Istanbul Summit, most of the Warsaw Initiative's key recipients will be members of the Alliance, with the program achieving enormous success. But the remaining 20 partners, particularly around the greater Black Sea, in the Caucasus, and Central Asia, have significantly *weaker* political, economic, social, and security and defense institutions than the 10 partners who have become full NATO members. In addition, the challenges that these partners face, consistent with the post-9/11 broader civil emergency planning and counterterrorism

direction taken by NATO since the Prague Summit, require *greater* assistance to bring their personnel and institutions closer to NATO standards.

The United States should support the new Istanbul Initiative with funding at roughly the same amount as the current Warsaw Initiative (Department of Defense share of \$40 million and Department of State Foreign Military Financing [FMF] share of \$40 million), to focus on a more sophisticated program stressing the basics. The Department of Defense share would be used to train and educate civilian and military partner personnel; assist in developing a rational partner military force that would be capable of cooperating with its border troops, police, and intelligence institutions; refine and develop civil emergency planning procedures that will be interoperable with immediate neighbors; and promote the development of a Greater Black Sea Defense, Interior, and Intelligence Ministerial to work with NATO and the United States. The Department of State FMF share should be used to upgrade air, ground, and sea facilities and build required infrastructure to support efforts such as the Greater Black Sea Defense Ministerial and Greater Black Sea Task Force.

Several multilateral funding actions should also be taken. NATO must ensure that the PFP Trust Fund becomes more than a rhetorical commitment. The fund—which has allocated \$4.2 million to destroy anti-personnel mines in Albania, Ukraine, and Moldova, and dispose of missile stockpiles in Georgia—will be expanded.

The Alliance also needs to look at redirecting NATO infrastructure funds to improve the infrastructure and bases needed to support Alliance operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other potential remote deployments.

The NATO Security Investment Program has an annual budget of over \$600 million (\$681 million in 2004)²⁷ to cover installations and facilities dealing with communications and information systems, radar, military headquarters, airfields, fuel pipelines and storage, harbors, and navigational aids. NSIP funds have also been used to cover eligible requirements for the NATO-led SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF peace support operations to include repair of airfields, rail, and roads.²⁸

Since NATO has assumed the lead in the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force, NSIP funds now ought to be eligible for the ISAF operation and be applied to the broader Black Sea region to augment NATO air, road, and rail support. The Istanbul Summit should make NSIP funds eligible to improve facilities in PFP countries in direct support of ISAF and other remote operations.

The summit should also authorize the Secretary General to restructure the NATO International Staff yet again to consolidate the partnership

in one directorate,²⁹ perhaps headed by its own assistant secretary general. This would symbolize Alliance commitment to a renewed partnership and highlight the enduring importance of the program.

Finally, NATO needs to engage the European Union and other institutions in coordinating assistance to these regions more effectively to help partners advance security sector reform, rule of law, and other capabilities that will enhance security and stability.

If the Istanbul Summit fails to give new momentum to the Partnership for Peace, there likely will be destabilizing consequences with implications throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, and NATO will find it increasingly difficult to fulfill its missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. A reenergized PFP can help NATO achieve its broader functional and geographic objectives.

Notes

¹ Source: Jeffrey Simon, *Partnership for Peace: Charting a Course for a New Era*, Strategic Forum 206 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004).

² These occurred in the form of Individual Partnership Programs and self-differentiation. It marked the establishment of a wide environment of cooperation to include participation in the Planning and Review Process, peace support operations in the Partnership Coordination Cell, transparency, and democratic oversight of the military.

³ The study, briefed to partners in 1995, incorporated the principles of political democracy, economic free enterprise, equitable treatment of ethnic minorities, good neighbor relations, and democratic oversight of the military as essential elements of being a producer of security into NATO *acquis*.

⁴ The following 14 (of 26) PFP partners participated in the Implementation Force: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine.

⁵ Later Ireland, Slovakia, and Slovenia also joined the Stabilization Force.

⁶ The first PARP cycle launched in 1995 had 14 participants: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine. See Anthony Cragg, "The Partnership For Peace and Review Process," *NATO Review* 43, no. 6 (November 1995), 23-25.

⁷ The second PARP cycle launched in October 1996, which introduced interoperability objectives to permit partner forces to operate with Allies, had 18 partners sign up.

⁸ The 16 partners participating in KFOR included Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland; Russia and Ukraine; and Azerbaijan and Georgia from the Caucasus.

⁹ In essence, Partnership Goals for Interoperability and for Forces and Capabilities would replace the old interoperability objectives in 2000. The new Partnership Goals aimed to develop specific armed forces and capabilities that partners could offer in support of NATO operations and permit partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council greater participation in deliberations involving exercise planning.

¹⁰ MAP identified five partner areas (political/economic, defense/military, resources, security, and legal) that were necessary to develop the capabilities needed for membership.

¹¹ Croatia only joined the partnership after the Washington Summit on May 25, 2000; later, in May 2002, it joined the MAP.

¹² The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council met December 19, 2001. Now 19 partners participated in the PARP. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan followed Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

¹³ PFP partners Austria, Finland, and Sweden; MAP member Albania; and NATO invitees Bulgaria and Romania participated in the International Security Assistance Force.

¹⁴ Central Asian partners Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; Black Sea partners Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine; and MAP invitee Slovakia, with new members Poland and the Czech Republic, participated in Operation *Enduring Freedom*.

¹⁵ Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, assisted Warsaw's orientation and force generation conferences; the NATO School at Oberammergau helped train the multinational staff; Allied Forces, Southern Europe, supported the Warsaw planning staff on logistics planning; NATO assisted the Poles to establish a secure satellite communications link and provided intelligence sharing and information management. NATO Press Release (2003) 093, September 3, 2003; accessed at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-093e.htm>>.

¹⁶ MAP member Macedonia; MAP invitees Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia; Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine on the Black Sea; Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Caucasus; and Kazakhstan in Central Asia participated in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.

¹⁷ Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government of the Atlantic Council in Prague on November 21, 2002. NATO Press Release (2002) 127, November 21, 2002; accessed at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>>.

¹⁸ See paragraphs 16.1 through 16.5. Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, November 22, 2002. This initiative called on partners to intensify political consultations and information sharing on armaments and civil emergency planning; enhance preparedness for combating terrorism by security sector reforms and force planning, air defense and air traffic management, and armaments and logistics cooperation; impede support for terrorist groups by enhancing exchange of banking information and improving border controls of arms ranging from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to small arms and light weapons; enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence management of WMD-related terrorism and civil emergency planning; and provide assistance to partner efforts against terrorism through the Political Military Steering Committee Clearing House mechanism and creation of a PFP Trust Fund.

¹⁹ In terms of criteria for NATO membership as outlined in the 1995 Study on *NATO Enlargement*.

²⁰ For example, Austria, Finland, and Sweden participated in Bosnia-IFOR, to be joined later by Ireland in SFOR. All five participate in KFOR. Only Finland, Sweden, and Austria have engaged in ISAF, and none is in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*.

²¹ Both joined in February 1994 and November 1995 respectively; Croatia only joined the Partnership for Peace in May 2000 and the MAP in February 2002.

²² The *regatta concept* entails extending an invitation *contingent* upon completion of specific predetermined *acquis*. If multiple invitations are extended, actual accession dates could likely vary.

²³ SEDM members include Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey (with the United States, Italy, and more recently Ukraine as observers). Croatia joined SEDM in October 2000.

²⁴ Launched in December 1996, the United States initiated and supported the SECI to encourage cooperation among the states of Southeastern Europe on economic, transportation, and environmental matters as a way to facilitate their access to European integration. The SECI Center in Bucharest supports common transborder crime fighting efforts of participating countries. SECI presently includes all 10 Balkan countries from Slovenia to Turkey plus Hungary and Moldova.

²⁵ Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

²⁶ For over a decade, the United States has been working closely with Georgia (and Uzbekistan in Central Asia) on training forces to deal with their internal requirements.

²⁷ Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, M-DPC-2 (2000) 107, May 11, 2000.

²⁸ Under the heading of Crisis Response Operations in the NATO military budget and NATO Security Investment Program, NATO is already spending NSIP funds in Afghanistan and is about to spend even more in the operation of Kabul Airport.

²⁹ PFP “drift” has resulted in part from the restructuring of the international staff. The partnership is now subordinate to two Assistant Secretary Generals—to the Political Affairs Security Policy Division and the Defense Policy and Planning Division.

NATO: Surviving 9/11 (2008)¹

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

What is the state of the NATO alliance today? While NATO may not be performing as well as its supporters wish, it is doing better than its critics have expected when stock is taken of the complex new missions and difficult strategic environment it is facing. Certainly NATO is doing better than during 2002-2003, two of the most troubled years in its nearly six decades of existence. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, NATO declared an Article 5 emergency, the first time it had ever invoked its collective defense clause. Yet when the United States invaded Afghanistan two months later, it turned aside offers for participation by European forces because they lacked the precision strike capabilities for the combat missions being pursued. Left standing on the sidelines and watching events in Afghanistan, NATO came away embarrassed. The Prague Summit of fall, 2002, was a success: e.g. it launched creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). Then, however, came the damaging debate over the impending invasion of Iraq, which split the alliance, polarizing the United States and Britain against Germany and France in a bitter feud, and further damaging NATO's reputation and self-confidence.

Today, the anger over Iraq has been replaced by a more forthcoming dialogue over transatlantic security policy, and NATO is taking steps to improve European military forces for power projection missions. Moreover, NATO is operating military forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan, two places where the stakes are high, the risks are serious and increasing, and success is essential. Overall, NATO is surviving the disruptions and strains that flowed in the aftermath of 9/11, and it is grappling with new challenges. But it is far from functioning perfectly, and it faces internal and

external troubles that, if unresolved, could threaten its future effectiveness and relevance.

If NATO's glass today is only one-half full, where should it be headed tomorrow? An old slogan, which seemingly applies today, holds that NATO works better in practice than in theory. In the years ahead, as discussed below, NATO will need to make important improvements to both its practices and its theory in several areas. These improvements do not need to be made overnight, but NATO's members cannot afford to dawdle in pursuing them. An appropriate, necessary target for achieving them, or at least making significant progress on them, is the Berlin Summit of 2009, which follows the Bucharest Summit of 2008. NATO thus has a two-year window in which to act, which is not a lot of time for a large, often-cumbersome alliance that typically moves slowly when big changes are in the works. A sense of commitment and timeliness is needed.

NATO's Performances of Strategic Missions: Past and Present

The stage can be set for analyzing NATO's contemporary agenda by briefly recalling its historical performance over the past six decades, including its efforts to blend theory and practice. During its first four decades, from the late 1940's to the late 1980's, NATO's main mission focused on waging the Cold War and contending with the bipolar international system of that era. NATO began the Cold War as a newly created alliance in weak shape facing an imposing Soviet military threat to the borders of its European members. Initially NATO established an integrated military command and adopted two new strategic policies to guide its efforts: containment and deterrence. Both strategic policies suited the enduring requirements of that era, but NATO lacked the military power in Europe to carry them out. Had war broken out at birth of the alliance, NATO's forces would have been defeated quickly and easily. In this setting, containment and deterrence were not assured, and victory in the Cold War seemed within the grasp of the Soviet Union.

Building Stronger Cold War Defenses

In order to remedy its military weakness, NATO set about to build a viable defense posture in the early 1950's. Its initial effort, embodied in the Lisbon defense goals, called for very large conventional forces in northern, central, and southern Europe. But these goals proved unaffordable in light of European efforts to focus their money on economic recovery. In response, NATO adopted a military strategy of massive retaliation, which

called for relatively inexpensive nuclear forces to form the backbone of its deterrent posture. The effort initially was successful, but by the late 1950's massive retaliation was rapidly losing its viability because the Soviet Union was building a nuclear posture of its own. The weakening of massive retaliation threw NATO into a prolonged, agonizing debate about how to respond. In 1967, NATO finally reached agreement on a new strategy of forward defense and flexible response (MC 14/3), which called for a combination of nuclear deterrence and stronger conventional defenses. Thereafter NATO began the slow process of improving its conventional forces through a combination of U.S. and European efforts.

The 1970's and 1980's witnessed a growing arms race in Central Europe in which NATO's force modernization steadily gained momentum in ways that transformed the military balance there.² By the late 1980's, the effort proved successful enough to deny the Soviet Union unquestioned military supremacy in Europe. Not only was NATO now more secure, but the Soviet Union found itself facing bankruptcy partly because it had invested far too much money in building military power. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union—its economy weak, its political system ineffective, and its ideology discredited—threw in the towel, and the Cold War ended with NATO the winner.

NATO played an instrumental role in winning the Cold War because it found a way successfully to blend theory and practice. NATO started weak and improved only slowly, but its steady pace had a strong cumulative effect, thereby earning the alliance a letter grade of "A" at the end of the contest. The act of creating a permanent peacetime alliance was a new feature of international politics, and it required its members to accept some losses of sovereignty and to negotiate with each other to find common ground. NATO's members embraced alliance partnership because it was a viable way to combine their scarce resources and thereby defend themselves at affordable cost. Equally important, NATO was able to craft a "transatlantic bargain" that assigned roles and missions to each of its members. The United States made major military contributions to NATO's security, but so did such important members as Britain, Germany, and France, as well as a host of smaller countries. NATO's integrated command played the vital role of combining these national military contributions to form multinational postures that ably defended all three regions. NATO succeeded because it formed alliance-wide consensus behind strategic policies that had strong substantive content, and it then implemented these policies well enough—despite some continuing blemishes, shortfalls, and risks—to meet the demanding security requirements of the day. Achieving

this positive outcome was not easy: it required enormous strategic labor, high defense spending, patience, and persistence. Yet the success achieved made this sustained commitment well worthwhile.

Enlarging NATO After the Cold War

When the Cold War abruptly ended in 1989-1990, bipolarity was replaced by a new, amorphous international system, called the "post-Cold War world," that endured until September 11, 2001. Although Europe's borders were no longer menaced by a major military threat, NATO's members decided to keep the alliance alive and functioning. They did so partly because they judged that the new era held unknown dangers, and because they wanted to preserve the practice of close transatlantic collaboration that NATO brought. The Cold War had taught them the valuable lesson that alliance membership could not only save money, but also could enhance the political and military power of members far beyond what any of them could achieve individually. Their decision was embodied in the new NATO strategic concept, which focused on multi-region operations in Europe and creation of multinational corps, that was adopted at the Rome Summit of 1990.

Within a few years, a new main mission confronted the alliance: enlarging into eastern Europe. Initially NATO was hesitant to move eastward. But new strategic arguments emerged to change its mind. Enlargement, its advocates said, was needed not only to remedy a security vacuum in eastern Europe, but also to help support the pursuit of democracy and capitalism there, and to unify all of Europe in common institutions. NATO's first step was to create the "Partnership for Peace" (PFP), which enabled interested countries to pursue collaborative relations with NATO military forces. With PFP underway, NATO's members began to debate the idea of formally admitting new members into the alliance. By 1999, the debate was resolved in favor of an alliance-wide consensus to undertake enlargement. The process began that year when Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were admitted to NATO. In 2002, seven additional countries were admitted: the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, plus Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Within the short span of only three years, NATO had grown from 16 members to 26, and the alliance now found itself handling the security affairs of most of Europe.³

NATO enlargement was a major, controversial step. Plenty of people on both sides of the Atlantic had strong misgivings, and accepted it only begrudgingly. Nor was it always implemented smoothly: as of this writing, some members have not adequately reformed their military forces, and

in a few cases, both democracy and market economies have not yet taken full hold. All things considered, however, enlargement thus far has proven to be a big strategic success, and its course is not yet fully run: additional countries (e.g., in the Balkans and elsewhere) are eager for membership. NATO enlargement's success, however, was not foreordained. The process thus far has worked effectively because NATO planned it well in both theory and practice—effectively enough thus far to earn a grade of “A-” for this vital new mission.

NATO enlargement became feasible because the United States worked cooperatively with Britain, Germany, and France, thereby forming a close transatlantic partnership that, history shows, is needed to make NATO act with vision and power. The dual process of NATO and EU enlargement has been animated by the vision of making Europe whole and free. Within only a few years, this effort has transformed Europe from being a cockpit of global calamity to becoming a poster child for unity, peace, and progress. Yet this effort is not yet complete, and thorny issues remain regarding admission of Turkey to the EU, Ukraine's relationship with NATO and the EU, continued progress in eastern Europe, political stability in the Balkans, and Russia's attitude toward the unification of Europe in partnership with the United States.

Performing New Missions

Even as NATO has been pursuing successful enlargement in Europe, it has been compelled to address the growing need to pursue a whole set of complex, new strategic missions that arise from menacing events taking place in regions beyond its traditional geopolitical perimeters. Although the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are the signature event that announced the arrival of a new and turbulent international system, the need for NATO to start performing expeditionary missions to distant areas began showing its face a decade earlier. In 1990-1991, the United States led a large UN-authorized coalition to eject Iraq from Kuwait. The *Desert Storm* campaign was a success, but it also exposed the big, growing difference between impressive U.S. capabilities for power projection and, Britain and France aside, the paltry capabilities of most European countries, including Germany, which had spent the past decades focusing on defense of their borders.

In late 1995, NATO was called upon to send large peacekeeping forces to Bosnia, where they remained for several years. Then, in 1999 NATO was compelled to wage war in order to eject Serbian forces from Kosovo. Its military campaign took the form of air bombardment led by

U.S. forces, which flew about 75% of the combat missions, but when Serbia finally capitulated and withdrew its forces, NATO was called upon to send large ground forces into Kosovo in order to maintain the peace for future years. The events in Bosnia and Kosovo showed that NATO forces could project power for enduring peacekeeping missions, but the Kosovo war again called into question the capacity of European members swiftly to project sizable forces for demanding combat missions.⁴

The events following September 11, 2001, graphically illuminated not only the emergence of a dangerous new international system, but also NATO's imperative need to become more proficient at expeditionary operations for a wide spectrum of missions, ranging from peacekeeping, to combat missions, to lengthy stabilization and reconstruction missions. Today NATO finds itself leading ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan by maintaining a large military presence of about 40,000 troops—including over 20,000 European troops—in a country whose future stability is far from ensured. In addition, NATO is performing support missions for the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq even as it deals with both Kosovo and Afghanistan. What the future holds for demands upon NATO to perform expeditionary missions is to be seen: much will depend upon the outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as events elsewhere (e.g., Darfur). But if present trends are a valid indicator, requirements for these missions are likely to remain high, and they could increase.

The growing array of new, complex missions facing NATO is not limited to expeditionary operations. Indeed, terrorism and the mounting threat of WMD proliferation are compelling the alliance to devote growing attention to new forms of transatlantic homeland defense missions. In addition to defending against terrorist attacks against European and American targets, NATO now finds itself concerned about guarding sea approaches to alliance ports (Operation *Active Endeavour*), addressing future requirements for ballistic missile defense, and being prepared for civil emergencies and consequence management missions. Likewise, it faces the prospect of dealing with energy security and potential cyber attacks on its information networks as well as those of its members.⁵ All of these new missions are unfamiliar to NATO, and the alliance is not yet well-endowed—politically or militarily—to perform them. Nor does NATO have a legacy of successful experience in similar areas to draw upon for inspiration or guidance.

How well is NATO performing today in handling these new missions and their preparedness requirements? Thus far, a fair answer is that NATO is earning a letter grade of "C," with lower grades in some specific areas,

but the final grade is an “Incomplete” because the process of change is still unfolding. The good news is that NATO is not failing in some holistic sense, and it has been showing signs of improving in several arenas. But a grade of C is far less than an A, and it likely will not be good enough to meet the troubled times ahead. Seen in historical perspective, a grade of C is not necessarily surprising. During the Cold War, NATO started slowly and gradually gained momentum only over a period of many years. The same pattern of a slow initial response followed by more vigorous performance also applies to NATO enlargement. The same may apply today. The looming question is: How much time does NATO have at its disposal? The accelerating events of today’s world suggest that the alliance may not have the time today that it benefited from in past years. At a minimum, NATO cannot afford the luxury of acting in leisurely ways—the risks and dangers are too great for such a response.

Political Environment for New Complex Missions

Beyond question, NATO’s ability to perform its new complex missions—for both homeland defense and power projection—is rendered more difficult and demanding by the political environment in which it is operating. This is the case both within the alliance and outside its borders, across a rapidly globalizing world of promise and peril. Dealing with this political environment, which is unlike anything experienced during the Cold War or its immediate aftermath, will be anything but easy, and it will require considerable skill upon the part of NATO and its members.

Strained Transatlantic Relations

Today’s political environment is characterized by unusual stress and uncertainty within the alliance itself. Transatlantic relations, which traditionally have provided the glue that holds NATO together, continue to suffer from the aftershocks of not only the invasion of Iraq but also other areas of U.S.-European policy disputes: e.g. global warming, arms control, the International Criminal Court, and global trade policies. Currently relations between the governments of the United States and its European allies have been restored to a relatively even keel. But public opinion is another, less reassuring matter.

Within the United States, public anger toward Germany and France has receded, but widespread uncertainty exists about the degree to which Europe can be counted on to help perform difficult global security missions in the years ahead. On Capitol Hill and elsewhere, perceptions of low European defense spending, unfair burden sharing, and sluggish strategic

responses have rankled critics of NATO.⁶ The key reality is that the United States is a European power by strategic choice, not by geography. It will remain a NATO leader only if its own legitimate vital interests continue to be served by this role. Individual policy disputes seem unlikely to fracture American public support for this role: many such disputes have occurred over NATO's long history, and the United States has never been seriously tempted to abandon NATO or Europe in response. But this support conceivably could erode if the United States is marginalized in Europe and/or if Europe is seen as withdrawing into a self-protective shell, thereby leaving the United States to handle a dangerous world without Europe by its side. The upshot is that European governments will need to take American domestic politics and public opinion into account in their handling of transatlantic relations. The key is to ensure that NATO works effectively not only for Europe, but for the United States too.

Across Europe, public support for the United States and NATO is an even bigger problem in today's world. Numerous public opinion polls—for example, by the German Marshall Fund, the BBC, and other organizations—have documented the alarming extent to which public support for the United States has declined in recent years. Although such support has increased somewhat since the nadir of 2002-2003, it remains disturbingly low today. In January, 2007, a BBC poll found that fully 57% of British people view U.S. influence in the world in negative terms, and only 33% see it as positive. In Germany, the negative figure was 77%, and in France, 69%. In March, 2007, another poll revealed majorities in Britain, France, Germany, and Spain as viewing the United States as the greatest threat to world peace. Still another poll found that support for NATO as essential to European security had declined from 69% in 2002 to 55% in 2006. Reflective of this declining support for NATO, recent polls show that 60-84% of Europeans—the numbers vary among countries—judge that the EU should be doing more in security affairs.⁷

Low public opinion polls of this sort do not necessarily reflect the attitudes and policies of most European governments, but they create a climate of opinion that governments will be hard pressed to brush aside if they persist. Regardless of their direct impact on policy, they reflect the extent to which America's stock has declined among its closest friends, on a continent that heavily owes its security and freedom to strong American support over the past decades. As such, they are a problem not only for European governments, but for the U.S. government as well.

Perhaps too much can be made of these public opinion polls in Europe. To a degree, they reflect transient anger at the George W. Bush Ad-

ministration and its allegedly muscular, unilateralist conduct. Even so, low polls may prove more enduring than supporters of NATO hope. After all, Europe is no longer militarily threatened in ways that were the case during the Cold War, and the importance its public opinion attaches to U.S. security guarantees and to NATO have naturally suffered in many quarters. Beyond this, the United States is a truly global power, and Europe is mostly focused on its own demanding continental affairs. This dissimilarity sometimes gives rise to differing priorities that become reflected in public opinion. A further trouble is the diplomatic frictions that still exist today. For example, the United States continues to be wary that European efforts to employ the EU for military purposes will come at the expense of NATO. Meanwhile, Europeans continue to be wary of the U.S. effort to promote democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere, and have reacted distrustfully to some recent U.S. initiatives, including efforts to install a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) site in Europe and to promote global trade reform. Such frictions make it harder for U.S. and European governments to work together, which in turn gives rise to adverse public opinion.

Also important, the United States and Europe are often seen—on both sides of the Atlantic—as being on two different cultural wavelengths. Whereas the United States is seen as being a highly religious society, ultra-capitalist, and increasingly influenced by Hispanic and Asian immigrants, Europe is seen as secular, partly socialist, and increasingly influenced by Islamic immigrants. A few years ago, these disparate societal and cultural trends, coupled with differing attitudes toward security policies, led one American writer to claim that while the United States is from Mars, Europe is from Venus.⁸ Both metaphors are highly exaggerated: the United States is not warlike or imperialist, and Europe—which maintains 2.4 million troops under arms compared to only 1.4 million in the United States—is not pacifist. Beyond this, the United States and Europe share many cultural bonds and increasingly interlocking economies as well as mutual support for democracy, capitalism, and multilateral collaboration. At a fundamental level, nonetheless, the United States and Europe are undeniably two different strategic entities with similar but separate interests. As history shows, cooperation between them does not come automatically and should not be taken for granted. In the coming years, it will have to be nourished and advanced by wise diplomacy and collaborative policies on both sides of the Atlantic—policies that advance the interests and priorities of both the United States and Europe.

In many quarters, hope is growing that closer cooperation can be achieved in the coming years of the sort that will not only produce better

public opinion polls, but also strengthen the alliance's performance. In Europe, many observers recognize that the Bush Administration is striving to heal recent transatlantic wounds, and they hope that when a new administration takes power in 2009, it will bring a commitment to collaborative transatlantic relations. In the United States, many observers hope that the new governments of Germany (led by Chancellor Angela Merkel), France (led by President Nicolas Sarkozy) and Britain (led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown) will pursue close collaborative ties with the United States while participating actively in NATO. All three leaders have proclaimed their intent to pursue this course. The past months have seen concrete achievements: e.g., a relatively successful Riga Summit, NATO's leadership role in Afghanistan, and common U.S.-European diplomacy toward Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. What the future holds is to be seen. What can be said is that the opportunity to pursue a positive vision will exist, but because it may be transient, it should not be missed.

Worsening Relations with Russia

If future transatlantic relations seem hopeful, the same cannot be said for relations with Russia. A decade ago, many observers judged that Russia was on the path to becoming a full-fledged democracy in close partnership with the United States and Europe. Under President Vladimir Putin, however, Russia has been taking a different course, and its rapidly improving economy, powered by sales of oil and natural gas, is giving it a capacity to act more boldly in world affairs. Russia's political system still holds elections for the presidency and other offices, but it cannot be called a true democracy. A better description is that it currently is suspended somewhere between quasi-democracy and authoritarian capitalism, with the trends pointed in the latter direction. A hallmark of Putin's leadership has been centralization of political and economic power in the Kremlin, enhanced control by the security bureaucracies, and the stifling of dissent, freedom of the press, and other democratic institutions.

Meanwhile, Putin's foreign policy has been marked by a growing assertion of Russian geopolitical interests, often through use of bullying and coercion. Recent months have seen threats to cut off energy supplies to Ukraine and Belarus, the assassination of the Russian defector Litvinenko, and an alleged cyber attack on Estonia's information networks. Russia continues to maintain its controversial military presence in Chechnya, Georgia and Moldova, and otherwise to show signs of intimidating its vulnerable neighbors in former Soviet territories. In the Balkans, it supports Serbia and is hostile to Kosovo independence, and in the Persian

Gulf, it has only recently agreed to support relatively weak sanctions aimed at derailing Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Putin and his aides, complaining about U.S. and NATO policies, have threatened to withdraw from the CFE Treaty and to scuttle the INF treaty, and to target with nuclear weapons those NATO countries hosting BMD systems, even as they paradoxically offered to cooperate with NATO in establishing missile defenses against threats from the south—by allowing NATO to use a Russian radar system in Azerbaijan for early warning of missile attacks.

What do these worrisome trends in Russian foreign policy mean, and where are they headed? Some observers view Putin as a modern-day Rodney Dangerfield, an American comedian who was constantly in search of respect. While this portrayal may be apt, it would be erroneous to see his foreign policy as dominated solely by transient emotions in need of psychotherapy. Contemporary Russian foreign policy is not being motivated by a new millennial ideology or a resort to imperialism. But it seemingly is being propelled by a statist mentality: i.e., by a hard-headed willingness to assert traditional Russian interests and to re-establish Russia as an important player on the world scene, with a zone of control around its borders. It also seems to be playing a diplomatic game aimed at driving wedges between the United States and Europe, and within Europe itself. In his recent threats and complaints, Putin is over-reaching with his pushy diplomacy and menacing threats, but at its basics, such a foreign policy seems reminiscent of the Russia Czars and some aspects of Soviet leadership, and it may continue beyond Putin's tenure.

Although Russia's foreign policy potentially could put it on a collision course with NATO, a new Cold War does not seem in the offing. One key reason is that although Russia will remain a nuclear power, it no longer has the conventional forces to carry out big offensive military campaigns. Yet Russia will possess other instruments of leverage—including economic power—to make life potentially difficult for vulnerable countries around its borders. If so, such pressure tactics would make it necessary for the United States and its allies to take steps needed to help protect NATO's new members as well as other nearby countries that are aspiring to embrace democracy and to join western institutions. In this setting, a slide into Cold Peace with Russia would be a worrisome risk. The challenge facing the United States, Europe, and NATO will be to carry out its obligations to friends and allies while employing a firm but forthcoming diplomacy toward Russia that avoids a Cold Peace.

Wise diplomacy can be used to help defuse the military tensions in NATO-Russian relations that have arisen lately. While the Russian

government is sensitive about potential threats around its borders, none of NATO's defense plans pose such threats. This certainly is the case for NATO's interest in installing BMD radar sites and a small force of ten missile interceptors in eastern Europe. This BMD capability is intended to defend against future threats from the south, and it will not nearly be large enough or oriented to pose a menace to Russia's big force of ICBMs and its overall nuclear deterrence posture. Nor do other NATO military activities—e.g., establishing limited training sites in eastern Europe and pursuing cooperative relations with PFP partners—create legitimate reasons for Russia to deploy IRBM missiles aimed at Europe, or to reconstitute a large army capable of major offensive campaigns. If Russia scuttles the CFE and INF treaties, the result will not only elevate tensions with NATO, but also damage Russia's own interests by polarizing NATO and Europe against Russia. With these realities in mind, perhaps diplomatic consultations can lessen Russian complaints and threats of reprisals. During the 1980's, NATO successfully pursued a "dual-track" diplomacy toward Russia that combined NATO INF missile deployments with arms control negotiations. Perhaps another dual-track diplomacy can be pursued today: not to trade away NATO's BMD deployments, but to establish and institutionalize a process of consultation and cooperation with Russia on such defense issues. If ways can be found to provide collaborative approaches to missile defense, to regulate security affairs in the Caucasus, and otherwise to promote arms control, the interests of both NATO and Russia can be advanced. The bottom line is that NATO and Russia both face too many dangers from the south to permit the luxury of geopolitical and military competition between them, and they also have plenty of reasons to collaborate together. The diplomatic challenge is to convince the Russian government to view its security priorities in these terms, and for NATO to be sensitive to legitimate Russian concerns.

Turmoil in the Middle East

While the potential troubles facing relations with Russia are worrisome, they pale by comparison with the troubles arising in the Middle East and the so-called "southern arc of instability." Thus far, most of this vast region is not benefiting from globalization, but instead remains mired in sluggish economic growth, ineffective governance, growing populations, and unstable societies. In this setting, militant Islamic fundamentalism has taken hold in ways that pose a growing menace not only to existing monarchies, but also to hopes for spreading democracy and market economies there. Islamic fundamentalism, in turn, has become a religious breeding

ground for terrorism. In past decades, terrorism was mostly viewed as confined to the Middle East and a response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But because globalization is empowering non-state actors to operate on the world stage, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups now have the capacity to inflict damage across great distances. Despite multilateral efforts to combat it, the threat of terrorism does not seem likely to recede anytime soon, and it may grow and become even more dangerous. The prospect of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is especially frightening and real enough to be taken seriously.⁹

Terrorism is far from the only danger arising from the Middle East and surrounding regions. One danger is another Israeli-Arab war, which would further poison relations across the Middle East. Another danger is that the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq could fail in ways that spill over into a regional war, thus giving rise to ascending violence and turmoil in that country and elsewhere. The same applies to Afghanistan. Defeat in both countries could seriously damage U.S. and European influence across the entire zone. Another danger is that various Arab monarchies—e.g., Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—might fall victim to domestic unrest and be replaced by fundamentalist Islamic regimes. Yet another danger is that of failed states at multiple places across the Middle East and adjoining regions (e.g., Pakistan), thus giving rise to rampant ethnic and religious violence. Another danger is interstate conflict and war in a geostrategic zone known for its mutual hatreds and lack of multilateral cooperation: e.g., an Indian-Pakistani war between two nuclear powers. Perhaps the gravest danger is accelerating WMD proliferation. Currently Iran seems dedicated to the goal of acquiring nuclear weapons and delivery systems that can reach distant areas. Possession of them could lead Iran to exert coercive political pressures on its neighbors while striving to become a Persian Gulf hegemon; nor can use of its nuclear weapons against Israel or turning them over to terrorists be ruled out. Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, in turn, could motivate other countries to seek them, thus creating a highly unstable zone of proliferation and hair-trigger nuclear force postures among countries animated by fear and suspicion toward each other.¹⁰

All of these dangers are real, and they are not mutually exclusive. The most fearsome scenario is that of a region composed of multiple fundamentalist Islamic regimes, failed states, many terrorist groups, rampant violence, and numerous nuclear powers. Even short of this disastrous scenario, there are multiple plausible outcomes that could prove deeply menacing in ways that are as bad, or worse, than today. Conversely, optimistic

scenarios of greater peace, democracy, and prosperity can be imagined, but while they may be plausible, the odds today seemingly do not favor them anytime soon. Nor will they transpire until strong strategic barriers are established to prevent dangerous trends from further engulfing the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions.

What are the implications for U.S.-European interests and policies? Although enhanced homeland defenses can help lessen vulnerabilities to terrorism and WMD attack, globalization makes it impossible for the United States and Europe to wall themselves off against dangers emanating from the Greater Middle East. Nor can the United States and Europe aspire quickly to transform this heterogeneous, chaotic region in the ways that enlargement worked in eastern Europe. The setbacks encountered in Iraq have shown that the conditions for stable democracy may not exist there, and perhaps in other countries as well. U.S. and European involvement in the Greater Middle East thus is necessary, but it must be guided by achievable goals, multilateral instruments that can attain their purposes, and traditional diplomacy that employs the art of the possible while not losing sight of ultimate visions.

How will NATO be affected? Afghanistan and training of Iraq's military aside, NATO currently is involved in the Greater Middle East only peripherally, mainly through limited but growing efforts to establish constructive relations with militaries there (e.g., the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative). While some observers judge that NATO should continue to maintain a low profile there, strategic trends seem pointed in the direction of expanding NATO involvements. Indeed, a growing number of NATO missions in peace, crisis, and war seem possible if the need arises and the United States and Europe can establish the necessary consensus. Such missions could be undertaken by the integrated command, or in support of either ad-hoc U.S.-European coalitions or the EU.

The need for military preparedness does not imply that resort to military force should be a regular feature in the Middle East and Persian Gulf: indeed, the experience in Iraq raises a cautionary flag in this regard. Depending upon the outcome in Iraq, the future U.S.-European peacetime military presence there may need to be small with low visibility, backed by an over-the-horizon capacity for swift interventions, which should be launched only when essential, and when the path to military and political success can be clearly established. Conversely, Iranian deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems could require military action against that country—a difficult act that could fail and/or divide NATO—or at least mandate the presence of sizable U.S. and European forces aimed at

creating a deterrence umbrella over friends and allies. While future contingencies cannot be predicted, NATO will need to be prepared for the full spectrum of missions, while working with other institutions to embed military power in a comprehensive political approach to the region.

The Need to Look Inward and Outward

In summary, while nobody can pretend to have a crystal ball that foretells the future, emerging trends in the political environment dictate that NATO will need to look both inward and outward in the years ahead. It will need to look inward in order to maintain its cohesion and public support while attending to homeland defense and the security requirements of a unifying Europe. But NATO's fate will be heavily determined by its capacity to look outward, and to prepare and act accordingly. Some observers proclaim that NATO should become a fully global alliance, with involvements as far away as Asia. Regardless of how this ambitious vision is appraised, it is hard to escape the conclusion that NATO will need to become a multi-region alliance whose strategic horizon extends well eastward and southward from Europe. It will need to deal effectively with a resurgent Russia and with other big powers, such as China and India, intent on influencing the future global security order. In addition, it will need to contribute importantly to U.S. and European efforts in the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions. These security challenges—which have been acknowledged by NATO's Riga Summit Declaration of November, 2006—will not be mastered easily, for they create complexities and demands that rival or exceed those of the Cold War. The agenda of creating appropriate theories and practices for handling these challenges and their associated missions is daunting, but not beyond NATO's capacity if it takes full advantage of its time-tested political and military assets.

NATO's Defense and Security Agenda

The past three NATO Summits at Prague, Istanbul, and Riga all issued fine-sounding communiqués calling for an alliance in motion with strategic affairs in mind. Yet, despite tangible improvements, many critics judge that NATO today is not moving fast and boldly enough. If so, what does NATO need to do in concrete terms in order to make the Berlin Summit of 2009 a success in recording past achievements and charting the alliance's course in the future? The Bucharest Summit of 2008, of course, is also a benchmark, but it will mainly be devoted to enlargement. NATO's leaders may meet again in a mini-summit in spring 2009 in order to mark NATO's sixtieth birthday. Strategic issues likely will be addressed the fol-

lowing November at the Berlin Summit, which will mark the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. NATO's agenda for the Berlin Summit can be portrayed as falling into four separate but interrelated areas:

- Accelerate pursuit of improvements in NATO's military forces and capabilities for new-era missions and homeland defense.
- Effectively carry out NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
- Pursue closer cooperation between the United States and Europe, and with other institutions, in order to build a better capacity for pursuing comprehensive approaches to new missions and strategic priorities.
- Forge consensus behind a new NATO strategic concept that provides an updated policy and strategy for guiding the alliance in its handling of new missions and challenges.

Improved Capabilities

When he was NATO Secretary General a few years ago, Lord Robertson often chanted the mantra "capabilities, capabilities, capabilities." This mantra reflected his focus on strengthening NATO's military forces with new capabilities for new missions. Owing heavily to his leadership, the Prague Summit of 2002 launched NATO's military forces on the course of transformation, crafted a Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) to help chart NATO's force goals, called for creation of the NRF in order to perform high-tech strike missions and to serve as a model for transformation, and created the new ACT command to help close the widening gap between U.S. and European forces for expeditionary missions. The Istanbul Summit of 2004 urged continuation of these important changes, and the Riga Summit of 2006 took the unusual step of using its communiqué, plus accompanying "Comprehensive Political Guidance" (CPG), to spell out in considerable detail how NATO forces and capabilities needed to improve.¹¹

The Riga Summit called for concrete steps in such disparate areas as flexible forces for the full spectrum of missions, better SOF forces, better stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) assets, higher readiness, improved information networking, better command structures, improved intelligence, better precision strike systems, improved WMD defense assets, better standardization and interoperability, better airlift for strategic mobility, and improved logistic support for sustainment of operations in distant areas. In calling for better forces for expeditionary missions,

NATO did not have purely small contingencies in mind. The CPG called for a capacity to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations, including at strategic distance. To this end, it called for 40% of NATO's ground forces to be structured, prepared, and equipped for deployable operations, and for 8% to be ready to undertake such actions at any single time. NATO did not publicly specify exactly what these percentages mean for force goals, but a reasonable estimate is that they translate into preparing 20-25 of NATO's divisions (or their equivalent in brigades) for deployability, and making 4-5 divisions ready for such missions at any time. The CPG also calls for commensurate contributions from air and naval forces. Forty percent of these assets would equate to about 1200 tactical combat aircraft and 250 naval warships.¹²

How do current European and NATO defense plans and programs stack up in relation to these ambitious standards for improved deployability, modernization, and transformation? Overall, NATO's progress has been faster than many critics realize, but slower than wanted by NATO's military authorities and the U.S. government. Moreover, the track record varies considerably among NATO's members. Britain and France have made substantial progress toward reforming their forces for expeditionary missions and acquiring transformational assets, and they plan further progress in the years ahead. In recent years, Germany and the Netherlands have also embarked upon this process of change, as have a few other countries. Elsewhere across Europe, progress has been slower and less visionary: a product of low defense budgets and scarce investment funds, a problem that plagues nearly every European country to one degree or another.

Even so, new combat aircraft and ships, modern munitions, UAV reconnaissance assets, information networks, and other technologies are being acquired slowly but steadily—with Europe's wealthiest countries leading the pace, and the less wealthy countries trailing behind. Hope for accelerating progress in the near term comes from the fact that big improvements in combat capability can come from low-cost, high leverage changes to training, doctrine, critical enabling assets, and force structures. Such improvements can be combined together to elevate European forces that, in many cases, already possess modern platforms and do not need expensive new weapons for some time. Barring a major increase in European defense spending, another five-ten years will be needed before longer-term modernization programs have their full impact. During this extended period, such new assets as the Joint Strike Fighter, the Eurofighter, the Network Enabled Capability, and the Ground Surveillance Monitor system—as well as other new weapon systems—will be arriving.

But in the intervening years, European military capabilities will be improving, as will the capacity to perform new missions and to operate with U.S. military forces.

If NATO has sound military goals in mind but is making slower progress than is desirable, what can be done in the next two years or so to improve things—apart from calling for higher European defense spending? For openers, NATO's political and military leaders can strive to prevent enthusiasm for defense transformation from waning in member countries. In the United States, fatigue with Iraq and abnormally high defense budgets has combined with disillusion over the DOD's focus on futurist technologies to begin giving transformation a bad name. But properly interpreted, transformation does not have to be fixated on one technological and operational agenda. Instead, it should be seen as a process aimed at preparing military forces for new missions. If the new missions now include counterinsurgency and S&R operations, then transformation should be broadened to focus on them. Regardless, the disillusion with transformation apply to the United States, not to Europe and NATO, where this term is focused not on high technology, but on the strategic basics of power projection and expeditionary operations. NATO and the Europeans need to remain focused on transformation as it applies to them.

High-level leadership in this arena can help preserve a supportive atmosphere in Europe and the United States regardless of the travails in Iraq. NATO can help by breathing more energetic life into the ACT, which thus far has been a disappointment because it is disconnected from both SHAPE headquarters (the ACO command) as well as from the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Currently a U.S. military officer heads both JFCOM and ACT. Perhaps this arrangement should be changed by eliminating such dual-hatting and by putting a European officer in charge of ACT. Regardless of command practices, ACT needs to become better connected to both ACO and JFCOM, and to be given a well-focused NATO and European transformation agenda to pursue.

Another near-term priority is to ensure that the NRF continues succeeding. The NRF achieved Full Operational Capability (FOC) in fall, 2006, but only because persistent shortages in European ground forces were offset by the last-minute assigning of a U.S. Marine Maritime Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to the force. Calls now are being heard to deal with continuing manpower shortages—the NRF totals about 25,000 military personnel from all components—by such steps as elongating its six-month period of rotational duty, reducing its size, dropping its forced entry mission, or establishing a tiered readiness system. Some of these ideas are

better than others: e.g., a longer period of rotational duty might provide a better-capable force while reducing cumulative manpower requirements continuously to populate one on-duty NRF while another is training to assume future duty within six months. Care must be taken, however, to prevent the NRF from losing its sharp military edge and its usability for swift strike missions. Common funding of the NRF is a priority to help ensure that its contributing members do not bear the full burden of its expenses. Also important, the NRF will not retain the enthusiasm of European militaries if it is perpetually kept at high readiness but never used, like a finely tuned sports car always sitting in the garage and never driven. The time has come to use the NRF. Giving it a tour of duty in Afghanistan could contribute to its prowess, help demonstrate its strategic utility, and enhance NATO's effectiveness there.

Faster progress on creating better NATO forces and capabilities for Special Operations Forces (SOF) and S&R missions also makes sense. The Riga Summit called for establishing a SOF Coordination Center, but its final location is not yet known. Establishing this SOF facility is a near-term priority; an equal priority is assembling the multinational forces of several hundred U.S. and European troops, and creating common doctrine and capabilities so that they can be used for future missions in the near term. The Riga Summit mentioned the need for better S&R capabilities, but took no steps to establish a command structure or coordination center, or to specify the size and characteristics of the forces that may be needed. Although some European militaries prefer to remain exclusively focused on combat missions, other militaries have expressed interest in the S&R mission, and have the manpower to contribute importantly. Because the S&R mission could be increasingly demanding, NATO needs to play a leadership role in identifying requirements, establishing force goals, and coordinating training and equipping of units.

NATO also can intensify its focus on preparing High Readiness Forces (HRF) for expeditionary missions. The CPG's call for configuring 4-5 HRF divisions for deployment within two or three months of mobilization, backed by a total pool of 20-25 divisions that are available for eventual deployment, responds to NATO's elevated sense of requirements in this arena. Whether the two figures of 8% and 40% of ground forces are optimal, however, is another matter. NATO's military commanders understandably want a capacity to carry out concurrent demanding operations. Four or five divisions might not be enough for this purpose: a total of 6-8 divisions would better meet their needs. Meanwhile a large pool of 20-25 mobilizable divisions runs the risk of diluting NATO's ability to properly

focus its energies for force improvement. A pool this sizable is mainly intended to provide a rotational base for long-term sustainment in distant areas, but a requirement for this many divisions seems improbable. For expeditionary missions, NATO might be better served by a bigger ready posture of 6-8 divisions and a smaller total pool of 12-15 divisions.

Regardless of the numbers chosen, NATO's near-term priority should be to focus intently on making at least four divisions, as well as commensurate air and naval forces, truly ready for swift deployment and a wide spectrum of expeditionary missions. Improvements in such key areas as information networks, strategic mobility, and multinational logistics are especially needed if NATO's ARRC, or one of its other five deployable multinational corps headquarters, is to deploy with a full complement of troops and engage in high-intensity combat in distant areas. Ideally, information networks should extend at least down to the brigade or battalion levels, and be sufficiently comprehensive to permit regular joint operations with air and naval forces. Strategic transport is a long-standing NATO deficiency that needs remedial solutions. A fifteen-nation consortium has been established to acquire a few big C-17 transports, NATO has created an airlift management organization, and it will await the eventual procurement of the A-400M transport. Even so, NATO's airlift capacity will not come close anytime soon to the capacity to lift a large force of fully four well-armed divisions that could weigh over 500,000 tons. Reliance upon improved multinational sealift is the only solution to this problem. NATO needs to enhance its capacity swiftly to mobilize commercial ships capable of carrying military cargoes: fortunately progress in this arena is being made. Likewise, integrated multinational logistics assets are necessary for expeditionary missions in order to trim support needs, accelerate deployment rates, and help produce greater combat effectiveness.

Finally, NATO can accelerate its preparations for new homeland defense missions, which are bringing Article 5 back to life as an important factor in the alliance's strategic calculus. Continued progress on analyzing how ballistic missile defenses against southern threats can best be established is a high priority, for such threats could materialize in the coming years. Missile defenses are needed for both NATO military forces and for continental Europe as well as for the United States. The challenge is to assemble a proper combination of command, control and communications facilities, radar sites, and layered missile deployments that will best provide protection at affordable cost. An equal challenge will be to forge consensus among European countries and to handle diplomatic relations with Russia. Defense against terrorism is mostly the responsibility of member

countries and their law enforcement agencies, but in addition to guarding sea approaches to ports, NATO can play a contributing role in civil emergencies and consequence management. In addition, NATO clearly will need to work closely with member governments, the EU, and other institutions to order to become better prepared to help ensure energy security and to defend against cyber attacks on information networks, which have the potential to damage not only NATO military forces but also European civilian infrastructures.¹³

Effective Operations

In today's setting, Lord Robertson's mantra of capabilities has been supplemented by another mantra, that of Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: "operations, operations, operations." This mantra reflects the dramatic growth of NATO's external operations in recent years, and their compelling importance for NATO's interests and effectiveness, as well as for global security and stability. In the coming two years and beyond, operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo will claim a great deal of NATO's attention, and rightfully so. Especially in Afghanistan, success is far from assured and failure is a worrisome possibility. Great skill on the part of NATO's political and military leaders will be needed, combined with effective operations by ISAF. Constancy by NATO's members, in the face of frustrating difficulties, will also be required.

The Riga Summit Declaration proclaimed Afghanistan to be NATO's top priority. In Afghanistan, NATO's mission, through UN-authorized ISAF, is to contribute to peace and stability there, and to support the Afghan government in its efforts to provide security, stabilization, and reconstruction. ISAF operates alongside U.S. forces for Operation *Enduring Freedom* (OEF), which pursues combat missions against the Taliban and al Qaeda. As NATO's defense ministers recently noted, ISAF grew during 2006-2007 from 10,000 personnel to 40,000, and the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) grew from 9 to 25, with additional PRTs under consideration.¹⁴ Surface appearances might suggest a combined military presence of 55,000 troops—counting ISAF and OEF—should be enough to pacify the country. But Afghanistan is a big country, with a population larger than Iraq's, where 160,000 U.S. and allied troops have not succeeded in their pacification missions. Similar to the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan's government and military forces are not yet highly effective. To date, 40,000 members of the Afghan National Army and more than 60,000 members of the Afghan National Police have been trained, but both institutions will not reach full size and effectiveness for several years.

The result has been to leave U.S. and NATO military forces stretched thin, in the face of grueling opposition by the Taliban aimed at wearing down the willingness of their governments to stay the course.

Table 12–1. ISAF Forces in Afghanistan, May 2007

Country	Troops (thousands)
United States	17.0
United Kingdom	6.7
Germany	3.0
Canada	2.5
Netherlands	2.2
Italy	2.0
Turkey	1.2
Poland	1.1
France	1.0
Others	5.0

Source: International Security Assistance Force data.

A further complication is that when NATO first assumed command of ISAF, several European contingents there (e.g., German forces) operated under national mandates and caveats limiting their deployment to relatively peaceful areas of Afghanistan and prohibiting their use in major combat operations. These restrictions have been loosened lately, and ISAF forces and PRTs have been allowed to spread out farther over the countryside, including into dangerous areas. The result has been greater participation by European forces in combat with the Taliban. This step, in turn, has resulted in an upswing of European casualties plus embarrassing involvements in firefights that have killed innocent Afghan citizens. The increase of fighting with the Taliban, moreover, has raised the prospect that military actions might spread into northwestern Pakistan in order to root out Taliban strongholds: a step that would have to be handled with great diplomatic care, and in any event, would amount to a worrisome escalation. Across NATO, governments have proclaimed their willingness to continue their military presence in Afghanistan. But in several countries—e.g., Germany, Italy, and Canada—public opinion has been swinging away from support for a continuing presence there, and parliamentary opposition is growing.

Improvements to U.S. and NATO force operations can enhance the effectiveness of combat, S&R, and training missions there, and as Afghan forces develop greater competence, they can gradually assume security

burdens and responsibilities. At issue, nonetheless, is whether European and American resolve will wither before the Afghan government can take over, thus compelling major troop withdrawals and exposing the country to gains, and perhaps reconquest, by the Taliban. A problem is that across Europe, intervention in Afghanistan is often equated with intervention in Iraq. Distaste for the latter gives rise to lukewarm support for the former. Yet, the two interventions are different, with differing motives and consequences. Afghanistan was invaded because it was a locus of international terrorism and the launch pad for 9/11; Iraq was invaded for geopolitical reasons aimed at removing the Saddam Hussein regime and its alleged WMD. The United States and NATO cannot afford to let remote Afghanistan again become a safe haven for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In addition to presiding over ISAF operations, a main challenge facing NATO's leaders will be to maintain the support of public opinion and parliaments across Europe until troop withdrawal becomes a viable, safe option. If anything, ISAF should have more troops at its disposal, and its presence should be extended another 3-5 years. Help from the UN, the World Bank, the EU, and other international institutions is also needed.

In Kosovo, UN-authorized KFOR's prospects are brighter than ISAF's, its missions are less demanding, and its operations are more mature. KFOR's mission is to provide a climate of security and stability, and to work with other institutions to help build a democratic government there. The Riga Summit proclaimed its support for the efforts of UN Special Envoy Marriti Ahtisaari to conclude the process successfully. Meanwhile, NATO has improved its military operations by reducing national caveats on force usage and by adopting a task-force approach. While progress is being made, a successful outcome in Kosovo is not yet assured, and the situation has the capacity to deteriorate rapidly into a powder keg. A key issue is whether and to what degree Kosovo will gain independence from Serbia. Successful negotiations that produce a mutually acceptable outcome could help stabilize Balkan security affairs for years, and set the stage for countries there to join NATO and the EU. A problem is that Russia is blocking UN Security Council willingness to support Kosovo independence. In this setting, concern is mounting that Kosovo might declare independence on its own, and thereby trigger renewed internal violence plus a military confrontation with Serbia. In the coming period, NATO activities in Kosovo will be mainly focused on diplomacy, and the EU may acquire a growing leadership role, but KFOR's continuing military presence there will be needed to prevent resort to violence on all sides.

Enhanced Cooperation and a Comprehensive Approach

In today's setting, a new mantra might properly be added to NATO's strategic agenda: "cooperation, cooperation, cooperation." One reason is that achieving enhanced multilateral cooperation within NATO will be key to determining its capacity to succeed in its complex new missions. In addition, enhanced cooperation within NATO and with other institutions, including the EU, will be critical to carrying out the Riga Summit's call for a comprehensive approach for addressing security and development challenges. The idea behind a comprehensive approach is not only to enhance NATO's effectiveness for complex missions, but also to harness multiple instruments—e.g., political, diplomatic, economic, and military—that must be employed effectively in order to achieve common strategic goals. A comprehensive approach is needed in order to provide better, more effective options than reliance upon improvised, ad-hoc approaches to each operation—approaches that often fail to work when they are cobbled together at the last moment. At Riga, NATO's leaders called for prompt creation of practical proposals that could help advance this agenda. Afterward, progress at NATO headquarters was stalled by intra-alliance political difficulties. At their meeting in spring, 2007, NATO's defense ministers reported that studies aimed at identifying such proposals were underway, and the results would become available in following months.

What can be done in practical terms to enhance cooperation within NATO? Close cooperation between the United States and European members is a must. The United States can contribute to this agenda by reaffirming its military commitment to the alliance. As part of its global military re-posturing, the U.S. military presence in Europe is being reduced from 150,000 personnel to about 65,000. The U.S. Army presence is being cut from four heavy brigades in Germany and an airmobile brigade in Italy, to only a single Stryker brigade in Germany plus the airmobile unit in Italy. Whether a single Army Stryker brigade will be enough to fulfill core interoperability and training missions is debated in some quarters, and is being questioned by SACEUR, General Bantz Craddock. Perhaps two or three Army brigades should remain in Central Europe. Regardless of future troop levels, the United States needs to correct the misimpression that it views Europe as a launch pad for operations elsewhere and is downplaying its commitment to NATO multilateralism. It can take positive steps in this arena by regularly committing units to the NRF and by assuming command of one of NATO's six deployable corps.

Steps also can be taken to enhance the cooperation of European members with each other, with NATO, and with the United States. President Sarkozy's stance creates an opportunity to further strengthen France's already important role in NATO and to enhance U.S.-European cooperation as well as NATO's cohesion and effectiveness. Today France's military forces are among NATO's best for power projection, and they are participating in the NRF, the Eurocorps, ISAF, and other alliance military activities. If common agreement can be found, a more pre-eminent role for France in NATO's command structure makes sense. For example, perhaps France could be given leadership of the NATO command in Lisbon and/or leadership positions in ACT and ACO.

The goal of strengthening France's role in NATO should not be seen in isolation. Britain will need to continue playing its traditional leadership role in close partnership with the United States, and Germany will need to continue emerging from its earlier reluctance to play a strong role in carrying out new NATO missions. Similar contributing roles are required by other long-standing alliance members: a good example is Denmark's leadership in helping NATO forge a comprehensive approach. Cooperative outreach to NATO's new members and PFP partners also makes sense. Already Poland has been contributing importantly to ISAF and coalition operations in Iraq, and some other new members have been similarly active. A good idea is to encourage new members to focus on specialized roles and missions in areas where they possess usable assets and competencies. The same applies to PFP partners, which include such wealthy, advanced countries as Sweden and Finland. NATO's decision to open the NRF to participation by competent partners is a step in the right direction, and additional steps may be possible. Enhanced PFP cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia also is important in order to help bring greater stability and security to them and their regions.

A closer, more collaborative relationship between NATO and the EU is also paramount so that both institutions can better perform their important strategic roles. The Riga Summit Declaration pointed out that a cooperative dialogue is already taking place between NATO and the EU at high levels and in such places as the Balkans and Africa. Nonetheless, critics argue that the ideological distance between the two institutions remains wide and that their professional bureaucracies often still view each other in competitive terms. Enduring competition between them can only be self-defeating for both bodies, and it is unnecessary, for they play complementary roles that must be harmonized. NATO remains Europe's premier defense alliance and repository of multilateral military capabilities

and close ties to the U.S. military. The EU provides an institution to harness Europe's considerable political, diplomatic, and economic powers not only for unifying the continent but also for pursuing stable security affairs elsewhere. These two potent but interdependent institutions need to work closely together, not view each other as rivals or fail to cooperate closely.

In recent years, the EU has been pursuing a common security and defense policy (ESDP) and it has been striving to enhance its military prowess by establishing a rapid reaction force as well as fifteen battalion-sized battle groups that can be deployed outside Europe. The Berlin Plus accord provides a vehicle for the EU to draw upon NATO military assets for support when both bodies so agree. The time when the EU's military strength will be sufficient to greatly lessen Europe's dependence upon NATO, however, lies in the distant future. In the years ahead, NATO needs to support sensible EU military programs while discouraging any unnecessary duplication that would waste scarce defense resources. To the extent that the political traffic will permit, EU military forces and capabilities should draw closer to NATO in an effort to create complementary roles and missions that serve both bodies. For example, perhaps some EU battle groups can be assigned to the NRE, and some of the EU's constabulary forces can be made available for NATO S&R missions.

Another practical idea of strategic import is to pursue enhanced military cooperation with friends and allies in distant regions. While few observers support NATO enlargement as far away as Asia, cooperative activities with such countries as Australia, Japan, South Korea, India, and others could enhance the scope of potential multilateral actions with them when the need arises—as already is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO-sponsored activities, for example, could take the form of common training, exercises, and joint planning. In addition to strengthening NATO's capacity, such activities could help encourage greater military and defense cooperation in unstable regions where multilateralism is badly needed. This is the case in Asia, but it also holds true for such regions as the Caucasus, South Central Asia, the Greater Middle East, and Africa. The Riga Summit Declaration endorsed closer working relationships with Middle Eastern militaries, but otherwise it did not mention this idea of global partnerships for NATO partly because some members balked at the notion of the alliance pursuing such horizons. But in the coming years, this idea seems both necessary and potentially fruitful, and it could become an important contributor to NATO's comprehensive approach and its need to perform multiple demanding security missions.

As the Riga Summit Declaration noted, a comprehensive approach also requires NATO to work collaboratively with multiple international institutions, which include the UN, the World Bank and IMF, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) as well as local actors in distant regions. This directive does not imply that NATO should start performing civilian functions, but it does mean that in many cases, military and civilian functions must be blended together so that both perform effectively on behalf of common strategic goals. Such collaboration is especially needed in regions that require both security and development, and where one cannot be pursued without making progress in the other. The need to work with diverse actors, in turn, means that NATO must develop the institutional capacities to perform this task. Progress has already been made in the Balkans and Afghanistan, but more will be needed in the coming years.

Achieving closer cooperation between NATO and multiple other institutions is vital, but it will not be easily achieved, and it will require hard work, patience, and persistence. Regardless of institutional arrangements, a comprehensive approach aimed at fusing military and civilian instruments can work only if it is guided by sound policies that are implemented effectively. As Iraq shows, success does not always follow promptly in the wake of significant application of military and economic resources. The key to success is to become skilled at "effects-based approaches" to planning and operations. This technique requires careful appraisals of the relationships between ends and means, and between complex actions and complicated consequences. The idea is to blend diverse instruments to ensure that they achieve not only their immediate military goals, but also their enduring political, economic, and strategic goals. It requires not only adequate resources and instruments, but also intellectual acuity in applying them so that they work effectively in achieving their desired results. This form of strategic effects-based approaches has been taking hold within the U.S. military and interagency community, and at NATO headquarters as well. It needs to continue being adopted and nourished.

A New Strategic Concept

The idea of writing a new NATO strategic concept is never popular at NATO headquarters and among member governments because it entails intense multilateral negotiations and can trigger divisive debates over strategic fundamentals. Yet history shows that NATO needs a relevant strategic concept to help unite its members in common causes and to provide a future sense of direction and purpose. The strategic concepts of 1967,

1990, and 1999 were all hard to negotiate, but once they were adopted, they played important roles in preserving NATO's cohesion and advancing its strategic effectiveness. The current strategic concept was written for the Washington Summit of 1999, and it has become outdated because of the major changes since then. As a result, NATO is left relying upon summits and ministerial sessions to issue communiqués that craft new strategic directions. The CPG was originally intended to help craft new political guidance, but when it emerged, it mainly focused on technical details of NATO military plans and programs, and it did not address in any detail new strategic priorities and relationships. Instead, it merely reaffirmed the 1999 strategic concept's directive that NATO should remain a collective defense alliance under Article 5, and should also be prepared to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

A new strategic concept is needed, and it should be ready for adoption at the Berlin Summit of 2009. The new document should reaffirm the centrality of close transatlantic relations between the United States and Europe, and provide a new sense of roles, missions, defense requirements and force goals, burden-sharing, authorities and responsibilities, and alliance decision making procedures. A key goal should be a new transatlantic bargain that serves the United States and Europe, and that cements their enduring strategic partnership on terms that can be strongly supported on both sides of the alliance. The new strategic concept should identify the continuing importance of old collective defense missions, but it also should cover such new missions as missile defense, defense against terrorism, cyber defense, and energy security. Equally important, it should articulate the growing importance of new NATO missions inside and outside Europe, and it should provide a common policy and strategy for dealing with Russia, the Balkans, the Greater Middle East and other endangered regions. It should also provide clear guidance on working with the EU and other international institutions as part of a comprehensive approach. NATO's recent successes at promoting internal dialogue, adopting new policies, and pursuing new practices may make writing a new strategic concept easier than is realized in some quarters. If necessary, perhaps NATO can begin soon by forming a team of outside experts from the United States and Europe that can prepare an unofficial report, which in turn, can serve as a basis for drafting the new strategic concept.

Conclusion

NATO thus faces a future that is full of challenges and troubles, but that also provides opportunities if the alliance is up to the task. A stron-

ger transatlantic alliance that performs well in theory and practice, and that can perform new missions adeptly, is needed for Europe, adjoining regions, and globally. The United States must contribute to this endeavor, and so must European members. Although the United States and Europe total only about 15% of the world's population, they possess nearly 50% of its economic wealth, and they can muster substantial political and military power. Yet they must stand together, for if they fall apart, they will both surely fail. NATO is their main instrument for standing together in the critical realm of security and defense affairs, and it can be an alliance that reaches out to cooperate with other institutions and actors in the pursuit of comprehensive policies that require multiple instruments. But NATO cannot be an alliance in stasis. It must remain an alliance constantly in motion, with new strategic priorities and capacities in mind. Fulfilling this mandate frames the strategic agenda ahead—for the Berlin Summit and long afterward.

Notes

¹ Source: Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, "NATO: Surviving 9/11," in *A Recast Partnership? Institutional Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations*, ed. Simon Serfaty (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008).

² For details on U.S. and NATO defense modernization programs during the Cold War, see Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993).

³ For analysis of the politics and policies of NATO enlargement, see Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).

⁴ For a portrayal of NATO's actions during the Kosovo War, see Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

⁵ Energy security issues especially arise because Europe relies heavily upon the Persian Gulf for oil, and upon Russia for oil and gas. Cyber threats are worrisome because so-called Botnets can be used for denial-of-service attacks aimed at flooding, and therefore temporarily crippling, multiple information networks, civil and military.

⁶ Whereas U.S. peacetime defense spending (wartime missions aside) consumes about 4% of GDP, European defense spending totals only about 2% of GDP. The difference is especially manifested in bigger U.S. investment budgets for RDT&E and procurement, which determine the rate of force modernization.

⁷ See: "World View of U.S. Role Goes From Bad to Worse," BBC World Service Poll (Jan. 23, 2007); "Except for Spain, Majorities or Pluralities in Five European Countries Believe Life Has Become Worse Since Joining the EU," *Financial Times*/Harris Interactive Poll (March 19, 2007); "Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2006," The German Marshall Fund and the Compagnia di San Paolo (June 2006).

⁸ See Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004).

⁹ For analysis of contemporary writings about global security trends, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, *Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2006).

¹⁰ For an historical analysis of western policies toward Iran, see Kenneth Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004).

¹¹ See *Riga Summit Declaration and Comprehensive Political Guidance* (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, November, 2006).

¹² European members of NATO field a total of about 70 division-equivalents, 3100 tactical combat aircraft, and 600 naval ships. Of these ground forces, not all are committed to NATO and some are maintained at a low level of readiness that makes them unavailable for potential deployment missions. For some years, NATO's premier force for such missions has been the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which is capable of commanding 4-5 divisions. A pool of 20-25 potentially deployable divisions is large enough to provide all members an opportunity to contribute meaningfully, with national forces ranging from two divisions to single brigades. For details on NATO/European forces, see IISS, *The Military Balance, 2006–2007* (London: IISS, 2006).

¹³ For analysis, see CTNSP/INSS *Special Report: Transatlantic Homeland Defenses* (Wash. DC: National Defense University Press, May, 2006).

¹⁴ See *Final Communiqué: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Defense Ministers Session* (Brussels, NATO Headquarters, 14 June 2007).

Should NATO Write a New Strategic Concept? (2008)

Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk

Writing a new NATO strategic concept is a longstanding approach to updating the security policies of the Atlantic Alliance in ways that help set the stage for concrete actions and improvements. The decision on whether to do so again is an important one. NATO's strategic concept serves as a capstone document for identifying key threats and dangers ahead as well as the Alliance's core requirements, goals, principles, and tasks. It plays an instrumental role in shaping not only the Alliance's overall security policy, but also its defense planning priorities. NATO cannot function effectively without a sound strategic concept.

Critics of the idea of writing a new concept argue that the effort will be too divisive and that the Alliance should instead focus on improving its daily practices rather than debating its strategic theories. Our argument is that marginal changes are inadequate; a new strategic concept is needed to address a new strategic situation, one that has changed radically since the 1999 Washington summit and will continue to change for years to come. Moreover, NATO's history of adopting new strategic concepts is encouraging and should give us the confidence to continue adapting the Alliance to changing circumstances.

Since its inception in 1949, NATO has negotiated and written six strategic concepts, four of them under great stress during the Cold War, and two since the end of the Cold War. In each case, NATO encountered tough debates among its members but was able to use its analytical talents, institutional mechanisms, and consensus-building procedures to forge widespread agreement for new strategic concepts that provided sound visions for the years ahead. Once these new strategic concepts were adopted, they played critical roles in enhancing NATO's performance in security policy and defense planning. To no small degree, NATO owes its success

to its ability to formulate strategic concepts adapted to changing security conditions.

Those positive experiences can be repeated, if NATO decides to write a new strategic concept aimed at putting forth a coherent vision of how the Alliance should act in the coming years in such critical areas as establishing core goals and requirements, reaffirming the transatlantic link, unifying Europe and enlarging NATO, countering new threats, creating new cooperative relationships and comprehensive approaches, dealing with the Middle East, guiding NATO's growing operations in distant areas, and transforming NATO's military forces. NATO's upcoming summit of 2009 provides an opportunity to initiate the review process for preparing a new strategic concept, which could be adopted at a special summit shortly afterward, or at the next regularly scheduled summit in 2011. Regardless of the timing of its adoption, a new NATO strategic concept is needed soon, both to equip NATO with the strategic theories that will be needed in the challenging times ahead, and to help guide its growing missions and activities in multiple new areas.

Pros and Cons of Writing a New Strategic Concept

Writing and adopting a new strategic concept would be a laborious endeavor requiring the building of consensus among NATO's many members, including new members. There are arguments for and against this step, all of which merit consideration. Proponents of this idea marshal several arguments for it:

1. The existing strategic concept has been overtaken by events to the point where it allegedly can no longer guide the Alliance's policies and activities in future years.
2. Today, NATO suffers from inadequate strategic vision and is pursuing multiple activities that badly stretch the boundaries of the existing strategic concept, and additional new activities lie ahead, all of which must be blended to form a coherent whole.
3. Currently, NATO suffers from a serious lack of support in public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, a gap that reflects lack of widespread support for common security policies. A new strategic concept could help shore up support for the Alliance.
4. Achieving Alliance-wide cooperation on NATO's future security policies and defense plans will require agreement on a new, updated strategic concept that reflects the tumultuous changes of recent years, as well as developments that lie ahead.

5. An effort to write a new and better strategic concept can be carried out successfully, and the final product can be expected to fulfill its purpose of providing NATO the strategic guidance that is needed in an international era of change, complexity, and danger.
6. A new strategic concept presumably will help enhance NATO's performance, especially in carrying out new tasks and missions, by enabling the Alliance to create new capabilities and resolve.
7. Although deep political divisions emerged over the invasion of Iraq in 2003—pitting the United States and Britain against France and Germany—these disputes reportedly have healed among participating governments to the point where cooperation among these and other countries in writing a new strategic concept is becoming possible.

Critics of the idea marshal several arguments against it:

1. NATO is still too divided internally and uncertain of its strategic priorities to take this step.
2. The act of trying to write a new strategic concept will generate so much political controversy and infighting that it cannot successfully produce a worthy product.
3. The effort will cause so much political fragmentation among members that it will do more harm than good to NATO's cohesion and its ability to act with unity and coherence.
4. A new strategic concept is not needed because the existing concept still suffices, when augmented by recent summit communiqués and related documents, as a guide to NATO's priorities and plans.
5. In recent years NATO has demonstrated a capacity to pursue new capabilities and operations without the benefit of an updated strategic concept.
6. Even if a strategic concept is adopted, it will not produce significant improvements through normal mechanisms, such as summit declarations and NATO's internal planning processes.
7. NATO can strengthen its performance by focusing on practical steps, rather than debating about its strategic theory in ways that potentially could stretch NATO's internal consensus beyond its limits.
8. This is not a good time to write a new strategic concept, because the Bush Administration is nearing the end of its tenure, and a new administration will not have defined its own strategic priorities for a year or more.

The central issue is not the need for a new strategic concept, but whether NATO currently is up to the task of producing it. The arguments against taking this step have practical impediments on their side and raise valid points about the tradeoffs that must be addressed and the troubles and pitfalls that can be encountered when a new strategic concept is written. As critics suggest, success is not a foregone conclusion, tough negotiations and compromising could be required, and if the process is mishandled, the result could be frustrating and even do more harm than good.

Throughout its long history, NATO has written new strategic concepts six times, as new security and defense conditions mandated change. On each occasion, NATO encountered strong objections to change. Each effort produced political controversies about the issues and options at stake. Each time, NATO was able to employ its analytical talents, institutional mechanisms, and consensus-building procedures to produce widespread agreement on a fresh strategic concept that met the requirements of the times and produced favorable consequences that were instrumental to NATO's evolution as an effective alliance during the Cold War and afterward. This history shows that, while writing new strategic concepts often has been difficult and contentious, it normally turned out to be a salutary exercise of renewal and innovation in which the benefits achieved surpassed the costs borne along the way. This history does not guarantee that NATO will succeed again, but it does suggest that NATO should not be frightened by the prospect, or doubt its capacity to produce a worthy product if its members work constructively together.

NATO's Historical Experiences with New Strategic Concepts

NATO's experiences with writing new strategic concepts provide a rich legacy from which insights can be drawn about the analytical, institutional, and political dynamics of the process. The first four strategic concepts were written during the Cold War (1949–1991), and the final two afterward.

- DC 6/1 Initial Strategy of Deterrence and Defense Specialization (1949–1951) called on NATO members to cooperate to develop adequate forces for defending Europe and to create coordinated plans for employing these forces in the event deterrence failed but did not produce an integrated plan for achieving these goals. Instead, it crafted a loose collection of principles for coordinating efforts by member nations. In essence, it called for an alliance

based on national specialization and a division of labor rather than a uniform distribution of military missions.

- MC 14/1 NATO Defense Buildup and Collective Defense (1951–1957) abandoned the old precept of defense specialization in favor of collective defense, integrated military formations under NATO commanders, and a theater-wide perspective. It relied on American strategic nuclear bombardment and Alliance-wide mobilization to achieve ultimate victory in a war, but it also included plans for strengthening NATO's in-being continental forces.
- MC 14/2 Strategy of Massive Retaliation (1957–1967) responded to Soviet assertiveness and military buildup, particularly in nuclear weapons, by anchoring NATO defense plans on a large-scale theater nuclear operation backed by a massive nuclear blow against the Soviet Union in event of war with the aim of deterring any form of aggression.
- MC 14/3 Strategy of Flexible Response (1967–1991) was prepared out of concern that over-reliance on deterrence by strategic nuclear forces might invite Soviet conventional attack on much weaker NATO conventional forces; it embraced strengthened forward defenses and an escalatory ladder to massive retaliation.
- The strategic concept of Rome Summit (1991–1999) focused on the post-Cold War risks facing the alliance, the importance of “soft power” to deal with those risks, and the continuing importance of the alliance.
- The strategic concept of Washington Summit (1999–present) made clear that NATO defense planning had shifted away from traditional preoccupation with border defense missions and toward multiple new missions, many conducted under Article 4.

The current strategic concept is addressed below. The first five strategic concepts are discussed in detail in the appendix. For each strategic concept, the narrative briefly describes the security conditions that gave rise to it, the principal participants and associated Alliance politics that helped shape it, its main contents, and the strategic consequences that flowed from it.

What enduring lessons can be derived from NATO's historical experiences with its strategic concepts? The first is that NATO strategic concepts face both outward and inward. They face outward by defining new threats, dangers, challenges, and opportunities, and by providing guidance on how NATO should act. They face inward by mobilizing widespread,

Alliance-wide consensus among NATO's members regarding mutual obligations, multinational priorities, national roles and missions, and fair burden-sharing.

In addition to re-establishing the transatlantic link on new terms, a NATO strategic concept helps forge an all-important coherent relationship between NATO's overall security policy, defense strategy, and military forces. It provides the rationale for new departures and methods for incorporating them. By establishing key principles, tasks, requirements, and responsibilities, it also helps determine how NATO members are to act together so that Alliance borders are protected and common goals, interests, and values are advanced. A strategic concept helps build the core theories from which multifaceted Alliance practices can be determined and coordinated.

A second lesson is that NATO has had favorable experiences with its previous strategic concepts. These concepts had varying life spans and impacts, all of them were transient, and none of them were perfect, but each contributed materially to NATO's effectiveness and its ability to achieve core security goals. Successive strategic concepts built on each other in ways that enabled NATO gradually to acquire growing focus, strength, and resolve, while shifting gears and directions as the emerging situations warranted. NATO began slowly early in the Cold War, but steadily gained momentum to eventually become the world's most effective alliance. In no small measure, this positive outcome owes to the legacy of NATO's strategic concepts.

A third lesson is that no strategic concept is timeless. Each is written in response to existing and forecasted conditions in security and defense affairs, all serve for a period of time, and all become outmoded when conditions change. Normally NATO waited until the existing strategic concept was reaching the end of its natural life span in the eyes of most NATO members, and after concrete activities suggesting the basic contents of a new strategic concept were already being pursued. This was the case for MC 14/3; NATO already had been pursuing practical steps to bolster its conventional forces and broaden its options for a few years before MC 14/3 was written. A new strategic concept was written when improved strategic guidance was needed to carry out major decisions that had to be made in the near future—and when NATO members were willing to support it.

A fourth lesson is that although the intra-Alliance politics of writing new strategic concepts can be difficult, they are not only manageable, but also potentially healthy. Each time that NATO set out to write new strategic concepts, it faced a plethora of disagreements and conflicts among its

members, coupled with understandable worries that the act of debating alternative strategic theories would rupture the Alliance's allegedly fragile cohesion. Yet, NATO chose to act anyway, and although plenty of debates regularly erupted, such fracturing never occurred. Indeed, NATO always emerged with a fresh consensus and a stronger sense of solidarity than before. The act of writing new strategic concepts set aside old, outmoded theories that themselves would likely have eroded NATO's cohesion had they been allowed to remain in force. In their place came an effort to erect new strategic theories that met the demands of changing times. The subsequent debates often were stressful, but they became engines of renewal and innovation that allowed a new consensus to form around new policies, strategies, and plans. Had NATO not chosen to embark on these debates, it would have been mired in stasis, and it never would have created the succession of strategic theories that allowed it to grow and flourish.

A fifth lesson is that although past strategic concepts have helped create policies and strategies that enabled NATO to address threats to Alliance security, they also have been especially influential in helping the Alliance address its defense preparedness requirements and agenda. In this capacity, strategic concepts have provided the guidance needed by NATO military authorities to help shape Alliance-wide force improvement efforts. In essence, they provided a framework for shaping subsidiary Military Committee planning documents (e.g., MC 48, 299, 317, and 400), and the NATO force planning process, including ministerial guidance to members, country plans of members, and NATO reviews of country plans. The effect was to help blend the separate military forces of members into an integrated multinational posture that could better meet NATO military requirements as they evolved during the Cold War and beyond. Without such guidance from strategic concepts, NATO doubtless would have been less militarily prepared throughout its long history, and thus less secure against threats and dangers as they evolved.

A sixth lesson is that NATO has had successful experiences with pursuing dual-path agendas to reaching agreement on how to handle difficult strategic challenges. This was clearly the case when, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, NATO chose to pursue both defense improvements and détente. Whereas MC14/3 guided NATO's new military strategy and improvements, the Harmel Report¹ and succeeding policies helped determine how détente and arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union were to be pursued in tandem. Another example is the experience of the 1980s, when NATO pursued the two paths of deploying Pershing II and GLCM missiles while also entering into LRINF negotiations with the So-

viet Union in an effort to achieve complete removal of such missiles from the inventories of both sides. In both cases, NATO would not have been able to attain its goals by pursuing only one path or the other, but did succeed by pursuing both paths concurrently.

A seventh, final lesson is that when controversies arise, the process of writing new strategic concepts must be handled wisely and effectively—as regularly was done in the past. NATO's history shows that this process has three dimensions: institutional, analytical, and political. In today's world, strategic concepts are political-military documents. Main institutional responsibility for writing and coordinating them lies with the NATO Secretary General and his subordinate staffs in Brussels, including the Military Committee, but historical experience shows the wisdom of drawing on national capitals for their ideas and inputs. Traditionally the United States has been a source of leadership in this arena, but such other members as Britain, Germany, and France have regularly contributed as well. On at least two occasions, NATO has created outside committees of "wise men" to help write new strategic concepts and associated studies, and if contemporary circumstances warrant this step, it could be employed again.

Regardless of who performs the writing and coordinating, historical experience also shows the importance of ensuring that the new strategic concept rests on sound analytical foundations regarding how dangers and challenges are assessed, multiple goals are balanced and prioritized, and supporting policies, strategies, and plans are evaluated. NATO's long-standing insistence on sound analysis is a key reason why strategic concepts have been effective documents that helped end debates about their contents. Likewise the political process—the act of forging unanimous consensus and NAC approval—is highly important, for unless the new strategic concept commands widespread support among NATO's members, it will not be adopted by the NAC, and if it is adopted, it will not be implemented enthusiastically. Throughout its history, NATO has shown skill at handling this political process in ways that produced both high substantive content and internal consensus. The political dynamic of forging consensus often requires intense negotiating, bargaining, and compromising; a central task is to ensure that these mechanisms enhance the quality of the new strategic concept, not detract from it. These three interlocking dimensions make the process of adopting a new NATO strategic concept challenging, but as history shows, NATO has mastered them before, and today it still possesses the tools to master them again.

Post-Cold War Strategic Concepts

The Rome Strategic Concept was the last Strategic Concept to refer to the Soviet Union. It was announced on November 8, 1991, almost exactly two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and exactly one month before five Soviet republics signed an agreement² that effectively ended the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Over the next three weeks, a series of formal steps progressively eliminated components of the Soviet apparatus. By the end of the year, the republics had taken over all functions of government, and Soviet rule was officially extinct; thus ended the threat that had brought NATO into being.

The changed security environment wrought by the rise of Yeltsin and the decline of Gorbachev and the Soviet Communist Party—and by the reunification of Germany—was reflected in the language of the 1991 Strategic Concept. Even though the Soviet Union still existed, the term *threat* was applied historically. Looking ahead, NATO saw *risks*, but no state with the Soviet Union's ability or intent to pose a threat to Europe. Those risks were "adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe." NATO might also face problems beyond Europe's borders. "The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown," and "the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies" in that area was a matter of concern. The Alliance also needed to "take account of the global context" because "security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage." The possibility that terrorists might acquire WMD was not addressed.

The thrust of the Rome strategic concept was that the importance of "soft power" had increased and the role of military power had changed.³ Allied forces were to be "adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war. Thus, "[t]he overall size of the Allies' forces, and in many cases their readiness, will be reduced." With the decline in importance of armed forces—and the reduced importance of American strategic forces—Europe would assume a larger share of a lighter burden. To offset reduced expenditure, "collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments

to NATO,” and interoperability of forces assumed a new importance. It had become possible to “draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension.”

In 1991, NATO faced “a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance,” with optimism. The possibility that failed states and non-state actors could challenge the international system was not contemplated at the Rome Summit.

In 1999, the NATO strategic concept approved by the 1991 Rome Summit was replaced by a new strategic concept that was adopted at the Washington Summit. The decision to write a new strategic concept, undertaken after some debate, reflected a broad agreement that so much had changed since 1991 that NATO needed to recast its strategic principles. The process of drafting and coordinating was primarily carried out by NATO Headquarters, led by the International Staff, the International Military Staff, and the Military Committee, with strong input from NATO military commanders. Member countries played active roles, marked by vigorous participation by the United States, France, and others. Intense debates swirled over such issues as the balance between Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions,⁴ the goals of NATO enlargement, whether NATO was willing to perform security missions outside Europe, the European security identity, and the principles of legitimacy and UN mandates for NATO operations beyond its borders. These debates raged until the eve of the Washington Summit, but ultimately NAC agreed on a new strategic concept that ran fully twenty pages, ten devoted to security policy and ten to NATO defense strategy and military forces.⁵

The Washington concept stated that NATO’s core strategic purposes are to safeguard the freedom and security of its members by political and military means, help promote a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe anchored in a stable security architecture, preserve the transatlantic link that binds the United States to Europe, and maintain Alliance cohesion and unity so that all members are protected equally.

To serve these purposes, the concept called for NATO to perform five fundamental security tasks: security, consultation, deterrence, defense, crisis management, and partnership. Surveying the Euro-Atlantic area, the Washington concept declared that developments in recent years have been generally positive, and that NATO has made progress in working with other institutions, such as the EU/WEU, OSCE, and the UN, in helping promote peace and security while bringing greater stability to the Balkans. The concept also portrayed a future of risks and dangers, includ-

ing regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, abuses of human rights, failed states, WMD proliferation, terrorism, and threats to energy security. It further noted that while NATO borders might be directly menaced by some of these dangers, external threats could affect Alliance security interests. Accordingly, the Washington concept put forth a broad approach to security in the 21st century that combined defense preparedness with appropriate attention to political, economic, social, and environmental factors. NATO, it said, must carry out a demanding set of activities: maintain its military prowess, be prepared for conflict prevention and crisis management in and around Europe that might be carried out under Article 4, pursue partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean region, begin the process of enlargement by admitting new members, and pursue arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.

In the defense arena, the Washington concept declared that, while NATO must retain strong forces for Article 5 missions in defense of Alliance borders in the remote event of a major attack on them, it must also be prepared to carry out non-Article 5 missions, including partnership-building, engagement, peacekeeping, and crisis response operations that might be as big as Article 5 missions. It further said that NATO forces should be prepared to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations by the EU/WEU. Accordingly the Washington concept called for a properly prepared conventional force posture that would be maintained at tiered readiness levels, with limited forces that could react quickly backed by larger forces that could be mobilized over a longer period of time. These conventional forces, it said, must be equipped with necessary capabilities in such areas as command and control structures, advanced weapons, training and exercises, combat formations, deployability, logistic support, and sustainment. In establishing these guidelines, the Washington concept made clear that NATO defense planning had shifted away from traditional preoccupation with border defense missions and toward multiple new missions, many conducted under Article 4. But, apart from noting NATO's military presence in the Balkans—the Kosovo war was being waged when the Washington summit took place—the new strategic concept was vague on the geographic regions in which NATO's future operations might take place and the force preparedness standards that should guide NATO military planning. Important details in the defense arena were left to a temporary High Level Steering Group (HLSG) charged with overseeing implementation of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) issued by the Washington summit.⁶

Utility of the Washington Strategic Concept

How has the Washington concept fared thus far? While it identified terrorism as a future threat, it did not contemplate terrorist attacks of the kind inflicted on the United States on September 11, 2001, or the dramatic events that followed from those attacks. In important ways, these events brought an end to the previous era and ushered in a new international security system. During the 1990s, NATO was mainly preoccupied with Alliance enlargement and related security affairs in the Euro-Atlantic area. The post-9/11 security environment expanded NATO concerns to global threats in the form of terrorists with intercontinental reach, potentially aggressive rogue states, and accelerating WMD proliferation. The Washington concept also elevated the importance of the Greater Middle East in global affairs and in NATO's own priorities for homeland security and power projection.

The Washington concept has played a positive role in several arenas since its adoption. Under its auspices, NATO finally won the Kosovo war of 1999. After Serbian troops left the province, NATO established the KFOR peacekeeping force there to help keep the peace, and KFOR troops remain there today. Overall, the Washington concept gets a fair share of credit for NATO's enduring efforts to maintain peace in Bosnia and Kosovo and play a constructive role in the Balkans. Although the Washington concept did not provide detailed guidance on further NATO enlargement (beyond the original three countries admitted), it provided authoritative support for NATO's subsequent decision to admit seven new members, thus expanding membership to 26 countries. NATO enlargement, in turn, helped lay a security foundation for a mostly parallel enlargement by the EU. The combined effect of NATO and EU enlargement has been to make Europe a safer, more democratic continent.

In the defense arena, the DCI failed to meet its original promises, but at the Prague Summit of 2002, NATO took important steps to increase preparedness for new missions: it created the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), launched creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), and endorsed the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) to replace the DCI. In the aftermath came measures by several European members to accelerate improvements of their military forces for new missions. The Washington concept deserves some credit for these steps, even though they responded to new security conditions and goals that were not fully anticipated by it. Finally, the Washington concept provided a backdrop for NATO's decision to take command of ISAF in Afghanistan and to send

25,000 European troops there. But here again, NATO's growing role in Afghanistan was a response to security conditions that were anticipated by the Washington concept only in general terms. The writers of the Washington concept could not have known that, within a few years, NATO would be intervening in Afghanistan, coping with threats of major terrorist attacks, and otherwise grappling with a world that had become far more dangerous than was commonly perceived in 1999.

Relevance Today

In recent years, NATO has embarked on many new endeavors that stretch, if not violate, the outer boundaries of the strategic principles and policies envisioned by the Washington concept. For example, the Washington concept envisioned operations outside the Euro-Atlantic region as taking place under Article 4, not Article 5. Events since 2001, however, have shown that such external dangers as terrorism and WMD proliferation pose genuine Article 5 threats that can mandate not just consultations, but a collective defense response. The Washington concept was largely blind not only to the looming prospect of global terrorism, but also to the menaces posed by radical Islamic fundamentalism and an increasingly unstable Middle East and surrounding regions. Today, NATO is grappling with these threats through complex strategic responses—a fusion of military, political, and economic power—that were not envisioned, much less specifically mandated, by the Washington concept. Indeed, NATO's official communiqués at Prague, Istanbul, and Riga read as though they respond to challenges and imperatives almost wholly different from those animated by the Washington concept.

If the Washington concept already seems outdated when judged in relation to activities that NATO has been pursuing in recent years, the same judgment holds doubly true when applied to the future.

Concepts are overtaken by new events in such areas as fresh threats and security goals as well as new technologies and force priorities. While the future is murky, NATO seems destined to become a different alliance a decade from now than is the case today. New strategic policies and strategies will be needed: e.g., to help coordinate actions by NATO and the EU, to deal with terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, to help stabilize the greater Middle East, to cope with an increasingly troublesome Russia, to build missile defenses, and to continue transforming NATO's military forces so they can better perform new expeditionary missions. Simply stated, the Washington concept no longer can serve to address these demands, much less provide authoritative strategic guidance on how NATO

can best handle them. If the Washington concept is not replaced by a new and better concept, one aligned with the changed strategic environment, NATO will increasingly be left without a map or compass, or even a clear destination. Guidance will come in the form of periodic summit communiqués and related documents that lack the authoritativeness of strategic concepts.

Conditions Are Right for a New Concept

Thus, the central issue is not whether NATO needs a new strategic concept. It does. The issue is whether political conditions within the Alliance are favorable for writing a new concept that combines coherent vision with internal consensus. Critics of writing a new concept believe that key NATO members—the United States, Britain, Germany and France—are still too much at loggerheads to permit constructive dialogue among them, and are not yet sufficiently responsive to the needs of new members. While the concerns of these critics are understandable, political tempers within the Alliance have cooled considerably since the low point of 2003, when the invasion of Iraq was launched in the face of widespread opposition. Since then, the United States has learned difficult lessons about the limits of military intervention in the Middle East and has been working hard to repair transatlantic political relations. Moreover, Britain, Germany, and France are under new leaders who have expressed commitment to building close ties with the United States. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel's policies point toward restored U.S.-German relationships in key areas. In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy's foreign policy offers opportunities to achieve agreement on NATO policies. Nor are these positive signs confined to atmospherics. The common transatlantic ground that has been achieved in guiding NATO's intervention in Afghanistan, and in pursuing cooperative diplomacy toward Iran, suggest that similar cooperation might be possible in writing a new strategic concept.

Process and Timelines

What process should be employed in writing a new NATO strategic concept? Past experience has shown that success can be achieved by tasking NATO Headquarters, under leadership of the NATO Secretary General, to handle the drafting and coordinating process. But NATO's key members must play principal contributing roles too by submitting their own analyses and evaluations. The need for strong multinational contributions applies to the United States, and it also applies to such important members as Britain, Germany, France, and others. The presence of

multiple actors inevitably complicates the process of achieving agreement on the final product, but this is the best vehicle for ensuring that when a new strategic concept is written, it will have high substantive content, express the views of multiple national capitals, gain widespread support at the NAC, and be enthusiastically implemented once adopted. If necessary, an unofficial team of outside “wise men” can be employed to prepare an initial draft that can then be used by NATO Headquarters and member nations to help launch the writing of a final product. Regardless of the exact process employed, writing a new strategic concept will stand the best chance of succeeding if the Alliance makes good use of its analytical talents, institutional mechanisms, and consensus-building procedures that have worked well so often in the past.

What should be the contents of a new NATO strategic concept? While this question will be addressed in detail in the following chapter’s treatment of key baskets of issues, suffice here to say that at a minimum, a new strategic concept should bring the Alliance up to date with goals, policies, and practices that have been adopted since the Washington concept was adopted. Beyond this, a new strategic concept should be forward looking. It should endeavor to determine basic directions that NATO security policy and defense strategy should be taking for the next 5–10 years, which promise to be a period of major changes in global security affairs. Perhaps most important, a new NATO strategic concept must be sufficiently wide-ranging and comprehensive in ways that cover the ever-widening spectrum of challenges, missions, and priorities ahead. For understandable reasons, past NATO strategic concepts have mainly focused on military and defense issues. Such issues must be addressed again in sufficient detail, but a new strategic concept must also be equipped with a robust political framework.

What timelines should NATO follow? While NATO should act promptly, it should also act in measured ways to ensure that a new strategic concept is well-conceived. In the past, typically several months have been required to carry out the entire exercise of analysis, writing, and consensus-building. The NATO Summit of 2009 offers an opportunity to launch the process of review and evaluation under direction of the NATO Secretary General. This process could have two parallel tracks: a formal track carried out at NATO Headquarters and in consultation with member governments, and an informal track of conferences and workshops that draw on the ideas and insights of outside experts. Once these two efforts have produced agreement on main themes and contents, the task of drafting the new strategic concept and coordinating it among member govern-

ments can begin. Perhaps the new strategic concept could be adopted at a special summit held in 2010, or at the next regularly scheduled summit in 2011. Regardless of the summit chosen, the key point is that NATO does need to make the writing of a new strategic concept a main item on its agenda in the period ahead.

Appendix: NATO's Historical Experiences with New Strategic Concepts

DC 6/1 Initial Strategy of Deterrence and Defense Specialization (1949–1951)

When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in early 1949, the Cold War was already underway, but the newly minted Alliance had no organizational structure or defense strategy to guide its efforts. Moreover, its military forces were perilously weak. In Central Europe, these forces included only about 8 ground divisions and 600 combat aircraft that were woefully inadequate to defend against the much larger Soviet army deployed in Eastern Europe. Had war broken out then, NATO's forces likely would have been defeated quickly. In this setting, NATO's defense ministers issued the first strategic concept in December 1949; it was approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in January 1950. DC 6/1 endorsed deterrence of war as the ultimate goal of NATO's defense plans for the Cold War. It also called on NATO members to cooperate to develop adequate forces for defending Europe and to create coordinated plans for employing these forces in the event deterrence failed.

DC 6/1 did not, however, produce an integrated plan for achieving these goals. Instead, it crafted a loose collection of principles for coordinating efforts by member nations. In essence, it called for an alliance based on national specialization and a division of labor rather than a uniform distribution of military missions. For example, the United States and Britain were assigned the missions of strategic bombardment and maritime defense. While both countries were also given the mission of providing supporting air and ground forces, the task of defending the European landmass was mainly given to the continental powers. At the time, France lacked a large army, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had only recently achieved sovereignty and was not yet a member of NATO or permitted an army of its own, and other members were not well-armed. As NATO's military leaders realized, the best that could be expected in a war was a weak initial NATO defense effort along the Rhine River, followed by

a long-term mobilization of U.S. and British military power in a prolonged campaign to regain lost ground. Such a defense concept fell well short of fulfilling the collective defense clause (Article 5) of the NATO treaty, but at the time, it was the most that the political traffic would bear in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere.

Because DC 6/1 was a compromise document that created a political-strategic vision without embracing long-term military requirements for coalition defense, it survived less than two years. But during its brief life-span, it helped bring important improvements to NATO's defense preparedness. Under its auspices, the SACEUR position was established and SHAPE Headquarters was created. It also helped inspire cooperative defense measures in such areas as common military doctrine, combined exercises, construction of military installations, standardization of maintenance, repair, and service facilities, and collaboration in research and development. Meanwhile, member countries began enlarging their military forces and strengthening their readiness. Such efforts helped establish a foundation of multilateral cooperation that proved critical when NATO began launching a major rearmament effort in 1952.⁷

MC 14/1 NATO Defense Buildup and Collective Defense (1951–1957)

The period 1950–1951 witnessed an intensification of the Cold War, including outbreak of the Korean War, Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, and increases in the readiness of the Soviet Army. The result was a major increase in the military threat to NATO. The United States launched a major military buildup, and NATO followed suit. The new strategic concept, MC 14/1, was the first to be drafted by the NATO Military Committee, and the first to benefit from SHAPE's professional analyses of NATO's enduring military requirements. Strong political impetus came from the United States. Widespread consensus for MC 14/1 was achieved relatively quickly, but it required close coordination and consensus-building among NATO members.

MC 14/1 abandoned the old precept of defense specialization in favor of collective defense, integrated military formations under NATO commanders, and a theater-wide perspective. Representing a combination of U.S. and European thinking, it relied on American strategic nuclear bombardment and Alliance-wide mobilization to achieve ultimate victory in a war, but it also included plans for strengthening NATO's in-being continental forces. In Central Europe, it called for a NATO defense line on the Rhine River for a period of 5 years until Alliance force improvements permitted a more forward defense. It called for building 54 mobilizable

divisions for defense of AFCENT (NATO Central Region), 21 divisions for defending AFSOUTH, and 14 divisions for defending AFNORTH. It also called for commensurate increases in NATO's air forces and naval power: it called for a total of 9,000 combat aircraft and 700 warships. When these forces proved unaffordable, NATO commissioned a study by a Temporary Council Committee led by three "wise men:" Averell Harriman (United States), Jean Monnet (France), and Edwin Plowden (U.K.). Their study produced the Lisbon Force Goals, which stretched out NATO's time horizon for achieving MC 14/1's ambitious goals and called for a balanced mixture of active and reserve forces. The Lisbon Goals were approved by the NAC in 1952.

Over the next 6 years, MC 14/1 provided the strategic framework for pursuing a host of political and military improvements that greatly increased NATO's security against the growing Soviet threat. The position of NATO Secretary General was established, the NAC was upgraded to include chiefs of state, and the SACLANT and CINCHAN military commands were established. NATO's rearmament effort accelerated. U.S. defense spending rose dramatically, and U.S. military assistance flowed to Europe. Between 1950 and 1954, annual defense spending by European members tripled. In Central Europe, active military manpower increased from 350,000 in 1949 to 600,000 in 1954. Animating this effort was a "transatlantic bargain" among the United States and its key European allies to provide an integrated defense posture in Central Europe that would protect the FRG. The United States committed to station five divisions there, Britain agreed to create a British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) of four or five divisions, Belgium and the Netherlands agreed to provide corps-sized forces, and France agreed to make significant commitments. In addition, an agreement was forged to rearm the FRG, which embarked on a long-term effort to create an army of twelve divisions and an air force of about 650 combat aircraft.

This set of transatlantic agreements had not only military import, but political significance that underscored a deepening commitment to collective defense and coalition planning. Combining the commitments of multiple members not only elevated NATO's overall strategic prospects, but also enabled each nation to pursue security goals that would have been impossible for any of them to achieve individually—a hallmark of NATO's growing effectiveness as the Cold War unfolded. Because rearmament was a slow process, initial efforts were not enough to meet the Lisbon goals. By 1956, nonetheless, NATO was able to field 17 active divisions, 2,000 armored vehicles, and 1600 combat aircraft in Central Europe—with prom-

ises of additional U.S. wartime reinforcements plus the gradual fielding of more German and French forces. Also important, NATO embarked on programs to increase training, bolster ammunition stockpiles, construct new airfields, and establish signal networks, pipelines, and storage facilities. These efforts fell short of creating a fully viable conventional defense posture, but they significantly elevated NATO combat power.

MC 14/2 Strategy of Massive Retaliation (1957–1967)

This period witnessed a further deepening of the Cold War and a growing military confrontation in Central Europe. The Soviet Union began deploying nuclear bombers and missiles, and strengthened Warsaw Pact conventional forces to pose an offensive threat of nearly 100 divisions and 4,000 combat aircraft. Cold War political tensions heated up, with the Berlin crisis a key focal point of growing Soviet assertiveness. NATO members in the mid-to-late 1950s were searching for ways to lessen the costs of military preparedness. New nuclear technologies, weapons, and delivery systems seemed to answer their needs, and the NATO summit of 1957 produced agreement on MC 14/2, which anchored NATO's defense plans on a large-scale theater nuclear operation backed by a massive nuclear blow against the Soviet Union in event of war. The central idea of MC 14/2 was that the threat of rapid nuclear escalation and devastating retaliation could reliably deter virtually all forms of Soviet aggression, including invasion of Central Europe. This new concept of massive retaliation reflected the Eisenhower Administration's strategic thinking and its political leadership of NATO. European members initially resisted this nuclear strategy, but eventually came to support it because it ensured U.S. nuclear guarantees while also lowering their own defense costs. Consequently MC 14/2 was adopted with widespread consensus across NATO, but only after searching analysis and debate over the strategic implications.

MC 14/2 was accompanied by major programs to strengthen U.S. and NATO nuclear forces. The United States initially deployed a large force of long-range strategic bombers, and then began constructing ICBMs and SLBMs. Britain and France also decided to become nuclear powers with bombers and missiles of their own. Meanwhile, the United States embarked on a program to deploy theater and tactical nuclear forces in Europe in the form of missiles, tactical aircraft, and tube artillery. Eventually the United States deployed about 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe and adopted a program of cooperation that enabled allied forces to gain access to tactical nuclear weapons for theater war-fighting. By the late 1950s, NATO was rapidly becoming well-endowed with a nuclear posture

capable of deterrence and defense. The effect was to upgrade NATO's overall security at a time of mounting dangers.

By the early 1960s, growing attention was devoted to NATO conventional forces, whose improvement efforts had slowed during the late 1950s. This effort was especially led by the Kennedy Administration, but it also benefited from growing support by NATO's military authorities. Initially, several European members, including Germany, were hesitant about any weakening of nuclear deterrence, but they eventually came to see value in practical, affordable steps to enhance NATO's conventional posture. In Central Europe, the main focus was on fielding a force of 30 divisions and 2,000 tactical combat aircraft that could forge a cohesive defense line across the 750-kilometer AFCENT front. In the late 1950s, NATO had moved its defense front from the Rhine River to the vicinity of the Weser-Lech Rivers, about 70 kilometers west of the inter-German border. Emergence of the German Army, with twelve first-class divisions, coupled with U.S. force modernization to enable this concept and allow NATO to contemplate a fully forward defense. By the mid-1960s, NATO moved its defense line to the inter-German border, and formed its layer-cake array of eight adjacent national corps formations. At the time, NATO still did not have enough ground and air forces in Central Europe for a sustained defense, and the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam prevented it from being able to send large reinforcements in a crisis. In particular, a NATO ground posture of only 30 divisions lacked operational reserves in the rear areas, thereby making nuclear escalation the only alternative in the event of enemy breakthroughs of NATO's front line.

MC 14/3 Strategy of Flexible Response (1967–1991)

The mid-1960s saw the Soviet Union launch a sustained program to deploy many ICBMs and SLBMs, and to greatly bolster the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities with new tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and other weapons—even as Moscow began issuing calls for *détente* in Europe. MC 14/3 was partially a response to this growing military threat, but more fundamentally, it addressed strategic flaws in MC 14/2's reliance on massive nuclear retaliation as an all-purpose deterrent. Dissatisfaction with MC 14/2 began in the United States, where Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and other officials feared that the Soviet Union could employ its own nuclear forces to deter a NATO nuclear response, and thereby might feel free to use its powerful conventional forces to commit aggression against NATO's still-vulnerable conventional posture. In his famous address to NATO defense ministers at Athens, Greece, in 1962, McNamara called

for NATO to broaden its defense strategy by bolstering its conventional forces so that they would have a stronger deterrent and defense capability of their own. McNamara's speech caused a political uproar in Europe, because many officials feared that greater reliance on conventional forces might weaken nuclear deterrence and invite non-nuclear war in Europe. More fundamentally, they feared that the United States might be trying to back away from its nuclear guarantees to NATO and Europe.

The resulting debate caused a deep transatlantic rift in NATO. Indeed, France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command, and some German officials publicly threatened to withdraw their country from NATO and build a nuclear deterrent force of their own. By the mid-1960s, however, NATO began employing its professional military staffs, its analytical talents, and its consensus-building mechanisms to find common ground. The result was agreement on MC 14/3, a strategy of flexible response that combined still-strong nuclear deterrence with enhanced conventional defenses in ways that satisfied both Americans and Europeans. MC 14/3 was written by NATO's Military Committee, but received major inputs from multiple members, including the United States, Britain, and the FRG. It required careful writing because it synthesized diverse military arguments, all of which had to be blended to advance the goals and interests of the various countries. This effort resulted in a document that employed military reasoning and political compromises to acutely balance perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic while equipping NATO with an improved defense strategy for the next phase of the Cold War. When MC 14/3 emerged, some critics accused it of being a compromise document that papered over still-existing disagreements and would not survive for long. Subsequent experience proved them wrong.

MC 14/3 embraced forward defense of NATO's borders, including the FRG. Within this framework, it called for three mutually supporting tiers of military operations: direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response. Direct defense was mainly the province of conventional forces, deliberate escalation was the province of theater nuclear forces, and general nuclear response was the province of strategic nuclear forces, such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers. The core idea was not only to establish across-the-board deterrence with strong nuclear and conventional forces, but also to provide NATO a broad range of military options that could be selected flexibly in meeting the demands of crises. As a practical matter, MC 14/3 meant that NATO would meet enemy conventional aggression with a strong, initial conventional defense, and in event this defense buckled after a month or so, it would then cross

the nuclear threshold deliberately and carefully, reserving massive retaliation as the final stage. MC 14/3 was thus a complex, multifaceted concept, but it proved successful because it made military and political sense. The Americans were content because MC 14/3 upgraded the importance of conventional defense and flexible options. The Europeans were content because MC 14/3 preserved the nuclear deterrence umbrella intact and made the enemy aware that in event Europe was attacked, NATO would employ nuclear weapons to defend itself if conventional defense failed. NATO's military authorities were content because MC 14/3 provided them a coherent strategic theory that could be used to build strong nuclear and conventional defenses at the same time.

MC 14/3 was approved by the NAC in 1967. It was accompanied by another important NATO document, the Harmel Report. Written by a team of five outside "wise men," the Harmel Report was entitled "Future Tasks of the Alliance." It endorsed closer transatlantic consultation in meeting the demands of contemporary security affairs. In particular, it urged a combined NATO security policy of defense and détente. At the time, several European members wanted to respond to the Soviet Union's call for détente, which was first issued in 1966. The United States was worried that détente might create a false atmosphere of reconciliation in which NATO would lose its resolve to continue strengthening its military forces. The Harmel Report sought to balance these differing transatlantic viewpoints by calling for a careful approach to détente coupled with ongoing NATO defense improvements, continued stability, and eventual settlement of the German question (i.e., Germany's divided status). The Harmel Report had a positive effect because it helped enable NATO to pursue détente and defense preparedness at the same time. Prospects for détente slackened in 1968 when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, but interest rose again in the early 1970s. Under the Harmel Report's auspices, NATO's members pursued SALT nuclear negotiations, an ABM Treaty, MBFR negotiations on conventional force levels, and the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). These diplomatic efforts produced mixed results by the mid-1970s, but owing to the Harmel Report's consensus, they did not derail NATO's commitment to pursue the military wherewithal for MC 14/3.

Faced with an accelerating Soviet military buildup, NATO's initial foray into defense preparedness under MC 14/3 was a five-year plan adopted in 1967. In 1970, NATO adopted a ten-year plan named AD-70, which focused on practical steps in such areas as training and exercises, war reserve stocks, and infrastructure. Progress initially was slow because

of limited European defense budgets, but within a few years, the political atmosphere across NATO began to change. A critical development came when the United States withdrew from Vietnam and switched its defense strategy to focus on NATO and Europe. In response to U.S. leadership, Germany, Britain, and France began devoting growing attention to the preparedness of their ground and air forces, as did other NATO members. Equally important, new military technologies and weapon systems began emerging from the R&D pipeline that aided NATO's strategy: e.g., modern tanks, self-propelled artillery pieces, antitank missiles, infantry fighting vehicles, air defense missiles, combat aircraft, and sophisticated munitions made it increasingly possible for an outnumbered NATO defender to contend with a larger Warsaw Pact attacker.

Under the Carter Administration in 1977, the United States led an effort to build Alliance-wide consensus to launch the Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP), a new 10-year plan with a comprehensive focus on readiness, interoperability, and stronger conventional forces. A centerpiece of the LTDP was a U.S. commitment to provide a rapid reinforcement capability of ten divisions and twenty fighter wings in order to help strengthen NATO's defenses in the early stages of a crisis. In addition, Germany began adding reserve brigades to its army, and France organized an army of six divisions to aid NATO in event of a war. In 1981, the LTDP gave way to the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI), another multi-year effort that was sponsored by the Reagan Administration. Although the Reagan years are mostly associated with NATO's decision to deploy Pershing II and GLCM nuclear missiles, behind the scenes sustained progress was made on improving NATO's conventional forces with more combat units, new weapons, new doctrines, better air defenses, and improved air-ground coordination.

By the late 1980s, NATO was capable of generating a D-Day force in Central Europe of about 45 divisions and 3,600 combat aircraft, backed by additional U.S. reinforcements later. As a result, NATO now had sufficient ground forces not only to forge a frontal line, but also to generate operational reserves for containing enemy breakthroughs and for performing maneuver operations of its own. In addition, the combination of NATO ground and air forces provided the firepower needed to inflict very high losses on enemy forces and possibly to stop an attack without having to employ nuclear weapons. NATO's defenses were still not perfect, but the Warsaw Pact was now susceptible to failure too. The effect was to greatly lessen NATO's vulnerability to surprise attack and political intimidation, to reduce undue reliance on nuclear escalation, and to raise legitimate

doubts about the Soviet Union's ability to prevail over NATO in a conventional war. When Moscow called for an end to the Cold War in 1989–1990, this sudden development owed partly to the USSR's own perilous economy and political system, but it also owed partly to NATO's success at building strong nuclear and conventional defenses that frustrated the USSR's expensive, fruitless quest for military superiority in Europe. In no small way, this favorable outcome owed to MC 14/3, which enabled NATO to surmount its debates over defense strategy to mount a concerted, sustained effort to build the modern military forces that were mandated by the final two decades of the Cold War.

Strategic Concept of Rome Summit (1991–1999)

Although MC 14/3 proved to be NATO's longest-lasting strategic concept, its useful life came to an end when the Cold War abruptly concluded. During 1989–1991, the European security situation was fundamentally transformed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Eastern Europe, and finally, dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. These profound changes not only swept away the Cold War military threat facing NATO, but also created a newly freed zone of East European states that mostly were striving to become democracies and draw closer to western institutions, including NATO. This hopeful development in Central Europe, however, was accompanied by worrisome trends elsewhere. In 1991, the United States led a large coalition, under UN auspices, to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Success of the Desert Storm campaign, however, left a still-unstable Persian Gulf in its wake. Shortly afterward, Yugoslavia in the Balkans began unraveling, and savage ethnic fighting broke out in Bosnia. For such reasons, the post-Cold War era of the 1990s promised to bring a combination of opportunities and dangers, both of which required wise U.S. and European policies in response.

During 1990–1991, a debate broke out over how NATO should respond to the new European security situation and other challenges. Some participants no longer saw a need for NATO to remain as a close defense alliance with strong military forces. Indeed, a few recommended that NATO should be dissolved and that the United States and Europe no longer needed their transatlantic partnership. NATO's members, however, saw things differently and wanted to preserve their alliance intact while also making changes mandated by the new security conditions. After a relatively brief period of internal debate and soul-searching, the result was agreement to issue a new NATO strategic concept at the Rome Sum-

mit of 1991.⁸ Made available to the public (rather than kept classified), this document provided a rich synthesis of political and military analyses that blended a new security policy with a new defense strategy. The Rome concept was drafted at NATO headquarters, but involved analytical inputs and close coordination from the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and other members. As a result, it embodied a new, widespread consensus across the Alliance that provided broad guidance on how the future was to be addressed.

The Rome concept's most important tenet was its firm statement that the transatlantic link would be maintained, that NATO would continue to perform its traditional defense mission, and that it would prepare for new responsibilities in the Euro-Atlantic area. It said that NATO's overriding objective is to safeguard the security of its members and to establish a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe through both political and military means. It called for a broad-based Alliance security policy based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue, cooperation, and collective defense. Its call for dialogue was focused widely, to include all European countries as well as Russia and its neighbors. It stressed that in working to create a new European security architecture and to quell new forms of instability, NATO should cooperate closely with other institutions, including the European Community (EC), the West European Union (WEU), and the CSCE as well as with other regional bodies from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. In addition, it asserted that NATO needed to take into account global security affairs and associated risks, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), disruption of the flow of vital resources, and acts of terrorism and sabotage that could affect the Alliance's vital interests. It pointed out that Article 4 of the NATO treaty permits members to consult in deciding how to handle threats and dangers outside Alliance borders. Also important, the Rome concept called on NATO to be prepared for new-era crisis response roles and requirements, rather than just collective defense of NATO's borders against traditional threats. In the defense arena, it called for downsizing of NATO's military forces for the Cold War, but it also mandated preservation of enough forces to meet new-era dangers, as well as efforts to make NATO's forces more mobile, multinational, and flexible for crisis management missions.

Seen in retrospect, the Rome concept comes across as getting the strategic basics correct, but also as understandably vague about future security challenges. Even so, it endured for 8 years and helped establish a framework for new NATO security and defense activities during its tenure.

Under its auspices, NATO began its historic move eastward by establishing the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and took steps to begin admitting new members, which got underway in 1999, when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance. During the mid-1990s, NATO, surmounting its initial hesitation, finally intervened in the Bosnia conflict, and, when the Dayton Accord was signed in 1995, established a Stabilization Force (SFOR) to perform peacekeeping there. In early 1999, NATO went to war in the Balkans to eject Serbia from Kosovo, and afterward established a Kosovo Force (KFOR) for peacekeeping. These operations in the Balkans opened the door to NATO employment of military forces outside Member borders when common interests and values were threatened.

In the military sphere, NATO reorganized its military command structure, reduced its European forces by about 35 percent below Cold War levels, and trimmed its defense budgets by proportional amounts. The United States reduced its Cold War posture in Europe of 330,000 troops, but agreed to keep 100,000 troops there composed of land, air, and naval forces. Meanwhile, NATO began pursuing multinational, corps-sized formations, and endeavoring to create better forces for new-era missions, established the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) as well as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). It also agreed to support European efforts to create a "European Security and Defense Identity" (ESDI), including steps to endow the EU/WEU with its own military forces and to draw on NATO forces, if necessary. Such efforts helped keep Alliance borders well-protected and strengthened NATO's capacity to perform new peacekeeping and crisis response operations elsewhere. But, despite repeated calls from NATO's military leaders for further reform, the Alliance made little progress in preparing its European forces for swift power projection missions at long distances. Apart from Britain and France, European forces remained mostly configured for continental missions, and thus lacked the mobility, logistic support, and other assets needed for expeditionary operations alongside U.S. forces. The 1990s ended with NATO agreeing on a Defense Capability Initiative (DCI), a ten-year plan to upgrade its capabilities in these areas, but subsequent progress on the DCI proved slow.

Notes

¹ For more on the Harmel Report, see Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler, "Dual-Track Transformation for NATO," *Defense Horizons* 35 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2003), 11.

² The Belavezha Accords, signed on December 8, 1991, by five of the fifteen Soviet republics, including Russia, effectively dissolved the Soviet Union. On Christmas Day, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev

resigned as president of the USSR and dissolved the office. The next day, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dissolved itself.

³ The term *soft power*, coined by Joseph Nye the previous year, aptly describes the new emphasis of the strategic concept but was not used in the document. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

⁴ Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

"Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security." Full text of the North Atlantic Treaty is available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>>.

⁵ See *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Headquarters, 1999), available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>>.

⁶ The text of the April 25, 1999, Defense Capabilities Initiative is available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm>>.

⁷ For more details on DC 6/1 and NATO's other strategic concepts during the Cold War, see Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003). See also Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, *Containment, Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

⁸ Available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm>>.

A New Transatlantic Compact? (2008)

Richard L. Kugler and Hans Binnendijk

Although launching an effort to write a new NATO strategic concept is imperative, it should not be the only vehicle for seeking to impart the Atlantic Alliance with greater unity, energy, and purpose in dealing with contemporary security affairs. NATO's strategic concept traditionally has focused on military and defense issues. Today the Alliance faces wide-ranging political and security challenges that must be addressed by a larger framework that extends well beyond the traditional province of NATO's strategic concept. Indeed, the United States and its European allies will be hard-pressed to reach consensus on a new, sufficiently comprehensive NATO strategic concept unless they pursue a wider dialogue on these broader challenges. Equally important, the task facing the United States and its European allies is to energize not only NATO, but also other key institutions, including the EU, and to determine how NATO is to work more closely in partnership with these bodies.

Accordingly, efforts to write a new NATO strategic concept should be embedded in parallel efforts to craft a new "transatlantic compact," one that addresses the fundamentals of U.S.-European political cooperation. This compact would cover the totality of the U.S.-European partnership in security affairs, and thereby provide a coherent, overarching framework for determining how NATO, the EU, and other common institutions and activities are to work together.

This section begins by discussing the nature of such a transatlantic compact and the reasons for embarking on an effort to craft it. Next, it examines three baskets of issues that will need to be addressed by this compact as well as by a new NATO strategic concept, including new strategic missions for the partnership, principles of decisionmaking and policy implementation that include reaffirmation and strengthening of common commitments to reciprocal multilateralism and closer NATO-EU rela-

tions, and improved Alliance capabilities for expeditionary missions and comprehensive approaches. Finally, it concludes by offering alternative suggestions for how this dual agenda can be pursued in today's political climate, either through grand U.S.-European summitry from the outset, or by first writing a new NATO strategic concept and then seeking to gradually apply the new transatlantic compact to other arenas of U.S.-European collaboration.

Essence of a New Transatlantic Compact

A compact can be a diplomatic treaty, such as the Washington Treaty that created NATO in 1949, or something far less formal, for example, a political agreement issued as a special communiqué by governments at a summit meeting. Regardless of its exact form, a compact is a firm agreement that reflects a harmony of opinion among the parties, creates mutual obligations, and joins the parties together to pursue common goals and agreed actions. In the case of the United States and its European allies, a new diplomatic treaty may not be required, but forging a solid political accord on how they can cooperate more effectively in strategic terms is.

Reaching agreement on such a compact is both desirable and necessary to enable the United States and its European allies to collaborate more closely. In important ways, the United States and Europe share many common interests, values, and goals in dealing with contemporary international security affairs. They also share many similar diagnoses of the problems and challenges confronting them in Europe and elsewhere. These similar diagnoses have resulted in collaboration in such places as Kosovo and Afghanistan, in pursuing common diplomacy toward Iran and other trouble spots, and in seeking to harmonize their approaches toward NATO and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). But despite these similar diagnoses, the United States and Europe often embrace different prescriptive solutions and pursue different policies and practices in handling global challenges. Magnifying these different approaches are dissimilar attitudes toward a host of subsidiary issues, including threat perceptions in various regions, the use of military power and other instruments, distribution of responsibilities and authorities for strategic missions, fair burden-sharing, approaches for employing NATO and the EU, and stances toward building improved capabilities. All of these issues create thorny problems, but many of them may be resolvable, or at least differences can be narrowed appreciably, if the United States and European countries employ diplomatic outreach toward each other in a spirit of collaboration and compromise.

A governing strategic reality, as true today as during the Cold War, is that close partnership between the United States and Europe can help magnify the power and effectiveness of both sides of the Atlantic, thereby enabling each participant to achieve its core purposes more effectively, and more cheaply, than otherwise would be the case. A renewed, energized, and mutually beneficial partnership requires a transatlantic compact to provide not only agreement on common missions and associated policies, but also an accord on processes and procedures for decisionmaking and policy implementation that take full advantage of transatlantic strengths. Such an accord needs to reaffirm and strengthen key principles of alliance participation in today's world, including common commitments and associated "rules of the road" regarding how the United States and its European allies are to behave toward each other as they endeavor to cooperate. In particular, a viable transatlantic compact requires stronger American efforts to treat European allies as equal partners in mutual strategic endeavors, and it requires, in reciprocity, those allies and their European institutions to make stronger contributions to these endeavors in ways that match their responsibilities and claims to equal influence. Reaching a strengthened agreement on the principle of reciprocal multilateralism and on getting NATO and the EU to cooperate more closely would need to be a key focal point of a new transatlantic strategic compact. Equally important, such a compact would also require agreement on the need for both the United States and Europe to develop improved capabilities for military expeditionary missions and for comprehensive approaches that involve adroit blending of civil-military assets, especially during interventions involving stabilization and reconstruction missions.

Can an effort to forge such a compact succeed? There are good reasons for being hopeful of a successful outcome if the effort is launched. One reason is that today's difficult times require a serious stocktaking of the transatlantic partnership at its fundamentals, and that without it, the Atlantic Alliance may be doomed to a future of drift and limited effectiveness. A second reason is that in contrast to the sharp disputes and mutual frustrations of a few years ago, the governments of the United States and key European allies, having witnessed the paralyzing effects of discord and the benefits of increased cooperation in Afghanistan and other areas, may be willing to launch a serious, wide-ranging discussion of the transatlantic relationship with a positive agenda in mind. A third reason is that similar efforts have succeeded in the past—the Cold War provides multiple examples—and perhaps can succeed again if high-level leadership is shown. And fourth, new leadership provides opportunities for a new compact.

Whether the time is right for such an attempt today may be questioned by some, but encouraging signs come from the ongoing U.S. shift toward greater multilateralism in its foreign policy, and from parallel efforts by several European countries, including France, to reinvigorate their cooperation with the United States.

Notwithstanding these positive incentives, an effort to forge a new transatlantic compact that brings the United States and Europe closer together on behalf of a common security agenda would confront challenges of consensus-building on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States would have to build internal support to shift its strategic policies in important ways and so would European countries. In Europe, the challenge would be compounded by the need to mobilize support among multiple nations, not only such big powers as Britain, France, and Germany, but also enough smaller powers to create a critical mass of support across NATO, the EU, and the entire continent. Perhaps the consensus-building problem would be too formidable to create a full-blown new compact in a single big bang of political awakening, but considerable progress could be made by treating this compact as an evolutionary creation: as something that focuses initially on achievable goals and gradually expands its horizons as successes are achieved and mutual confidence grows. After all, both NATO and the EU were built this way. The bottom line is that while no crystal ball can foretell the future in this arena, prospects for success will not be knowable unless an attempt is made. A source of confidence is that owing to events of past decades, many participating governments have plenty of diplomatic experience in knowing how to achieve both substantive policy content and political consensus in their dealings with each other. Crafting a new transatlantic compact will not be child's play, but neither does it lie beyond the province of mature leadership.¹

Three Baskets of Issues

If an effort to forge a new transatlantic compact is launched, its success will be judged not by its rhetorical flourishes, but by whether it provides a concrete agenda for the United States and Europe to pursue, plus a contractual agreement between them regarding how their mutual contributions are to be combined to create cooperative, effective policies. In other words, a new transatlantic compact must be a defining and empowering agreement that is taken seriously and heeded on both sides of the Atlantic. To be fully successful, such a compact would need to address a wide spectrum of U.S.-European cooperation on the world stage, not just NATO, or the EU, or some small subset of common policies (e.g., counter-

terrorism). With these standards in mind, the new transatlantic compact would need to address three baskets of critical issues.

1. In deciding on common purposes, what strategic missions, with associated goals and purposes, should the U.S.-European transatlantic partnership endeavor to perform in the coming years?
2. In performing these missions, what processes and procedures for decisionmaking and policy implementation will best take advantage of transatlantic strengths, how should they guide the manner in which the U.S.-European partnership functions in political and institutional terms, and how should NATO and the EU work together?
3. To be able to collaborate more effectively, what improved capabilities should the United States and its European allies seek to create for carrying out expeditionary missions and comprehensive approaches, and how should these capabilities be applied?

The manner in which these three baskets of issues are addressed and answered will go a long way toward defining the nature of a new transatlantic compact and, in addition, providing substantive guidance for writing a new NATO strategic concept. For basket 1, the transatlantic partnership has a range of options at its disposal. The principal challenge is to choose wisely in this arena, and then to ensure that the decisions reached in baskets 2 and 3 make sense in light of the option selected in basket 1.

Basket 1: Reaching Agreement on Common Strategic Missions

A compelling reason for pursuing a new transatlantic compact is the dramatic extent to which new security challenges are arising and magnifying each other in today's world. Only a decade ago, many observers judged that with the Cold War over and its bipolar structure a thing of the past, the world was headed toward perpetual peace and harmony. That comforting forecast has now faded from the scene, to be replaced by a more ambiguous and guarded appraisal that recognizes not only the continuing importance of positive trends, but also the growing impact of negative trends from multiple sources. Today's most dangerous threats are posed by terrorism, WMD proliferation, and radical Islamic fundamentalism: the most alarming worry is that WMD systems might fall into the hands of terrorist groups willing to use them against Western targets, including the United States and Europe. Accompanying these threats are worries about an unstable Middle East, stalled democratization, failing states in

Africa, uneven economic progress, global warming, increasing multipolarity, complex relations with Russia and China, South Asia's turbulence, and Asia's rising power, all of which create profound uncertainties about where the world is headed. Moreover, globalization, by drawing once-distant regions closer together, is depositing these troubles on the doorsteps of the western democracies in ways compelling close attention to them. The odds of containing these troubles and charting a path toward global stability and progress will be far greater if the United States and its European allies can collaborate on behalf of common purposes and associated missions. A new transatlantic compact could help lay a stronger foundation for such cooperation.

One of the most important challenges facing a new transatlantic compact will be to re-establish, in new-era terms, the political and strategic link that unites the United States and its European allies in close collaboration in security policy and defense strategy. Although member governments still value the Alliance because of its cooperative connections, opinion polls show diminishing public support for the Alliance in Europe and, to a lesser degree, in the United States.² Withering public support can make it much harder for member governments to work together. Conversely, the presence of strong public support can enable the Alliance to act boldly and decisively in the face of strains, controversies, and difficult challenges. A new transatlantic compact can help restore public support by making clear the Alliance's continuing vital importance and its capacity to advance both American and European interests in tandem.

Even though surface appearances seemingly create a rationale for a highly ambitious cooperative agenda, the reality is that the transatlantic partnership cannot readily be transformed into an alliance for all causes and all seasons. Although the United States and Europe share many common interests and values, they are separate strategic entities with goals and involvements that differ from place to place and issue to issue. In particular, whereas the United States is a truly global power, Europe thus far has been principally focused on its own continent, and is now only beginning to play assertive security roles in areas beyond its borders. Harmonizing these disparate perspectives requires a focus on challenges where the United States and Europe already are pursuing common agendas, or can reach agreement through a diplomacy of outreach. Beyond this, both the United States and Europe have finite resources that will have to be targeted carefully—with specific goals, strategies, and priorities in mind—if they are to be used effectively, without overloading both participants. For these reasons, a new transatlantic compact will need to strike a balance between

inclusiveness and selectivity in determining the number and types of strategic missions that are to be embraced in these five broad categories:

- ▀ Providing for homeland security of the Euro-Atlantic space against new-era threats including terrorism and nuclear missiles possessed by such rogue states as Iran.
- ▀ Protecting against political intimidation using threats of cutoffs of energy supplies and cyber attacks on information networks.
- ▀ Continuing NATO and EU enlargement aimed at unifying and democratizing Europe, while maintaining stable relations with Russia.
- ▀ Performing expeditionary missions in the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions, and pursuing associated political and strategic goals there.
- ▀ Enhancing deterrence and updating nuclear strategy.

Homeland Security

In today's world, the imperatives of homeland security require Alliance members to get back to the basics by working together to carry out Article 5 of the NATO Treaty against new-era threats. Throughout the Cold War, the Alliance was heavily preoccupied with Article 5, the clause of the treaty that provides for collective defense of NATO territory, because it faced a menacing threat of cross-border invasion posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. When the Cold War ended, Alliance-wide interest in the requirements of Article 5 declined, not only because no new threats appeared on the immediate horizon, but also because NATO members possessed ample military forces to defend against any threats that might possibly arise. The 9/11 attacks and their aftermath, however, dramatically changed this calculus in ways that propelled Article 5 back to the forefront, but in entirely different terms. Since then, the Alliance has been compelled to refocus on Article 5 and homeland security plans against such fresh, new-era threats as terrorist attacks and use of WMD against members. Considerable progress has been made since 2001, but additional improvements need to be made.³

Homeland security today requires capabilities and activities in several categories: guarding the approaches and achieving border security for the NATO region, preventing and managing terrorist incidents, strengthening capacities for consequence management in event of terrorist use of WMD or large-scale natural disasters, and providing defense against air and missile attack. In this arena, NATO's highest-profile activity to date

has been carrying out Operation *Active Endeavour*, which employs naval forces and other assets to safeguard the Mediterranean Sea and other waters against terrorist activities, including smuggling of WMD systems into Alliance ports. NATO has played a supporting role in otherwise helping prevent and manage terrorist incidents, such as in sharing intelligence and developing new technologies. But main responsibility for this important task has been trusted to the EU and individual nations employing their own resources. If deficiencies of resources still exist today, they seemingly lie in capacities for consequence management in event of large-scale incidents that could overpower national resources. Creating better capabilities for consequence management is a task that mandates cooperation among NATO, the EU, and member states of both bodies.

In recent years, the requirement to provide missile defenses against nuclear attacks by such rogue countries as Iran has become a subject of growing attention. Throughout the Cold War, missile defense was limited by the ABM Treaty. But during the 1990s, the United States, fearing emerging missile threats from rogue countries, developed plans to deploy a force of 100 missile interceptors, radars, and C4ISR assets to meet this threat. As these plans matured, interest gradually grew in expanding this capability to protect European allies from similar threats. After several years of debate and controversy, NATO's leaders at the Bucharest Summit of 2008 voiced approval of a U.S. plan to deploy a small force of ten missile interceptors in Poland and associated radar systems in the Czech Republic. The core intent, they explained, was not to challenge Russia's nuclear deterrent posture, but instead to defend against a future nuclear missile threat posed by Iran. In this spirit, they called for efforts to develop a comprehensive missile defense architecture that could eventually integrate U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defense systems. Now that this deployment decision has been endorsed by the NATO summit, the long-term challenge will be to field these missiles and radars and ensure their effective operation. Careful military management will be needed, but political management will be needed as well. Lessening Russian objections will be one concern; another will be meeting Poland's demands for additional military support and modernization from NATO. The missile defense issue seems destined to continue being at the forefront of Alliance decisionmaking, in ways requiring close U.S.-European cooperation, for many years to come.

Political Intimidation

In addition to providing for homeland security against terrorists and nuclear missile attack, the United States and its European allies will

need to collaborate in coping with an entirely new threat that has emerged only recently, and has the potential to become quite serious. This is the menace of political intimidation using threats to cut off energy supplies and to launch cyber attacks on information networks. Today Europe is highly dependent on oil and natural gas supplies flowing through pipelines from Russia. In recent years, Russia has cut off these energy supplies to such neighbors as Ukraine and Belarus. The ostensible purpose was to compel both countries to pay long-standing energy bills, but many observers judged that Russia was trying to intimidate both countries for larger political purposes. In spring 2007, Estonia's information networks were subjected to cyber attacks, evidently originating in Russia and employing botnets to carry out denial of service operations. That cyber attack was contained and the damage promptly repaired, but it illuminated the extent to which information networks across all of Europe (and the United States) are potentially vulnerable to extremely damaging attacks. The risk of such attacks is that they could not only disrupt these networks but also inflict serious damage on key services, such as financial institutions, the communications industry, police and fire departments, electrical power, and water purification. Russia publicly denies any intent to employ cyber attacks as well as cutoffs of energy supplies against Europe, but skeptics of its foreign policy judge that in the coming years, it might increasingly turn to such threats to intimidate Europe and the United States to acquiesce in its strategic goals. Nor is Russia the only actor that might resort to such tactics. Cyber attacks could be launched by many countries around the world, as well as by non-governmental actors, including terrorist groups.

What is to be done to counteract these threats? Thus far, Europe has been slow to awaken to these dangers, but awareness is growing. At its Bucharest Summit of 2008, NATO announced that it was adopting a policy on cyber defense along with the institutions and authorities to carry out efforts at enhancing defensive capabilities in this arena. Likewise, NATO adopted a new study on its role in energy security, which proclaimed that NATO would be active in such fields as intelligence fusion and sharing, advancing regional and global cooperation, supporting protection of critical infrastructure, and supporting consequence management. These initiatives provide reasons for encouragement, yet some critics judge that in both arenas, NATO is mainly preoccupied with protecting its own cyber networks and energy infrastructure, rather than with the larger needs of Europe and the Alliance as a whole. These two arenas will require increasingly close cooperation between the United States and Europe that employs not only NATO, but also the EU and other institutions.

NATO and EU Enlargement

A new transatlantic compact will also need to devote priority attention to judging how democratic enlargement is to continue unfolding along Europe's periphery, and to how relations with Russia are to continue being made stable. Part of this agenda involves determining how many new members are to be admitted to NATO and the EU. At its Bucharest Summit in 2008, NATO announced that Croatia and Albania would be admitted soon, that Macedonia would be admitted when the dispute over its name is settled, and that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually be admitted, with the prospect that the Membership Action Plan (MAP) might be extended to them later this year.⁴ Membership for Georgia in particular presents problems with regard to the Article 5 commitment and secession movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbia are also potentially in the queue. Providing for the security of these new members will be a key priority for NATO; the same applies to the EU as it enlarges further. An equally important task will be ensuring the security and prosperity of countries that are not likely to gain admission to these bodies soon, but may become closer partners. Relations with Russia enter the strategic equation here because its government seems steadily drifting toward a more nationalist foreign policy that views continuing western enlargement into its bordering regions as a threat to its geopolitical interests. Recent experiences show that while Russia no longer poses a direct military threat to Europe, it remains a nuclear power that may be willing to use diplomatic intimidation, threats of natural gas and oil cutoffs, and other instruments to pursue an increasingly assertive agenda in these regions. While some observers fear that the United States and Europe are on a collision course with Russia, risks of this undesirable outcome can be lessened by employing a diplomacy of continued engagement and dialogue with that country, coupled with a restored emphasis on dissuasion and deterrence in some areas. Finding a solution to the conundrum posed by further democratic enlargement in the face of growing Russian resistance promises to be a continuing, thorny geopolitical challenge that will need to be addressed by the United States and Europe, and will need to be a key focus of any new compact between them.

Expeditionary Missions

A new transatlantic compact will also need to pay close attention to the Greater Middle East and the entire "southern arc of instability" that stretches from North Africa through the Persian Gulf into South Asia. Today this vast zone is a cauldron of political conflict, unstable security

affairs, radical Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic and cultural hatreds, failed states, authoritarian governments, economic stress, and military tensions. A decade or two ago, the Atlantic Alliance could afford the luxury of viewing this zone as lying mostly outside its traditional geostrategic perimeter, but this is no longer the case. Globalization is drawing once-distant regions closer together and giving new actors, including terrorists, global reach. Although the United States and Europe today are cooperating closely in Afghanistan, their collaborative involvements elsewhere in the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions are only beginning to take shape. Europe for its part has historic responsibilities in Africa where peace support operations require constant attention. Charting how to expand this collaboration, in ways that satisfy both the United States and Europe, will need to be an important feature of a new transatlantic compact.

Across this vast zone, priority attention must be given to crafting a shared willingness by the United States and Europe to perform military expeditionary missions together in regions where threats and dangers are likely to arise. As used here, the term “expeditionary missions” is meant in its broadest sense: to include power projection missions that cover a wide spectrum of operations ranging from peacekeeping and stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) to major combat operations. Notwithstanding the bitter debate over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, recent years have witnessed the United States and Europe draw closer in their willingness to mount such expeditionary missions. The past decade has seen U.S. and European forces operate together in the Balkans in performing peacekeeping roles in Bosnia and Kosovo. Today’s most salient example is Afghanistan, where sizable U.S. and European forces are operating together under ISAF and NATO command in fighting the Taliban and bringing democracy and stability to that country. Even so, many observers judge that several European members of NATO, including Germany, have not deployed sufficient forces to Afghanistan, and are not participating extensively enough in combat missions. This deficiency of western forces, coupled with Taliban insurgency warfare and problems inherent in Afghanistan, are making success uncertain.

Achieving success in Afghanistan will remain a compelling requirement for NATO and the transatlantic partnership for the foreseeable future. But Afghanistan likely will not be the only endangered place in the Greater Middle East, as well as South Central Asia, South Asia, and Africa, where requirements for military expeditionary missions might arise for a wide spectrum of operations. If the United States and Europe are to cooperate in such missions, they will need to establish a shared mindset on

when military power is an appropriate instrument, on how military power can best be successfully employed to achieve political goals, on standards for determining military requirements and operational practices, and on a host of related technical issues. NATO will remain the best forum for pursuing such collaboration, but it will be a usable forum only if the United States and Europe can agree on the fundamentals of military strategy for expeditionary missions. Creating such a military accord does not promise to be easy, given the differing perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic, but recent experiences have educated the United States on the sheer difficulty of employing military power to political effect in these regions, and have educated the Europeans on the need to employ military force and expeditionary missions on critical occasions. Perhaps these hard-learned lessons can help enable both sides to find increasingly solid common ground in this important arena.

Nor can such an accord be limited to military strategy and operations. As the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq show, the act of militarily intervening to remove hostile governments and squelch existing or imminent threats is often far easier to accomplish than the presence missions of stabilization and reconstruction that normally come in the wake. By any measure, stabilization missions can require as many or more resources than combat missions, and they demand not only adequate military forces, but also sizable civilian assets in multiple areas focused on comprehensive approaches to rebuilding governments, economies, and societies. Such demanding missions often take years to succeed. Nor is the need for such missions limited to crisis interventions that begin with military invasions. In the coming years, they may be needed simply to help shore up friendly governments and countries that are plunging into chaos and on the verge of becoming failed states. Africa already provides ample examples, and such big countries as Pakistan and others could require outside assistance as well. An accord on the need to perform these missions, on becoming prepared for them, and on how to carry them out would need to be an important part of a transatlantic compact, including better NATO-EU cooperation.

Notwithstanding the importance of being willing to employ military force and civilian assets in the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions, a new transatlantic compact would also need to be characterized by a common political and diplomatic strategy there. Thorny issues arise. How can Iran and other troublesome powers best be handled, contained, and deterred? How can friendly powers be made secure in regions marked by interstate rivalries, ethnic and sectarian hatreds, terrorism, and WMD

proliferation? How can Israel be kept secure while seeking a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian rivalry? How can Pakistan be kept stable and democratic while avoiding an India-Pakistan war that might go nuclear? How can regional stability be ensured while avoiding the pitfalls of aligning too closely with autocratic regimes? How can democratization be promoted without paving the way for hostile, anti-western governments? How can radical Islamic fundamentalism be defused in an era when widespread frustrations are fanning its growth? How can economic progress be brought to these regions in ways that help bring peace and democracy in its wake? What are the main U.S. and European goals and strategies in these regions, how are they best pursued, and what forms of transatlantic collaboration are necessary and possible?

None of these complex questions are easily answered, but all of them will require well-conceived, multifaceted strategies to address them effectively. The key point is that common answers must be sought because the United States and Europe are now irretrievably involved in these regions to the point where detachment is no longer a viable option. In this troubled arena, relations between the United States and Europe have often been marked by conflicting perspectives, but signs of greater collaboration—e.g., diplomacy toward Iran and Lebanon—have been appearing lately. Whether this emerging transatlantic consensus can be broadened and accelerated is to be seen, but working hard to achieve it will need to be a key feature of a new strategic compact for the compelling reason that if the United States and Europe work at cross-purposes in these regions, or merely fail to cooperate, both of them may be destined to fail.

Although a primary focus on Europe and the Greater Middle East seems necessary for a new transatlantic compact, the rest of the world cannot be ignored, especially for the long haul. Owing to the steady emergence of China as a great power with a geopolitical agenda, coupled with Russia's increasingly assertive conduct, the global security system seems headed toward greater multipolarity and, potentially, friction with these countries. Also important, the entire Asian region is growing in economic and political power in ways that seem destined to have a major impact on the global security system. In South Asia, India is emerging as a major power with an agenda of its own. By tradition, the task of handling this profound transformation would be entrusted to the United States, which has long experience in dealing with China and Russia, presides over a bilateral system of security treaties in Asia that protect democratic allies there, and has been developing close relations with India and Pakistan. Even so, a core problem with continuing to follow this approach in any

singular way is that the United States may be too embroiled in the Greater Middle East, and too overextended elsewhere, to perform this demanding task on its own. If Europe can be added to the strategic power equation, in ways supporting the United States and its allies, prospects for achieving a stable multipolar system—one that counterbalances and integrates China while protecting Asia and other regions—will increase significantly. Adding Europe in this way would require it to adopt a global security perspective to a degree not currently being embraced. Fortunately the difficult task of forging a common U.S.-European approach in this demanding and uncertain arena does not have to be mastered immediately. But creating a foundation for it arguably could be a goal of a new transatlantic compact.

Enhancing Deterrence

One lesson from the 9/11 terrorist attacks that has been extended to Iran is that it is more difficult to deter new-era threats than it was to deter threats during the Cold War. This is particularly true in the nuclear arena. But alternatives to deterrence also have drawbacks, as we have seen with the doctrine of preemption. At the same time, NATO's nuclear strategy has become outmoded. Several recent developments highlight the need for a new NATO nuclear and deterrent strategy. First, at the Bucharest Summit NATO accepted the need for missile defenses, but public support is quite thin. Second, questions are being raised again on both sides of the alliance with regard to the need for retaining the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Third, if Iran develops a nuclear capability with a delivery system, how can Iranian use of that capability be successfully deterred? And fourth, what is needed to hedge against an emergent threat from Russia? NATO needs to update and strengthen its deterrent mission.

Three Options for Transatlantic Strategic Missions

In essence, the United States and Europe have three broad options at their disposal in deciding on which strategic missions should be embraced by a new transatlantic compact. The first, minimalist option would have this compact focus mainly on common security goals in the Euro-Atlantic area, coupled perhaps with steps to create a more flourishing transatlantic economy. This option would not be blind to regions outside Europe, including the Middle East, or wind back the clock on current outreach activities there, including the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. But neither would it seek to greatly expand these activities. In essence, this option would be limited to calling on the United

States and Europe to collaborate on an ad-hoc basis, i.e., temporarily and in specific cases when their interests and priorities happen to intersect.

The second option would be a more ambitious compact. It would focus on the Euro-Atlantic area coupled with common, sustained collaboration for carrying out political strategies, expeditionary missions, and comprehensive approaches across key parts of the Greater Middle East and Africa, and by adding more partners to the enterprise.

The third option is a maximalist approach. It would aim to create a truly global compact, one that, in addition to covering Europe and the Greater Middle East, strives to handle the emerging multipolar security system, contend with challenges posed by China, and preserve stability in Asia. This maximalist approach would provide a framework for integrating Asian democratic partners into the Euro-Atlantic compact, for providing leadership to the entire democratic community, and for participating in such global endeavors as controlling WMD proliferation, promoting climate control, and encouraging economic development.

Selecting which of these options to pursue depends on the strategic goals and time horizons of the transatlantic partnership. It also depends on the willingness and capacity of the United States and Europe to forge the necessary political consensus to harmonize strategic policies and commit the required resources for carrying out mutual activities. Choosing wisely among these options, in both the near-term and long-term, will go a long way not only toward defining the nature of a new transatlantic compact, but also toward determining its effectiveness in the coming years.

How can these three options best be appraised? In a nutshell, the minimum Eurocentric option arguably is too narrow, because it would pay insufficient attention to challenges arising in distant areas that will greatly affect the security of both the United States and Europe. For opposite reasons, a sudden leap into the maximum global option seems too demanding, because it would overload the transatlantic partnership and is not yet compellingly necessary in today's climate. This leaves a main focus on option two as an attractive choice: a vigorous focus on the Euro-Atlantic area, coupled with steadily expanding cooperation across the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions. This approach is attractive because it combines strategic necessity with the transatlantic partnership's potential capacity to operate effectively. This option makes best sense in the near-to-mid term; as it matures, it could be accompanied by a gradual shift toward the global option as strategic needs evolve and the partnership's capacities grow.

Although these three strategic options help illuminate broad choices, they should not be viewed as mutually exclusive, or as establishing rigid

start points and end points. All three point to compelling challenges that the transatlantic partnership will need to continually address. For this reason, a new compact needs to set clear priorities, but it also should be a flexible creation. It should allow the United States and Europe to work together in appropriate ways in all three arenas—Europe, the Greater Middle East, and globally—and to shift emphases as problems are solved and new challenges and opportunities arise. Above all, this compact should enable the transatlantic partnership to successfully address current priorities, while giving it ample room to adapt, mature, and grow. Such a glide path toward continuing maturation and growth is how the transatlantic Alliance started the Cold War—modestly, but growing steadily into a potent strategic entity that won the contest in Europe by promoting military security, political democracy, and economic progress. The same prescription applies to crafting a compact that helps determine how the transatlantic partnership is to be given new life, energy, and focus today.

Basket 2: Fostering Effective Decision Processes, Reciprocal Multilateralism, and Close NATO-EU Relations

Even a flexible and evolving compact that pursues demanding goals within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area will need a set of effective processes and procedures for decisionmaking and policy implementation that take advantage of the full scope of transatlantic strengths. Effective strategic performance in this key arena will never be easy for an alliance that encompasses two continents and is composed of the U.S. superpower, many European countries, and multiple institutions that include NATO and the EU. But there is a great deal of difference between performing poorly and performing competently. Achieving improved performance, compared to that of recent years, is an achievable goal. Doing so will require agreement on key principles and associated rules of the road regarding how the transatlantic partnership is to function in political terms, and how the United States and Europe are to behave toward each other in areas where they are endeavoring to collaborate.

Reciprocal Multilateralism

In particular, better performance will require reaffirmation and strengthening of U.S. and European commitments to what might be called “reciprocal multilateralism” which entails close consultation, consensual decisionmaking, acceptance of responsibility, and implementation of combined policies. By itself, reciprocal multilateralism is no guarantee that all

future Alliance decisions will be made wisely and implemented effectively. But it can provide a potent safeguard against crippling differences of opinion, mutual antagonisms, and the breakdown of collaborative mechanisms. Beyond this, it can help ensure that, when decisions are being made and policies implemented, the best ingredients of Alliance-wide cooperation are available.

Fortunately the United States and its European allies, acting mainly through NATO, have already learned how to practice this type of demanding multilateralism in dealing with continental security and defense affairs. The same cannot yet be said for their cooperation in dealing with areas outside Europe, including the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions. To be sure, progress has been made since the dark days of 2003, when the invasion of Iraq drove a deep wedge between the United States and multiple European countries led by Germany and France, and produced rancor on both sides of the Atlantic. Today, a spirit of greater empathy and cooperation is manifest in increasingly common U.S. and European policies toward Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, and other places, but considerable additional progress must be made if the United States and its European allies are to act as consistent, mutually supportive partners in these volatile and complex regions, which are producing today's greatest threats.

Although public controversy was especially inflamed by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, with troops from only Britain and a few other European countries by America's side, the problem of flawed U.S.-European gear-meshing in the Greater Middle East has deeper sources, originated years before, and has not yet been adequately resolved. During peacetime, the United States found itself largely alone in handling daily security affairs in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. When a crisis threatening war or otherwise requiring military action arose, the United States would turn to its European allies for help. Unable to call on NATO, which remained focused on Europe, U.S. leaders adopted the practice of assembling ad-hoc coalitions composed of enough willing participants to meet military requirements for the emergency at hand. This practice worked for the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991, a special situation that created a clear threat and triggered a large European response led by Britain and France. After this war, ad-hoc coalition building was revealed to have serious drawbacks. Typically, the United States would approach the Europeans with its strategic policies already established, and with expectations that they would provide resources to support these policies. European countries often resented not being consulted when these policies were being forged as well as alleged U.S. “cherry picking” of allies. Because they had made no prior

contractual agreements to participate, they would balk at providing military forces or otherwise contributing in major ways. The difficulties that arose during the Iraq invasion of 2003 thus were not isolated events, but instead reflected fundamental problems regarding principles governing how the transatlantic partnership should operate outside Europe.

Continued reliance on ad-hoc coalition building may still be favored in some quarters because it excuses the United States and Europe from making prior commitments to common action in nebulous circumstances before crises erupt. Experience shows, however, that even under the best of circumstances, ad-hoc coalition building is a flawed instrument for crisis management because it typically results in improvised responses that can produce inadequate resources from both the United States and Europe, fail to deter potential aggressors, and fail to meet high priority requirements for the situations at hand. Even when adequate resources are potentially available, the act of assembling and transporting them can be time-consuming, thus delaying decisive responses in potentially damaging ways. Equally important, such improvised coalition-building at the time of crises prevents the prior, regular, U.S.-European consultations that are vital to managing daily peacetime affairs and to creating the consensual agreements that permit swift, sure responses during crises. Likewise, ad-hoc coalitions are normally transient creations that fade after the crisis has passed, and are not available for addressing fresh challenges in the aftermath. To handle the requirements of the future, something better than ad-hoc coalition building is needed, in ways that foster ongoing consultations about peacetime strategic priorities in the Greater Middle East, coupled with agreements on how the United States and Europe are to be responsible for providing military forces and other assets during crises and wartime operations, and afterward, as well. Reciprocal multilateralism provides an instrument for helping to achieve this goal.

For the United States, fostering reciprocal multilateralism will require a concerted effort to treat Europe and its leading countries as co-equal partners in strategic affairs. This principle does not mean granting European countries veto power over U.S. foreign policy. The United States must retain the freedom to act independently when necessary. But it does mean a switch away from making American strategic judgments unilaterally, and then expecting European countries to act in support merely because they are expected to be loyal allies. At its core, reciprocal multilateralism requires genuine collaboration when such strategic judgments are being made, in an effort to find common ground if possible. Doing so requires the United States to respond in forthcoming ways in areas of spe-

cial importance to Europe, such as global warming. More fundamentally, it requires the United States not only to listen carefully, but also to grant European countries meaningful influence over the heart-and-soul of its security policies and strategies in cases when these countries are being asked to make important contributions.

Reciprocal multilateralism applies with equal power and a mandate for change to Europe. In particular, it requires European countries to accept the principle that, if they aspire to co-equal influence and authority over strategic choices in the Greater Middle East and elsewhere, then they must be willing to accept commensurate responsibility for bearing burdens, accepting risks, and sharing costs. This principle applies not only to launching military interventions and other forms of crisis response, but also to sharing the responsibilities, obligations, and commitments that arise on a daily basis in peacetime, over a period of many years. Reciprocal multilateralism does not mean that the Europeans must identically match all U.S. involvements in the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions. Nor does it mean that the exact blend of U.S. and European contributions must be the same from one issue to the next, for there will continue to be cases in which one participant leads and the other plays a supporting role or is not involved at all. Nor does it mean pursuing unanimity of strategic thought to the point of preventing both sides of the Atlantic from acting assertively in cases where disagreements exist. Instead, it means firm but flexible recognition that responsibility and authority must be allocated in equal doses, that both the United States and Europe regularly must endeavor to achieve a meeting of minds, cooperate whenever possible, and refrain from blocking each other from taking responsible actions when they are not directly collaborating.

The commitment to reciprocal multilateralism in new areas must be reaffirmed and strengthened in today's climate. Following the principle concertedly was a key reason why the transatlantic partnership and NATO performed so well during the Cold War. Once common approaches were agreed on, both the United States and its European allies normally felt that their authorities and responsibilities were balanced, that no participant was overloaded with too many burdens or stripped of critical influence, and that their respective contributions were blended in ways which advanced common security goals on both sides of the Atlantic. Plenty of disagreements occurred along the way, but the practice of joint consultation, coupled with fair-minded bargaining and negotiating, regularly ensured that initial conflict gave way to consensus and effective action. Moreover, reciprocal multilateralism was beneficial because it made sure that, when

complex issues arose, they were addressed by multiple governments, not just one, in ways that produced better policies and strategies.

Whether this principle can now be consistently applied to the Greater Middle East and adjoining regions is to be seen. Suffice it to say that it is key to the future ability of the United States and its European allies to attain their strategic goals and to deal effectively with new-era threats there. Reciprocal multilateralism, coupled with agreement on common strategic missions, especially offers a formula for breaking away from the pattern of relying on ad-hoc, improvised coalitions that perform ineffectively too often. In its place, reciprocal multilateralism offers an approach to creating permanent coalitions of U.S. and European countries for performing each strategic mission in sustained, effective ways. The exact nature of this coalition could vary from issue to issue, involving the United States and different European countries in shifting ways. But in each case, the coalition would be an enduring feature of the strategic terrain, capable of guiding security affairs toward common goals and desired outcomes. Equally important, each strategic mission would have its own permanent coalition, thus ensuring an across-the-board response from the transatlantic partnership.

NATO-EU Cooperation

If a new transatlantic compact for common security missions, enhanced strategic performance, and reciprocal multilateralism is to succeed, it must be anchored in an agreement to establish close cooperation between NATO and the EU in the security and defense arena. These two large institutions are the principal instruments by which the United States and Europe endeavor to handle contemporary strategic affairs in Europe and potentially elsewhere. NATO is especially important to the United States, because it enables the American government to exert presence and leadership in Europe, and because it provides a potent source of allied military forces that are interoperable with U.S. forces for operations outside Europe. While the Europeans value NATO for the same reasons, their special attention today is devoted to nurturing the EU and charting its future growth. On paper, these two institutions seem natural partners because they perform compatible, mutually supporting strategic missions. Whereas NATO helps provide Europe's security foundation, the EU helps determine how Europe's superstructure of multinational political integration and enlargement is to be built on this foundation. In reality, however, historical circumstances conspired to produce the opposite of close partnership: enduring suspicion and rivalry between the two institutions that

weakened both of them in security affairs and elsewhere. Progress toward lessening this rivalry and establishing greater cooperation has been made recently, but it needs to be accelerated. In their public rhetoric, NATO and the EU have already proclaimed a partnership. The challenge now is to supplement this rhetoric with concrete action.

The origins of the NATO-EU competitive relationship owe heavily to the longstanding rivalry between the United States and France for leadership in Europe. Whereas the United States relied on NATO, France increasingly used the EU to pursue its own goals. As a result, the United States sought to constrain the development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that might come at the expense of NATO. This U.S. attitude was reflected in a series of policy pronouncement beginning with the so-called "Bartholomew cable."⁵ France for its part sought to prevent new NATO strategic departures that might come at the expense of its visions for ESDP. In this strained climate, which often viewed NATO and the EU in zero-sum terms, the professional bureaucracies of both institutions developed attitudes of suspicion and indifference toward each other. As a result, supporters of NATO and the ESDP tended to block and frustrate each other. For example, the EU was blocked by Britain from creating its own senior military headquarters and from fully funding the European Defense Agency; and NATO was discouraged from pursuing homeland security in Europe and stability operations in Africa.

In recent years, the pendulum has begun slowly swinging toward greater cooperation, and encouraging progress has been made. In 2003, NATO and the EU finally signed the long-delayed Berlin Plus Accord, which permitted the EU to draw on NATO assets for military missions in cases where NATO had already exercised its right of first refusal. Although the Turkey-Cyprus problem prevented NATO-EU summits (this roadblock continues today), NATO and the EU began establishing formal institutional relationships at lower levels. An EU staff cell was established at NATO's SHAPE headquarters. NATO and the EU established a pattern of regular annual meetings, including two meetings by their foreign ministers each year, four high-level military staff talks per year, and other meetings at lower levels. Also important, the EU launched efforts to create its own military forces, in the form of large reaction forces and multiple small battle groups that could be deployed outside Europe's borders for a variety of missions. Fearing EU encroachment on its own missions and force improvement priorities, NATO initially reacted to these departures with skepticism. But as time passed, many of its members, including the United States, began seeing opportunities for burden-sharing and better

European defense integration in an EU that possesses important military capacities for power projection of its own.

Perhaps most important, NATO and the EU began performing security missions outside their borders that illuminated the potentialities of both bodies, promoted cooperation between them in some cases, and suggested a future division-of-labor between them. By 2007, NATO was performing fully seven external security missions in places ranging from the Mediterranean Sea to the Balkans and Afghanistan, while striving to establish cooperative military ties to key Middle East countries. Meanwhile, the EU was performing seven external missions of its own, including in the Balkans, Lebanon, and sub-Saharan Africa. With this many new-era missions—fourteen in total—each institution likely would have been overloaded in absence of contributions from the other. Moreover, their mutual experiences in the Balkans, especially Bosnia, showed the advantages of a practice in which NATO would intervene first to dampen major combat between local participants, and the EU would follow afterward to perform residual peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction missions.

In today's climate, hope for additional progress comes from several quarters. The United States has recently developed a more forthcoming attitude toward the EU and its ESDP. Equally important, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has adopted a more forthcoming attitude toward the United States, and has offered to return France to NATO's integrated military command, from which it has been absent since 1966, in exchange for U.S. and NATO support for ESDP. Warmer U.S.-French relations help set the political stage for closer ties between NATO and the EU, which evidently will write a new strategic concept of its own in the coming months. Also, important, the EU's signing of the Lisbon Treaty is creating an Office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, thus lessening the EU's traditional hydra-headed structure in this arena. For the first time, the EU, and all of Europe to a degree, will have a single official who can pursue cooperative ties with the United States and NATO. Although the EU's future is uncertain, continued integration in the security and defense arena will broaden long-range prospects for the transatlantic partnership to take the form of a triangular relationship among the United States, NATO, and the EU. Such a triangular relationship could strengthen the capacity of all three participants to cooperate more closely in performing new strategic missions in a setting of reciprocal multilateralism.

A second set of differences now block closer NATO-EU cooperation, differences between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and over Turkey's

admission to the EU. Turkey tends to block NATO-EU cooperation within the Alliance while Greece blocks cooperation within the EU. Turkey feels that elements of the Berlin-Plus Agreement advantageous to them have been breached and they object when NATO and the EU meet on the grounds that Cypriot delegates do not have proper security clearances. Positive political developments on Cyprus may provide an opportunity to remove this blockage but a major initiative is needed.

NATO-EU Division of Labor

If NATO and the EU are to collaborate closely, under leadership by the United States and key European powers, their interaction will need to be guided by clear strategic principles that are appealing to both bodies. Such principles would need to treat NATO and the EU as co-equal partners on the world stage, with neither body subordinate to the other in security and defense affairs. Such principles could be guided by an informal division of labor between NATO and the EU, one aimed not at hamstringing either institution, but instead at enabling both of them to take best advantage of their scarce resources. For the foreseeable future, NATO will remain the transatlantic partnership's premier military alliance for high-end defense requirements, including force transformation, demanding expeditionary missions, and major war-fighting. The EU will not be able to aspire to such defense standards for many years, but it could help promote armaments cooperation, common R&D and procurement, standardization and interoperability, training, multinational logistics, and other activities in ways that conserve scarce resources and thereby benefit European and NATO defense preparedness. The EU also will be able to acquire military forces and related capabilities for several important security and defense missions, including peacekeeping, training with foreign nations, stabilization and reconstruction (S&R), limited crisis interventions in such places as Africa, and providing civilian assets for comprehensive approaches. While such assets may be primarily intended for the EU's use, future collaboration perhaps could result in them being assigned to NATO missions. An example is the EU's ongoing effort to create fifteen battle groups of about 1,500 troops apiece, and to supplement them with an operational headquarters and associated air and naval forces. If the EU agrees, these battle groups and joint assets could be made available for some NATO forces and missions: e.g., the NATO Response Force (NRF). The same applies to any other modern forces that the EU might create, such as larger rapid reaction forces.

A division-of-labor approach should not be rigid. Instead, it could be flexible and evolutionary, with decisions made by a variety of decision-making bodies on a case-by-case basis. Frank Kramer and Simon Serfaty have proposed the creation of a Euro-Atlantic Forum consisting of all 32 EU-NATO members that would act as a “strategic coordinator” for transatlantic security issues.⁶ Regardless of how the division-of-labor idea is appraised, the governing reality is that if the United States and Europe are to achieve closer cooperation inside and outside Europe, they will both need a healthy NATO and a healthy EU. Equally important, neither NATO nor the EU can realistically aspire to perform the wide range of future strategic missions without significant help from the other. In recent years, both bodies have embarked on the task of performing strategic missions beyond Europe’s borders, but their current efforts may seem modest in comparison to the demanding endeavors that lie ahead. Because they can magnify each other’s powers while allowing both to focus on compelling priorities, close cooperation between NATO and the EU provides the best prescription for ensuring that both succeed, individually and collectively, in ways that promote the common goals of a strategic compact for the transatlantic partnership.

Basket 3: Building Capabilities for Expeditionary Missions and Comprehensive Approaches

A transatlantic compact will need to address improved capabilities in these two areas, because future requirements for them could be high, and current assets fall well short of meeting them. How large will these requirements be? U.S. and European military forces and civilian assets are carrying out two major contingencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while also operating in the Balkans and responding to crisis situations in Africa. The era of multiple concurrent contingencies has arrived, and future contingencies could be as large as, or larger than, those of today, and equally numerous, too. U.S., NATO, and European officials are already aware of the need to be prepared for multiple contingencies. But the exact nature of these contingencies—their time, place, circumstances, and requirements—cannot be confidently foreseen. For this reason, considerable flexibility and adaptability will be needed. The transatlantic partnership will need adequate military and civilian resources to respond effectively.

Expeditionary Missions

In the military arena, the United States already possesses sizable assets for power projection and expeditionary missions, but will need to so-

lidity its commitment to continued NATO preparedness. A few years ago, the Department of Defense forged a plan to reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe from about 100,000 military personnel to about 65,000. A centerpiece of this plan was to reduce the U.S. Army in Germany from four heavy brigades to only a single *Stryker* brigade, plus an air assault brigade in Italy. Recently, this drawdown plan has been suspended. If a new plan is adopted, it should leave enough Army brigades in Central Europe to train with their-European counterparts and be fully prepared for potential missions.⁷ Also, U.S. forces could take command of a NATO multinational corps headquarters, as well as continue to participate closely in the NRF. In addition to keeping its European Command properly resourced and involved in NATO, the United States can contribute by ensuring that its Central Command and new Africa Command work collaboratively with NATO and the EU.

Even with continuing U.S. contributions, remedying the deficiency of military resources for expeditionary missions will depend heavily on whether Europe can increase its contributions beyond current levels. Larger European defense and security budgets are needed. Whereas currently the United States spends well over four percent of its GDP on defense, Europe spends well less than two percent of its GDP for the same purpose. What matters at least as much as levels of security expenditures is creation of better European assets that can be applied to power projection, while also attending to emerging new-era needs in homeland security and defense. European members of NATO currently maintain about two million military personnel on active duty. Wealthy NATO members, mainly from northern Europe, maintain nearly one million active military personnel, including 500,000 ground troops, 56 combat brigades, 1,400 combat aircraft, and 150 naval combatants.⁸ But most of these large forces remain configured for old-style, border defense missions inherited from the Cold War, and are not readily deployable for new-era expeditionary missions.

Addressing this deficiency, NATO's *Comprehensive Political Guidance* (CPG), issued at the Riga Summit of 2006, called for fully 40 percent of NATO's ground forces to be prepared for operations in distant areas, for 8 percent of them to be deployable at any single time, and for the remaining 32 percent to provide sustainment assets plus capabilities for additional concurrent contingencies.⁹ Roughly speaking, the 8 percent figure translates into a requirement for 4 or 5 divisions (12–15 brigades), or 120,000–150,000 troops when combat units and logistic support assets are counted. European countries today field enough active divisions and

brigades to meet this 8 percent requirement, but they currently lack the mobility forces and logistic support assets to deploy them rapidly outside Europe. This is the case even when British and French forces—the best prepared for projection missions—are included. Moreover, European countries recently have been falling short of quotas for manning the much-heralded NRE, a swiftly deployable strike force that totals only 25,000 personnel for its ground, air, and naval components. In a wartime emergency, additional forces could be generated, but low readiness levels, shortages in strategic lift, and equipment shortfalls would set an upper limit on the total number. Whether more than 75,000 ground troops plus commensurate air and naval assets could be quickly deployed outside Europe is an open question.

What should be future European and NATO preparedness goals in this arena? On paper, the idea of having fully 40 percent of European ground forces available for deployment missions looks impressive, but it might overestimate requirements and create too many force goals for available budgets to handle. Conversely, the idea of having only 8 percent of forces ready for short-notice deployments might underestimate requirements. A ready posture of only 4 or 5 divisions might prove inadequate if two or more contingencies erupt concurrently. Perhaps the Europeans and NATO might be better off by focusing on preparing 6–8 divisions for rapid deployment, backed by a total pool of 16–20 mobilizable divisions (roughly 30 percent of total forces). These and other ideas will need to be considered by NATO and European military authorities. Regardless of the exact numbers chosen, the key point is that if future requirements are to be met, European capabilities for swiftly projecting military power will need to increase significantly in the coming years.

Hope for tangible progress comes from the prospect that high-leverage, low-cost changes in such areas as training, doctrine, and reorganization can yield significant improvements to deployability for expeditionary missions. British and French forces already are organized for such missions. Together, they field 18 ground brigades, 600 combat aircraft, and 90 naval combatants, a significant portion of which are deployable. In Afghanistan, such countries as the Netherlands and Canada have been making large contributions that meet any fair sense of “per capita quotas” assigned to them. Among other countries, Germany is making progress in the arena of force reorganization. Today, Germany fields 21 ground brigades, 300 combat aircraft, and 15 major naval combatants, but this sizable posture has traditionally been oriented to local defense. Recently, Germany issued a far-sighted plan calling for its ground forces to be reorganized into three

bodies for expeditionary missions: 35,000 troops for rapid reaction, high-intensity combat missions, 70,000 troops for stabilization and other low-intensity missions, and 147,500 troops for logistic support.¹⁰ Some other countries are following this path, albeit in less ambitious ways. Individually, few of them will likely be able to commit large forces for expeditionary missions, but if most of them can contribute small forces—a division or a brigade and some fighter aircraft apiece—the combined effect can be to add sizable forces to Europe's ledger for power projection.

Generating adequate, deployable manpower and combat units is only part of the requirements equation. As the *CPG* observed, NATO forces for expeditionary missions must be well-equipped and properly transformed so that they can perform new-era combat missions and achieve interoperability with U.S. military forces. Fortunately, Europe's wealthier countries already possess modern ground weapons, aircraft, and ships that meet requirements in this area. But significant additional transformation is needed in such areas as improved C4ISR assets, information networks, unmanned aerial surveillance, SOF forces, precision-strike systems, air-ground coordination, WMD defense assets, airlift and sealift, and logistic support. Across Europe, military investment budgets are typically too small to permit rapid acquisition programs in these areas. This is a key reason why defense budgets need to grow, so that investment funds can be increased in the face of high spending on manpower and daily operations. Even with current investment budgets, however, several countries are pursuing innovative procurement programs. In the coming years, such new systems as the F-35 fighter, the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), the Ground Surveillance Monitor, the medium-size A-400M transport aircraft, and, for Britain, two new, large aircraft carriers, will enter the inventory. Over a period of 5–10 years, this positive trend will gradually elevate European military capabilities for new-era missions.

NATO can contribute to this enterprise by encouraging sound force goals and investment priorities for European countries, and by taking steps to further refine its force structures and command relationships. Ongoing efforts to encourage better information networking, airlift and sealift, critical enabling assets, and multinational logistic support make sense. Priority attention should be given to those forces that actually will be used for expeditionary missions rather than border defense, e.g., the NRE, SOF units, and some High Readiness Forces (HRF), such as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and other multinational corps headquarters and formations. In addition, NATO could contribute by breathing greater life into its Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), thereby providing

its European members with strong guidance regarding their plans and programs in transformation, modernization, and armaments cooperation. The same sense of priority attention to expeditionary missions applies to the EU and its defense preparedness efforts, which will help make best use of scarce resources if they are harmonized with those of NATO.

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

In today's setting, expeditionary missions often go hand-in-hand with S&R operations. Growing recognition of the need for extended, demanding S&R missions arose in the aftermath of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the immediate goal of regime change was swiftly accomplished in both places, U.S. and coalition military forces were then assigned the larger goal of stabilizing both countries, eliminating enemy residual opposition there, and helping lay a security foundation that would enable both countries to undertake the long transition to democratic governments, civil societies, and functioning economies. These new ambitious goals, in turn, required U.S. and coalition forces to perform a large set of demanding, unfamiliar, and unplanned missions that fall under the rubric of S&R, e.g., counterterrorism, fighting criminal gangs, pacifying ethnic violence, restoring distribution of electrical power, water, food, and fuel, other aspects of infrastructure rehabilitation, and rebuilding armies, police forces, and other institutions of governance and law enforcement. In all of these areas, U.S. and coalition forces soon found their work cut out for them, and the demands facing them have not abated in the years since both invasions were launched.

Future requirements for S&R missions could be large. Meeting requirements for these capabilities during the initial stages of an intervention can be demanding, and the act of sustaining large S&R forces is more demanding because it necessitates periodic rotation of forces, thus creating a need for a sizable total pool of available assets. Fortunately, European militaries possess plenty of manpower and associated capabilities to generate large S&R assets, including administrators, trainers, military police, CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation), construction engineers, and medical personnel. But steps to better organize and prepare them are needed for both combat and non-combat contingencies. Today some European militaries (e.g. Britain and France) prefer to remain focused on traditional warfighting, and want to configure EU battle groups for high-tech, combat operations. In particular, France's new White Paper seems to limit France's willingness to engage in S&R operations.¹¹ Germany and others, however, have expressed interest and a willingness to act in the

S&R preparedness arena. They need sound guidance from NATO to set their priorities individually and collectively. At its Riga Summit, NATO acknowledged the need for improved S&R capabilities but took no steps to establish a command structure or coordination center, or to identify the size and characteristics of forces needed. Nor was anything definitive said at NATO's Bucharest Summit of 2008. Better guidance for planning and programming will be needed from NATO and the EU in this arena.

Comprehensive Approach

Although S&R missions remain a preoccupation of the U.S. military and its European partners, performing them has recently been subsumed under the larger category of "comprehensive approaches," whose importance was acknowledged by NATO in its Riga Summit of 2006 and its Bucharest Summit of 2008. The core idea is that the mission of restoring order and progress to damaged countries cannot be accomplished by military forces alone. Instead, it must be performed by a combination of military forces and civilian assets that are forged together on behalf of common purposes. Significant civilian assets are needed because they are best able to perform critical rehabilitation functions, including civil engineering, infrastructure construction, communicating across cultures, creating law enforcement systems, establishing modern governmental structures, setting economic and financial policies, regulating currencies, and promoting effective education systems. Such civilian functions, in turn, cannot normally be performed by a single institution. Instead, they must be performed by a multiplicity of actors, including governmental bureaucracies such as the U.S. State Department as well as NATO and especially the EU, assets from partner countries outside Europe such as Japan and Australia, international agencies such as the United Nations and OSCE, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, and numerous civilian contractors. Fusing these civilian activities and blending them with ongoing S&R missions of military forces is the demanding purpose of comprehensive approaches.

As recent experience shows, comprehensive approaches are anything but easy to carry out. This especially is the case in the immediate aftermath of major combat, when military forces may be present in large numbers, but civilian assets are slow to arrive on the scene. As these civilian assets begin arriving, they often must operate in a setting of chaos and violence, in ways requiring that they be protected by military forces from insurgency and terrorist opposition to them. Once these civilian assets have deployed in sufficient numbers, and are able to operate in a peaceful setting,

they can begin functioning with growing effectiveness. At this juncture, a new challenge arises, that of providing them top-down guidance and control so that their activities are properly coordinated in a setting of multiple agencies and actors with goals, agendas, priorities, and procedures of their own—not all of which are easily compatible or reconciled with each other. Even after each civilian activity is properly resourced, and proper teamwork is established, the act of carrying out the full spectrum of demanding missions can require months or years, and in badly damaged or underdeveloped countries, progress can be excruciatingly slow. Patience and persistence are required for comprehensive approaches to succeed.

The difficult experiences encountered thus far in such places as the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq show that comprehensive approaches, involving close cooperation among military and civilian instruments, should not be mounted on the fly through improvised, ad-hoc arrangements. In the military arena, ad-hoc mechanisms can sometimes be employed because the requisite military forces are already available, are sufficiently ready and equipped, and respond obediently to orders from atop. The same does not apply to most civilian agencies and instruments, and to their capacity to interface with military forces. Although governmental agencies respond to executive orders from their commanders, multinational institutions and NGO are a different matter. They must be recruited and persuaded to participate. Even when the full spectrum of required actors is mobilized, many of them may lack prompt access to the specific assets that are needed in each case. Valuable time can be lost as these actors assemble the proper combination of skilled personnel and equipment. Such problems can be quickly solved when only a small number of civilians must be deployed to a distant area, but an entirely different, less tractable situation emerges when hundreds or thousands of civilians, with many different skills, must be sent, and then must establish close cooperation with military forces.

Such considerations highlight the paramount importance of advanced planning for the civilian side of comprehensive approaches, and for the civilian-military interface, if future interventions are to succeed. To be sure, no advanced planning can anticipate the unique demands of each situation. But such plans can make a critical difference between responding poorly and effectively because they help identify and mobilize the basic categories and amounts of resources, and help create the organizational practices, that might be needed in each case. Above all, they can place the United States and its partners in the general ballpark of having adequate resources and collaborative practices, while lessening the risk of

being caught completely unprepared when surprising demands emerge. As Dwight Eisenhower once said, "plans are nothing, but planning is everything." The key implication is that because demanding military-civilian missions in this arena are likely to be a permanent feature of tomorrow's strategic terrain, the United States and its European allies need to intensify serious planning for them.

The need for advanced planning carries with it the requirement to develop better civilian capabilities than exist today on both sides of the Atlantic. Both the United States and Europe could establish a standing civilian core for these missions. Merely compiling a list of potential volunteers would not suffice. Participating personnel must be given adequate education, training, and exercise opportunities to develop the special skills that are needed. This especially applies to such demanding areas as police training, justice, rule of law, and cross-cultural communications. National leadership in this arena is needed because the necessary personnel and skills will remain largely in the possession of participating countries. But NATO and the EU have important roles to play as well. They can employ their planning mechanisms to help guide and coordinate the application of national resources, programs, and budgets. They can establish centers of excellence for helping promote common training and doctrines. They can create operational plans for determining how to act when the need arises. Also, they can create command structures capable of carrying out military-civilian missions, e.g., by allocating one of NATO's multinational corps headquarters for this purpose. At its Bucharest Summit, NATO proclaimed that it had adopted an "Action Plan" for pursuing comprehensive approaches. The challenge now is to carry out this plan effectively, while working closely with the EU and other bodies.

Becoming better prepared for expeditionary missions, S&R operations, and comprehensive approaches is only partly a function of creating the necessary resources and deploying them when needed. Being successful also is a function of knowing how to apply these resources in concrete situations so that the strategic goals of U.S.-European interventions can be accomplished as effectively and swiftly as possible. Recently, the frustrations of operating in Afghanistan and Iraq have given rise to a growing emphasis on learning how to apply effects-based practices that strive to ensure a coherent relationship between the means and ends of operations. The capacity of the United States and Europe to learn this art will go a long way toward determining whether their future interventions in distant areas continue to be frustrating, or instead turn out successfully.

Conclusion

In summary, the idea of forging a new transatlantic compact that bonds the United States and Europe more closely in security affairs, one in which a new NATO strategic concept would be embedded, has important merits. But if such a compact is to succeed, it must have tangible, real-life components and consequences. On both sides of the Atlantic, it must create a sense of common strategic missions within and beyond Europe, forge agreement on principles of reciprocal multilateralism and close NATO-EU relations, and produce a commitment to creating improved capabilities for expeditionary missions, S&R operations, and comprehensive approaches. Such an ambitious agenda, with all of its requirements for gear-shifting and new directions by both the United States and its European allies, cannot be accomplished overnight. But if the effort is launched and sustained, progress can be made in ways that have steady cumulative effects over a period of years and thereby help address today's threats while making key parts of the world more peaceful. This, at least, is the promise of such a compact and a dual-path approach.

How can this idea best be implemented in political terms in a manner that appeals to both the United States and Europe? One idea is to have a new transatlantic compact become the centerpiece of a grand summit whose attendees would include the United States, participating European countries, NATO, and the EU. At such a summit, the initial version of the compact could be adopted and issued as a special communiqué. Afterward, working groups could further develop its contents, and NATO could write a new strategic concept. A year or two later, another grand summit could be held to formally adopt conclusions and recommendations and launch further studies by working groups. Through regular, successive summits, coupled with ongoing studies, the compact could steadily expand.¹²

If the idea of grand U.S.-European summits fails to gain traction, the alternative is a less publicly visible approach that seeks progress via multiple avenues of action. In this option, the United States would first pursue close consultations with key European countries on the ingredients of such a compact. As consensus emerges, a new NATO strategic concept would be written. Afterward, this consensus would be gradually but steadily be expanded to NATO-EU relations and other venues of transatlantic collaboration. A single document embodying the full compact might not emerge anytime soon, but it could eventually be signed, and in practical terms, this multifaceted evolutionary approach could gradually help steer the transatlantic partnership in the right directions.

Both of these options have attractions and liabilities. The first offers the best prospects for big immediate success, but it would require mobilizing a widespread consensus on both sides of the Atlantic, perhaps in ways that exceed the art of the possible in today's situation. The second is less immediately ambitious, but it would face fewer political obstacles, and could gradually be expanded as consensus grows. Neither option offers an easy path, but either of them could succeed if it is pursued systematically. The key point is that if a new transatlantic compact is to be forged and brought to life (along with a new NATO strategic concept), one or the other of these options needs to be tried. In today's troubled world, the imperatives for action, and the potential payoffs, are too great to be ignored.

Notes

¹ For in-depth discussions of U.S.-European political relations and related issues, see Simon Serfaty, ed., *A Recast Partnership? Institutional Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008). Especially insightful chapters are those by Simon Serfaty, Franklin Kramer, Jolyon Howorth, and Julian Lindley French.

² See "World View of U.S. Role Goes From Bad to Worse," *BBC World Service Poll*, January 23, 2007; "Except for Spain, Majorities or Pluralities in Five European Countries Believe Life Has Become Worse Since Joining the EU," *Financial Times/Harris Interactive Poll*, March 19, 2007; "Transatlantic Trends, Key Findings 2006," The German Marshall Fund and the Compagnia di San Paolo, June 2006.

³ For further analysis, see CTNSP/INSS Special Report, *Transatlantic Homeland Defense* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006). See also Esther Brimmer (ed.), *Five Dimensions of Homeland and International Security* (Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2008).

⁴ See NATO Press Release, "Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of States and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008" (Brussels, Belgium: 2008). Available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>>.

⁵ The cable, sent to NATO posts by Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew on February 20, 1991, is reprinted in Willem van Eekelen, *Debating European Security: 1948–1998* (The Hague: SDU Publishers, 1998), 340–44.

⁶ See Franklin D. Kramer and Simon Serfaty, "Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership," in *A Recast Partnership? Institutional Dimensions of Transatlantic Relations* (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008), 191–213.

⁷ The current U.S. military presence in Europe is about 95,000 personnel, counting ground, air, and naval units. See *The Military Balance, 2008* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007).

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ See "Comprehensive Political Guidance of the Riga Summit," available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b061129e.htm>. See also the communiqués of the summits held in Istanbul, available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>> and Riga, available at <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>>.

¹⁰ See *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 2006 (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006), 69, available in English at <http://www.bmvg.de/portal/PA_1_0_P3/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/W26UWAMT995INFOEN/W_2006_eng_DS.pdf?yw_repository=youtatweb>.

¹¹ See *The French White Paper on defence and national security* (Paris: The Presidency of the Republic, June 2008).

¹² For further analysis of this option, see Kramer and Serfaty, "Recasting the Euro-Atlantic Partnership."

Part III:

New Operations

and Missions

Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of Euroatlantic Institutions (2007)¹

Jeffrey Simon

Key Points

Despite 15 years of international peacekeeping and security assistance, the West Balkans are still beset with major security challenges that will severely test the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in 2007.

Bosnia-Herzegovina still requires the presence of EU and NATO police and peacekeepers and, along with newly independent Montenegro, needs help in building basic institutions. The same is true for Kosovo. As the United Nations addresses Kosovo's "final status," Kosovar and Serbian interethnic relations will likely grow more unstable, possibly with ripple effects in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Among the instruments for enhancing Balkan stability today are NATO's Partnership for Peace and the EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements, along with an array of subregional organizations promoting cooperation.

NATO and EU members—Hungary, Slovenia, and Greece, along with Romania and Bulgaria, who joined the EU in January 2007—now provide a core for coordinating NATO and EU programs in promoting West Balkan security sector reform, encouraging regional collaboration, and providing a credible roadmap for Euro-Atlantic integration.

Expanding the Southeast European Defense Ministerial and Civil-Military Emergency Planning Council for Southeastern Europe membership to include all West Balkan states and broadening their coverage to include interior ministers (police and border guards) would create the necessary conditions for advancing Balkan regional cooperation in

a Southeast European Homeland Defense Ministerial. Such a union of defense and interior ministers would work with the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative to provide opportunities for West Balkan states to move beyond stabilization toward integration.

These stabilization efforts and institutional developments are cause for optimism but no guarantee of success. A NATO–EU Balkan strategy that aims at effective and well-integrated national, NATO, EU, and sub-regional capacity-building efforts will be a vital ingredient in forestalling future conflict.

Balkans in Perspective

Since the end of the Cold War, the Balkan region has presented major security challenges to the United States and Europe. The instability and weak governance of the region remain an important concern in the post-9/11 period. Balkan regional tensions erupted in several wars resulting from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in 1991. After a slow initial response from Europe and confronted by an inadequate United Nations (UN) effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), the United States convinced the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to initiate a decade-long peacekeeping mission to safeguard implementation of the Dayton Accords. Then, in an effort to halt a humanitarian catastrophe stemming from ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, NATO engaged in an air campaign against Serbia and another major peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.²

The Yugoslav wars during the 1990s reinforced the view that Europe was unable to handle its own security challenges and that the European Union (EU) needed to improve its military capabilities and be able to deploy forces outside its borders. In 1999, the EU launched its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with a Helsinki Headline Goal that called for a European Union Force (EUFOR) of 60,000 troops to deploy within 60 days for up to 12 months to focus on the so-called Petersberg Tasks comprising humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis-management missions. EU governments also agreed to support major new efforts to better integrate their competencies in civil society, security sector reform, and military operations to enhance post-conflict stabilization, security transition, and reconstruction operations.

Looming Challenges

Despite successful stabilization efforts and institutional advances of the past decade, Balkan regional conflicts and the risk of state failure, which receded into the background after 9/11, are likely to reemerge as challenges requiring renewed attention from the United States and Europe. Three major challenges are on the horizon:

- ▀ The future of Bosnia-Herzegovina in light of the recent constitutional setback and aftermath of the October 1, 2006, parliamentary elections will be challenged, raising questions about likely future requirements for EU Operation *Althea* (EUFOR) and the EU Police Mission (EUPM).
- ▀ With Montenegro opting for independence in the May 21, 2006, referendum, its small size (population 620,000) and embryonic state institutions may prove to be an impediment to achieving its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and could have an impact on governance in Belgrade and on regional stability and security.
- ▀ With Kosovo final status negotiations moving toward conclusion without resolution by Belgrade, Priština, and Kosovo Serbs, an “imposed” settlement could have significant implications on Kosovo’s statehood prospects, Kosovo Force’s (KFOR’s) future, and Serbia. If Kosovo fails to remain a multi-ethnic entity, it could also have an impact on stability and security in the West Balkans, Southeast Europe, and beyond (for example, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia).

In each case, NATO and the EU, along with subregional organizations, will play significant roles in preventing a backslide into conflict, but the character of these roles will vary. Bosnia and Montenegro need assistance in building their civilian and defense institutions, respectively, while Serbia and Kosovo will need help developing cooperative activities with each other and their neighbors, as well as advancing security sector reforms.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: Unresolved Issues. BiH continues to face the challenge of building state-level institutions. To begin moving toward its objective of joining Euro-Atlantic structures, BiH started negotiations in November 2003 and approved a feasibility study with the EU, but it still has outstanding issues of police reforms. Recent efforts to amend the constitution to strengthen the state over ethnic entities failed and had to be postponed until after the October 1, 2006, parliamentary elections, which

were successfully convened. It remains to be seen if unity of the country will prevail and if state-level police institutions will make necessary progress.

Though BiH created a new state-level defense ministry in January 2006 and was invited to join Partnership for Peace (PFP) in November 2006, it is expected to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and it faces remaining challenges to move other institutions from entity-level to state-level (such as the Ministry of Interior). As ethnic mistrust remains, it is unclear as to when this will happen, and the Republika Srpska (RS) prime minister continues to resist police reform under a state-level ministry of interior. As BiH constitutional amendments to do this failed to acquire the necessary two-thirds majority in both parliament houses in spring 2006, the new government after the October 1, 2006, parliamentary and presidential elections will have to renew the constitutional debate. But initial indications are not promising, as RS President Nebojsa Radmanovic and Prime Minister Milorad Dodik do not want a unified Bosnia.³ Weak governance and a destroyed economic base have led to chronic unemployment, which official statistics put at roughly 40 percent but which is probably closer to 20 percent because of the gray economy.⁴

EUFOR's mission will be accomplished when BiH state-level institutions have been created and are functioning adequately. No one can predict when this will happen, however. Recognizing that local politicians must ultimately accept responsibility for the result, the EU Office of the High Representative believes it is still premature to shift to state-level institutions, preferring that the EU Special Representative remain in the country for at least another year.

Montenegro's New Start. Montenegro proclaimed its independence from Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) on June 3, 2006, following its May 21, 2006, referendum. On June 12, the EU recognized Montenegro as a sovereign and independent state. Given that Belgrade's efforts to seek EU association for SaM had been sidetracked by the failure to deliver Ratko Mladic to the Hague Tribunal, many Montenegrins believed, not unreasonably, that Euro-Atlantic accession would be faster if they could proceed independently. Yet Montenegro is also starting from a very weak institutional, human, and financial resource base.

Five shortcomings are most evident. First, the new country is only now in the midst of writing its constitution, which presumably will define the powers between the president and prime minister. Apparently operating under the Montenegrin Republic's Constitution of 1992, the president has already decreed that the Montenegrin Armed Forces will abandon

conscription and field an all-volunteer force. (Thus far, it is in the process of reducing from 6,300 troops to a goal of 2,500). Second, although Montenegro has a newly appointed defense minister (the prime minister had previously been dual-hatted), it still does not have a defense ministry, nor does it have sufficient adequately trained personnel to provide necessary civilian (budget, defense policy and plans, personnel management, and logistics) oversight of the military. Third, members of parliament also need assistance in developing appropriate skills to perform necessary defense committee oversight of operations and budget. Fourth, of the planned 2,500 troops in the Montenegrin Armed Forces, only 13 speak English, and only 3 have observed or participated in UN peacekeeping operations.⁵ Finally, Montenegrin financial resources will likely prove to be a major constraint. Montenegro's planned 2007 defense budget of 40 million Euro (less than the 2006 budget) represents 2 percent of gross domestic product, is insufficient to meet its planned requirements, and likely will be difficult to sustain over time. Montenegro may find that its planned professional force is too large and expensive to sustain or maintain at operational levels and likely will require reassessment.

In sum, Montenegro's expectations about rapid Euro-Atlantic integration resulting from its independence from Serbia may prove to be overly optimistic and will need to be tempered by hard work that remains to be done on building institutions. Montenegrin independence also has consequences for regional security. Albanian views of the Montenegrin referendum are that since Belgrade accepts the results as legitimate, it should also accept a Kosovo independence referendum as legitimate. In contrast, Serbs disagree, claiming the two cases are entirely different.

Kosovo: The Next New State? The status talks led by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, which began in March 2006 and failed to reach any agreement among the Serbs and Kosovars, resulted in a "mandated" Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement that satisfied neither Belgrade nor Priština when presented on February 2, 2007. While the plan does *not* mention independence, its provisions describe de facto statehood for Kosovo—providing for an army, constitution, and flag—although it foresees the need for an International Civilian Representative and a continued NATO presence to support Kosovo's fledgling government.⁶ In Belgrade, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica refused to meet with Ahtisaari, and the parliament overwhelmingly rejected the plan by a vote of 225 to 15. In Priština, demonstrations supporting full independence resulted in violent clashes that left 2 dead and 70 injured when a Romanian contingent of UN civilian police fired on the crowd.⁷

This event was reminiscent of the violence that erupted unexpectedly in Kosovo on March 17–18, 2004, which left 19 dead and had nearly disastrous consequences for regional stability because of the inability of KFOR, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to protect Kosovo's minority communities. National caveats and rules of engagement prevented KFOR from responding expeditiously. Although KFOR ultimately proved effective, it had no crowd control capacity. NATO learned from the experience; as a result, KFOR underwent a transformation—from 4 multinational bases to 5 multinational task forces that are more mobile and flexible and operate with fewer national caveats—that was completed in fall 2006. Presumably now prepared for riot control operations, KFOR continues to provide presence, supervision, and deterrence, and to direct support to authorities—KPS and UNMIK—and the population.

Many in the region are concerned about the lack of progress in Kosovo's final status negotiations. General consensus exists on Kosovo's need to adhere to "standards" in the status negotiations, and to conclude the negotiations this year to fend off frustration and stagnation. Kosovo's economic conditions remain poor, with unemployment in the 50 percent range, inadequate infrastructure to sustain economic growth, and a lack of foreign direct investment. Of the 200,000 Serbs who have left Kosovo since 1999, only 14,300 (slightly more than 7 percent) have returned. For economic reasons and security concerns about radical Kosovars, particularly after the March 2004 violence, Serbs have not returned to Kosovo. Even Norwegian Ambassador Kai Eide claims that his October 2005 Kosovo report provided a sober assessment of the situation but that the international community was "sugar coating" the results and was *not* paying adequate attention to "standards" in the status negotiations.⁸ The NATO Riga Summit has also attached "great importance to standards implementation, especially regarding the safeguarding of minority and community rights and the protection of historical and heritage sites, and to combating crime and corruption."⁹

NATO's credibility is tied to the future of Kosovo, where its commitment has been substantial and remains real. The 78-day air campaign represented the first time that NATO actually went to war, and its present KFOR commitment of roughly 16,000 troops (down from 46,000 in 1999) is still sizeable compared to its commitment of 32,000 troops to Afghanistan (a country 60 times the size of Kosovo).¹⁰ Despite the size of the force, however, challenges remain.

Though NATO is heavily engaged in demanding operations in Afghanistan and is fatigued by the ongoing Balkans issues, many European NATO members and partners see Kosovo, which is closer to home, *not* Afghanistan, as a priority. There is no consensus among NATO members and partners on the Kosovo “status” negotiations. A major concern about Kosovo’s future direction is the possibility that it will encourage other demands for ethnic self-determination in Europe. For example, although Albania wants Kosovo independence, Macedonia will support an agreement only if *both* Belgrade and Priština recognize existing borders and if the future Kosovo remains multi-ethnic as an example for Macedonia. Furthermore, a mono-ethnic Kosovo could trigger Bosnian Serbs in the RS to pry away from BiH. On the other hand, Slovakia and Romania (concerned about an independent Kosovo becoming a model for Transnistria secession) would prefer “autonomy” for Kosovo. Ukraine and Georgia see potential for spillover in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but Poland does not because Kosovo is not part of Russia. Bulgarians perceive potential disintegrative pressures resulting in Macedonia, while Hungarians harbor concerns about the status of ethnic Hungarians in the Serbian province of Vojvodina. Hence, if Kosovo achieves independence through a “forced” decision, there will likely be a price to pay within NATO (among members and partners) and with Serbia and possibly Russia. In addition to these problems, Kosovo will present further challenges after its final status is mandated.

The International Role

International and regional organizations have come to play a significant role in West Balkans stability, though it was not always that way. Initially, when the Balkan wars began in 1991, the best that NATO and the EU could muster was half-hearted support for a humanitarian aid effort led, weakly, by the United Nations. That changed in late 1995, when a combination of developments on the ground and U.S.-led coercive diplomacy produced the Dayton Accords that ended the Bosnian war and ushered in a major ramp-up of NATO and EU activities. Ever since, NATO and the EU have engaged in stabilization, cooperation, and integration activities in the region. Over the past decade, NATO and EU ranks have swelled with new members and partners so that both institutions now bound the West Balkans geographically and create conditions for building cooperative security by fulfilling NATO and EU membership aspirations through a variety of techniques. Dual enlargement and integration incentives have

played, and continue to play, a vital role in enhancing West Balkan stability and security.

Along with Greece and Turkey (NATO members since 1952), the addition of Hungary in 1999, and Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania in 2004 has formed a stable security boundary around the six states presently comprising the West Balkans. NATO's PFP and Membership Action Plan (MAP) program keep Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia (the so-called Adriatic Three) constructively focused and engaged in cooperative security activities consistent with NATO principles and will continue to do so as long as NATO's "Open Door" policy remains credible. Albania and Macedonia joined PFP in 1994 and 1995, respectively, and MAP in 1999, while Croatia joined PFP in 2000 and MAP in 2002.

The incentive of PFP also keeps the remaining three West Balkan states—Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (which could easily become four with Kosovo or potentially five with an independent Republika Srpska)—focused on reform because they perceive PFP as their initial pathway to Euro-Atlantic structures and legitimacy. The continuing engagement of the Adriatic Three in MAP and of BiH, Serbia, and Montenegro in PFP has become increasingly important because of NATO's continuing need to coordinate its Sarajevo headquarters with EUFOR Operation *Althea* since NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) transfer in December 2004 in BiH; to deploy KFOR in Kosovo; and to deal with unresolved Serbia status issues in Kosovo, which create counterproductive temptations.

To help maintain this course, NATO's Riga Summit in November 2006 sent a strong signal to the Adriatic Three regarding membership invitation prospects for 2008 and offered invitations to join PFP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to BiH, Montenegro, and Serbia to temper nationalistic tendencies and to enhance long-term stability in the West Balkans.¹¹

Although the six West Balkan aspirants see EU enlargement as a longer-term process than NATO does, the benefits reaped by EU membership are more tangible. As it is, the EU has played a critical stabilizing role, particularly since the June 2003 Thessaloniki Summit opened up prospects for their ultimate inclusion.¹² Along with support from EU members Greece, Hungary, and Slovenia (and Romania and Bulgaria in January 2007), the EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the West Balkans contain provisions for future membership. Nonetheless, recent events have raised some questions. Following the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands on the EU constitution in May

and June 2005, respectively, the EU foreign ministers meeting in Salzburg on March 11, 2006, conveyed the message to the West Balkans that their integration prospects are slipping into the distant future. While the EU has been struggling with its enlargement to 25 (from 15) members and facing concerns about the addition of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007, it is having difficulty grappling with the thought of possibly adding another 6 weak Balkan states to the fold.

The West Balkan aspirants have made some, albeit halting, progress with the EU. Macedonia and Croatia signed SAAs on April 21, 2004, and February 1, 2005, respectively, that entered into force in 2005. Albania signed an agreement on June 12, 2006, although corruption continues to undermine respect for rule of law. The EU Report on BiH progress made between October 1, 2005, and September 30, 2006, noted that the SAA signing depends primarily on police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which RS authorities are obstructing (for example, by refusing to abolish the interior ministry and creating police districts that cross entity lines), along with lack of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.¹³ In April 2005, the EU Commission concluded that SaM was sufficiently prepared to negotiate an SAA but decided on May 3, 2006, to suspend negotiations because of its failure to arrest Ratko Mladic. Then Montenegro proclaimed independence from SaM on June 3, 2006, following its May 21, 2006, referendum.

How might the EU and NATO collaborate in the interests of Balkan stability? As discussed below, Macedonia and Bosnia illustrate some positive practices, while Serbia and, separately, Montenegro, pose new challenges.

Macedonia: A Good Model. One example of successful cooperation involved the Ohrid Agreement to prevent war in Macedonia. In February 2001, when interethnic strife between Macedonian security forces and armed Albanian extremists made war look likely, NATO and the EU coordinated negotiations that led to the August 13, 2001, Ohrid Framework Agreement, which opened the door to numerous amendments to the Macedonian constitution and far-reaching legislative changes.¹⁴ NATO launched the 30-day Operation *Essential Harvest* on August 27, 2001, with 3,500 troops and logistical support to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons. This was followed by the 3-month Operation *Amber Fox* with the mandate to protect the international monitors overseeing implementation of the peace settlement in Macedonia.

But the stabilization process did not stop there. To minimize the potential for backsliding, NATO agreed to continue support with Operation

Allied Harmony conducted from December 2002 to March 2003, when it was handed over to the EU.¹⁵ Operating under a Berlin-Plus Agreement, the EU maintained Operation *Concordia* from March through December 2003; this was followed by an EU civilian police mission, Operation *Proxima*, comprising 200 personnel, which continued through December 2005.¹⁶ EU police authorities cooperated with Macedonian police and assisted in the implementation of the comprehensive reform of the interior ministry and the operational transition toward a border police as part of a broader EU effort to promote integrated border management.¹⁷ Following irregularities and problems in Macedonia's local elections in March 2005, the parliamentary elections of July 2006 were seen as a key test in meeting its NATO–EU objectives. While the campaign was marked by confrontations sometimes resulting in violence between not only the two ethnic Albanian parties, but also the two ethnic Macedonian parties, the election itself was greatly improved compared with past elections and gained the approval of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and Council of Europe.



Bosnia-Herzegovina: Tangible Progress. Another example of successful NATO–EU Berlin-Plus cooperation involved the transfer of NATO’s International Force (IFOR) follow-on Stabilization Force to EUFOR’s Operation *Althea* in BiH. After 9 years of IFOR/SFOR stabilization operations (ranging from an initial 60,000 troops in January 1996 to 7,000 troops in December 2004), EUFOR’s 6,000-troop Operation *Althea* assumed responsibility for shifting “from stabilization to integration” operations throughout BiH, which is four times the size of Kosovo. Operating under the same mandate as SFOR (Dayton annex 1, chapter 7), EUFOR coordinates with NATO headquarters in Sarajevo (which assists BiH in defense reform as well as counterterrorism and intelligence gathering),¹⁸ provides deterrence, and supports the police because peace is still fragile. EUFOR is different from SFOR not only because of its more flexible organization, being broken into 3 multinational task forces with 45 Liaison and Observation Teams, but also because it fights organized crime and is connected to the police. In addition, since January 1, 2003, the EU Special Representative has guided the EUPM in Sarajevo with the goal to mentor and monitor middle/senior police, and to inspect the creation of a professional, multi-ethnic police service in BiH. As of January 1, 2006, EUPM had been scaled back and focused on police restructuring to more effectively fight organized crime.¹⁹

Another result of the Balkan wars has been the explosion of organized crime involving human, drug, and arms trafficking. NATO and the EU now need to focus and coordinate their programs and activities to combat organized crime and counter terrorism. Hence, the MAP that NATO developed for Central and Eastern Europe in 1999 needs to be revised to accommodate the peculiarities of Southeast Europe and coordinated with the EU’s support to state institutions.

Macedonia and BiH have evidenced progress in the defense sector. Despite more than a decade of independence, interethnic issues still challenge Macedonia and the BiH constitution, requiring further amendments and/or substantial adjustments to critical institutions. West Balkan challenges can easily upset these fragile states’ fabric and create an ever greater need to develop a common EU–NATO strategy and to move beyond “stabilization” to improve coordinated “cooperation and integration” activities on the ground.

Serbia: The Challenge of Integration. However the Kosovo question is finally resolved, the integration of Serbia into the Euro-Atlantic mainstream will be a major challenge. The country’s politics are still roiled by bitterness and resentment over the wars of secession that split apart the

old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO and the EU will need to reach out to Serbia to help build democratic structures there and in its Balkan neighbors to ensure that its surrounding environment is secure and stable. While the EU told Serbia on September 29, 2006, that it would not resume suspended talks because of failure to turn over Ratko Mladic, NATO, in a bold and significant move at the Riga Summit, invited Serbia to join PFP. Providing assistance to the Serbian defense establishment, which has made significant progress in reform efforts since Zoran Stankovic became defense minister in October 2005, and building military ties and cooperation with neighboring NATO partners (Croatia, BiH, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania, which could lose its shared border if Kosovo becomes independent) and members (Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary) will be critical to building West Balkan regional stability and security.

But this may prove difficult in light of hardening positions on Kosovo. On September 30, 2006, the Serbian parliament unanimously approved a new draft constitution that defined Serbia as an independent state for the first time since 1919, strengthened parliament's control over Vojvodina, and declared Kosovo to be an integral part of Serbia. A referendum held on October 28–29 ratified the constitution, and the Serbian parliamentary elections of January 21, 2007, returned Tomislav Nikolic's Serbian Radical Party, which is staunchly opposed to Kosovo independence, as the largest parliamentary party (with 81 of 250 seats). President Boris Tadic's pro-European Democratic Party increased its share by 30 seats to 64. How Tadic will form a coalition and what concessions on Kosovo will be necessary with Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (47 seats), Mladan Dinkic's G17 Plus (10 seats), and the Liberal Democratic Party (15 seats) remain to be seen.²⁰

If Kosovo obtains independence and seeks to also join PFP, NATO will need to assist in building Kosovo's defense establishment. In order to build West Balkan regional stability and security, NATO will need to ensure that Kosovo's military be adapted to enhance NATO interoperability and contribute to regional security. Kosovo autonomy will require that the core of its future military will need to be truly multi-ethnic and to be tightly entwined in a coordinated PFP combined exercise program with neighboring Serbian and Montenegrin PFP partners. Because the Kosovo Protection Corps will likely find it difficult, if not impossible, to overcome its Kosovo Liberation Army past, Martti Ahtisaari called for its disbandment and the establishment of a new professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force.²¹ NATO should discourage Kosovo's new military from procuring offensive weapons, which Serbia would see as

provocative.²² KFOR will need to become more efficient, borrowing from the experiences and lessons of EUFOR in BiH. NATO and the EU will need to coordinate PFP and SAA activities and programs to enhance regional cooperation and keep integration prospects, which have proven essential for institutional reform, credible. NATO KFOR and the EU must plan for the possibility of protecting Kosovo Serbs (particularly from the enclaves), many of whom have memories of March 2004 and may attempt to seek passage to safe refuge.

Montenegro: Starting Small. NATO and the EU will need to assess their responses to Montenegro. While the EU has recognized Montenegro's independence, it has kept its options open and will likely commence separate negotiations with it. NATO decided at the Riga Summit to extend PFP to Montenegro (and Serbia and BiH) while recognizing that it would need "advice and assistance [to] build its defense capabilities."²³ NATO decided to extend PFP even though Montenegro's constitution has not yet been approved; nor are its defense and other state institutions in place or functioning. In November 2006, Montenegro had a general staff and plans for a small professional military of 2,500 troops but had no defense ministry. NATO will need to develop a plan and establish combined PFP programs/exercises with MAP neighbors Albania and Croatia and with Serbia.

New PFP members Montenegro and Serbia will face significant challenges in the defense sector, having missed years of reform experience enjoyed by their neighbors. Compared to their Macedonian neighbors, constitutional and institutional challenges are just beginning, and the EU SAA process needs jump-starting. The impending Kosovo final status issue will put enormous stress on interethnic relations, can easily upset the fabric of West Balkan stability, and will likely create further NATO–EU challenges.

Can Regional Organizations Help?

The role of regional organizations has greatly expanded over the past decade in the West Balkans. These institutions also have encouraged military, border guard/police, and intelligence cooperation and enhanced broader security sector reform—contributions that are in great demand.

Southeast European Defense Ministerial. With strong U.S. backing, the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) commenced annual meetings in 1996 to enhance transparency and build regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe. SEDM's membership includes Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, along with the Adriatic Three—Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia since October 2000—with the United States, Italy,

and more recently Ukraine and Moldova as observers. At the November 5, 2004, SEDM in Ljubljana, Slovenia, Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina were “guests,” and Ukraine requested to become a full SEDM member, which took place in December 2005.

In 1999, the SEDM approved the creation of the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG), with headquarters now in Constanta, Romania, that comprises a 25,000-troop force that can be assembled and employed in conflict prevention or peace support operations under NATO or EU leadership. Once the Joint Forces Command in Naples certified SEEBRIG with full operational capability in October 2004, it deployed a brigade of 350 troops to Afghanistan ISAF on February 6, 2006. Adhering to the SEEBRIG motto—“One team, one mission, no matter what nationality or religion”—the brigade operated successfully under NATO command for its 6-month rotation.²⁴ In addition to peace support operations, SEEBRIG has also begun focusing on developing disaster relief capabilities within the framework of a Political Military Steering Committee project called Employment of SEEBRIG in Disaster Relief Operations (SEDRO).

As SEEBRIG moves into emergency planning, SEDRO, although embryonic, provides a great opportunity for NATO–EU cooperation to promote security sector reforms among those partner-members with weak institutional capacities (for example, interior ministries). It could encourage broadening SEDM to include civil emergency planning and interior minister participation to create a new Southeast European Homeland Defense Ministerial.

Southeast European Cooperation Initiative. The Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) was launched with U.S. support in December 1996 to encourage cooperation among the states of Southeastern Europe on economic, transportation, and environmental matters as a way to facilitate their European integration. Now linked with Europol, the SECI Center in Bucharest, Romania, currently comprises 12 members (all 10 Balkan countries from Slovenia to Turkey, plus Hungary and Moldova) and 16 permanent observers.²⁵ All 12 members, including BiH and Serbia (without Montenegro),²⁶ maintain 24 police and customs officers at the SECI Center. In October 2000, SECI broadened its activities to combat transborder crime involving trafficking of drugs, weapons, and human beings, and money laundering. In 2003, it added task forces on antismuggling, antifraud, and antiterrorism, to include small arms and light weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

While SECI has demonstrated some impressive successes, many limitations remain. For example, of 500 human traffickers arrested as a

result of SECI cooperation by the end of 2004, only 50 went to trial, and only 5 were convicted.²⁷ This experience clearly demonstrates the “limited institutional capacities and weaknesses” among some of its member nations, demonstrating why SECI in cooperation with its members’ judicial authorities (for example, its Prosecutor’s Advisory Group) adopted general guidelines for activities and competence in December 2004. Also, it demonstrates the importance of coordinating NATO’s Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building adopted at the June 2004 Istanbul Summit, the extension of PFP to BiH, Serbia, and Montenegro at the Riga Summit, and the EU’s SAA process.

Civil-Military Emergency Planning. The Civil-Military Emergency Planning Council for Southeastern Europe (CMEPCSEE) was formalized in April 2001 among Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. Romania joined in 2002, Turkey in 2003, and BiH in 2005. The council’s role is to facilitate regional cooperation in disaster management through consulting and coordinating among its members. The members have agreed to develop common standards for planning and responding to regional disasters or emergencies; create emergency response databases and digital maps of SEE countries’ roads, rails, pipelines, and airports; establish emergency operating centers in each country with common communication procedures; and conduct national and multinational exercises. The council, while still rather new, has sponsored many tabletop exercises; Bulgaria, for example, in 2004 hosted a civil-military emergency planning field exercise comprising 968 personnel from all council members (with observers and visitors from Moldova, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, and the United States) with the aim of improving the collective ability to respond to disaster.

All three organizations—SEDM/SEEBRIG, SECI, and CMEPC-SEE—provide opportunities for promoting movement in the West Balkans beyond stabilization by further advancing and reinforcing regional cooperation of all six countries and facilitating each country’s integration objectives.

The Way Ahead

Although the West Balkans has been pushed to the background in recent years, serious security challenges are likely to resurface in 2007. NATO and the EU, albeit in different ways, can help to provide sufficient ballast to weather the storm. To do this effectively, NATO PFP and EU SAA programs should develop and coordinate a West Balkan strategy to enhance integration prospects, coordinate security sector reforms to tackle

the security threats prevalent to the region, and link PFP and SAA efforts to regional organizations to facilitate cooperation.

If integration prospects were to lose credibility among the West Balkan states, security in the Balkans could be severely undermined. Some nations (in particular, the Adriatic Three) might be tempted to move in unhelpful directions. With this in mind, NATO's 2006 Riga Summit established more precise goals and timelines for keeping its "Open Door" credible for the three remaining MAP members by establishing the *prospect* of membership for the following Summit, possibly in 2008. Similarly, the EU, which counted Bulgaria and Romania among its members in January 2007, needs to reiterate and make credible its 2003 Thessaloniki Summit's commitment to remain open to the new and possible future states of the West Balkans.

While the United States and NATO have demonstrated that they have the comparative advantage in utilizing defense instruments to resolve security challenges, the EU has shown its ability to integrate civilian programs in development, judicial, and police assistance. The United States and several European governments have developed effective bilateral training programs and operational cooperation with Southeast European law enforcement officials over the past decade. A new NATO–EU Balkan strategy would build on this and provide the necessary conditions for nurturing military cooperation and coordination with border troops, police, and intelligence agencies to enhance West Balkan security and stability. PFP programs should place new and greater emphasis on combating organized crime, which is prevalent in Southeast Europe, and the EU focus on furthering West Balkan cooperative regional security sector reforms. PFP's mandate, consistent with the Prague Summit's Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, ought to be broadened to include partnership goals with police activities to combat organized crime.

NATO must think about how to specifically craft PFP to enhance regional cooperation among its three (and possibly two future) new partners. NATO PFP should focus on building more transparent and accountable defense and military establishments, and the EU should concentrate on civilian agencies. As has been demonstrated in the successful Berlin-Plus handoff from SFOR to EUFOR in moving from stabilization to cooperation and integration, the EU's West Balkan SAA process can similarly be coordinated with NATO at the regional level. The objective is to improve interagency coordination and cooperation *within* and *among* Balkan states.

PFP's emphasis should focus on furthering West Balkan cooperative regional security sector reforms. These are the necessary conditions for nurturing military cooperation and coordination with border troops/police/intelligence interoperability to enhance Balkan stability and security. NATO PFP has already assisted the SEDM, which counts Serbia and Montenegro and BiH as observers, through its support of individual defense establishments and SEEBRIG's deployment to Afghanistan.

A fertile area for EU–NATO cooperation would emerge if SEDM were broadened to include interior minister participation as SEEBRIG and CMEPCSEE begin to focus on regional emergency planning. The recent evolution of CMEPCSEE is a positive and important development in that it not only incorporates military *and* civil institutions fostering necessary coordination and cooperation at the national level, but also pushes planning to the regional level. In addition, if SEDM were broadened to include interior ministers to form a Southeast European Homeland Defense Ministerial (SEHDM), it could be linked to the SECI, which counts BiH and Serbia (but not yet Montenegro) as members, to combat transborder crime in the Balkans. Hence, SEDM–SECI could become the organizational locus for implementing a coordinated EU–NATO West Balkan Strategy.

It is of utmost importance that KFOR in Kosovo (and EUFOR in Bosnia) succeed in preventing violence from erupting in the first place. If interethnic conflict occurs in the Balkans and NATO fails to contain it quickly, the Alliance's prestige and perceived utility could suffer a great setback—particularly among those European states whose security is already stressed by large Muslim minorities and strained interethnic relations. Assuming stability prevails, the EU and NATO need to build further upon SEDM, SEEBRIG, SECI, and CMEPCSEE successes to deal with the new West Balkan risk environment and prevent future conflict from emerging.

Southeast Europe's dual NATO/EU member states—Hungary, Slovenia, and Greece, along with Romania and Bulgaria who joined the EU in 2007—provide a core for coordinating and integrating EU *and* NATO programs in promoting West Balkan security sector reforms and Southeast European Homeland Defense regional planning. Additionally, the Balkans' dual-member states can help NATO and the EU to expand upon earlier successes in Macedonia and BiH and to develop a coordinated NATO/EU strategy to resolve existing challenges to Southeast European security and stability in Kosovo and Serbia.

For this effort to succeed, regional collaboration could be strengthened along several lines.

- ▀ Expanding the SEEBRIG, SEDM, and CMEPCSEE to include Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina would be an important step in building West Balkan confidence and security.
- ▀ CMEPCSEE might broaden its membership to West Balkan PFP members Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro and consider merging with SEDM.
- ▀ SEDM should be broadened to include civil emergency planning and interior ministers, creating a new annual Southeast European Homeland Defense Ministerial. This new SEHDM should be encouraged to further coordinate its work with SECI which, among other things, combats transborder crime involving trafficking of drugs and weapons, prostitution, and money laundering.
- ▀ SEHDM should create a regional civil protection coordination center to harmonize training procedures, establish a regional training plan, and explore, with SEEBRIG (SEDRO) in Constanta, Romania, ways in which that organization might address issues of civil protection. Such a union of interior and defense ministers would formalize the necessary conditions for further advancing Balkan regional cooperation.

By successfully implementing an EU–NATO Balkan strategy, renewed conflict might be avoided in the West Balkans and transatlantic relations strengthened.

Notes

¹ Source: Jeffrey Simon, *Preventing Balkan Conflict: The Role of Euroatlantic Institutions* Strategic Forum 226 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2007).

² See Jeffrey Simon, *NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts Upon New NATO Members and Partners*, Occasional Paper 1 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 2005), 1–14.

³ Haris Silajdzic, who won the Bosniak (Muslim) seat (with 62.8 percent) in the collective state presidency, wants to eliminate the entities and build a stronger centralized state. But Republika Srpska President Nebojsa Radmanovic, with 53.2 percent (and Prime Minister Milorad Dodik), does not want a unified Bosnia. See Steven E. Meyer, “Borders, Ethnicity, and Globalization in the Western Balkans,” *Politika* (Belgrade), December 26, 2006, 5. Also, “Final results of BiH 1 October elections announced,” October 18, 2006, available at <www.europeanforum.net/news/281>.

⁴ Huib Poot, *Labour Force, Employment and Unemployment in BiH* (Economic Policy Planning Unit, Working Paper No. 1, March 2006).

⁵ Montenegrin General Staff briefings, Podgorica, Montenegro, November 6, 2006.

⁶ See Articles 1.3 and 1.7, 11.1, and 13.1–13.2, “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,” February 2, 2007, 2, 7, 8, available at <www.b92.net/eng/insight/reports.php?yyyy=2007&mm=02&nav_id=39411>.

⁷ Barry Wood, “Serbian Parliament Rejects UN Plan for Kosovo’s Autonomy,” available at <<http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-02-14-voa50.cfm>>; and Nicholas Wood, “U.S. Criticized After Deaths in Protests Over Kosovo,” *The New York Times*, February 14, 2007, A8.

⁸ Kai Eide noted that:

The standards implementation process . . . so far is uneven. . . . The development of new institutions is undermined by a strong tendency among politicians to see themselves accountable to their political parties rather than to the public they serve. . . . the Kosovo Serbs have chosen to stay outside the central political institutions. . . . Organized crime and corruption have been characterized as the biggest threats to the stability of Kosovo . . . [but] The Kosovo police and judiciary are fragile institutions. . . . With regard to the foundation for a multi-ethnic society, the situation is grim.

See Kai Eide, *A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo*, United Nations Security Council, S2005/635, October 7, 2005, 2–3.

⁹ NATO Press Release (2006) 150, “Riga Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,” November 29, 2006, paragraph 9.

¹⁰ NATO’s 26 members and 11 non-Alliance partners have committed 32,000 troops to Afghanistan, with 12,000 Americans assigned to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. Another 8,000 U.S. troops are in Afghanistan carrying out counterterrorism operations under U.S. command in Operation *Enduring Freedom*. Thom Shanker, “Rift Over Afghan Mission Looms for NATO,” *The New York Times*, November 27, 2006. Kosovo is 10,887 square kilometers, compared to Afghanistan, which is 652,000 square kilometers.

¹¹ Riga Summit Declaration, November 29, 2006, paragraph 30, “welcome(d) the efforts of Albania, Croatia, and . . . Macedonia to prepare themselves for the responsibilities and obligations of membership. . . . [adding] At our next summit in 2008, the Alliance intends to extend further invitations to those countries who meet NATO’s performance based standards and are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability.” NATO Press Release (2006)150.

¹² Just ahead of the EU–West Balkans Thessaloniki Summit, Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten said: “The prospect of membership in the EU is real, and we will not regard the map of the Union as complete until you have joined us. . . . But membership must be earned.” See, “The Thessaloniki Summit: a Milestone in the European Union’s Relations with the West Balkans,” Brussels, June 18, 2003, IP/03/860.

¹³ Vlatko Vukotic, *Southeast European Times* (Banja Luka), November 14, 2006.

¹⁴ See Council of Europe, Ohrid Framework Agreement, Annexes A and B, August 13, 2001, available at <www.coe.int>.

¹⁵ See “NATO’s Role in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” available at <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm>.

¹⁶ In June 2000, at the European Council in Feira, the European Union committed to create a civilian international peacekeeping force comprising 1,400 police forces with military status, available for rapid deployment within 30 days.

¹⁷ EU Council Joint Action (2003/681/CFSP), September 29, 2003, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Council%20Joint%20Action%202003%20681%20CFSP.pdf>.

¹⁸ “Defence Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina on Track,” NATO Update, October 13, 2006, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/10-october/e1001a.htm>.

¹⁹ European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mission Statement, available at <http://www.eupm.org/MissionOverview.asp>.

²⁰ “Serbia’s Chance,” *Financial Times*, January 23, 2007; Aleksandar Antic, *The New Federalist* (Belgrade), January 28, 2007.

²¹ See “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,” February 2, 2007, articles 9.4 and 9.6, 6.

²² A defense weapon would be an 82mm mortar, and an offensive weapon would be a 155mm howitzer.

²³ Riga Summit Declaration, paragraph 35.

²⁴ "NATO Aligns Command Structure to Adapt to Expended Mission in Afghanistan," August 8, 2006, available at <www.nato.int/shape/2006/08/060808a.htm>.

²⁵ At SECI's Joint Cooperative meeting in Bucharest on October 26–27, 2006, Georgia applied to become a full member, and Slovakia and the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine became permanent observers.

²⁶ Serbia assumed membership responsibility for Serbia-Montenegro. It remains to be seen if, and when, Montenegro will participate.

²⁷ John F. Markey, Director of the Office of Law Enforcement, U.S. Department of State, at Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference on Romania, October 19, 2004.

Securing Afghanistan: Entering a Make-or-Break Phase? (2007)¹

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Key Points

Afghanistan has reached a critical point in its struggle for post-Taliban recovery. The stakes are high and bound to influence enormously the future directions of Islamic extremism, global terrorism, a nuclear-armed Pakistan, and the stability of south and central Asia.

During the past year, major problems festered rather than being treated, mainly because Iraq diverted high-level U.S. attention, resources, and leadership. Aggravating these problems were internal tensions within the Afghan Transitional Authority of President Hamid Karzai, Pashtun resentment toward the authority, and the emergence of a serious Taliban-led insurgency in the south.

To correct these problems, major additional resources were allocated, Operation *Enduring Freedom* adopted a new focus on security and stability, and the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed to expand the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force beyond Kabul. The successful adoption of a new constitution at the special national assembly (Loya Jirga) in January 2004 by a strong moderate consensus was a significant step forward in national unity, reduced Pashtun resentment, and strengthened the hand of President Karzai as a national leader.

Even so, critical ground and time have been lost, due in part to doubts regarding America's commitment. Success is not assured and will require a longer, harder, and more painful slog for Afghanistan, the United States, and the international coalition, as well as sustained U.S. leadership commitment.

To appreciate Afghanistan's predicament, it is essential to understand that all Afghan politics are tribal. Thus, while Afghans share a genuine national identity, their immediate concern in any political process is to advance or preserve the welfare of their ethnic or extended family group. Further, since the Russians and British artificially imposed the country's international borders, the tribes are not wholly contained within Afghanistan. They straddle the borders with surrounding nations. Thus, tribal politics are also international politics.

This tribal nature of politics has made Afghanistan highly susceptible to local warlords. These individuals draw power from the tribally based militias of the civil war that broke out after the Soviets left and that resumed in much of the country after the defeat of the Taliban. (The Taliban controlled or defeated militias and maintained public order, albeit ruthlessly, in most of the country from 1996 until 2001.)

Kabul has been relatively secure and economically bustling under the protection of the 5,000-person International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), now led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the Afghan countryside has been dominated by the local and regional warlords and their militias, who have paid little heed (or taxes) to the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) to which they nominally belong as governors, corps or division commanders of the regional Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), ministers, or vice presidents. In an attempt to improve the security situation, the AMF—that is, the warlords' militias—were loosely incorporated into the ATA structure. Unfortunately, while some militia members loyally assist the coalition, others have continued to be the cause of, rather than the cure for, insecurity, human rights abuses, and criminality, frequently in alliance with the increasingly powerful drug lords.

Neither the ATA nor coalition forces made much of an effort to redress this situation. The former did not feel that it had the power; the latter felt that the anti-al Qaeda/Taliban combat mission they had assumed in October 2001 did not extend to broader security or intra-Afghan ("green on green") disputes, even to supporting the ATA against the warlords. In many localities, the coalition was actually allied with warlords and their militias in pursuit of al Qaeda and Taliban remnants. The result is that outside Kabul, various warlords represent the real power in Afghanistan.

Each of the prominent warlords was a major commander during the war against the Soviets and the civil war that followed. In the north, west of Mazar-e Sharif, Abdul Rashid Dostum leads the Uzbek militia. Just to the east of the same city, Mohammed Atta leads the Tajik militia. Over the past 2 years, these commanders ignored the ATA and repeatedly fought

to gain control of key locations and revenue sources in the area. Unfortunately, while they fought, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts were slowed or halted, exacerbating the unrest. In November and December 2003, some promising initiatives ended the fighting, began the collection of heavy weapons, and started improving governance. While still volatile, the area is much quieter and more secure than just a few months ago.

Afghanistan



In western Afghanistan, warlord Ismail Khan remains firmly in control of the city of Herat and surrounding areas and of the lucrative official and unofficial customs duties generated by the substantial commerce with Iran. With the continued instability in the south and southeast, Iran has replaced Pakistan as the primary trade route, greatly increasing the value of the customs collected in the west. While Khan passes along a token portion of those revenues to the ATA, he has made it clear that he is the functional authority in that portion of the country. There is stability in his

region, but it comes at a price for the Afghan people and the Karzai government. One either does business Khan's way or not at all.

In the south and southeast, warlordism extracts the highest price from both Afghans and the coalition. There is no single powerful Pashtun leader to unify the Pashtun tribes and no effective security in the area. Instead, there is constant fighting and shifting alliances (which can include cooperation with both the coalition and the resistance and cross-border ties with tribes in Pakistan). The installation of Governor Yusuf Pashtun in Kandahar province and the commitment to provide better security and revitalize reconstruction initiatives are positive first steps in dealing with this volatile area, which has become the primary focus of Taliban efforts to disrupt coalition and ATA efforts.

Minister of Defense Mohammed Qasim Fahim Khan has been recognized as the most powerful warlord. He assumed leadership of the Northern Alliance in late 2001 and, with the collapse of the Taliban, moved his Tajik forces into Kabul. Despite agreeing at Bonn in 2001 to move outside the capital, Fahim kept over 5,000 militia and over 200 tanks inside the city. Tajik dominance of the ATA security establishment was bitterly resented by the much more numerous Pashtun. In late 2003, he began to redress his image by surrendering some heavy weapons stocks from the Panjshir Valley, moving others out of Kabul, and putting more non-Tajiks in senior Ministry of Defense positions.

The Karzai government, supported by the coalition, ISAF, the slowly expanding Afghan national army, and newly trained police, has to meld these and many other diverse elements into a functioning nation.

Political Progress

The outcome of the recently completed Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) will have an important, long-term positive impact upon security and national unity. Efforts by the anti-coalition forces to disrupt the holding of the CLJ failed. Subsequent efforts by Islamists and Tajiks to block key provisions of the constitution also failed. The constitution was endorsed largely as drafted with a strong presidential system and a two-house parliament. Those pushing for a strong Sharia law were rebuffed as were those (mostly warlords) advocating federal or provincial systems. Ethnic differences were overcome after a fierce debate, and minority and women's rights are protected. The result has been a psychological boost to President Karzai in particular and, in general, to national unity, the ATA, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United States,

and the international coalition. It is also a boost to the Pashtun, who played a cohesive, decisive, and moderate role in the CLJ outcome.

While the new constitution may provoke discontent in some areas, these problems are probably containable. Of critical importance is not only the large majority of delegates who supported the constitution but also the nature and extent of the negotiations between power blocs that went into its approval. The Pashtuns had a majority of the seats and achieved most of what they wanted but did not humiliate the Tajiks, Uzbeks, or Hezara. The first real Afghan foray into democracy post-Taliban was a positive experience for most participants.

The next big challenge will be the presidential elections tentatively scheduled for June, possibly July 2004. Registration procedures and the actual polling process are inherently susceptible to insecurities. They probably are manageable for the presidential election, but preparations have been lagging due to preoccupation with the CLJ and the major security problems in the south and southeast. A belated crash campaign to prepare for security and registration in over 4,000 locations has been begun by the United Nations, the ATA, Operation *Enduring Freedom*, and NATO/ISAF. It is likely that presidential elections can be held in most of the country this summer. However, the more daunting task will be the formation of parties, the selection of candidates, and the actual voting for parliamentary seats, which can be much more easily influenced by the Islamist warlords and drug lords than the presidential elections. The objective is to hold both sets of elections at the same time. However, the new constitution states that parliamentary elections may be delayed up to a year after the presidential election, providing more time for the buildup of security.

External Complications

Complicating efforts to gain control of the warlords and their militias is the fact that each major tribal faction has external supporters:

- The Pakistanis want a friendly government in Afghanistan to secure what they see as their vulnerable rear area. For this and internal political reasons, they support the Pashtun—the majority tribe and traditional rulers of Afghanistan who make up the vast majority of the population of Pakistan's tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Pakistan as well as President Karzai have been frustrated by the absence of any single dominant Pashtun leader.
- The Indians continue their support to the Tajiks (Panjshiris) that began during the anti-Taliban period of the 1990s. They see this as

a counterbalance to Pakistan's support of the Kashmir insurgents. Pakistan sees it as a threat, designed to promote subversion.

- ▶ Uzbekistan and Russia provide support to Dostum and his Uzbek militia.
- ▶ The Iranians continue to support Ismail Khan and the Hazara, who are Shia, and whom Tehran regards as an ally in the part of Afghanistan that borders Iran.

Thus far, respect for the powerful U.S. role and a wait-and-see attitude toward the ATA and Afghanistan's recovery have kept external support to various factions from reaching a sufficient level to undermine Afghan sovereignty. However, all the external powers, particularly Pakistan, are hedging their bets.

Transnational Threats

Two transnational forces further cloud the security situation in Afghanistan. First is the transnational drug trade. In 2003, opium production quintupled to three-fourths of the total world production. The opium trade is estimated to have brought in more money than all foreign aid during 2003. The huge injection of funds increased instability by increasing criminality and corruption throughout most of the country, also reaching important officials in Pakistan, Iran, the Central Asian states, and Russia. It has clearly benefited the anti-coalition forces, just as it had earlier financed al Qaeda. Estimates indicate the acreage planted in 2004 could be almost double that planted in 2003.

Operation *Enduring Freedom* did not include a counternarcotics mission because U.S. leadership felt it would be a complication and diversion from combat activities against the Taliban. The United Kingdom volunteered for the mission and worked along with the Afghan authorities, but they have lacked the assets to attack the problem. The United States turned its attention (and resources) to the issue in late 2003, assisting Great Britain and the ATA.

The second transnational threat is the Islamic radical movement. It provides both direct funding for al Qaeda and the Taliban and indirect funding through Islamic religious schools (*madrassas*), mainly in Pakistan. Even more important, the *madrassas* provide a steady supply of Islamist recruits for the anti-coalition forces spread among the Taliban/al Qaeda remnants, and even Hekmaytar Gulbiddin, the fundamentalist *muja-hideen* leader who fought the Northern Alliance for control of Kabul in the mid-1990s.

Pashtun Resentment

A major threat to Afghan stability emerged from the southern Pashtun population (which is twice as large as that of the northern Tajiks), who see Kabul as their capital and the Tajiks as enemy occupiers. Among the Pashtun, the United States is portrayed as responsible not only for opening the way to renewed Tajik occupation of Kabul in November 2001 (by its assistance to the Northern Alliance in expelling the Taliban) but also for supporting their continued dominant presence. This argument resonates widely with the Pashtun population on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. President Karzai, the senior Pashtun in government, has been seen—at least until recently—by many of his fellow Pashtuns as too ineffectual to counterbalance Tajik domination of politics.

It has also struck a sympathetic chord with the Pakistani military and intelligence services, both of which dislike and distrust the Tajiks and are extremely concerned about the close ties (carried over from Indian support of the Northern Alliance versus the Taliban in the late 1990s) that the Indians have with the ATA. When the ATA permitted the Indians to open consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, Pashtun and Pakistani suspicions were further fueled. Indian-Iranian cooperation in developing railroads, roads, and commercial activities for the flourishing Iranian-Afghan trade has also upset the Pakistanis.

A second powerful and emotional message among the Pashtun has been the portrayal of the United States as basically anti-Islamic. This message took on even greater credibility with the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the aggressive, highly publicized Israeli military action against Palestinians with what is seen as American acquiescence.

A corollary to the anti-Islamist theme has been the portrayal of the United States as the driving force behind efforts to modernize the very conservative Afghan culture. Resistance to any central government attempts to modernize tribal society, particularly attempts to change the rights and role of women, has always been fierce. The initial tribal revolts against the Afghan communists during the late 1970s came in response to their attempts to modernize the society, not as a result of their deposing the monarchy. The subsequent tribal resistance to the Soviets was driven as much by the desire to preserve their tribal culture as by hatred of communism or Islamic rage.

The Taliban hardcore pushed all three ideas—that America is responsible for the Tajiks controlling Kabul, is anti-Islamic, and wishes to destroy the Pashtun way of life—and accused Karzai of being a U.S. puppet. The

propaganda, plus the prevalent insecurity, absence of authority, and slow expansion of reconstruction, contributed to support for the regrouping and rearming of thousands of former Taliban fighters inside Afghanistan and in adjacent areas inside Pakistan. Starting in early 2003, the Taliban revitalized their alliance with al Qaeda remnants and related Pakistani Islamic groups, particularly Hekmaytar Gulbiddin's Hezb-e Islam. This conglomerate can be best labeled as *anti-coalition forces* (ACF).

Anti-Coalition Forces

The term *anti-coalition forces* is used deliberately here; to refer to the resistance as either *Taliban* or *al Qaeda* oversimplifies the problem. In fact, the resistance includes elements of both, but its core is formed by Pashtuns, who are sustained by their perceptions of being excluded from power and under siege. In addition, the resistance gains strength internally not just from Taliban and al Qaeda remnants but also from drug lords and smugglers, and it enjoys support from elements on Pakistan's side of the border. One cannot simply neutralize al Qaeda and think the resistance will be broken.

Starting in spring 2003, the ACF conducted hit-and-run raids on ATA and coalition targets across the south and southeast of the country. Al Qaeda targets were the United States and coalition forces. Of even more concern have been the deliberate attacks by the Taliban on international assistance workers and those Afghans helping them (identified as partners of the United States in threatening traditional Islamic values). Aid organizations that provided assistance and remained in place through the initial Afghan revolution, the Soviet invasion, the Afghan civil war, and Taliban rule have been attacked for the first time. Also for the first time, they (and the United Nations) are pulling their people out of the south and southeast. As the Taliban intended, the raids caused a sharp reduction in reconstruction activities, still more preoccupation with security, and a corresponding negative impact upon support for the Karzai government, the United States, and the international coalition.

The Coalition Response

The Bush administration and NATO are moving aggressively to make up for the lost ground. At the same time, the Karzai government, reinforced by increased international support, is becoming more assertive. The United States tripled its resources during 2003 with an additional \$1.7 billion; \$1 billion more will be available for 2004, with an additional \$1 billion to be pledged by the United States at the March 2004 Bonn donor's

conference. These new resources represent a significant boost for activities in the security, democracy/governance, and reconstruction sectors—including accelerated military, police, and antinarcotics programs. With U.S. support, the ATA also is proceeding with the new constitution and elections, provincial government reform, and promotion of women's rights. Efforts also are being made to increase the pace of road construction, infrastructure rebuilding, and community development. Among other milestones, the vital Kabul-Kandahar road was completed in December 2003, and some 20,000 provincial police are to be trained by June 2004.

The United States has reorganized the coalition command structure and is reorienting the strategic thrust of Operation *Enduring Freedom*. The commander has moved to Kabul, where he is closer to and better able to coordinate with the Afghan government, a new American ambassador—who has not only much greater resources with which to operate but also, as President Bush's special representative, a broader, more dynamic mandate for support of the Karzai government—the UN Special Representative, and the newly empowered NATO/ISAF. The broad military coalition of Operation *Enduring Freedom* and NATO plans to undertake enhanced security measures outside of Kabul with a new nation-building focus as well as continuing and sustaining combat operations, especially in the south and southeast. This new approach is much closer to a classical, politically focused counterinsurgency strategy and represents a belated recognition that sporadic military actions alone cannot eliminate the renewed radical Islamist/terrorist threat. Instead of responding to sporadic ACF attacks and withdrawing, small units will remain in high-threat locations to deter the ACF and protect the local population.

The long-called-for decision in October 2003 by the UN Security Council and NATO to expand the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul is also a response to accumulating threats and reveals a determination to resolve them. In addition to providing more potential resources for the security of the countryside, this step has injected greater dynamism into ISAF and inaugurated closer coordination with Operation *Enduring Freedom* and a potentially broader role in all security sector reform programs. The United Nations continues to coordinate the overall security sector reform with increased efforts by the lead countries designated in the Bonn process. One major concern is the slowness of NATO to identify and provide the actual forces that they will commit to honor their expanded role.

Japan, in conjunction with UNAMA, has commenced the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) plan. The Japanese-led effort has successfully concluded pilot projects near Konduz and Gardez

in which 1,600 militias forces turned in their weapons in return for a small cash payment, aid, and retraining. Demobilization is currently under way in Kabul. In a significant positive development, both Dostum and Atta have turned in some of their heavy weapons for cantonment in the vicinity of Mazar-e Sharif. In a similar move with political significance, Fahim has moved some of his heavy weapons out of the Panjshir Valley to supervised cantonment sites and has removed some heavy weapons and militia from Kabul. Japan, the United States, and UNAMA will apply the lessons learned from the pilot program and the heavy weapons turn-in as they reorganize and expand the program to other areas the government can secure.

Germany, meanwhile, has focused its efforts on long-term police training. It developed a 3-year program to train senior police officials to fill the top-level position in the national and regional police. Large-scale, short-term training provided by the United States, in cooperation with Germany, is now complementing this program.

The United Kingdom is leading the antinarcotics efforts but has limited resources for what it sees as a huge undertaking. Further, the ATA has very limited capacity in this area, although it is now gearing up new programs. The United States has allotted about \$123 million to assist the ATA, alongside the United Kingdom. *Enduring Freedom* units also have recently been given orders to take down narcotics laboratories and smugglers of narcotics if located. The key frustrations are the lack of an economically viable alternative crop and the absence of security in much of the poppy growing area. In September 2003, nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers reported that an Afghan farmer could earn only about one-fourteenth the amount of cash from an acre of wheat as from an acre of poppy. Also, in the absence of government security forces, he can be impelled to plant poppies by the warlords and their allied drug dealers. Since both crops are commodities, the price fluctuates, but it is difficult to see how wheat can be made competitive with poppy on a purely economic basis.

Police and Army

Security assistance, particularly police training, is picking up speed. In addition to the long-term German efforts for senior officers noted above, the United States is putting up over \$60 million and has instituted a training program for ordinary police officers with centers in Kabul and eight key regional locations (such as Gardez and Kandahar). The total cost for police could be over \$75 million for 2003-2004 and \$115 million for 2004-2005. The European Union has contributed some \$50 million to the

police training fund. The number of trained provincial police is supposed to reach 20,000 by June 2004. The United States is also working with Germany to train a 3,600-man border police organization by June 2004.

The objectives of the expanded police force are to work with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and coalition forces to provide security for the provincial reconstruction effort, to offer special protection against cross-border movement (smuggling) and for customs collection, to enhance safe movement on the roads, and to improve local intelligence. The police played a major successful role in security for the Constitutional Loya Jirga and will be the main security force for elections. The principal challenge will be the equipping and overall coordination, as well as overcoming the current weaknesses in training and incentives (for example, salary and allowances). Training, which is done primarily by Afghan personnel, lasts between 2 and 8 weeks, and there is no provision for trainers/mentors to be present alongside the newly trained police (as there is with ANA). These shortfalls, especially the lack of supervision on the job, can be dangerously corrosive given the pressure of smuggling, narcotics, clans, and sectarian tensions. However, with additional international police trainers assigned to the reconstruction effort in key provinces and active police support programs by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), working in coordination with Afghan trainers and police supervisors, the problem can be largely overcome.

The newly minted ANA units and their American, British, French, and Bulgarian trainers have proven to be a positive development, although the army's small size still limits the number of missions it can undertake. As of December 2003, the army had trained 13 battalions of roughly 600 to 650 soldiers each. As of mid-February, the army had trained 14 battalions of over 8,000 soldiers. To ensure loyalty to the central government rather than to a warlord, each battalion is ethnically mixed with recruits drawn from throughout the nation. Each battalion is trained as a unit at a rebuilt base just outside Kabul. During January 2004, the training base capacity grew from 6,600 to 10,800 trainees annually. Reports from the field indicate that the ANA is a genuine, multiethnic national army that is operating effectively and steadily improving.

Reinforcing this success, recent changes in U.S. regulations allow American trainers to accompany the battalions to the field on operations. This is critical to complete the training on tactics, techniques, and procedures; to provide the communications links to coalition firepower and rapid reaction forces; and to offer a psychological boost to the army. ANA troops have deployed on operations in the south and southeast part of the

country, conducted security for the Constitutional Loya Jirga, and monitored heavy weapons cantonment activities in the north.

By June 2004, the three brigades of the ANA Central Corps will be fully fielded with infantry and mechanized battalions. Newly instituted salary and benefits packages have increased the number of recruits sufficiently that the Office of Military Cooperation Afghanistan and the Ministry of Defense plan to expand the training program to produce three battalions per month starting in January 2004, depending on restructuring and retention.

Two issues cloud the future of the ANA. First, until December 2003, recruiting was not producing sufficient numbers to fill the ranks at the current rate of one battalion per month. Basic classes have a capacity of 750. Afghans had been filling only about 650 seats and delaying the classes by up to 3 weeks to reach that number. Greater involvement by the Afghan Ministry of Defense and General Staff, the opening of new recruiting stations in four locations nationwide, and increases in pay and benefits seem to have reversed this trend. In December 2003, the 14th training class began at full capacity and 1 week early. In addition, there are currently enough recruits awaiting training to fill the next two classes. It remains to be seen if this is a temporary or permanent increase in the number of Afghans willing to serve in the army.

A more serious issue had been the attrition (desertion) rate of around 10 percent per month from August through October 2003. As a result, when battalions 16 through 22 graduate, they will be broken up to bring the previous 15 battalions back up to strength to maintain the viability of the Central Corps. Although the rate had decreased to 2 percent per month by late January, the Ministry of Defense is pressing forward with initiatives to increase the retention rate by improving living conditions, salaries, leave opportunities, and by building mosques in the garrisons in order to avoid another spike in attrition rates this spring.

Reconstruction

Reinforcing the growing Afghan police and army are new plans for accelerating the promising Provincial Reconstruction Team program. The PRT concept is drawn from time-tested counterinsurgency doctrine of extending the reach and influence of the central government. By providing basic security, the teams serve as a catalyst to development by opening up an area to both aid organizations and Afghan government agencies.

In Afghanistan, a Provincial Reconstruction Team helps to provide security and assistance for the community in which it works. Formed

around a U.S. or international military force of between 60 and 100 soldiers, it is ideally reinforced with an ANA element, a national police element, various aid organizations, and effective representation of the ATA. Operation *Enduring Freedom* provides more immediate robust forces as a backup to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams when needed. The combined security forces provide the protection that the government departments need to begin rebuilding the community.

Reinforcing the reconstruction efforts, the teams work with the Departments of State and Agriculture, the U.S. Agency for International Development, UNAMA, and the Afghan government to coordinate closely with NGOs to ensure that each focuses on those projects its organization does best. For instance, in Bamian province, nongovernmental organizations were rebuilding schools and municipal buildings. They asked the provincial team if the military could focus on rebuilding the bridges essential to reaching some of the smaller villages. The team concurred and is using its resources to rebuild the vital bridges. With this division of labor and the increased general sense of security, both NGOs and government agencies are making steady progress in the area.

Using the PRT concept as a base, the aid and governmental organizations can reach further into the countryside. As security increases, they plan to set up other PRTs and satellite facilities in the smaller communities. In essence, this program uses the same spreading “ink stain” concept that the British used in Malaya. Together with an Afghan internal security presence and greater support from *Enduring Freedom*, the teams have increased security in the Gardez area with a resultant step-up in the pace of reconstruction. Consequently, regional government officials have been replaced with more competent, honest, and loyal personnel. This area, previously one of the most unstable in Afghanistan, has become more supportive of the Karzai government and more resistant to the resurgence of the Taliban and al Qaeda than the surrounding provinces. The new DDR and police training programs will provide an additional impetus.

An unanticipated benefit accrued to the government with the establishment of PRTs in Gardez, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kandahar. They have strengthened the position of the central government sufficiently that, with the firm backing of the United States, the Interior Minister has been able to replace corrupt local officials with more effective ATA representatives. This provides a visible sign of the commitment by the government to rural Afghanistan. In the Mazar-e Sharif region, it has been accompanied by the cantonment of heavy weapons belonging to Dostum and Atta. Secretary

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reportedly gave both warlords a push in this process in early December 2003.

In addition to these three PRTs, the New Zealand contingent established a team in Bamian, the Germans have established one for NATO/ISAF in Konduz, and the United States has organized teams in Parwan, Jalalabad, Herat, Khowst, Ghazni, Qalat, and Kandahar provinces. There are at present 12 Operation *Enduring Freedom* teams and over the next 3 months, the operation plans to establish 4 more throughout the south, southeast, and west to reach a total of 16 by mid-summer. In addition, NATO hopes to establish two more PRTs in the North provided the necessary resources can be found from member states. While this is a positive step, experience has shown that it takes months for a PRT to gain the trust and confidence of the local population. Further, while *Enduring Freedom* can provide the forces to establish the teams, the ATA will be hard-pressed to provide the additional ANA battalions, trained police, DDR personnel, and competent staff for the governmental offices.

A new variation on the PRT theme is the Regional Development Zone (RDZ), a deliberately coordinated program derived from the success in Gardez. It will concentrate larger-scale security, governance, and reconstruction assets on a particular locality to achieve maximum synergy. It involves installing better government officials, providing better security (more trained police and border guards, an ANA presence, and support from *Enduring Freedom*), supporting effective counternarcotics and judicial reform, initiating DDR, and making larger investments in new infrastructure projects (such as dams and electrical power), as well as reconstruction (schools, clinics, government buildings). The army will be assisted by UNAMA and the PRT in overseeing and facilitating the RDZ, starting with Kandahar.

Pakistani Assistance

Reinforcing the coalition's efforts in the south and southeast, the Pakistani government has moved forces into areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier. For the first time in their history, Pakistani army forces are operating in the tribal areas. Even more encouraging is the fact that the Pakistanis are taking a long-term approach, with a focus on winning public support. Rather than simply hunting for al Qaeda and their Pash-tun sympathizers, the Pakistanis are dedicating significant resources to improving the standards of living in particularly sensitive locations. They intend to have a lasting, positive impact there. In addition to stepped-up patrols and presence at known border crossing points, where they and U.S.

forces have identified specific ACF targets, the Pakistanis have conducted successful targeted raids within areas of concern on Pakistan's side of the frontier. There are regular bilateral U.S.-Pakistani military coordination meetings, at all levels including Operation *Enduring Freedom* Commander Lieutenant General David Barno, and there are monthly Tripartite Commission meetings, including senior U.S., Pakistani, and Afghan military commanders. Lieutenant General Barno recently praised Pakistan publicly for increased activity and for closer cooperation, building toward a major effort on both sides in the spring against al Qaeda and Taliban leadership and their forces.

The parallel major military operations in mid-March on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border represented a quantum leap ahead in intensity and cooperation. On the Afghan side, ANA elements performed well, fighting alongside forces from Operation *Enduring Freedom*. The unprecedented Pakistan operations in the tribal areas showed clearly the commitment to take on al Qaeda and other local supporters, once they were located, despite considerable military, as well as political, costs.

The year 2004 may well be remembered as a decisive year for Afghanistan's long-term stabilization and reconstruction, as well as the fight against al Qaeda. As the foregoing indicates, the CLJ has imparted much needed momentum to the forces favoring national unity. The ATA is demonstrating a more assertive, engaging posture toward the provinces. Army recruitment, retention, and training are accelerating. So is police training. Current or would-be spoilers are being marginalized, albeit slowly and painfully. The United States has demonstrated its commitment to stay the course; NATO is beginning to shoulder greater responsibility; and the strategy for promoting provincial-level stability and reconstruction is yielding measurable progress.

None of this should diminish our estimation of the remaining challenges, which are enormous. The current momentum is fragile and perishable. If it is squandered, Afghanistan's slide back into civil war—with all the hazards that it entails—may be impossible to prevent.

Finishing the Job in Afghanistan*

The war in Afghanistan is being fought by NATO soldiers near this capital, but it may be lost in the capitals of Europe. Europe's citizenry is tiring of this prolonged and distant conflict, while their governments struggle to maintain NATO solidarity in the face of Taliban advances in Southern Afghanistan and deadly suicide attacks here in Kabul.

More than half of the 53,000 coalition troops deployed to Afghanistan are American. About 41,000 of that coalition total are assigned to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission; the remaining, mostly American, contingent operates separately under the U.S. Central Command. Together they face an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 active Taliban and other insurgents.

The contribution of America's 36 coalition partners is important, but in many cases it is limited. Most coalition contributions are relatively small; only eight contribute a thousand or more troops. The U.S. and a few key allies such as Britain do most of the fighting. Seven allies join the U.S. in the turbulent southern region while combat operations in the east are also primarily American. Most partners are deployed in the quieter northern and western region. About two thirds of all coalition casualties in Afghanistan are American.

Germany is a top contributor with more than 3,000 troops deployed. The German government last month renewed its engagement in Afghanistan despite the opposition of some 62% of the German public.

But ISAF commanders remain vexed by the limitations placed on the German troops. While they will support Afghan Army combat operations in the north where they are deployed and will fight there in self defense, they have no significant operational reserves for combat. They will respond to emergency situations elsewhere in Afghanistan with logistics and transport. They cannot reinforce combat operations in the south without consulting the Bundestag in Berlin.

Dutch forces serve in the turbulent Uruzgan province and the Canadians are deployed around Kandahar, a Taliban stronghold. Both have experienced considerable fighting. Both are looking for

relief. The Dutch government seeks to reduce its 1,600 troop commitment by about a quarter starting next summer, and it is considering withdrawal if reinforcements from other nations cannot be found. The Canadians also prefer to move to a less dangerous mission. NATO leaders fear that the Dutch and Canadian actions could trigger an unraveling of the ISAF coalition with dire consequences for NATO.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates sought at the recent NATO Defense Ministerial to raise more European troops for Afghanistan. He went so far as to suggest that the U.S. might swing its troops from still-volatile Kosovo to Afghanistan if Europeans do not contribute adequately in Afghanistan. Several NATO allies responded with promises of small increases, but not enough to meet the Dutch needs. These small contributions also do not address the growing requirement for reinforcements in Afghanistan.

A recent German Marshall Fund poll showed that European support for combat operations in Afghanistan is only about 31%, so much needs to be done. Three basic points can help European governments make this case before irreversible damage is done.

First, this war is waged in direct response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S. as well as to al-Qaeda sponsored attacks in London and Madrid. The Taliban harboring al Qaeda have systematically proven their brutality to all who deviate from their radical religious beliefs. The war is being fought under the international legitimacy of a September 2001 NATO Article 5 declaration, and a December 2001 U.N. Security Council Resolution. NATO's North Atlantic Council made a clear decision to engage by taking overall responsibility for the ISAF mission. The American people support this conflict, in marked contrast to deep divisions over Iraq.

Second, this war can be won. While Taliban forces have re-taken some territory, fighting over the past half year has not been in their favor. Casualties among Taliban leadership have been high, and some of those remaining are contacting the Afghan government and international organizations asking how they might avoid being targeted. Some are suggesting peace talks. Without their sanctuary in Pakistan's frontier provinces, the Taliban and their al Qaeda partners would not last long.

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Third, the consequences of failure are severe. A much bloodier civil war would surely break out. Taliban rule would return to much of Afghanistan. Regional instability already evident in Pakistan would escalate. Al Qaeda would regain a more stable base of operations. And NATO would be shattered, having failed at its most important military conflict to date.

Regaining European public support is critical, but more must also be done in Afghanistan to win. A well-crafted and publicly articulated plan is needed using current progress and lessons learned as a foundation. Such a plan might include the following elements.

A comprehensive approach with clear movement towards peace is needed. Recent progress in Iraq's Anbar province can serve as an example. There, moderate Baathist insurgents turned against foreign fighters after concluding that continued collaboration undercut their own interests. The same can happen in Afghanistan, where some relatively moderate Taliban leaders are already looking for relief from ISAF pursuit. Clearly, this will be made more difficult if Taliban insurgents and al-Qaeda terrorists maintain their sanctuary in Pakistan's Northwest frontier areas.

The military pressure on the Taliban leadership has to accelerate to provide incentives for negotiations. The anticipated Taliban Spring offensive this year was pre-empted by an effective offensive, and according to ISAF Commander and U.S. Gen. Dan McNeill, "we have had significant tactical success this fighting season." But Afghanistan has been starved of coalition troops as the buildup in Iraq proceeded. Gen. McNeill estimates that he needs at least four additional deployed battalions plus a rapid response force to stem lawlessness arising from gaps in police reform efforts.

In short, Gen. McNeill needs a surge much smaller than the one in Iraq. One place to get some of these troops is from the NATO Response Force, an impressive but unused capability that NATO leaders refer to as the "Rolls Royce in the garage."

In the longer run, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) have to take over Afghan security. Progress growing, training, equipping and mentoring the ANA is proceeding, with the goal of 70,000 vetted and trained troops available at the end of 2008. ANA forces now engage in combat together

with embedded ISAF advisers, and they have not broken ranks yet. Elite ANA commando units are being developed to engage in special operations. The ANP is another story. Police units tend to be both local and corrupt. Better vetting and training is long overdue.

Ultimately, a comprehensive approach to peace in Afghanistan hinges on an enhanced economic development effort. There is progress: During the past three years, per capita income has doubled, access to health care has increased eightfold, and roads and telecommunications have improved significantly. However, the key remains agriculture; and large investments are needed in irrigation, food delivery and planting of traditional Afghan crops like figs and almonds. When it comes to the thriving poppy trade, crop eradication only drives farmers into the arms of the Taliban; the solution lies in crop substitution and, again, greater peace and economic development.

Finally, a new, high-profile European High Representative under U.N. auspices should be appointed to pull together the diverse national contributions in Afghanistan and to coordinate military and economic approaches into a comprehensive and coherent whole. Paddy Ashdown provides a good example with his work in Bosnia. Such a High Representative could also help convince European publics to stick with the Afghan effort.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy told the U.S. Congress last week that his nation would remain engaged shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. in Afghanistan. This promise may not be enough. If NATO is to continue fighting in significant numbers in Afghanistan, a major public-diplomacy effort must be launched in Europe. President Bush would do well to suggest the launch of such a campaign to German Chancellor Angela Merkel when she visits him in Texas this weekend.

*Binnendijk, Hans. This work originally appeared in *The Wall Street Journal*, November 10, 2007.

Notes

¹ Source: Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes, *Securing Afghanistan: Entering a Make-or-Break Phase?*, Strategic Forum 205 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004).

Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Nangarhar, Afghanistan in 2006 (2008)¹

Michelle Parker

Introduction

This paper describes one method of programming development funds at a sub-national level to positively affect a counterinsurgency, in this case, in Eastern Afghanistan. It is presented as a practical model for both students in the classroom and operators in the field to understand the complexity of a type of mission that the United States has not attempted since Vietnam. The paper explores how one interagency group, the Jalalabad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), developed and implemented a strategy for increasing stability in its area of operations by maximizing the resources each agency brought to the table and creating “unity of effort.”²

In 2006, when the activities described in this study took place, no process or doctrine of any kind existed to aid PRTs in programming funds to influence an active insurgency—and to the author’s knowledge, none exists as of the writing of this paper. The aim of this study is to provide readers with an eight-step process of strategic program development, culminating in the execution of a series of projects, highlighting lessons learned throughout the experience. The eight steps were developed by the command group (CG) of the PRT, which consisted of a representative from USAID, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Army Civil Affairs.

The CG decided to create this process because of the limited funding of the PRT. There was no way to fund every project brought to the PRT by the local government, the people, or other actors in the area. Because the PRT was the largest source of accessible funds in the province, it was often pulled in multiple directions. The CG feared losing focus on the primary and critical task of establishing stability by getting caught up in basic development projects that were outside its mandate. The tipping point of holding the meeting that established this process occurred when USAID allocated \$1 million to its Jalalabad Field Office at the PRT for stability projects.³

The eight steps of strategic program development are:

- ▀ Understanding the Strategic Framework
- ▀ Operationalizing the Strategy
- ▀ Determining Geographic Focus through Tribal Analysis
- ▀ Defining Project Parameters
- ▀ Conducting the Project Identification Process
- ▀ Gaining Government Approval
- ▀ Holding the PRT Project Nomination Board
- ▀ Implementation


The target audience for this study is the CG of a PRT operating in Afghanistan, but the lessons can be extrapolated to other interagency models around the world.

Background

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PRTs were created in late 2002 by the U.S. military to expand its civil-military operations in the provinces of Afghanistan with the goal of creating stability.⁴ A PRT is a team of interagency partners with representatives from each of the “3Ds”: defense, development, and diplomacy.⁵ When the U.S. military designed the concept, it was also important for the PRTs to be international. Since 2002, 14 countries established or took over PRTs, with many more countries augmenting the mission.⁶ Figure 17–1 outlines the task organization chart of the Jalalabad PRT in 2006:

Figure 17–1. PRT Jalalabad Task Organization 2006



The PRT is led as a team by the CG (second tier of chart), with each agency having its own responsibilities outside the team. No singular agency or department has authority over any other in the Afghanistan model.⁷ The military commander manages all military functions including the provision of basic life support (food, shelter, health, communications, transportation) as well as specific skills that are utilized by the team (planning, intelligence collection and analysis, reporting, patrolling, cordon and search, combat operations, and others). The development officer manages, monitors, and develops projects and programs for her/his country and works with the military to develop sound projects to affect stability in the area. The diplomat analyzes the political situation in the area and reports back to both her/his home country's embassy and NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) headquarters in Kabul in addition to shaping the strategy of the PRT.⁸

Every PRT is different based on a number of factors, including the needs of the province, the PRT host-country requirements, national and international development programs in the area, and security.

According to the ISAF PRT Handbook:⁹

The PRT should not act as an alternative to the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), but rather seek to improve the capacity of the GoA to govern itself. PRTs perform a vital role in occupying the vacuum caused by a weak government presence and are hence deterring agents of instability. PRTs seek to establish an environment


that is stable enough for international agencies, the local authorities and civil society to engage in reconstruction, political transition and social and economic development.

The PRT's mandate is to extend the reach of the central government, develop security sector reform, and conduct reconstruction and development activities. Together, these three objectives are designed to bring stability to the provinces in which the PRT operates.¹⁰

PRT Mission: Stability

Stability is defined as government monopoly of the use of force over its people.¹¹ As illustrated by figure 17–2, stability can be measured along two axes: legitimacy of government and effectiveness of government.¹² Increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of government are considered “friendly” lines of operation (LOO) in military terms.¹³ The PRT can also focus on mitigating the enemy’s LOO, which includes decreasing government effectiveness and legitimacy. When programming development funds, it is best to focus on the former because the nature of development is to improve the government’s ability to monopolize the use of force and deliver benefits enabled by that monopoly of force, such as public works, education, and public health.

Figure 17–2. Stability Lines of Operation (USAID/Kabul Civil-Military Program, 2006)



Nangarhar Province

Nangarhar is an extremely important province in Afghanistan because it provides the primary licit trade route with Pakistan at the Torkem border crossing. It is the economic center of the east for business and development, has one of the most educated populations in the country, and is considered one of the “breadbaskets” of the country because of the land’s fertility.¹⁴ It is also known as one of the leading producers and processors of poppy in the country.¹⁵ The Nangarhar population has a history of supporting insurgents, ranging from the Ghulzais, who attacked the British as they retreated from Kabul after the first Anglo-Afghan war, to the anti-Soviet *mujahideen* forces—and now the Taliban. The first use of Stinger missiles in warfare occurred at the airport on the outskirts of its capital, taking down three Soviet helicopters.¹⁶ Nangarhar’s strongmen welcomed Osama Bin Laden when he was forced to leave Sudan in 1996 and provided sanctuary for Al Qaeda training camps. Some of the most intense fighting early on in Operation *Enduring Freedom* took place in the Tora Bora section of the Spin Ghar Mountains, a range that lines the southern part of the province. As of 2006, Nangarhar was a staging ground for the insurgency raging in the eastern part of the country.


The province is home to two ethnic groups, the Pashtun and the Pashai. There are four Pashtun tribes (Khogiani, Shinwari, Mohmend, and Ahmadzai), and each tribe has additional subtribes. For the purposes of this study, the most important subtribes to distinguish are those of the Khogiani tribe: the Waziri, Sherzad, and Kharbone. Each ethnic group, tribe, subtribe, village, and family has a complex network of relationships that extend back generations. For foreigners who don’t speak the language and live in a secure compound to fully comprehend, these relationships are incomprehensible. Despite the challenges, the members of the PRT’s CG had to learn as much as they could about the province, its power brokers, its history, and its current challenges before the team could complete the following process.

The next sections will discuss an eight-step process of strategic program development, highlighting lessons learned throughout the experience. The eight steps were developed by the CG of the Jalalabad PRT in Afghanistan in 2006. Situational awareness is a prerequisite to developing a program; the first step helps the team develop that awareness.

Step 1: Understanding the Strategic Framework

PRTs are one component of a full-spectrum operation, as the guide illustrated in figure 17–3, demonstrates. The CG, therefore, met every week with other stakeholders in the area (maneuver units, other foreign governmental actors, and the GoA) to deconflict the PRT strategic planning with ongoing combat operations. At the same time, the development and political officers also met with their development agencies and embassies in Kabul to ensure the strategic plan of the PRT was in line with the current policies. The importance of the non-kinetic and kinetic elements working in unison cannot be emphasized enough.

Figure 17–3. Spectrum of Intervention (USAID/Kabul Civil-Military Program, 2005)




The purpose of a PRT is to enhance stability in the provinces of Afghanistan. By the definition used in the PRT handbook, the population's willingness to be governed is the "legitimacy" axis upon which stability is measured. In the case of Afghanistan, stabilization is the first step in a democratic process that includes the population's willing participation, so securing the population's support is a key component of Afghanistan's stabilization process. PRTs can help the government monopolize force while

securing the population's support in many ways, ranging from training and mentoring the government to constructing government facilities—district centers, courthouses, schools—that provide a clear platform from which government can operate. The construction of basic public works such as bridges, roads, and micro power that serve the population the government needs to affect is another option for PRT support.¹⁷ Gains made towards securing the population's support can easily be undone with kinetic operations either targeting or resulting in civilian casualties. If the population's support recedes for the group the United States is helping vie for the monopoly of power, the challenge of securing force becomes increasingly more difficult.

Step 2: Operationalizing the Strategy

Figure 17–4 was developed by the USAID/Kabul Civil-Military Program to better assist the Field Officers, who are responsible for programming millions of dollars, how to understand the environment in which they are operating and tie programming to specific stages or phases of the counterinsurgency (COIN) operation. The mission of the PRT will differ based on the reality on the ground; this chart helps the team identify the stages that the province's various population groups are in during the assessment period.

Figure 17–4. Criteria for Mission Determination (USAID/Kabul Civil-Military Program, 2005)



Lessons Learned

1. The PRT command group needed to analyze their environment—in military terms “define the battlespace”—immediately upon arriving in theater. Keeping in mind the three mandates of the PRT, and nesting the discussion in the strategic framework outlined above, the interagency representatives should work together to determine how to best achieve their mission in the next 6–9 months. It is important to keep the timeframe short in highly insecure environments because the PRT strategy will often have to be revisited based on the shifting realities on the ground.
2. It is important to note that the PRT developed the mission determination, tribal analysis, and project parameters without GoA involvement. They did this because they wanted to get their national agenda lined up clearly before going to the GoA. They debated bringing in key provincial leaders early in the process, but decided against it due to this priority. In retrospect, it could be argued that this was a mistake. The sooner a PRT can bring the GoA into the process at the provincial level, the better. Government involvement has many benefits, including building the capacity of the GoA to think strategically, to bring an Afghan “reality check” to PRT assumptions, and to create the sense of ownership of these projects that is needed to achieve the stated goals.

Regardless of what a team decides, the issue of local government involvement should be a discussion point within the PRT in the early stages so they can decide at what point government involvement is appropriate. If the governor and line directors are corrupt and may impede the process, a team will want to avoid them as long as possible. The team may discover that the GoA stakeholders needed are rarely in the province; if the projects need to be nominated quickly, time restricts GoA involvement. It must be decided if the benefits outweigh the negatives so the CG can move forward with a clear understanding of when GoA involvement is needed and why.

In Nangarhar, the CG used this graph to discuss where they thought the five main tribes in the province fell on the spectrum of intervention. In a COIN campaign, the population is the center of gravity, so analysis must be conducted at the community level. The CG chose to use subtribes as a point of analysis rather than an arbitrary district or provincial boundary, and was thus better able to target communities that were having a negative impact on stability in the province.¹⁸ The CG looked at indicators including: NGO activity, violent acts against the military coalition, violent acts against the GoA, poppy growth, the numbers of schools and clinics (government service in action), and population centers. The CG did not develop a complex methodology for measuring each of these criteria; they simply discussed the tribes and indicators using personal knowledge and intuition. The CG determined that most of the province was either “in transition” or “secure and stable.” The subtribes that the CG identified as creating an insecure and unstable environment had a primary geographic commonality—they border Pakistan.

As a team, the CG had to decide where to focus along the spectrum. The tribes considered “green” were off-limits, because those areas were stable and outside the PRT mandate. The question the CG explored was “how far into the red should the PRT go?” The CG quickly realized that was not a question that could be answered intuitively, it needed more complex analysis.

Step 3: Determining the Geographic Focus through Tribal Analysis

After determining generally which communities created or allowed an insecure and unstable environment to develop, the CG had to narrow the targeted areas even more because USAID’s budget was only 1 million dollars, and not every community in need could be reached. At this point, the USAID Field Program Officer (FPO) asked the commander of the military component of the PRT, LTC Lynda Granfield, to provide the USAID office with a soldier to research the tribes and conduct a conflict analysis. A senior Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) who had shown great interest in this subject was assigned to the project.¹⁹

The NCO, SGT Steve Kling, was tasked with mapping each subtribe and sub-subtribe and placing them in the stability matrix illustrated in figure 17–5, based on the geographic area the CG had agreed upon in the operationalizing meeting. SGT Kling developed a picture of tribal instability in the province, but argued that, although certain sub-subtribes were

quite stable, the CG had to target those villages with projects or risk creating conflict between the sub-subtribes.

Figure 17–5. The Stability Matrix (USAID/Kabul Civil-Military Program, 2006)


EFFECTIVENESS	High	Medium Stability <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Authoritarian regime• Population does not support authorities• Susceptible to ideological and political spoilers	High Stability <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Authorities are strong• Population supports authorities• Resistant to ideological, political, and economic spoilers
	Medium		
	Low	Low Stability <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Authorities are weak• Population does not support authorities• Susceptible to ideological, political, and economic spoilers	Medium Stability <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Authorities are weak• Population supports authorities• Susceptible to economic spoilers
		Low	Medium
		LEGITIMACY	

Once the communities were analyzed down to the smallest tribal division possible, the NCO began to target specific villages. The CG criteria included:

1. Communities must be politically fence-sitting and generally located near “problem village clusters.”²¹ The populations were not in support of the GoA, but they did not support anti-government elements, either.²²
2. The communities had to lie along key smuggling routes, a primary cause of insecurity in these districts.
3. There was little or no international or GoA involvement via projects in the community.

Over the next month, SGT Kling researched possible village candidates using military intelligence databases, GoA, local DOD maneuver units, Special Forces, Other Coalition Forces, USAID implementing part-

Figure 17–6. Map of target villages for USAID Quick Impact Projects (QIP) program in Nangarhar, Afghanistan (USAID/Jalalabad PRT, 2006)²⁰



The author could not have programmed the funds with such complexity without the help of the military. The access the military has to intelligence on anti-government elements is incomparably better than the information a USAID employee can access. By tapping into core capabilities of the military (intelligence and planning), the money the author was responsible for programming had a greater impact.

The author vetted the information collected by SGT Kling with the Provincial Governor, Provincial Council, appropriate GoA line ministry representatives, NGOs working in the area, PRT interpreters, and USAID Implementing Partners to better triangulate the information. The military is an excellent source for information, but cannot be the only source.

Step 4: Defining Project Parameters

In the beginning stages of program design, as in all normal development programs, it is fundamental to establish clear project parameters, or the program can quickly lose focus. In the case of Nangarhar, the first parameter set was *infrastructure projects only* for two important reasons. First, the CG wanted to create physical reminders of the GoA in these areas. Second, USAID's implementing partner (IP)²³ was a construction organization with no capacity to manage "soft development" projects—that is, projects that build skills and improve human capacity. This limitation was frustrating, but USAID had to work with the available IP so construction factored heavily into the project parameters.²⁴

The next step was to establish exclusion criteria so that everyone involved understood what could or could not be funded. Policy and legal restrictions make it difficult for USAID to fund either religious or security-related infrastructure, so structures such as mosques and police stations were excluded. The CG also excluded clinics, because the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) hires NGOs to operate clinics around the country. Clinics sit empty if NGOs do not have donors to provide the clinic's operating expenses. The CG could have met with local healthcare providers to try to coordinate a joint project, but that would have been time-consuming, and no member of the CG had the extra time to dedicate to that coordination. Constraints such as a program manager's limited time will also factor into parameters.

It is important to note that health projects in Nangarhar were funded by the European Community (EC), yet there was no local EC representative in Jalalabad with whom the PRT could coordinate. If this had been a USAID health area, the CG might not have excluded it. The last point is not meant as a criticism of the EC, but rather as an example of the importance of understanding the area or "battlespace" so the program's design can maximize the money's effectiveness. If a donor does not have provincial representation, coordinating operations at the local level is difficult.

A project time limit of 3–6 months, from groundbreaking to ribbon cutting, was the next parameter set by the CG. This limit was set because the purpose of building these structures is to shift popular sentiment toward the GoA, and the CG feared that if a project took years, the goal would not be achieved—in part because growth of enemy strength might outpace the project. Also, the projects should be small in scope, such as a school or a micro-power system. QIPs should not be multi-million dollar development projects in warfighting areas due to the challenge of an ever-

changing battlespace. The purpose of a QIP is to positively affect stability, not to conduct long-term development.

Another aspect of gaining popular support for the GoA was to give jobs to the sub-subtribe community we were trying to affect, who would also be the project's beneficiaries. The next parameter, therefore, was to insist on local employment opportunities. Jalalabad is home to a vocational construction trades training school funded by USAID and DOD, so the CG included a provision for the communities involved with the project to nominate 6–12 people to attend the month-long course and learn vocational trade skills. If the village was interested in this option, the CG then required the contractor to allow the villagers to serve as interns on the project in their area, so they could work with the contractor's staff and practically apply the skills they learned in the school.

The final parameter was that the projects must serve multiple villages and have a subtribal area impact. The rationale was to reinforce the idea of *community*, which was destroyed during 25 years of war. We also wanted to foster the idea of development rather than a laundry list of projects. Too often communities in high-risk areas are caught in survival mode; one goal of these projects is to lay the groundwork for the population to think above a sub-subtribal level and identify with those from nearby areas to build a larger community mindset.

The limitation of Afghan contractors was another factor considered at this time. Due to 25 years of nearly continuous fighting, Afghanistan had an extremely limited capacity to absorb the quantities of aid that began flowing in 2001. The CG discussed the number of locally owned construction companies that were available in the area, what other projects those companies were working, and what level of construction they could handle, e.g., could they construct an eight-room school house, or a three-story district center with power and water? The CG knew the challenges could be worked around, but it was important to discuss these realities as preparation for managing the expectations of the villagers in the target areas.²⁵

The CG decided to develop a short list of the types of acceptable projects for this program based on the limitations described above. The list was not exhaustive by any means, but the CG used it as a baseline to ensure that members of the team could speak consistently and coherently to those outside the PRT. Three primary sectors were agreed upon:

- Water/Sanitation/Sewage (piped water systems, gutters),
- Agriculture (irrigation, canals),
- Basic Infrastructure (bridges, schools, micro-hydro, flood protection).

Step 5: Conducting the Project Identification Process²⁶

After the team developed a clear idea of the tribal area and the parameters of the projects, the CG then discussed the project identification process. Ideally, the FPO planned to first meet with the Provincial Council, the only democratically elected body in the province, and the directors of key line ministries (Rural Reconstruction and Development, Agriculture and Public Works), explaining the concept of QIP, its parameters, and its geographic focus. The goal was first to vet their programmatic concept with the provincial government and deal with any issues at that time.

The next step was to push the project identification process to the government to decide how best to proceed. The FPO explained the preferred geographic focus, acceptable project types, and implementing limitations with the hope that the GoA would sort out the actual projects. The CG anticipated that the GoA would develop small teams to go to the areas of interest and hold *shuras*²⁷ with the community leaders to discuss project options; a representative from USAID's primary IP in the area and the USAID Afghan program manager would participate, representing the interests of USAID.

In reality, USAID had only a few weeks to meet with villagers, design the project, gain GoA approval, nominate the project through the USAID chain of command, have it sent to the IP for a bill of quantity (BOQ)—USAID's internal process to have a QIP project funded—and have the BOQ approved.²⁸ Based on the author's prior experience of working with the provincial GoA, they would not have been able to do this in a timeframe that met USAID's needs. Time constraints were explained to the government, but timelines are not always adhered to in Afghanistan, and all too often, the deadlines passed. Some projects never happened or were delayed by months while the government decided whether to support them.

Because of the time restrictions, the CG chose to use existing USAID partners working in the area, and asked them to hold community *shuras* and develop project nominations. The author met with USAID IPs and explained the concept of QIP and its parameters. They agreed to conduct the process and transmit the information to USAID electronically. USAID also used information that the U.S. Army civil affairs team collected that fit within the scope of the program. In each instance, the communities were asked to nominate their top four project priorities.

A key factor in project success is local ownership. Initially, the CG thought of requiring a 30 percent community contribution to any project, but realized there were other ways to gain community buy-in, such as re-

quiring security for the project and ensuring local workers have jobs on the project site. Additionally, the contractors could hire local women to cook food for the work crews. They also could hire the head of the local *shura* to coordinate the labor force rather than having the outside contractor find people.

Lessons Learned

1. If you want to utilize the GoA in project identification, then it will require a significant amount of time and mentoring by the PRT. The PRT will most likely have to fund the transportation and per diem costs of the GoA to visit the communities, which have limited operating funds of their own. The parameters of the projects must be clear, and the PRT must have Afghan representatives present at meetings to manage community expectations. It is possible that the GoA may promise projects that are beyond the PRT's capacity, which would undermine the entire project. It is much more difficult and time consuming to have the GoA engaged, but it is a key factor in counterinsurgency, and the PRT must have a serious discussion about the cost-benefit analysis if it is considering bypassing the GoA to meet a deadline.

The Jalalabad PRT chose to follow the time deadline instead of building the capacity of the GoA, and it was probably a mistake. Nangarhar had a competent and active provincial government, which is ideal for this kind of program. Further, to achieve the greatest impact on an insurgency, programming of funds must have GoA ownership; bringing in the government at a later stage might remove the government even further from ownership of the program.

continued

*continued***Lessons Learned**

2. If there are any doubts about the ability to fund at least one project in the area, then the GoA and the PRT or its proxy *must not go to the area*. Only after a budget is secured should anyone meet with the communities. The PRT, its proxy, or the GoA, will explain the number of projects that can be completed based on the budget. The project nomination process should be explained in simple terms, so the community can know when to expect a project to begin. They should be given contact information for the GoA and the primary IP so they know that they can follow up directly. They must understand that they will be responsible for security in the area for the contractor, and will be held accountable. They must understand that the community will have the chance to work on the project, and they must know if a trade school option or other training options exist. These discussions may need to be held in multiple meetings to ensure that everyone understands the project.
3. It is important to manage expectations of the beneficiaries during the project identification stage. In most cases, the PRT will not know their exact budgets or how many projects they can complete. Once a meeting like this is held, the community will expect some kind of results. Considering the strategic objectives of affecting the insurgency, if the community's expectations are raised and nothing occurs, the result could be damaging. The people's frustration with their government for not delivering what they thought was promised will be used by the enemy to further undermine the legitimacy of the GoA. Therefore, it is *imperative* that this part of the exercise be handled delicately.
4. There *must be* community contribution of some kind for a project to have the desired effects. If the community is not willing to contribute to the project, then the importance of the village should be reassessed. The PRT could meet with the district sub-governor or the provincial governor to address this issue and get greater government involvement to understand why the community refuses to contribute. In a particularly hostile area with nearby villages that are good secondary targets, moving focus areas should be considered.

Step 6: Gaining Government Approval

In each province of Afghanistan, there are formal and informal governance institutions. Because the goal of the PRT was to increase the government's effectiveness and legitimacy, the FPO decided to gain project concurrence through the formal mechanisms, namely, the Provincial Council and the appropriate technical line directors representing their ministries: Rural Reconstruction and Development, Agriculture and Public Works. It is important to note that USAID did not seek approval for the projects, only concurrence. The QIP programming cycle includes a final approval at the ministerial level in Kabul, so the provincial directors do not have the authority to approve projects.²⁹

Once projects were identified, USAID staff wrote project nomination forms and translated the forms into Pashto for GoA distribution. USAID first met with the Provincial Council, which had been together for about a month. This was the first formal meeting between USAID and the council, so the FPO spent the morning explaining USAID and the strategy behind QIP. The Council was asked to review the projects nominated by the communities to see if there were any issues or concerns that were not addressed. They agreed to have their comments back within the week, and were very appreciative at being included in the process. They also requested to be involved in future programming, especially in the project identification portion. USAID agreed that it would be a good idea.

USAID next met with the appropriate line directors to ensure the projects were nested in the larger national programs of their technical ministries. The government was asked to verify and concur with the projects within one week; most of the line directors signed their concurrence on the internal PRT project nomination form (Annex 1) during the initial meeting. USAID worked with each of the line directors in other project programming, so they were familiar with the process, and this was merely routine business.

Once the Council and the technical directors signed their concurrence with the projects, USAID sent a final copy of the project form to the Governor's office for notification.

Lessons Learned

This is the time to conduct capacity assessments of the GoA. Find out what they can contribute to the project. For example, the Jalalabad PRT in 2006 often had Department of Public Works engineers work on their projects to ensure the contractors met GoA specifications. Additionally, the provincial council agreed to meet with the beneficiary communities on a monthly basis to ensure the project was meeting the communities' expectations. It is not only the community that must feel ownership of these projects, it is also the government.

Step 7: Holding the PRT Project Nomination Board

The next step in the process was the Jalalabad PRT's internal project nomination board, a coordinating mechanism in which each agency voluntarily agreed to participate to better coordinate efforts.³⁰ The PRT established this meeting within 3 months of its creation because it was clear the local community expected each team member to have the ability to discuss any project managed by someone in the team. The locals did not care about agency distinctions, only that someone could explain what was happening in their village. Although frustrating at times, each agency found this meeting instrumental in ensuring that the PRT's various projects fit within the strategic focus each agency agreed to honor, there was no duplication of efforts, and the team had visibility on what everyone was funding.

Anyone in the Jalalabad PRT could bring a project idea to the board, which consisted of DOD Civil Affairs, USAID, USDA and DOS as voting members, and any other PRT member who was interested could attend for situational awareness. Although every agency was on the board, only USAID and DOD had money available to fund projects, so if a project was suggested by someone on the team without funds and everyone agreed that it supported the mission, DOD and USAID would discuss which funding mechanism was more appropriate. The meetings were held only when necessary—when someone wanted feedback or guidance on projects they were planning, when they needed funds, or when the projects had gone through the cycle described below and were ready to be sent to higher headquarters. The board served as a brainstorming session, a sounding board, a reality check, and a final check before elevating the projects to the next level.

The process is as follows:

1. A representative from the agency proposing the project provides a brief verbal summary of the concept.
2. The representative explains the project nomination and approval process that occurred for the project.
3. The representative asks for feedback/input and possibly funding.
4. Usually, questions ensue and are either addressed to everyone's satisfaction at the time, or the agency representative is requested to provide more information and complete what is unsatisfactory. For example, someone who wants to build a school but has not coordinated with the director of education must get that coordination piece in place before the board will concur on the project.
5. If everyone agrees that the project is a good idea, fits within the strategic focus of the PRT, and has the necessary government and community approvals, then everyone signs the form noting their concurrence. (*Note: Only the agency representative has the authority to request or deny projects; if someone is against a project they*

Lessons Learned

The Project Nomination Board is an excellent tool to allow everyone in the PRT to have visibility on each other's projects. Even if a PRT does not want to use a model of endorsing each agency's projects, it is recommended that representatives meet regularly to discuss the status of ongoing projects, thus ensuring the PRT is speaking with one voice externally.

There is some debate regarding who from the military should participate. Ideally, it would be the head of the military component, usually a LTC or COL, the final decisionmaker for DOD project funding. In Jalalabad, the Civil Affairs commanders participated because they had *de facto* authority from the military commander to make decisions in the meetings. In the future, both the military commander and whoever he or she delegates as project management could participate, because the military commander also needs visibility on the other agencies' projects. Additionally, in some PRTs there is a feeling of disparity between the civilian and military components, so the more the leaders of each agency work as a team, the stronger that team will become.

can note their concern on the form, but the project may be nominated anyway.)

Once the project was approved, each agency had its own internal project approval processes, which will not be discussed in this document. Generally, the project nominations were sent to higher headquarters for final approval. Once approved, the next step was implementation.

Step 8: Implementation

Planning is essential, but plans are of little value without good implementation. Due to the collaborative nature of this project, and the desired end state of creating a more stable environment, it is fundamental that the contractor hired to construct the project work with complete community and GoA involvement.

The best way to ensure cooperation is to write any such requirements into the scope of work for the contractor. During the bidding conference, it is important to inform the potential contractors that these requirements are non-negotiable, and failure to meet them will be the basis for termination.

Conclusion

It is not easy to measure the effects of funding construction projects on stability operations. A project in one area could be the reassurance that a community needed to believe in their government. A project in another area could have little effect outside the immediate community it serves.

Lessons Learned

Based on experience, it is not enough to do all of this hard work in the beginning. The PRT also must follow up as the project develops. Extensive pre-planning, as laid out above, will greatly help with the amount of follow-up. If the Provincial Council agrees to meet with the community, and the line ministry has a worker on the project, it should considerably ease the burden of management from the project funder. Further, it is the responsibility of the donor agency to constantly monitor and evaluate these projects and ensure they are being done well. A monitoring schedule and form should be developed for each project.

But the people at the tip of the spear in the field have to start somewhere. Once the CG starts to understand what “wins” or “loses” in a specific area, they need to capture that information and share it with others to ensure that practitioners in the field and analysts and policymakers can grow smarter about how to conduct the civilian side of counterinsurgency.

The CG must keep in mind that the goal is not to buy the community. It is to give the community faith in their government so they will take the initiative to deny sanctuary to and provide information about the people trying to destroy the government. The communities must take their future into their own hands by standing up to the forces who want to undermine the new government, and no amount of kinetic operations will convince the community to take such a risk.

Part of defining the battlespace is setting up a good timeline of project cycles. In areas of greater instability, the cycle of determining mission criteria, tribal analysis, and project parameters will be more frequent than in areas with greater stability due to the changing realities of the insurgency. This is fundamental to the success of the PRT’s mission due to the ever fluctuating staffing patterns of the various agencies and personnel. The military may rotate on 9-month cycles, whereas the development officer may stay for 36 months, and the political officer for 12. Programming must not be personality-dependent. The timelines for the PRT to analyze the battlespace and adjust programming accordingly should be driven by the realities of the insurgency, the Afghan people, and institutions in the area, rather than the PRT personnel.

Annex 1 Project Board Approval

Project Title _____

Project Number _____ Est Cost \$_____

Date of PNB Approval _____ Funding Source: _____

GoA Concurrence:

Technical Directorate	Signature of Director Date
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Technical Directorate	Signature of Director Date
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PC Committee	Signature of Member Date
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Board Concurrence: (comments on back)

Concur / Do not concur	(circle one) DOS Signature Date
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Concur / Do not concur	(circle one) USAID Signature Date
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Concur / Do not concur	(circle one) USDA Signature Date
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Concur / Do not concur	(circle one) DOD CA Signature Date
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Notes

¹ Source: Michelle Parker, *Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency: A Case Study of Nangarhar, Afghanistan in 2008*, Defense & Technology Paper 53 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2007). Color versions of the figure appear in the original publication, available at <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/Defense_Tech_Papers.htm>.

² Nick Marinacci, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams—Towards Unity of Effort," May 2004. USAID Discussion Paper.

³ Having a clear understanding of budgets is helpful, but not necessary until further into the process, when the team goes into the community to talk to potential stakeholders. It is useful to have everything in place so when money does become available it easily fits into the strategic framework the PRT sets up for its province.

⁴ This study is about one PRT in Afghanistan, and any general references to PRTs apply only to PRTs in Afghanistan.

⁵ The "3D" concept came out of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, which stated that the United States needed to maximize each component of its foreign services to achieve national security.

⁶ Australia/Netherlands (joint PRT), Canada, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

⁷ PRTs in Afghanistan are not led by the U.S. Military, as is often reported. The military provides basic life support and transportation, but has no authority over the activities or programs of the other interagency partners.

⁸ This is true of PRTs in Afghanistan and may not be applicable to PRTs in other engagements.

⁹ "ISAF PRT Handbook," Edition 3, February 3, 2007.

¹⁰ Taken from the Terms of Reference for CFC and ISAF PRTs in Afghanistan, which were adopted by the Executive Steering Committee on 27 Jan 05.

¹¹ "ISAF PRT Handbook," Edition 2, August 21, 2006.

¹² This concept and the associated graphics were created in 2006 by Nick Marinacci and John Schweiger, the Director and Deputy Director respectively of USAID/Kabul's Civil-Military Program from 2003–2006.

¹³ The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines a line of operation as, 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s) or, 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s).

¹⁴ USAID focused on five areas of the country for its Rehabilitating Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP), one of which was Nangarhar due to its production potential (RAMP quarterly reports).

¹⁵ This was not the case in 2005 and 2006 due to counter-narcotics programming by the GoA and the international community (UNODC 2005 and 2006).

¹⁶ Crile, George, *Charlie Wilson's War* (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 436–439.

¹⁷ Baltazar, Thomas and Kvitashvili, Elizabeth, "The Role of USAID and Development Assistance in Combating Terrorism," *Military Review*, Vol. 87, Issue 2, March 2007.

¹⁸ In Nangarhar, a subtribe is a mostly homogeneous group in regards to making and execution decisions. The subtribe as a whole would decide whether to give sanctuary to the enemy. Because many subtribes spanned multiple districts, district lines were irrelevant to analysis and to working with subtribes.

¹⁹ This is a prime example of the "unity of effort" that can happen at a PRT. The author was far too busy managing a \$19 million Alternative Livelihood Program to spend the time needed to analyze the tribal situation well. The NCO who helped with this project was being underutilized by his team, and was able to support USAID in designing the intervention for the PRT. In the end, everyone benefited from this unconventional approach to program development.

²⁰ In figure 17–6, the circles indicate village cluster area for targeting purposes; the lines that look like strings on balloons are key smuggling routes. The black dots are specific villages.

²¹ The term *village clusters* was coined by a USAID implementing partner who discovered the sub-subtribes in Nangarhar existed on a hub-and-spoke model, where the hub is a village headed by a male elder, and nearby villages (the spokes) are headed by the children of that male elder. The village clusters were the entire hub-and-spoke model for a family, or sub-subtribe.

²² The CG's rationale for targeting fence-sitting villages was that it was still possible to win their support for the GoA through increasing the legitimacy or effectiveness of the government. The CG reasoned that the villages supporting the insurgency were already decided and would be harder to win over.

²³ USAID does not directly implement projects it designs. It outsources project implementation to a partner organization. The degree to which USAID is involved with managing the partner is determined by the type of aid provided—grant, cooperative agreement, or contract.

²⁴ As of 2006, USAID changed the program managed from the PRT Office from QIP to Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD), which expanded the scope of work to include capacity building and conflict mitigation, in addition to construction.

²⁵ If there is only one viable construction company for foot bridges in the area, and that company is working on two other projects, then the villagers may need to accept a company from another part of the country to get their bridge constructed soon, or else agree to wait 6–8 months while the local company completes the other projects. It is important to be aware of this in the program design phase, so that when projects are identified, the people who meet with the communities can be aware of the limitations and manage expectations.

²⁶ At this point in the process, the USAID FPO moved from the consultative process of the CG meetings to the individual responsibility of programming funds as a development expert. The FPO continued to seek advice from her colleagues, but the ultimate legal responsibility for representing USAID-funded projects and programs to the population and the GoA rested with the FPO.

²⁷ *Shura* is an Arabic word for “consultation” or “council.” In Afghanistan, it is a method for decisionmaking whereby the leaders of a community discuss a topic and make a decision for the whole of the community.

²⁸ Having to nominate projects in a minimal timeframe is common in combat zones because of ever-shifting money cycles at higher levels. That is all the more reason to develop a sound strategic plan at the provincial level, so that the minute money becomes available the team can program it into an existing framework rather than starting from scratch every time the HQ wants the PRT to spend money.

²⁹ The GoA has a unitary government structure, so decisionmaking authority was not delegated to the provinces, which made the job of the PRT much more difficult. The CG was tasked with increasing GoA effectiveness and legitimacy, but at the provincial level the leaders often had little of either. Fortunately, in Nangarhar, there was a strong government at the provincial level that would make decisions and gain the proper support inside each ministry.

³⁰ The PRT concept has no policy directives that require the leadership of each agency to meet, coordinate, or operate together in any way. The Jalalabad PRT developed the nomination board to ensure that each agency knew what the others were doing and could support each other. This was a personality-based solution to a major coordination problem that worked beautifully.

The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: Future Options for NATO (2007)¹

Friis Arne Petersen and Hans Binnendijk

Overview

Experience has shown that conflict resolution requires the application of all elements of national and international power—political, diplomatic, economic, financial, informational, social, and commercial, as well as military. To resolve conflicts or crises, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should adopt a Comprehensive Approach that would enable the collaborative engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international power to end hostilities, restore order, commence reconstruction, and begin to address a conflict's root causes. NATO can provide the military element for a comprehensive approach. Many other national, international, and nongovernmental actors can provide the civilian elements.

In May 2007, the Royal Danish Embassy in Washington, DC, and the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University held an informal workshop of experts from across the Alliance to explore options for creating an international comprehensive approach to postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. This paper is the product of that workshop and subsequent collaborations. It endeavors to describe the major requirements for conflict resolution, what NATO has learned from its post-Cold War experiences to date in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and how a more effective program of international civil and military engagement can be put in place.

Much work remains to be done to flesh out the initiative, but already it is clear that military efforts in the field must be complemented throughout any operation by nonmilitary means that bring to bear the

expert civil competencies of other actors, both national and international. In the Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO engaged with other actors belatedly through ad hoc, situational arrangements. Not knowing in advance what roles and which participants will eventually come into play results in longer and more costly conflict resolution in terms of lives, treasure, and ultimate effectiveness.

The adage that “NATO works in practice better than in theory” has become a convenient excuse for not reaching much-needed comprehensive agreements on civil-military cooperation, from the top levels down to face-to-face relationships in the field. More than enough operational experience has been gained to indicate that it is past time to replace expedient constructs with systemic, institutionalized procedures for cooperation on what, as is widely agreed, must be accomplished quickly and effectively.

The last remaining core task of NATO transformation is to link the Alliance’s military capabilities effectively with the indispensable nonmilitary elements of power essential to successful conflict resolution. Failure to finish that work hampers and at times frustrates success in the field by operational personnel, civilians, and military across all organizations who are simply trying to get the job done.

The Riga Initiative

The government of Denmark, with the support of like-minded North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, took the initiative in late 2004 to put the concept of a comprehensive approach on the Alliance agenda, initially under the heading *Concerted Planning and Action* (CPA). At that time, it was clear that even though NATO had no capabilities for purely civilian use, the Alliance had in fact already taken a number of pragmatic steps in these areas. The work and results in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan demonstrated that. But there was no defined frame of reference or codification of existing practices, especially regarding NATO’s collaboration with other actors in the field.

In June 2005, Denmark convened a seminar to kick-start the discussion within the Alliance. Political disagreements on the broader aspects of NATO’s future role led to skepticism from some countries on the idea of CPA, so a lot of time was spent in the first phase spelling out what the initiative was not. It was stressed that the aim was not to develop new, independent NATO capabilities but to strengthen Alliance ability to engage in cooperation with—not control of—other actors and to improve NATO mission planning in these areas.

In the spring of 2006, Denmark and six other countries—Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, and Slovakia—circulated a paper within the Alliance describing some of the basic ideas underpinning the CPA approach and what they were trying to achieve in the Alliance. The United States later joined the initiative through an eight-nation letter further clarifying the ideas behind what had by then become known as the NATO *Comprehensive Approach* (CA) initiative.

At the Riga Summit in November 2006, the Alliance decided to formally put the Comprehensive Approach initiative on its agenda. The summit tasked relevant entities to begin work on elaborating an Action Plan for how the Alliance could incorporate a comprehensive approach into its work. With this tasking as a starting point, significant progress has been made in many areas, but broader institutional questions relating in particular to NATO cooperation and interaction with the European Union are not yet resolved. Many of the elements and ideas outlined in this paper are reflected in the NATO Action Plan and have been the subject of discussion within the Alliance since Riga. Outside the formal setting, workshops have also been organized by the United Kingdom in Brussels and by the United States in Munich. It is critical that the focus on both the practical and conceptual work relating to the development and implementation of NATO's Comprehensive Approach initiative continues. Concrete progress on creating a common understanding among NATO members must be made. The cooperation between the Royal Danish Embassy and National Defense University is a contribution to this effort.

The Bucharest Summit in 2008 will be an important opportunity to take stock of how well the Alliance is responding to the critical challenge of forging an effective comprehensive approach. At the heart of the issue is the future role of NATO and its ability to contribute to global peace and security. The Comprehensive Approach initiative and its practical application in critical peace operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere form an integral part of this current transatlantic debate and will set the tone for future cooperation between the United States and Europe.

NATO's Post-Cold War Record

NATO has been engaged in transformation since the end of the Cold War, modifying its processes, structures, and missions to meet its members' security interests. Collective defense remains the core mission of the Alliance. However, in the absence of overt military threats, and facing new challenges, NATO has resolved to strengthen regional security through engagement, expansion, and crisis response beyond Alliance borders.

Much has been accomplished over the past 15 years to turn NATO toward its new missions. The Partnership for Peace, Euroatlantic Partnership Council, and other forums have been added to the NATO institutional base, strengthening European security. The Alliance has downsized and reorganized its military command structure. Combined joint task forces and the NATO Response Force have been operationalized to provide the Alliance with capabilities to respond to crises on short notice. Airlift and sealift capabilities are being organized as well.

For 12 years, NATO has been engaged continuously in major military crisis response operations, first in the Balkans and Mediterranean, and now in Afghanistan. These critical land, sea, and air operations have involved tens of thousands of troops deployed well beyond Alliance borders, providing NATO with considerable experience in deployments, strategic sustainment, and complex multinational command and control. These operations also have afforded Alliance military forces considerable interoperability experience from the tactical to strategic levels of training, planning, and execution. In brief, NATO has remade itself into an unquestionably able multinational military resource for crisis prevention and conflict resolution while remaining capable of carrying out Article 5 missions, as it demonstrated in September 2001.

The Alliance cannot go back; it must continue to adapt both politically and institutionally as a force for transatlantic action when crises or conflicts threaten collective interests. It must become a credible, collaborative player within the context of a far more comprehensive approach to conflict resolution in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and wherever its members agree to commit military resources under NATO command. The Alliance has gained enough experience since 1995 to replace some of the cobbled-together arrangements that have degraded its planning and coordination with the United Nations, European Union, and other actors.

The next steps in NATO transformation should concentrate on honing Alliance resources to operate more effectively within the framework of a comprehensive approach to crisis response and conflict resolution. It is most critical to adopt new accommodations in Afghanistan, where civil-military cooperation must be greatly improved to achieve a successful outcome.

Challenges Today

A key difficulty in moving beyond ad hoc arrangements is the inability of allies to come to an enduring agreement on NATO's future roles beyond collective territorial defense, such as crisis management. This

situation has persisted since the Soviet threat disappeared, with some seeking to turn the Alliance's considerable organizations and resources to address new risks to mutual interests beyond collective defense, and others desiring to diminish the Alliance commensurate with the now-remote threat to members' territories. Notwithstanding this long-running tension, NATO has engaged in crisis response almost since the end of the Cold War, reaching hurried agreements to improvise political arrangements and cooperative mechanisms in lieu of more permanent, less risky, and more effective procedures.

The debate stands in stark contrast to the reality of NATO's actual missions. Though difficult, there will be resolution. What should be possible now is to replace some of the most basic expedient arrangements with preestablished procedures that can be counted on as agreed methods for civil-military engagement, both internally and externally. The Alliance should identify some of the most important areas for planning and coordination and set up processes to put these into effect, including exercising.

Some resist institutionalizing any of the cooperative relationships that served in past crises, even as NATO expects to be committed in future crises that will require these same relationships. Advocates believe high-level political discussion and consensus on NATO's future purpose must come first. Once that is agreed, it is held, requisite civil-military and interorganizational mechanisms will readily follow. However, the long and continuing history of NATO's engagement in crises alongside other actors argues for moving beyond ad hoc frameworks without delay. If political consensus remains elusive, NATO should still push forward in important areas. But we must avoid institutionalizing cumbersome arrangements that will frustrate how our forces are already working together—internally and externally—in practice.

National capacities for a comprehensive approach have developed with NATO's operational experience. Members and partner countries have responded to the need for civilian capabilities by taking steps to develop some of these capabilities to work with their national militaries. The next step is for NATO to coalesce these capabilities at the international level in a way that provides the necessary teamwork with multinational military capabilities. Negotiating toward standardized goal setting, planning, operational interfacing, and resourcing will be necessary. Information-sharing modalities will be critical but must overcome national prerogatives.

NATO's engagement in crises has involved three broad operational phases: military operations (Kosovo, Afghanistan), postconflict stability operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan), and reconstruction operations

(Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq). So far, NATO has been able to organize only for the military phase by creating the NATO Response Force to provide a ready initial military response. This force is the best planned and most organized crisis response capability, though it still requires much fine tuning in terms of mission definition and sustained force commitments.

What NATO lacks is any organized deployable civil-military capacity to address either stabilization or reconstruction operations. The solution may not necessarily be a standing force but should be at least a preplanned menu of capabilities organized and exercised together periodically that constitutes a viable set of civilian skills and military resources to provide immediate triage to destabilized populations in conflict or crisis areas. These capabilities require equitable resourcing agreements, basic multinational doctrinal concepts, appropriate command and control architectures, sustainment profiles, and deployment flow schemes.

Findings

A key workshop finding was that the Alliance's continuous operational engagement since 1995 and the high expectation for future operations provide compelling arguments against further use of ad hoc arrangements between NATO's military and non-NATO civilian entities in the field. A comprehensive civil-military approach and permanent interorganizational arrangements are needed at both the military-strategic and political-military levels. Not to apply lessons learned in this area—in order to better our collective response—is to expose all our efforts and forces to unnecessary risk in future crises. Should the Alliance not meet its objectives in these endeavors, there is risk of declining political support for future operations.

Movement on a Comprehensive Approach initiative should not be held back due to unresolved, broader political disagreements among major Alliance members on the future institutional frameworks for crisis management. An opportunity for progress on the initiative seems to be developing. It is vital that this opportunity be seized.

Persistence counts on the Comprehensive Approach initiative endorsed at Riga. Many details must be worked out, requiring information-sharing, negotiation, compromise, and ultimately resource commitments. NATO summit initiatives have a spotty history of success. However, repeated initiatives on a single theme over time have found productive areas to move the Alliance toward meaningful change.

If full endorsement of a comprehensive approach is politically difficult for the immediate future, NATO should find seams of agreement and

pursue them until some form of the initiative is fully implemented among at least the key contributors to conflict resolution.

NATO need not create any civilian capacity that other organizations already have and can reasonably make available (for example, the European Union's well-known expertise in border control, institution-building, and policing). Notwithstanding the capabilities of civilian partners once they can be brought into volatile areas of conflict, NATO does need adequate capacity to deal with immediate postconflict stabilization requirements when a nonpermissive environment precludes engagement by other organizations. At present, NATO does not have sufficient organized capacity in this area but could readily develop what is required by building up a more robust civil-military cooperation capability.

Ensuring a common political understanding of the strategic objectives of a mission is vital. Cooperation among NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and other organizations worked well in Kosovo because there was early, high-level political agreement on ultimate goals and what each engaged agency needed to accomplish. For operations such as the one in Afghanistan, mechanisms for agreeing to objectives, roles, and contributions—in Brussels (the North Atlantic Council and the Council of the European Union) as well as in-theater (the Joint Civil Military Board)—are already in place and should be better utilized.

It is critical that NATO and other organizations clarify the division of labor when working together to resolve conflict situations. Many actors are engaged, and, if not coordinated, their different efforts risk colliding or at least yielding suboptimal results due to overlap. NATO must draw on and cooperate with neighboring countries and regional institutional frameworks.

The CA concept is as relevant to conflict prevention as it is to crisis response. NATO should explore ways to reinvigorate its highly successful Partnership for Peace and Euroatlantic Partnership Council mechanisms with the goal of strengthening their influence in conflict prevention. The Alliance should reenergize its relationships with organizations such as Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in this area.

Much of the success of interorganizational collaboration has been personality driven. NATO and other institutions need to make quality appointments of highly knowledgeable, goal-oriented, and diplomatic individuals in order to overcome stovepiped approaches and the current absence of institutional frameworks. Individuals alone cannot be the solution, however. Similarly, NATO and other organizations need to guard against organizational adaptations becoming the goal. The goal must be

realizing an optimal interorganizational civil-military enterprise for successful conflict resolution. Organizational flexibility will continue to be essential.

The details of possible initiatives that emerged during the workshop are described below.

A Summit Agenda in 2008

At its next summit, NATO has a fresh opportunity to move forward in its relationships with those organizations and partners willing and able to deploy civilian resources. To seize that opportunity, NATO should focus action on five broad undertakings to optimize its structures for participating with other organizations in a comprehensive approach to crises and conflicts:

- Formalize standing political-military and strategic military forums tasked to engage with all appropriate civil actors in crisis response, such as the United Nations, European Union, OSCE, African Union, and so forth. These mechanisms should address, as equal partners, top-level policy, planning, and resourcing considerations for integrated civil-military responses in current and future operations.
- Adjust NATO structures to provide optimum interface for civilian counterparts at the operational and tactical levels. This should include preoperational coordination and planning, as well as doctrine and standards for supporting and being supported by civil entities, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams and police trainers. NATO support might include appropriate levels of security, communications, logistics, and transportation. Agreements will be needed to establish what is required and how resources will be funded.
- Develop a compatible understanding with other actors on the CA elements of crisis resolution. This could be done by exercising and planning, examining best practices with civil actors, and sharing lessons learned from operations as appropriate.
- Establish a comprehensive database of lessons learned and update it continuously from teams in the field, without regard to organizational source. This database must go beyond current efforts by NATO's Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center to include civil as well as military lessons from other agencies, and it should be

available to all organizations engaged in planning and operating together.

- ▶ Identify to civil actors what nonmilitary capabilities are needed for future NATO crisis/conflict operations and encourage those organizations to indicate what capabilities they might provide and under what conditions. This set of capabilities should include the reestablishment of basic services, public safety and security, and institutions of government at the local, regional, and national levels.

CA Long-term Agenda

Within the five broad undertakings described above, pre-summit discourse should seek agreement on a fuller, long-term agenda for NATO staffs and decisionmakers. The following initiatives can flesh out a long-term CA agenda that could be agreed at the summit. Some of these initiatives are already under way but require continued emphasis as essential capabilities for civil-military collaboration.

Marshaling External Resources:

- ▶ The NATO Secretary General should begin coordination and consultation with external organizations for civil-military collaboration on crisis response and conflict resolution, with priority given to Afghanistan.
- ▶ The North Atlantic Council should appoint an Assistant Secretary General to oversee cooperation with essential civilian counterparts and arrange for regular reports on progress in this area.
- ▶ NATO and each of its members should undertake to strengthen public support for the Alliance role in CA crisis response. This would require that NATO and its members develop vigorous, parallel public awareness campaigns to connect CA commitments to collective interests supported by members' publics.

Marshaling Military Resources:

- ▶ NATO should develop three or four comprehensive approach operational scenarios, involving both military and nonmilitary assets, to provide a framework for preliminary crisis response planning, exercises, and doctrine development.
- ▶ Allied Command Operations/Allied Command Transformation should train and exercise more with a host of civilian partners—not only the European Union, OSCE, and United Nations but also

key nongovernmental organizations. These exercises should take into account training and expertise extant at the national level and endeavor to make national knowledge available to all NATO members and partners.

- ▶ Given that police as well as military capabilities are essential to public security, the North Atlantic Council should discuss formalizing release authority procedures for the constabulary forces being organized at Vicenza, Italy, as well as seeking to define commitment modalities for other organizations' policing capabilities.
- ▶ As a tenet of military force planning for crisis response, troop-list a force sufficient to include fielding a standby force for protection of civilian partners, including nongovernmental organizations, when called for by conditions of the operational environment.
- ▶ Training and equipping indigenous security forces are key components of generating long-term stability in semipermissive environments. NATO should ensure that its schoolhouses educate allied forces on best practices and lessons learned associated with training and mentoring these forces.

Marshaling Information and Communications Resources:

- ▶ The Alliance should propose creative and forceful ideas for intelligence-sharing as it relates to the Comprehensive Approach initiative, especially beyond NATO's traditional core group in this area.
- ▶ NATO military authorities should study how to extend necessary communications and data network connectivity to essential nongovernmental and international organizations. One way would be to design a portable communications system that can be provided to essential external actors who do not have resources themselves to link to NATO.
- ▶ The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency should inaugurate a Web-based multiservice (blogs, chat, collaboration, informational, linked, and so forth) NATO portal for authorized users to share information on civil-military cooperation of immediate interest to others in the field, such as Provincial Reconstruction Team best practices.
- ▶ The Alliance should take steps to share NATO standards in key areas and push for interoperability among all crisis responders, especially data and communications systems interoperability.

- ▶ NATO should agree on a process for systematically collecting, sharing, and acting on lessons learned both internally and with civilian partners on a continuous, perhaps Web-hosted basis. These information-sharing activities are best conducted in-theater by institutions set up for that purpose. This is one initiative the Alliance should explore to strengthen the effectiveness of its forces and resources in Afghanistan.

Marshaling Civilian Resources:

- ▶ NATO should encourage its members to identify deployable civilian capacity at the national level and compile a database so that all members will realize where their contributions might fit and where there are gaps and invest in same. There should be no presumption that civilian resources would necessarily be organized under NATO but that these assets would be available to work with the Alliance, either as national contributions or under other appropriate organizations, such as the United Nations, OSCE, or European Union. NATO's interest should be to ensure that the requisite civilian partners are available and ready. The Alliance must also know what levels of support civilian assets will require of its military resources in unsecured, austere environments.
- ▶ The United States, as the principal ally outside the European Union framework, should allocate \$50 million for a deployable civilian corps able to work with civilian capabilities from the European Union in support of NATO as well as non-NATO operations.
- ▶ NATO must determine how to bring its Civil Emergency Planning Directorate and Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee to bear on the challenges of civil-military coordination, as was done in the mid to late 1990s. Cataloguing available commercial resources, capabilities, and standards is one task. Other tasks would include how to mirror at least some of NATO's Cold War process for civil emergency planning that supports interaction with other agencies in deployed operations.
- ▶ The Alliance should establish a consolidated database of current and anticipated language requirements and available linguists at NATO and by member nations, both civilian and military.

Notes

1. Source: Friis Arne Petersen and Hans Binnendijk, *The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: Future Options for NATO*. Defense Horizons 50 (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2007).

Transatlantic Homeland Defense (2006)¹

Hans Binnendijk, Steven J. Flanagan, et al.

Context

This paper proposes an initiative to enhance transatlantic homeland defense at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) November 2006 Riga Summit and beyond. As NATO develops its capabilities for expeditionary operations, it needs to revitalize plans and capabilities essential to realize its core mission: protecting Alliance territory as outlined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This back-to-basics approach is designed to ensure that Allies can protect the transatlantic homeland against an array of new threats and challenges. This initiative would unfold in the context of broader efforts to protect the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO is but one of many institutions—national and international, governmental and nongovernmental—involved in societal security.

Key Points

Homeland defense—that is, the military's role in preventing and defending against terrorist attacks on the territory of Alliance members—is an increasingly important imperative for the United States, Canada and Europe. NATO has the opportunity to articulate a strategic direction and planning process for homeland defense to ensure that relevant Alliance activities and capabilities are adapted and integrated to deal with these new threats. NATO's activities in many areas—for example, its protection of Mediterranean sealanes against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorists—provide multiple elements that can be united to form a homeland defense initiative at Riga. Such an initiative would be intended to complement, not detract from, national and European Union (EU) capabilities and institutions that bear the major responsibility for ensuring

homeland security. This initiative would offer NATO both a 21st-century approach to Article 5 and new meaning and credibility in the eyes of NATO publics who are concerned about threats to their homelands.²

This report proposes that enhanced transatlantic homeland defense be a major initiative for adoption at the 2006 Riga Summit and completion at the 2008 summit. Accompanying this initiative would be parallel proposals on strengthening partnerships with nonmembers and further improving NATO's military forces and capabilities for new-era missions. The initiative would include four categories of homeland defense, none of which would address expeditionary, counterterrorism, natural disaster, and humanitarian missions outside the NATO area. In some cases, capabilities created for homeland defense purposes could be used within and outside the NATO area for such civil-military missions. The four categories are:

- guarding the approaches and achieving border security for the NATO region
- pursuing enhanced/integrated and linked continental early warning and air/missile defense capabilities
- preventing and managing terrorist incidents
- strengthening transatlantic capabilities for consequence management, ranging from terrorist use of WMD to large-scale natural disasters.

NATO and its members already possess noteworthy capabilities in some respects in these areas, but their capacity to act as a fully organized and capable alliance is not well developed. NATO will need improvements in physical assets and strengthened strategic planning and operating capacities. It also will require close coordination and harmonization with national governments, many of which view control of homeland security resources as vital manifestations of their sovereignty. The ultimate outcome of decisive action in these areas would be enhanced NATO capabilities to protect member airports, seaports, maritime approaches, and critical infrastructure; defend against future missile threats; prevent and manage terrorist incidents; and react promptly to WMD use.

NATO-EU Cooperation

The rationale for a NATO homeland defense initiative is that the vital interests of all member nations are involved; hence, their cooperation will be critical to achieving improved capabilities. NATO's political and practical collaboration with the European Union will also be crucial. Many

Europeans view the EU as the main institution for promoting European integration across a spectrum of economic, political, and—increasingly—foreign policy and security activities. To be successful, a NATO initiative on homeland defense would have to complement existing national and EU programs. It also would have to provide an important collaborative role for the EU, which is seeking to develop a value-added role to complement and integrate national capabilities for civilian and civil-military crisis management. As a consequence, many common European capabilities related to societal/homeland security and emergency response (such as customs, police cooperation, environmental security, and information-sharing) are likely to be housed within the EU in the future.³ Since 19 of the 25 EU member states are members of NATO, and 4 of the remaining 6 are Partnership for Peace (PFP) members, they are unlikely to be inclined to duplicate activities in NATO and/or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to which they already are committed in an EU context. An initiative linking NATO and the EU in a common cause could have a positive impact on their cooperation in other areas as well, such as civil-military operations outside the Euro-Atlantic space. In short, the proposed approach would create a win-win outcome rather than a zero-sum game.

Of the four categories surveyed here, the first two (guarding approaches and air/missile defense) are mainly military and thus are largely NATO's business when they require U.S.-European military integration. The third category, preventing and managing terrorist incidents within the NATO region, will require Alliance participation only when EU or national capabilities are overwhelmed. Because NATO involvement would come as a last resort, it must be prepared and able to respond if asked to do so. The fourth category, consequence management, requires a mixture of military and civilian assets and therefore will require national or EU cooperation.

Thus far, the European Union has undertaken a range of activities and initiatives aimed at improving its military and civilian capabilities and structures to respond to crises spanning both homeland defense and homeland security, including cross-border cooperation on consequence management for natural and manmade disasters (such as terrorist attacks, port security, and protection of critical infrastructure). For the most part, these activities were either spawned or accelerated by the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings. The European Union has developed a European Security Strategy and a Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and has a situation center in Brussels that provides valuable EU-wide threat assessments to national governments. An exam-

ple of an EU response to a disaster was the *Prestige* accident in November 2002, in which a tanker sank off the west coast of Galicia, Spain, releasing 44,000 tons of fuel. In response to a Spanish government request, EU member states made available floating barriers, ships, and surveillance planes. This action was carried out under EU agreements by the EU Commission's Monitoring and Information Center.

EU officials and documents acknowledge that EU activities and initiatives are at various stages of development, with some in their early stage. For example, the European Council agreed in 2005 (during the British presidency) to examine a Commission proposal for an integrated "rapid response and preparedness instrument" to react to all types of disasters (including terrorism) inside or outside the EU while setting a goal to finalize crisis coordination operational procedures by June 2006. This examination includes work on possible support that member state military assets and capabilities could give to consequence management within an EU context.

Broad political support exists for these crisis response and management efforts within the EU. For example, during the British presidency, senior UK officials, including Secretary of State for Defence John Reid, noted that development of EU civil-military coordination—covering analysis, planning, and management of capabilities and operations—was a top priority. Finnish officials have expressed similar sentiments (Finland will assume the EU presidency during July-December 2006, overlapping the Riga Summit).

Given U.S. interests and equities in improved cooperation with the EU, bilaterally and through NATO—a goal shared by almost all EU members—any new initiative on homeland defense at the Riga Summit should be couched as one aspect of improved overall cooperation. This will require careful advance scrutiny to determine what the European Union already has in place or is developing, and where NATO can offer real value added. Creating a joint clearinghouse of capabilities would allow the EU and NATO to determine how best to meet the requirement of a specific crisis.

Moreover, Europeans have diverse constitutional approaches to domestic uses/authorities of their own militaries in crisis situations, and these are sensitive issues.⁴ (For example, Germany's Constitutional Court recently found that the Ministry of Defense does not have legal authority to shoot down a terrorist-controlled aircraft if it would kill innocent civilians aboard.) Any suggestion that a "NATO commander" would somehow have authority over foreign forces or capabilities deployed within a mem-

ber state will be viewed skeptically. Thus, a demonstrated U.S. willingness to initiate a discussion within NATO on transatlantic homeland defense that is cast in the context of NATO–EU cooperation and offers a mutually beneficial solution stands a plausible chance of gaining widespread consensus.

Guarding the Approaches

A Riga initiative in this category could have widespread appeal because this is a natural ongoing mission for NATO as well as an important, growing strategic priority in the current era. Simply stated, NATO's approaches, especially its maritime approaches, need greater security from terrorists and other threats than they currently have. With a modest commitment of military and other resources, coupled with improved strategic planning and coordination by NATO civilian and military staffs, regional security could be enhanced. Building upon programs already being pursued, additional progress in this category could be made quickly in the years after the Riga Summit, thus showing success and commitment at the summit in 2008.

Existing Capabilities. NATO has been active in new arenas in recent years. For example, NATO airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft were used to provide air surveillance at the recent Athens and Turin Olympic games and the 2004 European football championships. Existing Alliance capabilities in the area of guarding the maritime approaches to the transatlantic homeland are especially noteworthy. In October 2001, Allies implemented Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and agreed to deploy NATO forces to protect the approaches to Alliance territory from terrorist threats. Allied ships and aircraft soon began patrols in the eastern Mediterranean in what became Operation *Active Endeavor*. These patrols now help detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity in this vital and crowded sealane, through which flows 65 percent of Europe's energy and a large percentage of other seaborne trade.

In February 2003, the operation was expanded to include escort of merchant vessels from Allied states passing through the narrow Straits of Gibraltar, where they might be vulnerable to terrorist targets. In April 2003, NATO expanded *Active Endeavor's* scope to include boarding operations in compliance with international law. In 2004, the Alliance extended *Active Endeavor's* area of operations to include the entire Mediterranean. It also welcomed participation by EAPC/PFP Partners and Mediterranean Dialogue countries and put into place a new operational pattern focused on gathering and processing information and intelligence to target specific

vessels of interest. As of March 2006, *Active Endeavor* had completed its 100th compliant boarding of a suspect vessel, while monitoring 75,000 vessels and providing escort to 480 ships.

NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval Force Atlantic support this mission. Several NATO members—mainly Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey—contribute naval assets directly; Mediterranean Allies provide substantial logistic support; and several northern European Allies provide fast patrol boats for escort operations. Three PFP countries (Croatia, Georgia, and Sweden) and three Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Algeria, Israel, and Morocco), as well as Russia and Ukraine, have indicated a desire to participate in the operation.

Potential Improvements. This mutual interest of Allies and Partners to ensure the safety of maritime transit provides NATO an opportunity to enhance defense of its homeland approaches, including container security on the high seas, support to civil authorities, and the security of Partners. *Active Endeavor* has expanded the sharing of data collected at sea by Allies and Mediterranean rim countries. The Commander, Allied Maritime Component Command Naples, has developed the Joint Information and Analysis Center (JIAC), an experimental networking system that provides analysis and warning, as well as information on deployment of assets, in order to ensure timely action by appropriate authorities.

Fuller development of the JIAC could help galvanize NATO member and Partner efforts to provide a two-way flow of usable information for countering terrorism, illegal trafficking, and WMD proliferation in the maritime domain. This information could be shared with coast guards and appropriate national and EU law enforcement and civilian authorities to enhance port and border security.

NATO member states could also take additional steps to integrate and selectively deploy with *Active Endeavor* and other operations their chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection capabilities to diminish further the threat of catastrophic terrorist attacks before they reach their shores. Capabilities in ground, air, and coastal surveillance, port security, airport security, and CBRN detection could be improved to bolster support of civil homeland security authorities. Finally, establishment of a NATO Training Center in the Mediterranean Dialogue region that focuses on port security could deepen mutual security in that area.

The Black Sea region is increasingly important to Europe and the United States as a major East-West energy supply bridge and as a barrier to many transnational threats. Littoral states, led by Turkey, have initiated steps to enhance regional economic and security cooperation. In March

2004, the Turkish navy launched *Black Sea Harmony* to monitor traffic on the southern sections of the Black Sea and invited other littoral states to join. However, Turkey and Russia have both rejected NATO's proposal to extend *Active Endeavor* into the Black Sea. This stance, driven by objections to a permanent presence by nonlittoral states, does not need to impede realization of NATO's goals of enhancing security of the maritime approaches to the homeland. NATO might express its support for *Black Sea Harmony*, encourage Allied littoral states (Bulgaria and Romania) to join, and develop an exchange of information through the JIAC.

Air/Missile Defense

The United States is beginning deployment of national missile defenses against intercontinental ballistic missile threats posed by new-era adversaries such as North Korea and Iran. A small defense shield of 100 to 150 midcourse interceptor missiles (employing hit-to-kill technology) is being contemplated, and other systems, including boost-phase missiles and high-energy lasers, are being developed. Yet such threats might not be confined to the United States. Iran's development of nuclear weapons with missile delivery systems in the next few years would provide a direct threat to Europe of the sort that could build support for deployment of a NATO missile defense force.

Existing Capabilities. NATO recently has been studying options for missile defense. Its Theatre Missile Defence Programme seeks to field an active layered theater ballistic missile defense with the capability to protect deployed troops against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles by 2010. Defense ministers approved a technical blueprint in 2004, and Allies have subsequently agreed to commit resources to develop a command and control and planning capability. At the Prague Summit, Allies agreed to study options for protecting populations against ballistic missile threats of all ranges and will evaluate these options on the basis of contractor studies. Thus, NATO is not yet seeking a missile defense of population centers in continental Europe comparable to that being deployed by the United States. Some members are pursuing research and development programs for missile defense, and major studies on European missile defense options are now under way.

Today, NATO air defense is focused on traditional threats to European airspace. The NATO Air Command and Control System Management Organization provides the structure for the planning and implementation of the command and control system supporting NATO air defense operations. Simply stated, NATO has a large traditional air defense system

composed of AWACs, fighter interceptors, and surface-to-air missiles, but it has no near-term prospects for deploying a missile defense system for the European continent.

Potential Improvements. Should a NATO homeland defense initiative include heightened emphasis on continental missile defense? This controversial question is likely to generate a wide spectrum of answers, but as matters now stand, Europe is not prepared to deploy missile defenses in the foreseeable future.

Requirements studies establishing the framework for an active layered theater ballistic missile defense are mature enough that advance engineering work can be done to refine the concepts that would set the stage for the integration of NATO–EU air/missile defense processes. Based on earlier studies, Allies could establish a Missile Defense Technical Center to focus further research and development.

The Riga Summit plausibly could call upon NATO to accelerate its assessment of an architecture for protecting Alliance territory and populations against the full range of missile threats. This could include a call for greater research and development efforts on promising technologies by participating countries, as well as intensified studies and analyses of potential deployment options. To respond to the threat of attacks on Europe by cruise missiles from southern locations, the Riga Summit could call for enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Counterterrorism

Article 5 was invoked for the first time in NATO history in a counterterrorism context on September 12, 2001, following the terrorist attacks on the United States. As a result, NATO's Article 5 focus has shifted from the traditional territorial defense of the Cold War era to emphasize counterterrorism. From October 2001 to May 2002, Operation *Eagle Assist* resulted in NATO AWACS aircraft being sent to help patrol skies over the United States. The need to consider terrorist threats has been a regular theme of NATO summits since then; for example, the Istanbul Summit of 2004 called for NATO to develop improved intelligence, rapid response assistance after attacks, and assistance in protecting high-visibility events. Nonetheless, counterterrorism within the NATO region has remained mostly the responsibility of national ministries (such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security in the United States) and of multilateral police and law-enforcement organizations.

Increasingly, the Europeans are trying to use the European Union to coordinate counterterrorism activities. The organization has established

a counterterrorism action plan, and its situation center continuously provides threat assessments to all EU members. Throughout Europe, NATO is mainly viewed as a helpful adjunct to counterterrorist missions within the NATO region, not a lead agency. Even so, NATO will continue to play a role in preventing and managing terrorist incidents, especially when indigenous capabilities require reinforcement.

Current Capabilities. NATO's main role in counterterrorism has been to help provide continental early warning and air/missile defense as well as protection of vital sealanes through Operation *Active Endeavor*. It also provides protection of its own military assets. In the event of terrorist strikes, especially involving WMD use, NATO military forces could be mobilized to back up first responders for disaster relief. NATO has established a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit to analyze threats against Europe. Member states of the EAPC established a Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism to promote and facilitate cooperation among its members in the fight against terrorism. NATO's largest role in the war on terror, of course, has been its involvement in operations outside its territory and that of its Partners—for example, its participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan since August 2003, its role in training Iraqi security forces, and its contributions to stability in the Balkans. But these are missions outside its territory, not homeland defense missions within its territory.

Potential Improvements. NATO nations are developing new, cutting-edge technologies to protect troops and civilians against terrorist attacks, including technology for the early detection, protection, and destruction of improvised explosive devices. Measures that protect critical infrastructure (ports, platforms, and energy pipelines) should be emphasized in cooperation with EU efforts in this area. In addition, further measures to strengthen NATO intelligence collection and sharing capabilities would contribute to counterterrorism efforts within the NATO region.

Flexible response to countering terrorism requires a special operations force (SOF) capability. Such forces are expensive to organize, train, and equip, and are in great demand and short supply. NATO could explore a mechanism for nations to pool their SOF assets in order to respond promptly to a major challenge that would require NATO to assist overwhelmed individual nations.

The reinforced North Atlantic Council at Defense Ministers Level (NAC-D) could hold meetings with interior ministers on counterterrorism issues. A NATO exchange with Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries could be created by holding an

annual conference focusing on the challenges of transnational threats, terrorism, and countermeasures. NATO also could explore how securing pipelines, offshore platforms, and ports to assure energy supplies in wartime defense could be applied to antiterrorist protection of critical infrastructure. Finally, NATO should establish mechanisms for cooperation with national police forces and other local first responders.

Consequence Management

Consequence management requirements could arise in response to challenges ranging from terrorist WMD use, to pandemics, to large-scale natural disasters in the NATO region. NATO planning, logistical, and operational capabilities could provide unique support to the responsible national and EU authorities in the face of such catastrophic incidents. Improving NATO's capabilities for consequence management support could be part of a Riga Summit agenda on homeland defense.

Existing Capabilities. For defense against WMD, NATO countries are jointly developing five nuclear, biological, and chemical defense initiatives: a deployable analytical laboratory, an event response team, a virtual center of excellence for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons defense, a defense stockpile, and a disease surveillance system. In addition, a multinational NATO chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense battalion achieved full operational capability in 2004. Many of the key capabilities for responding to a CBRN event are resident in European and U.S. military forces, which could be called upon to assist first responders. NATO's Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee has developed a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan, which calls for the development of nonbinding guidelines and minimum standards for the protection of the civil population against CBRN risks. In addition, countries have prepared inventories of national civil and military capabilities that could be made available in the event of CBRN attacks.

There is precedent for NATO's involvement in disaster relief in its own region and beyond. NATO assisted victims of Hurricane Katrina in autumn 2005 and aided Pakistanis in the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake. It also has provided assistance to the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and other countries in response to flooding and to Portugal in response to forest fires. NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center is the focal point for coordinating disaster relief efforts of the 46 EAPC nations—in case of natural or technological disasters. The small staff is headed by NATO's Director of Civil Emergency Planning. In the case of

the Pakistan earthquake, NATO sent engineers, medical units, helicopters and crews, and a field hospital from its Response Force.

Potential Improvements. Experiences from natural disasters to high-end terrorist attacks indicate that a nation might need to supplement its indigenous capabilities in eight categories:

- ▶ decontamination teams to respond to CBRN attack
- ▶ local airlift assets (primarily transport helicopters)
- ▶ logistic support assets (primarily trucks and forklifts)
- ▶ communications and intelligence assets
- ▶ emergency medical teams
- ▶ constabulary forces and military police
- ▶ engineers, including explosive ordnance disposal
- ▶ Civil-Military Coordination Group capabilities.

Units with these capabilities exist in NATO member forces. The Alliance's capacity would be strengthened by deliberate planning and force execution for consequence management in the event of a catastrophic incident.

NATO should undertake a homeland defense requirements and capabilities study. It should strengthen its structure and capacity for deliberate planning in order to identify requirements, develop force goals, and help guide national plans and programs to fruition. The formation of military disaster assistance response teams with a chemical-biological decontamination capability should be considered. In addition, NATO needs to ensure that its military forces for consequence management missions are properly trained and prepared. The acquisition of larger stocks of supplies and materials that might be needed in catastrophic terrorist attacks, especially WMD situations, should be investigated.

NATO could develop planning exchanges with subregional organizations such as Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial/Southeastern Europe Brigade or various Black Sea groupings to enhance subregional planning and cooperation with Partners.

NATO's new Comprehensive Political Guidance has highlighted the need to plan for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. As the force planning process focuses on S&R requirements, member countries likely will respond to some degree. Most S&R forces and capabilities will be useful in a variety of consequence management missions.

NATO's military requirements for consequence management are proving to be larger than appeared to be the case only a few years ago. In addition to strengthening its military capabilities in this arena, NATO could pursue other improvements:

- ▶ develop NATO standards for cyber-security, particularly those essential to energy, communications, and transportation
- ▶ conduct NAC–D meetings with interior ministers and, as appropriate, health ministers to review NATO's capacity to respond to consequence management challenges⁵
- ▶ create a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan tailored for Mediterranean Dialogue/ICI countries and Black/Caspian Sea Partners
- ▶ conduct exercises, involving NATO, the EU, and other multinational institutions that involve serious incidents of various sorts, including cyberattacks on governments, power grids, and air traffic systems
- ▶ strengthen multinational information-sharing on threat assessments, incident reporting, and early warning.

Command and Force Posture

Important command and force posture issues arise in determining how NATO's role in homeland defense can best be strengthened. How can NATO headquarters best organize for these new challenges? Should NATO have a command equivalent to the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to plan and implement homeland defense missions? Can existing NATO military capabilities be used to perform homeland defense missions, or should new capabilities be created?

NATO headquarters would no doubt need additional assets focused on homeland defense missions. The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee and its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center might need larger staffs. Beyond this, it may be necessary to create an Assistant Secretary General for Homeland Defense with appropriate staff to chart NATO's future in this arena. This planning in NATO could also be linked to similar efforts in other regional organizations, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Creation of a Homeland Defense Committee to advise the NAC might also be a good idea.

With regard to military staffs, the United States needed USNORTHCOM because it had no other command for homeland defense. By contrast, NATO's military commands were organized primarily to manage territorial defense of Europe. Thus, a NATO NORTHCOM equivalent does not

appear necessary. However, some improvements to the existing military command structure may make sense. Allied Command Operations (ACO) is the logical headquarters for planning the use of NATO military forces for homeland defense missions. Below ACO, a proven command concept is to designate one of the principal subordinate operational headquarters as the deployable headquarters for handling homeland security missions. This would involve converting an existing principal subordinate command to handle homeland defense issues rather than creating a new one.

NATO authorities will need to analyze the issue of how new homeland defense missions should affect the force posture. A new small but highly ready force may need to be created for this purpose. Forces of lesser readiness are the equivalent of U.S. Reserve Component forces but can be mobilized over a period of weeks. These units will provide sufficient manpower and equipment in aggregate to handle the biggest homeland defense missions: incident management of WMD use or, as a lesser included case, natural disasters that clearly overload national and EU response capabilities. Yet close inspection may show that existing forces lack necessary capabilities in specific areas: for example, medical support, engineers, military police, and transport units. To the extent such deficiencies arise, NATO force planners will need to seek the necessary changes in forces, equipment, training, and readiness.

The alternative to relying upon existing forces is to convert forces to provide new capabilities oriented to homeland defense missions, especially consequence management. Because NATO's members have active-duty forces that significantly exceed potential requirements for warfighting and related crisis response, some of the forces could be converted to homeland defense missions.

The tradeoff among three options will have to be analyzed carefully:

- ▶ rely upon existing forces and capabilities for homeland defense missions
- ▶ rely upon existing forces, but approve a contingency headquarters and organizational design that provide additional capabilities as warranted by homeland defense requirements
- ▶ create a new command and assign forces that are sized, equipped, and trained exclusively for the homeland defense mission.

Action Agenda/Recommendations

At the Riga Summit, NATO should focus on homeland defense as a key part of its deliberations. The overall goal should be to point NATO

in the direction of developing better capabilities for performing future homeland defense missions in concert with European countries and the EU. Specifically:

- ▶ The Riga Summit Declaration should include a statement of principles on a “Homeland Defense Initiative,” underscoring that NATO will undertake this initiative in cooperation with ongoing national and EU efforts, with a view to develop a capacity that can be used to complement national capacities and be available when these are overwhelmed.
- ▶ The Riga Summit should announce new homeland defense activities for PFP, designed to enhance Partner capabilities for homeland defense missions.
- ▶ In appropriate areas, the Riga Summit should announce a few specific force and organizational changes aimed at producing improved homeland defense capabilities in the near term.
- ▶ NATO headquarters and military staffs should conduct a study of future homeland defense requirements, capabilities, costs, and improvement priorities, and report the results in the near future.

Notes

¹ Source: *CTNSP/INSS Special Report* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006). This report is a joint project of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. It was prepared by Neyla Arnas, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen J. Flanagan, Stuart E. Johnson, Richard L. Kugler, Leo G. Michel, Anne M. Moisan, Jeffrey Simon, and Kimberly L. Thachuk.

² Former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, and his *Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales* (FAES) colleagues Rafael Bardají and Florentino Portero, made a compelling case for renewed Alliance attention to homeland defense efforts in their report *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom* (Madrid: FAES, 2005), 22–29. We have included and expanded upon several of their proposals in framing this initiative.

³ For an overview of the European Union’s approach to homeland security, see Gustav E. Gustenau, “The Concept of Homeland Security in the European Union and in Austria: A Challenge for the Austrian EU Presidency,” in *Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches*, ed. Esther Brimmer (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, 2006), 59–80.

⁴ For a review of European national approaches to “societal” or homeland security, see *Protecting the Homeland: European Approaches to Societal Security—Implications for the United States*, ed. Daniel Hamilton, Bengt Sundelius, and Jesper Gronvall (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, 2006).

⁵ For a discussion on forging new health security alliances, see Daniel S. Hamilton and Bradley T. Smith, “Atlantic Storm,” in *European Molecular Biology Organization Report*, 7, no. 1 (2006), 4–9.

Responding in the Homeland: A Snapshot of NATO's Readiness for CBRN Attacks (2007)¹

Michael Moodie and Robert E. Armstrong with Tyler Merkeley

Overview

The possibility of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members having to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident is not a hypothetical scenario reserved for training exercises. Indeed, a number of countries worldwide have considerable experience in dealing with a variety of naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate CBRN incidents. NATO itself, however, has no clear conceptual vision of its role in civil emergencies because preparedness of this sort remains a national responsibility.

For many years, NATO's military forces have addressed CBRN issues as part of their military planning. But the question remains as to how NATO nations view the capability of their military forces and the contribution that these forces can make in dealing with the consequences of a domestic CBRN attack within one or several member countries. This paper provides insights into current thinking of NATO members—based on an informal survey of Alliance military attaches assigned to Washington, DC—regarding the planning, assets, and training for such a contingency.

The resulting snapshot of NATO CBRN capabilities suggests specific initiatives that should be considered within the Alliance to improve its collective response to a CBRN incident. Areas recommended for particular emphasis and further study include bolstering Alliance capabilities for biological and radiological contingencies; strengthening command and control and logistics capabilities; addressing the airlift shortfall; intensify-

ing multilateral exercises; and creating an Alliance-wide mechanism for sharing lessons learned.

Terrorist bombings in Madrid and London, Hurricane Katrina, the tsunami in Southeast Asia, and the earthquake in Pakistan are all reminders of the importance of civil preparedness for domestic emergencies, whether natural or manmade. In recent years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has made civil emergency response a higher priority to reflect the changing role of the Alliance and to contribute to the transformation of its forces. A number of studies have made the point, however, that no single comprehensive approach to civil emergency response exists within NATO.² Civil emergency preparedness remains a national responsibility, and Alliance members have distinct domestic governance structures, face different risks, and experience diverse cultural influences in the way they conduct their national business.

One domestic contingency that has received considerable attention from NATO members is the risk of attack by terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The occurrence of such events—whether accidental or deliberate—is certainly not hypothetical. The United States alone has experienced events that range from a partial reactor meltdown to anthrax attacks. Worldwide, there also is considerable experience with dealing with such crises.

One notable incident involved the release of anthrax (*Bacillus anthracis*) spores in 1979 in Sverdlovsk in the former Soviet Union. In that event, 96 people were hospitalized, 68 of whom died.³ The Soviet government initially claimed that the deaths resulted from gastrointestinal anthrax caused by tainted meat. In 1992, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin confirmed what Western analysts had long suspected when he revealed that the incident was in fact caused by inhalation anthrax from an accidental spore release from a biological weapons facility.⁴

Also in 1979, the United States experienced its most serious radiological incident with the reactor accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania. A failure in the nonnuclear part of the powerplant led to inadequate cooling and the melting of nuclear fuel pellets. Investigations by several well-respected organizations concluded that, despite serious damage to the reactor, most of the radiation had been contained and that the actual release had negligible effects on the physical health of individuals and the environment.⁵ The cleanup of the damaged reactor, however, took nearly 12 years and cost almost a billion dollars.⁶

A less well-remembered incident took place in 1984. The Oregon-based Bhagwan Shri Rajneesh cult disseminated *Salmonella typhi* bacteria—causative agent of salmonella poisoning—in salad dressing at a restaurant in The Dalles, Oregon. The cult was attempting to keep voters away from the polls, where a measure hostile to the cult was on the ballot. In the end, they succeeded in sickening 751 local citizens but failed to block the measure.⁷ For more than a year, Oregon officials treated the incident as an unusual but natural outbreak.⁸ With the confession of a cult member, the responsible parties were arrested.⁹ This event is often cited as the first bioterrorism attack staged in the United States.

In 1986, Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl, Ukraine, in the former Soviet Union suffered an accident, resulting in the release of massive amounts of radiation into the environment. Thirty-one people died in the Chernobyl accident and its immediate aftermath. Most of the immediate casualties were suffered by firefighters.¹⁰ Estimates of the delayed health effects vary, but by 2002, 4,000 cases of thyroid cancer had been reported in exposed children. The cleanup costs at Chernobyl are estimated at \$1 billion.¹¹ The aggregate damage from the catastrophe to the country has been estimated at \$235 billion (calculated for a 30-year recovery period).¹²

In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult conducted a nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway. A dozen riders were killed and thousands injured.¹³ The incident was actually five coordinated attacks on several subway lines during the rush hour commute. The terrorists used a low-tech approach of boarding the trains with two plastic half-liter bags of liquid sarin, which they punctured with an umbrella tip as they left the train. This incident illustrates the point that such attacks do not have to be conducted by tech-savvy individuals. The five simultaneous, separate attacks highlighted the pressures placed on emergency services during a CBRN attack and illustrated the need for better communication and coordination of emergency medical services.

The appearance of West Nile Virus—a mosquito-borne flavivirus—is a good reminder that Mother Nature is also capable of creating biological incidents. Although not a public health issue on the scale of an anthrax release or a sarin attack, it is a useful case study in how quickly such organisms can spread across the country. First identified in New York City in 1999, the virus had spread across the United States by 2004. In 2006, there were 4,180 human cases of West Nile Virus in the United States, resulting in 149 fatalities.¹⁴

Of even greater public health significance was the 2002 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, a virus related to the common cold. First appearing in China and initially misdiagnosed as influenza or severe pneumonia—pointing out how newly emerging diseases can easily be allowed to “break out” from their initial cases—the virus ultimately resulted in 774 deaths worldwide and caused economic losses estimated at \$80 billion to \$100 billion.¹⁵

The dominant CBRN-related terrorist incident was the 2001 anthrax attack in the United States. Although the attack caused a relatively small burden of illness and death—22 infections and 5 deaths—it created significant political, economic, and social disruption. In the wake of the attack, as many as two million Americans might have taken antibiotics unnecessarily—a public health issue in and of itself.¹⁶ Additionally, the U.S. Government spent in excess of \$3 billion in direct costs to the U.S. Postal Service, as well as more than \$24 million for the cleanup of the Hart Senate Office Building.¹⁷ The so-called Amerithrax attack highlighted significant shortfalls and challenges in the Federal biodefense response to an attack on the homeland—many of which remain unresolved 5 years later.

For most NATO members, the 2001 anthrax mailings in the United States transformed the CBRN threat from an interesting theoretical possibility to a real national security challenge. Continued reports of terrorist interest in CBRN capabilities and a number of disrupted plots that may have involved CBRN materials have kept the need for effective preparedness to deal with such a contingency well up on the list of priorities for most NATO members.

For many years, NATO military forces have addressed CBRN issues as part of military planning. Confronting battlefield use of such weapons, especially chemical and biological, is a contingency that NATO has had to address throughout most of its 60-year history. For this reason, NATO military forces have significant experience and expertise relevant to civil contingencies involving CBRN use. How do the NATO nations themselves view this capability within their military forces and its contribution to an effective response to a possible domestic CBRN attack in the homeland of one or more Alliance members?

To answer this question, the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the National Defense University distributed a questionnaire to the defense attaches of NATO member nations in Washington, DC, regarding their national capability for dealing with a CBRN attack. The questionnaire was designed to elicit views on the degree of planning, available national assets, and level of training of military and

other national contingents for a CBRN attack in their homelands. Not all the questionnaires were answered, nor were complete answers always given in returned questionnaires. Nevertheless, the answers that were reported allow development of a snapshot of current thinking and practice regarding this domestic contingency of key importance to all Alliance members (see table 20-1).¹⁸

Table 20-1: Summary of Selected Questionnaire Responses: NATO CBRN Assets by Geographic Region ¹⁹

Expertise	Northwest²⁰ (percent)	Central²¹ (percent)	Mediterranean/Southeast²² (percent)
Threat Identification			
Chemical	83	57	100
Biological	83	43	60
Radiological	67	43	80
Nuclear	67	43	100
Threat Decontamination			
Chemical	67	71	100
Biological	67	43	60
Radiological	50	57	80
Nuclear	67	57	60
Casualty Care			
Chemical	67	29	40
Biological	67	43	20
Radiological	67	14	20
Nuclear	67	29	0
Consequence Management			
Command and Control	50	29	40
Logistics	33	14	60
Dedicated CBRN Units²³			
None	67	71	40
Company-size	0	14	40
Battalion-size	0	14	40
Other assets ²⁴	33	14	20
Critical Equipment²⁵			
Medicines	40	86	100
Protective equipment	40	86	90
Decontamination gear	40	57	90
Asset Deployability Outside of Homeland			
Self-sufficient	80	33	40
Require additional airlift	20	67	60
Require additional sealift	0	17	0
Require additional rail	0	17	0

Following a preliminary discussion of current NATO efforts to address emergency responses and civil preparedness for CBRN contingencies, the results from the questionnaire are discussed in the remainder of this paper. Various “cuts” on the data seemed relevant, but the most useful proved to be a geographic assessment of the survey responses. This provided a better picture of where strengths and weaknesses existed in Alliance assets and capabilities. Thus, the analysis partitioned NATO’s European members into Northwest Europe, Central Europe, and Mediterranean/Southeastern Europe. (This cut does not include North American members—the United States and Canada—that were part of the survey.) The general observations offered here are subject to the limitations of this survey, but they do highlight some key issues that should be of interest to NATO and national leaders.

Background

Although civil emergency planning remains a national responsibility, NATO has made significant efforts to work the problem across the Alliance. The principal NATO body in the areas of civil preparedness, operating under the North Atlantic Council (NAC)—the main decisionmaking entity—is the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC), which is supported by the Civil Emergency Planning Directorate at NATO headquarters.

The NAC and SCEPC have adopted a series of agreements defining NATO’s role and instruments in civil emergencies. Agreements related to natural and manmade disasters include the NATO Policy on Disaster Assistance in Peacetime²⁶ and the statement on Enhanced Practical Cooperation in the Field of International Disaster Relief.²⁷ In the realm of terrorism and CBRN, the main document is the Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan, adopted at the 2002 Prague Summit, which calls for establishment of an inventory of national capabilities, development of interoperability for response services through exercises, and adoption of standard operating procedures.²⁸ The plan encourages adoption of border-crossing arrangements for relief teams, equipment, and supplies. It also suggests development of nonbinding guidelines or minimum standards in the areas of planning, training, and equipment for civilian response to CBRN attacks. In April 2005, the SCEPC also approved an Updated Action Plan for the Improvement of Civil Preparedness for possible CBRN terrorist attacks. The plan encompasses a variety of measures to improve the preparedness of individual allies, as well as NATO as a whole, with particular emphasis

on disaster response coordination, protection of critical infrastructure, and support to victims of an attack.

The operational entities for NATO's involvement in civil emergencies are the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU). The EADRCC, headed by NATO's Director of Civil Emergency Planning, is a small entity with four functional desks for situations, assistance, transportation, and general policy. Its main responsibilities are coordinating national responses and serving as a focal point for information-sharing and assistance requests. During Hurricane Katrina, the EADRCC coordinated responses to a U.S. relief request from 39 NATO and partner countries, including provision of food, water, medical supplies, tents, and other necessities. Between September 12 and October 2, 2005, 12 NATO flights delivered almost 189 tons of relief goods to the United States.²⁹ The EADRU is a multinational mix of civilian and military elements volunteered by NATO and partner countries for deployment in case of a major disaster. Its elements can include qualified rescue personnel, medical supplies and equipment, temporary housing, water sanitation equipment, and airlift.

NATO has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at improving Alliance military capabilities for the fight against CBRN terrorism that could also contribute to civil protection. The two most important are the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the NATO CBRN Defense Battalion. The Katrina relief effort was the first deployment of the NRF. In October 2005, the NRF also deployed to assist in the earthquake relief efforts in Pakistan, where it coordinated all NATO land and air operations, such as transport of supplies, evacuations, medical assistance, and engineering support. The battalion's main mission is to provide the Alliance with a rapidly deployable and efficient response capability in the event of a CBRN attack against NATO forces, but it can also be used to support civil authorities, as it was during the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens. The 2002 Prague Summit further approved five CBRN defense initiatives with CBRN implications for civil emergencies, including development of a deployable CBRN analytical laboratory, CBRN event response team, virtual center of excellence for CBRN weapons defenses, biological and chemical defense stockpile, and disease surveillance system.³⁰

Despite these advances at the Alliance level, civil emergency preparedness is a national responsibility. As a result, a conceptual vision of NATO's role in civil emergencies remains undefined and without common agreement, leaving preparedness efforts subject to competing views of what is appropriate for NATO to do. The EADRCC and EADRU, for

example, are used to coordinate only if called on to do so. In no sense are their roles conceived to give direction to any NATO member. Whether at the Alliance or the national level, the ability of Alliance members to respond effectively to a CBRN attack will depend on the quality of national assets and, increasingly, their ability to work together. The following section presents a snapshot of the perspective of NATO allies on the status of this vital capability.

Preparedness: A Snapshot

Planning. NATO members that answered the CTNSP questionnaire were nearly unanimous in indicating that they have national response plans for civil emergencies and that civil authorities would lead consequence management efforts in the event of a CBRN attack. A significant majority of respondents indicated that their national military forces have contingency plans to respond to such attacks. In most cases, however, military forces would be utilized after the initial response, which would be handled by civilian agencies. In the plurality of cases, military forces were described as “second responders” (especially in Central Europe). Several countries suggested that their designated forces would serve as either second or third responders. Only two countries reported that their forces would act as first responders; a few others suggested their military forces could act in this role, if necessary. In the U.S. case, military forces generally are scheduled to serve as third responders, although some identification and detection units are envisioned to arrive on the scene early.

In the event of a CBRN attack in their homelands, almost all national plans of NATO members include the possibility of requesting support from other nations (two Central European allies indicated they did not have such plans). The majority of answers pointed out that these countries will accept assistance from any country that offers, although some noted that this was not official policy, but the practice in reality. In some cases, countries also reserve the right to refuse offers of assistance. One responder indicated it would accept assistance only from other NATO members.

Assets. NATO members reported a wide range of capabilities when surveyed on the assets they could bring to bear in the event of a CBRN attack. The listed options of possible assets included identification, decontamination, and casualty care for each of the CBRN contingencies, as well as command and control in consequence management and logistical support. Three countries (the United States and two in northwestern Europe) indicated that they had all of the identified capabilities; only one nation (in

Central Europe) indicated that it had none. All other countries reported some combination of capabilities. In most cases, answers indicated that these capabilities reside in a combination of military and civilian agencies (with Mediterranean/Southeastern European countries virtually unanimous in this regard).

Despite the wide diversity in reported assets, the majority of capabilities appear to relate primarily to detection/identification and decontamination functions. Casualty care assets are reported significantly less often. The reporting also suggests that NATO members tend to be especially short on command and control and logistics capabilities. Responses make it difficult to determine whether these capabilities relate more to chemical, radiological, or nuclear contingencies. What is clear, however, is that capabilities appear to be particularly limited with respect to a biological contingency.

In terms of specially trained military units that could be used in the event of a CBRN attack, only one country (in Central Europe) indicated it did not have such units. Of those countries answering positively, about half reported that their largest such units were battalion-size; slightly less than half described their largest such units as company-size. In contrast, the United States has organized brigade-size units for the CBRN response mission. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents pointed out that their ministries of defense (MODs) did not have other possible CBRN response units (for example, fire brigades, national gendarmerie) under their control. The one-third that did indicate their MODs controlled additional assets reported battalion- or company-size units.

Almost all respondents indicated that other assets in the civilian sector not under MOD control would be involved in responding to a CBRN attack. These assets include some combination of command and control, medical care, communications, and logistics, with about 60 percent of the respondents reporting assets in each category. Not surprisingly, medical care assets were virtually unanimously identified.

Similarly, when asked whether the nation maintains a stockpile of critical material and/or equipment specifically dedicated for use in the event of a CBRN attack—stocks of medicines, protective equipment, and decontamination gear—most Mediterranean/Southeastern European states checked all the boxes, while only about a third of those members in northwestern and Central Europe did so. Almost all respondents indicated that they held stocks of medicines. Protective and decontamination equipment was reported in slightly fewer answers.

Most respondents suggested that they might be able to provide assistance to another ally if requested. When asked what kind of aid they could provide, options included specialized decontamination personnel and equipment, communications, logistics, and medical support. Four countries—the United States and three in northwestern Europe—could, in their view, provide help in all categories. For the other respondents, potential assistance on offer related primarily to decontamination equipment and medical support. Other than the five countries that could possibly offer all categories of assistance, only two countries indicated they could offer logistics support, and none indicated communications support was available.

No other significant findings regarding regional differences were discernable.

One area in which there was considerable shortfall was the deployability of assets to other regions of the Alliance. Almost half of the overall respondents noted that they would need additional airlift if they were to deploy outside their borders. (This was especially true for Alliance members in the Mediterranean/Southeastern Europe and the small Central European members.) This is an area in which the United States could play a significant role, given its considerable airlift assets. The United States might be called on, therefore, to lift not only its own national assets in support of a response to an attack on an ally in Europe, but other nations' assets as well.

Training. A significant majority of respondents consider their forces that would respond to a CBRN event to be well trained. The quality of training reflects the amount of time devoted to training. Most units with a dedicated CBRN mission commit 50 to 100 percent of their time to training for that mission.

Much of the training appears to be conducted jointly with civilian units responsible for consequence management of CBRN events. Almost all respondents reported such joint training. Although one country noted monthly joint training between civilian and military units, and another noted quarterly joint training, most answers indicate military-civilian training is conducted semi-annually.

Respondents were almost equally divided between those who train with other NATO allies and those who do not. For those who do, the joint training mechanisms utilized are split between countries that include allies in the full range of training activities—from command post observers to observers with units or allied units integrated into the exercise—and those that report only integrating allied units into their exercises. One country

noted its training with allies is undertaken as part of NATO's nuclear, biological, and chemical battalion.

A significant majority of NATO members also point out that they have a mechanism for sharing lessons learned. These mechanisms, however, tend to be national in operation, with some allies sharing at the national level either with other agencies that also have CBRN responsibilities or, in some cases, with others at the national level of government generally. A few countries, including the United States, also share lessons learned with authorities at the local level. Little sharing of lessons learned among allies, however, was reported: Only about 20 percent of those nations who said they do share lessons (and only about 16 percent of the total respondents) indicated they share with allies.

Recommendations

The responses to the CTNSP questionnaire provide a relatively optimistic picture. Nevertheless, in comments to NATO's Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee in November 2006, Federal Emergency Management Agency director R. David Paulison made the following observation: "In NATO, I see an extraordinarily valuable emergency management capability that is being underutilized. I believe that this is due to the lack of civil-military cooperation, coordination, and planning at NATO. We need to plan together. We need to train together. We need to exercise together. So that we can respond together."³¹

Even this limited assessment identifies a number of gaps and shortfalls. As a result, NATO should consider the following recommendations:

Conduct a formal survey of Alliance capabilities. The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee should produce a report on NATO CBRN response capabilities for consideration at the Spring 2008 Bucharest Summit based on a formal survey of NATO members. The survey and report are essential first steps in an effort to establish the best possible NATO response posture in the event of a CBRN attack. The informal survey summarized above establishes that not only capabilities exist, but also gaps. Critical gaps must be filled, and existing capabilities will serve the Alliance better with appropriate advance organization, which can be addressed by the report.

Bolster Alliance capabilities for biological and radiological contingencies. Responses to the questionnaire did not identify much in the way of Alliance assets for responding to biological or radiological attacks. NATO nations, individually and collectively, should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the entire spectrum of necessary biological- and radiolog-

ical-related capabilities to identify shortfalls and develop a strategy for determining priority investments to address them. With the possibility of a naturally occurring flu pandemic, this is an especially important point to address.

Strengthen command and control and logistics capabilities. A striking shortfall identified in the responses to the questionnaire was the lack of command and control and logistics assets, which represent notable shortcomings in terms of assets that might be shared with allies. While some command and control and logistics assets for CBRN consequence management certainly reside in the civilian sector, the limitations in these areas could represent serious bottlenecks that would badly impair NATO CBRN consequence management efforts.

Address the airlift shortfall. CBRN contingencies could well have impacts across national borders, so response effectiveness could depend on allies working together. While NATO members have resources that they are willing to share, the identified lack of airlift could create problems in ensuring a timely response to requests for assistance.

Intensify multilateral exercises. Because emergency response remains a national responsibility, most NATO members conduct national-level exercises. Although NATO nations do exercise together, it is often on an ad hoc basis, and the exercises frequently are limited in scope. NATO should review the exercise plans of members for addressing CBRN contingencies and determine if they are sufficient in terms of numbers of exercises and participation.

Create a NATO-wide mechanism for sharing lessons learned. An Alliance-wide mechanism for sharing lessons learned and best practices would be an important planning asset. Possible models for such a mechanism could be either the Center for Army Lessons Learned, developed by the U.S. Army, or the electronic Lessons Learned Information System, created for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security by the U.S. Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism as a means for sharing detailed lessons and best practices among first responders across the United States.

With NATO's role continuing to develop in the fight against terrorism, and with the potential for naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate CBRN incidents likely to increase, it is prudent to consider further examination of these points. Some problems may be fixed easily using current assets, while some may require considerable discussion and compromise among Alliance members. Nonetheless, the earlier that these is-

sues are addressed, the sooner the Alliance will be in a position to respond adequately to the needs of its members in the event of a CBRN incident.

Notes

¹Source: Michael Moodie and Robert E. Armstrong with Tyler Merkeley, *Responding in the Homeland: A Snapshot of NATO's Readiness for CBRN Attacks*, Defense Horizons 56 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2007).

²See, for example, Lord Jopling, Rapporteur, "NATO and Civil Protection," Committee on Civil Dimension of Security, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report 166 CDS 06 E, October 3, 2006, 5.

³Suburban Emergency Management Project, "1979 Sverdlovsk Human Anthrax Epidemic: Perspectives of Victims and Health Workers," SEMP Biot #324, January 22, 2006, accessed at <www.semp.us/biots/biot_324.html>.

⁴Robert A. Wampler and Thomas S. Blanton, "U.S. Intelligence on the Deadliest Modern Outbreak," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 61, November 15, 2001, accessed at <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB61/>.

⁵United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Fact Sheet on Three Mile Island Accident," March 2004, accessed at <www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html>.

⁶Uranium Information Centre, "Three Mile Island: 1979, Nuclear Briefing Paper 48," March 2001, accessed at <www.uic.com.au/nip48.htm>.

⁷Raymond A. Zilinskas, *Biological Attacks: Lessons of September and October 2001*, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, December 12, 2002, accessed at <www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications_colloques/colloques/20021212/20021212-4.doc>.

⁸Seth W. Carus, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, March 4, 1998. See also Seth W. Carus, "The Rajneeshis (1984)," in *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, ed. Jonathan Tucker (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 128.

⁹Bruce Hope, *Systematic Identification of Research Gaps for Food and Waterborne Pathogens*, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, interview, Baltimore, MD, March 10, 2004.

¹⁰United States Regulatory Commission, "Fact Sheet on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant," December 2000, accessed at <www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fschernobyl.html>.

¹¹German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety, "Federal Government Provides Further Funding for Clean Up Work in Chernobyl," December 29, 2005, accessed at <www.bmu.de/english/nuclear_safety/press_statements_speeches/pm/pdf/36498.pdf>.

¹²Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, "Belarus Develops System of Social Security of Chernobyl Victims," April 19, 2006, accessed at <www.government.by/en/eng_news19042006.html>.

¹³Kyle B. Olson, "Special Issue: Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?" July 1, 1999, accessed at <www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/olson.htm>.

¹⁴Centers for Disease Control, Statistics, Surveillance, and Control, "2006 West Nile Virus Activity in United States," January 3, 2007, accessed at <www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&control.htm>.

¹⁵World Health Organization, Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response, "Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from November 1, 2002 to July 31, 2003," September 26, 2003, accessed at <www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2003_09_23/en/>.

¹⁶Robert J. Blendon et al., Harvard School of Public Health/Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Survey Project on "Americans' Response to Biological Terrorism" Tabulation Report (Media, PA: International Communications Research, October 24–28, 2001), 5.

¹⁷David Heyman, "Lessons from the Anthrax Attacks: Implications for U.S. Bioterrorism Preparedness, A Report on a National Forum on Biodefense" (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2002), vii, accessed at <www.fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/dtra02.pdf>.

¹⁸Six NATO member nations did not respond to the CTNSP questionnaire. According to data provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in its annual *Military Balance*, these six nations accounted for only 10 percent of NATO's active forces and 15.5 percent of NATO forces overall (active and reserve). See IISS, *The Military Balance 2006* (London: Routledge, 2006). A complete copy of the questionnaire and data analysis can be obtained by emailing a request to lifesciences@ndu.edu.

¹⁹For the purposes of this geographical analysis, data submitted by the United States and United Kingdom were not considered. Figures represent percent of respondents having the indicated expertise/assets; six member states did not respond, accounting for only 15.5 percent of total NATO forces (active and reserves).

²⁰Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and Spain.

²¹Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia.

²²Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey.

²³Not all columns add to 100 percent; some respondents declared both company- and battalion-size units.

²⁴Nonmilitary units such as fire brigades and national gendarmerie.

²⁵UK data were not considered in this particular calculation of northwestern NATO countries.

²⁶See <www.nato.int/docu/logi-en/logist97.htm>. See also *NATO's Role in Disaster Response* (Brussels: NATO, November 2001), 18–19.

²⁷For a NATO Fact Sheet, see <www.nato.int/eadrcc/fact.htm>.

²⁸The plan does not appear to be available publicly. For the Prague Summit Declaration language, see <www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>, para 4(e).

²⁹Lord Jopling, "NATO and Civil Protection."

³⁰Prague Summit Declaration.

³¹Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Director Paulison Speaks to NATO on the Importance of Civil-Military Cooperation," press release, November 16, 2006.

Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic? (2006)¹

Kimberly L. Thachuk²

Overview

Differences in strategic vision and concepts of security are central to the U.S. and European Union (EU) approaches to counterterrorism. While the United States conceives of a *war* against terrorism, Europe does not. As a result of different perceptions of the threat, both sides of the Atlantic take divergent approaches to homeland security. Europeans tend to favor the use of a law enforcement strategy over a warfighting approach. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration believes that a quasi-militaristic, overtly proactive, and highly vigilant stance will serve as the best deterrent to future attacks. By their own standards, Europeans are doing more to counter terrorism since September 11 and even more since the attacks in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and in London (July 7, 2005); by U.S. standards, these measures sometimes appear inadequate. As a result, there are significant transatlantic divergences on the best methods for halting the spread of terrorism.

The way ahead in an EU–U.S. counterterrorism relationship may be to focus on positive areas such as capacity building, anticorruption measures, and strengthening multilateral agreements. Further, the key to apprehending—or at least interrupting—terrorist conspiracies may well lie in cooperating on the law enforcement side to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists for criminal activity. The United States may have to be satisfied when terrorists are brought to justice for organized criminal activity in EU states. While this does not hold the same political weight as convictions for terrorism, the result may be fewer acts of terrorism. Perhaps the greatest task for the transatlantic counterterrorism partnership is to renew the sense of urgency for cooperation in areas where the United States and EU countries do agree.

Differing Assessments

American-European Union (EU) cooperation in the war against terrorism has improved in a number of important areas over the past several years, but in some respects policies and practices in justice and law enforcement continue to diverge. Overall, the effort is exposing serious differences born of the varying backgrounds and diagnoses of the problems. To be sure, both sides of the Atlantic are being more vigilant; the United States and the European Union countries have worked diligently to create inhospitable environs for terrorists. Still, notable variations exist in their approaches to terrorism, especially with respect to the costs and benefits of responses to the heightened threat posed to the West. For the most part, the events of September 11 did not result in a fundamental shift of most European governments' security paradigm. However, both the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004, and the London bombings of July 7, 2005, spurred new antiterrorist proposals that have since brought EU policy closer to that of the United States. Still, these measures have been undertaken not so much to cooperate with U.S. efforts as to address more realistically terrorism as "one of the key strategic threats facing Europe."³ Indeed, shortly after the March 11 attack, British Prime Minister Tony Blair observed that the Madrid bombings had exacerbated the divergence between the United States and Europe.

In response to the September 11 attacks, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Charter was invoked for the first time in the history of the Alliance. Nevertheless, Europe does not see itself at war. For Europe, March 11 was a wake-up call that new policies and practices were needed, but it was not the beginning of a war in the same way that September 11 was for the United States. In general, Europeans have been dealing with relatively low-level terrorism for decades and have found means to cope with it. Many prominent Europeans have noted that complacency is a grave danger, particularly in light of the potential for terrorist groups to undertake mass terrorism using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. However, for the most part, European governments do not appear to share the United States's sense of urgency about terrorist groups with global support networks.⁴

Under the auspices of NATO, European states agreed to numerous enhancements to defend against terrorism, such as intelligence-sharing and force protection measures. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO members agreed to improved collaboration on civil emergency planning, increased sharing of information and intelligence, and intensi-

fied scientific cooperation, especially in the area of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the NATO Ministerial meeting in December 2004, members agreed to continue the measures adopted in 2002 as well as to improve interoperability and to conduct joint counterterrorism training exercises.

Despite these significant accomplishments in terms of collective security arrangements, the war in Iraq has muddied transatlantic counterterrorism relations. The Iraq war is very unpopular in Europe, and along with dredging up old transatlantic differences, it is viewed as exacerbating terrorism rather than combating it. European voters fear—and for them March 11 confirmed—that being seen as pro-American and, more importantly, supportive of the war in Iraq, makes them possible targets for al Qaeda and its affiliates.⁵

The transatlantic relationship on counterterrorism becomes still more difficult to decipher when the various approaches of the European countries are considered. While Britain has been a staunch ally of the United States, France has been less willing to enter into agreements in which privacy laws might be abrogated. Some of the other countries have less capacity to invest in anti-terrorist countermeasures due to fiscal constraints and lack of sufficiently robust institutions to confront adaptable transnational individuals and groups. Much of the transatlantic relationship continues to be conducted via bilateral channels rather than through the multilateral vehicle of the EU. However, for the purposes of analyzing the transatlantic counterterrorism relationship, sufficient similarities exist in European states' approaches such that some generalizations may be made about the stance they tend to take.

The war on terrorism has brought to the fore a number of latent differences between the United States and EU countries in the way that justice and law enforcement issues are approached and organized. By their own standards, Europeans are doing more to counter terrorism since September 11 and even more since the Madrid attacks of March 11, 2004; by U.S. standards, these measures sometimes appear inadequate. Regardless of these differences, the war on terrorism requires that all partners work together. It may be, therefore, that the United States will have to continue to urge European partners to take a stronger stance while at the same time make some serious and realistic choices over which issues it can bear to have less control.

A low point was reached in 2003–2004 when the United States and Britain were pitted against France and Germany in the debate over Iraq. Arguably, the past year has seen some warming of relations. President

Bush's call for democracy in the Middle East and his fence-mending trip to Europe in late 2005 helped reduce tensions. Progress in the Middle East, including democratic elections in Afghanistan and Iraq, Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, and steps toward democracy in Egypt and Saudi Arabia have further helped in creating a common cause across the Atlantic Alliance. NATO recently has increased its involvement in Afghanistan and is now training Iraqi security forces. All agree on the importance of creating a stable, democratic Iraq and on using diplomacy to deflect Iran from pursuing acquisition of nuclear weapons. Europeans are also working hard on creating the new NATO Response Force and on other defense initiatives. In this setting, perhaps collaboration can be expanded elsewhere, including the key realm of counterterrorism. If so, determining exactly how to do so is critical.

Differences in Approach

Differences in strategic vision and the way that terrorism fits into overall concepts of security are central to the differences in the U.S. and EU approaches to counterterrorism. President Bush has defined the battle against terrorism as "a clash between civilization and those who would destroy it."⁶ Indeed, the United States is waging a war against terrorism. Europe is not. While global terrorism has achieved somewhat greater political salience in Europe, particularly in the aftermath of the March 11 train bombing in Madrid, the security paradigm of European governments has not fundamentally shifted. As a result, there are significant transatlantic divergences on the best methods for halting the spread of terrorism.

For the United States, the strategy remains to: make no concessions to terrorists and bring them to justice for their crimes; broaden the international consensus that terrorism is an international scourge and warrants global cooperation; degrade, disrupt, and destroy terrorist cells and support networks using a combination of intelligence, law enforcement, financial, informational, and military capabilities; isolate any states that harbor or support terrorism; enhance U.S. and coalition partner capabilities to counter terrorism and strengthen domestic critical infrastructures and consequence management capabilities to cope with a broad array of terrorist attacks, including those from WMD; transform the environment in which terrorism flourishes by addressing the sources of anger and hatred; and minimize the backlash against coalition activities in the Muslim world.

Europeans, on the other hand, do not mix war and justice in their version of counterterrorist strategy. They tend to characterize terrorists

as criminals and to favor a law-enforcement strategy over a warfighting approach. For Europeans, war requiring the annihilation of an enemy will do little to resolve criminal and social problems. Instead, law enforcement and judicial cooperation are required, as well as attention to conditions of poverty and deprivation that give rise to violent expressions of indignation and powerlessness.

Notwithstanding these beliefs, there remains, at times, a lack of consensus in Europe on whether it is possible to deter and protect against certain terrorist groups and some of their possible associates, as well as disagreement on which cases such action might be necessary. Despite the appointment in May 2004 of an EU Counterterrorism “czar,” responsible for coordinating the development of an EU-wide counterterrorism policy, most European governments assess and deal with terrorism “on an emergent basis, after particular threats have arisen.”⁷ Further, at the December 2002 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, European participants noted that they felt that the American response to terrorism has been “one dimensional” or solely a military one. While U.S. representatives quickly cited a three-pronged approach, involving military, political, and social components, the Europeans stressed that the latter two components are not evident. In effect, the Europeans were concerned that the United States was not adequately addressing the causes of terrorism.

A Perception Gap?

Since the September 11 attacks, Europeans have been apprehensive about some of the steps the United States has proposed and undertaken as part of the war on terrorism. Most European governments opposed a U.S. military campaign against the regime of Saddam Hussein for the purpose of eliminating WMD—even for the stated purpose of preventing those weapons from falling into the hands of apocalyptic terrorists. While Europeans and Americans agree that al Qaeda, and perhaps other radical Islamic groups, have the requisite determination and patience required to acquire and deploy WMD, they do not agree on the likelihood of their success in either instance.⁸

Europeans, for the most part, prefer to resolve differences with enemies through reconciliation and dialogue. A majority of Europeans view the unilateral move by the United States against Iraq, and the strong language employed against other would-be aggressors such as Iran and North Korea, as unhelpful and counterproductive. These Europeans are dedicated to multilateralism and resolution of crisis through international institutions. President Bush’s announcement shortly after September 11

that “either you are with us or you are against us” was arguably viewed as damaging to the transatlantic relationship. While this remark was not necessarily intended to draw allies into a debate about the strength of allegiances, it was misinterpreted by many Europeans who were displeased by the proverbial line being drawn in the sand. Indeed, Europeans tend to feel that many of the Bush administration policies continue to reflect this stance. For Europeans, alliance does not imply allegiance in all things. They are further stung by the seemingly-recurrent implication, through U.S. action and deed, that this is a unipolar world in which the United States takes the lead. The European view is that the world is multipolar and that Europe is a significant, autonomous “pillar,” effecting a balanced “partnership based on mutual respect” with the United States.⁹

As a result of different perceptions of the threat, both sides of the Atlantic take different approaches to homeland security. The United States believes that a quasi-militaristic, overtly proactive, and highly vigilant stance will serve as the best deterrent to future attacks. Europeans, while more conscious of the threat since the attacks on London and Madrid and more cooperative in terms of transatlantic collaboration in this regard, are still unwilling to replicate this stance with a “Fortress Europe.” For some in Washington, this seemingly passive European attitude is making the United States increasingly vulnerable. After all, it is argued, the hijackers began plotting September 11 in Europe and then took advantage of good U.S.-European relations (that do not require visitor visas and so forth across the Atlantic), to enter the United States and execute their attack. Yet, the fact that the United States now openly displays the extent of the power and force behind homeland security should perhaps alert Europeans to the fact that terrorist groups, who might have originally set their sights on attacking the American heartland, may now be satisfied with targeting Europe.¹⁰

In terms of the NATO Alliance, the picture is somewhat different. At the Prague Summit in 2002, a majority of the Alliance concepts and doctrines were reviewed with the terrorist threat in mind. In particular, the Military Concept called for a common defense against terrorism, including the use of military force to deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against threatened or real terrorist attacks. It was further agreed that military assistance could be rendered to national authorities for dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks, including those using CBRN weapons. The Military Concept further allows NATO to act outside the Euro-Atlantic arena wherever and whenever necessary, including involvement in crisis-response operations. What is interesting to note is that while there

is a differing assessment of the threats posed by terrorism between the EU countries and the United States, the European members of NATO appear to support the Alliance's possible military action against terrorist threats. Reconciling these two seemingly different approaches will be an important task for both sides of the Atlantic.

Operational Differences

Differences of opinion continue between the United States and EU countries about the nuances of counterterrorism operations regarding, for example, the degree to which certain subnational communities should be monitored and how. As a result of September 11, the U.S. Justice Department utilizes a 1996 law that makes it a crime to offer "material support" to any group designated by the United States as a terrorist organization. Because this represents a once-removed evidentiary standard or a near-"guilt by association" notion of intent, it is seen as antithetical to stringent European evidentiary standards. Such differences do not bode well for cooperation that has existed at least since World War II on issues of legal harmonization, including information-sharing, mutual legal assistance, and extradition matters. Aside from political misgivings, many of the European states may be legally prohibited from sharing information or extraditing a suspect if such evidence or act will be contrary to the provisions set forth in their constitutions.

Despite these hurdles, since September 11, the EU Third Pillar Cooperation (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) and bilateral EU-U.S. exchanges in these areas have both been enhanced. The United States and the EU announced coordinated targeting of an expanded list of terrorists and terrorist entities at the May 2002 U.S.-EU Summit. Still, differences over the conduct of certain counterterrorist operations and the scope of information sharing are evident.

In June 2003, amid major debates over the war in Iraq, the United States and the EU succeeded in concluding two treaties, one paving the way for the extradition of terrorist suspects to America and the other offering mutual legal assistance for terrorism cases. Since the 2004 U.S.-EU Summit, both bilateral protocols have been implemented with 17 EU states. These treaties are landmarks because it is the first time a country has negotiated with the EU as a unit, and also because many EU states are opposed to extraditing their nationals for any crime, particularly if the death penalty is a sentencing option. In the first instance, the United States has long preferred to conclude bilateral extradition treaties with individual countries, so negotiating with the EU was viewed as a triumph for Euro-

peans. In the second case, EU agreement to form joint investigative teams, provide information on the assets of terrorist and criminal suspects, and allow videotaped testimony was a breakthrough for the United States, as these had previously been prevented by stringent EU civil liberties laws.

Indeed, while transatlantic collaboration on preventive security and investigative matters appears satisfactory, judicial issues could prove to be highly disruptive. Exceptional judicial provisions, such as irregular rendition, secret military courts, and the battlefield detainee status currently being employed by the United States, are problematic for Europeans on two counts. First, if not managed with a substantially multilateral approach, such exceptional legal measures risk being highly incompatible with existing European judicial principles, provisions, and practices. Second, because the fight against terrorism is also a fight for hearts and minds, Europeans fear that deviations from the rule of law and accepted international legal principles could play into the hands of terrorists. Europeans often argue that the Italian success against the Red Brigades was achieved with significant societal support due, in part, to scrupulous adherence to constitutionalism and high judicial standards.

A more recent sticking point has been the alleged extraordinary rendition program run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in which the agents are said to have spirited Egyptian-born imam Osama Mustafa Hassan, also known as Abu Omar, from the streets of Italy in 2003 without the approval of the Italian government and to have taken custody of two Egyptian terrorist suspects at the Stockholm airport and escorted them to Egypt to stand trial.¹¹ In the former case, Italian authorities were clearly upset and claimed Omar had been kidnapped. In the latter case, widespread internal criticism forced the Swedish government to change its regulations for executing deportation orders. The Italian Government went so far as to issue 22 arrest warrants for the suspected CIA agents involved in the abduction of Omar, saying that it had hindered ongoing Italian terrorism investigations and sparked further Islamic extremism.¹²

Reports that the CIA maintained secret prisons in Europe and North Africa and used a number of EU states as transit facilities led to reactions by European governments ranging from quiet denial to seething outrage. Despite subsequent revelations that a number of European countries had allowed their facilities to "support the return of criminals/inadmissible aliens" and also by default to what many critics termed the eventual "outsourcing of torture," the damage to transatlantic relations was done.¹³

During her December 2005 trip to Europe, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice restated the U.S. view that terrorists must be brought

to justice wherever possible because traditional extradition is often not an option. She added that, "the local government can make the sovereign choice to cooperate in" the transfer of a suspect to a third country using rendition.¹⁴ Rice's implicit assertion was that circumventing traditional extradition allows for countries to cooperate with the United States while not undertaking unpopular overt judicial actions with political consequences. Rice underscored this point by stating that not only are European lives being saved by expediting burdensome legal procedures, but that the suspects in question are "essentially stateless, owing their allegiance to the extremist cause of transnational terrorism." While politically expedient in the short run, this may not be the best argument for the United States to employ with European partners. European states take the European Convention on Human Rights very seriously and prefer to defer—even for responding to terrorism in extremis—to the European Court of Human Rights to safeguard the rights of individuals.¹⁵

Indeed, in his remarks to the press on the publication of a report of the inquiry into the irregular renditions by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secretary General of the Council of Europe Terry Davis stated that while he strongly supports cooperation between Europe and the United States on all issues, especially in the fight against terrorism, "the threat of terrorism cannot justify disregard for the European Convention on Human Rights. Blatant violations of human rights, such as secret detention and torture, are not only morally wrong and illegal, they are dangerous because they undermine the long-term effectiveness of our fight against terrorism."¹⁶

Differences in approach stem from how each side of the Atlantic defines terrorism and terrorists. Rather than being intimidated by the presence of 15 million Muslims, European states take their cues from their definitions of terrorism. For the most part, European states define terrorism as a crime, so they are legally constrained in the measures they can take. The majority of European national constitutions and the EU legal regime have clear guidelines for addressing criminal offenses. Thus, European countries impose a self-limiting definition on the amount and type of state force that may be brought to bear on terrorists.

For its part, the lack of success by the Bush administration in deciding whether the suspects at Guantanamo Bay prison are belligerents or international criminals has led to strong recrimination from European states. On her January 2006 trip to Washington, German Chancellor Angela Merkel's criticism of Guantanamo Bay was quickly rebuffed by President Bush on the grounds that the prison is "a necessary part of protecting

the American people.”¹⁷ On the one hand, it is argued, if the suspects are belligerents, they must be accorded all the rights of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and become subjects of international humanitarian law.¹⁸ If, on the other hand, they are found to be international criminals, then *habeas corpus* would apply in most constitutional democracies, paving the way for fair and speedy trials of the detainees. It might be argued that by using the term War on Terrorism, the U.S. Government has opened the door for the detainees to be classified as belligerents under the Geneva Conventions. Since the United States has chosen to call these suspects enemy combatants, this term, at some point in the future, may have a place in customary international law, thereby legitimizing the status. For this to occur, particular remedies, actions, and techniques must be decided upon and institutionalized such that they become practice, and therefore customary, over time. The seemingly ad hoc nature of the terms and treatment of the detainees invites the accusation that arbitrary justice is being applied. The United States cannot operate alone on this front indefinitely; to successfully wage a global war on terrorism it must rely on the cooperation of friends and allies. To gain this cooperation, it must demonstrate that international law and institutions shape and constrain U.S. actions.

An Expanded Definition of Terrorism?

The focus of the current phase of the U.S. counterterrorism campaign has been on certain groups with global reach, failed states where terrorists can operate with impunity, and defiant state sponsors of terrorism. With this in mind, future transatlantic security planning needs to take into account not only the challenges of terrorism, but also a broader range of new asymmetric threats as they intersect with terrorism. Indeed, many of the tools required to counter other threats, such as international organized criminal activity, can be used to combat terrorism and a wide array of other transnational threats. Yet, because the global war on terrorism has consumed much American and European policy and planning time since September 11, some of the other transnational threats, such as drug trafficking, have seemingly fallen through the cracks.¹⁹ To focus on countering terrorism to the near exclusion of other threats is to overlook the fact that many, if not all of the threats, are linked. It is on this linkage that transatlantic consensus may be built.

The success of al Qaeda results not only from its adaptability but also its willingness to seek out the vulnerabilities of each state's system and exploit them for criminal enterprise. In Europe, Spain was used by

al Qaeda operatives to raise funds through a credit card scheme, while Germany was exploited for its privacy laws to store contraband materials. Funds were raised in Italy through the manufacture of counterfeit couture, and Belgium became the epicenter of document forgery using Belgian passports.²⁰ Indeed, Belgium is particularly vulnerable because the Belgian police are rather ill-equipped to combat conspiracies of this nature, and because Belgium is the center of the international diamond business, which is an important source of funds and a money-laundering vehicle for terrorists. Britain is the target of Russian and Albanian mafias trafficking in humans that make upwards of \$1.6 million per week smuggling people into the country.²¹ The great fear is that because these trafficking rings are not concerned with whom or what they are smuggling, but rather how much a client can pay, they may be helping al Qaeda and other groups to gain access to many European countries. Further, because of the Schengen Agreement²² and despite the creation of the European Borders Agency to control the flow of illegal immigrants, once inside Europe, criminals can move across borders using a single visa, virtually undetected and unimpeded.

Both the United States and EU states are in agreement regarding the definition and illegality of most activities of organized crime. In fact, transatlantic legal, judicial, and law enforcement cooperation was strong prior to September 11, especially in terms of the fight against such organized criminal activity as human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, international vehicle theft rings, hazardous waste dumping, and cross-border fraud schemes. Indeed, transatlantic law enforcement collaboration already had ironed out any barriers to concluding agreements on evidence sharing, cooperation in law enforcement intelligence gathering, rendition of fugitives, joint training, harmonized standards, port security, and financial regulation.²³

Law Enforcement and Intelligence Cooperation

A key thrust of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy has included enhanced law enforcement exchanges and intensified cooperation with intelligence and security services worldwide. Much of this cooperation takes place through bilateral channels, including those with European governments. EU member governments responded quite vigorously to UNSC Resolution 1373 and subsequent measures that called on member states to take certain law enforcement and financial actions to thwart terrorism, including abolishing the use by terrorists of the Political Offense Exception to extradition. Further, there have been agreements on biometric standards,

both bilaterally and via the International Civil Aviation Organization, as well as on cargo screening and inspection procedures under the Container Security Initiative. These measures, along with the implementation of the U.S.–EU Passenger Name Record agreement, which allows airlines to provide EU-origin passenger data for flights to the United States, have helped to integrate border control systems across the Atlantic.²⁴

While counterterrorism operations can be onerous, they will likely continue to be pursued via multiple bilateral channels largely because of the realities of the sovereign states system and the fact that corresponding law enforcement agencies generally have longstanding working relationships.

In December 2002, the United States and the EU assigned liaison points of contact between Europol and Eurojust and their U.S. counterparts; entered into agreement on the sharing between the United States and Europol of data on terrorism and crime; and collaborated on threat assessments. Among other things, the agreement allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Europol to station officials in each other's headquarters. While not a Euro-FBI, Europol is acting with increasing efficiency as an information clearinghouse among European national police bodies on a widening range of matters. This model might offer some solutions for future U.S. law enforcement cooperation.

Cooperating closely, the European police have had considerable success piecing together the European links of the September 11 hijackers. In Germany, Moroccan Mounir el Motassadeq was convicted in 2003 for his role in the September 11 attacks. While the conviction was later overturned on appeal, the verdict was a victory for German prosecutors because it was the first successful prosecution of anyone involved in the September 11 attacks. Further, a number of European police and intelligence agencies claim to have prevented future planned attacks. In Spain, 300 people suspected of being involved in the March 11 bombing have been detained. The French police have arrested dozens of alleged terrorists and more recently have entered into a joint U.S.–France anti-terrorism center in Paris codenamed “Alliance Base.” With several countries, including Canada and Australia, contributing to it, the center allows sharing of intelligence information, including criminal records.

Meanwhile, although the British police had arrested suspects all over Britain, their dragnet had not delved deeply into fringe elements of the Islamic community for fear of violating civil rights. The London Underground bombings led Britain to appeal directly to the EU member states for “extra impetus” to understand the radicalization and recruitment

behind these attacks, with Tony Blair stating that the links of terrorism are seldom confined to one country.²⁵ The Italian police thwarted an alleged attempt to gas the American Embassy in Rome in 2002 and apprehended a group of Moroccans near Venice with maps of the London Underground.²⁶ More recently, in April 2006, Italian police averted an attack by “North African Islamists” who were planning to disrupt the recent Italian elections by attacking a church in Bologna and the Milan underground.

A More Proactive European Approach?

Since the Madrid and London bombings, the European states have begun taking proactive stances in their approach to terrorism. This is perhaps borne of the realization that, while conspiracies are difficult to prove in the courts, waiting for a terrorist event to occur is not a palatable option. Recently, the Dutch government chose to test its new antiterrorist legislation, which enables the prosecutions of people who intend to commit terrorist acts. In March 2006, nine Muslims belonging to the so-called Hofstad terrorist group were found guilty of promoting a violent ideology. The ruling stated that, “threatening terrorist crimes strikes public order at its heart,” which threatens Dutch democracy.²⁷

Perhaps the greatest victory in Europe was the conviction in Spain of Syrian-born Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, also known as Abu Dahdah, for conspiring with the September 11 hijackers. More significant were the guilty verdicts awarded to 17 of the 23 men who were on trial at the same time as Yarkas, not for any specific acts that they committed, but for their membership in, and support of, al Qaeda. In European courts, such charges are traditionally more difficult to prove because of strict adherence to rules of evidence and the difficulty of proving conspiracies. In part, these impediments were overcome because the Spanish Court chose to accept wire-tap evidence that may not be acceptable elsewhere in Europe. The decision also might be attributed to Chief Prosecutor Pedro Rubira’s request of the Court to impose “an exemplary sentence that shows that fighting Islamic terrorism does not require wars or detention camps,” alluding to the war in Iraq and the Guantanamo Bay prison.²⁸

Strengthening Current Efforts

Some positive measures on which the United States may work with European partners are in the areas of building capacity, curbing corruption, and strengthening multilateral agreements. The United States cannot combat small cells of transnational criminals and terrorists alone. Not only do the groups have little knowledge of each other’s operations, they are

autonomous operators who rely on their wits and guile to achieve success. Hence, the capture of one may not necessarily lead to the capture of, or information on, others. Modern terrorists are elusive denizens of a globalized world with no fixed addresses. They tend to move quickly across borders using fake passports and identification cards, gaining access to any number of countries before moving again, leaving few, if any, signs of their passing. They also operate in cyberspace using new technology to elude detection and evade capture. Criminals and terrorists are more adroit than many states at adapting to the realities of a globalizing world. Governments must not only catch up to the methods being employed by such groups, they must surpass them by responding creatively, consistently, and quickly to the new challenges. To elicit the support needed, U.S. policymakers must take the first steps along the path of reconciliation with European partners. This may be done in the following manner:

Strengthening Multilateral Agreements

- ▶ While bilateral agreements have useful applications, multilateral agreements tend to employ a group psychology to their adherence. A logical complement to effective mutual law enforcement assistance on a bilateral basis would be to conclude more multilateral treaties for cooperation between law enforcement and other agencies involved in pursuing terrorists. Such treaties are symbolically quite significant because they demonstrate that countries are not solely responsible for the activities of transnational actors within their sovereign borders.
- ▶ European countries also could do more to ensure that nonprofit organizations, such as charities, cannot be used to finance terrorism. Yet, many European leaders are hesitant about displeasing the minority groups in their countries and are walking a much finer line than are U.S. lawmakers in regard to monitoring and investigating individuals or nonprofit organizations. European nations tend to have much larger Muslim immigrant communities and hew to stringent standards regarding the inviolability of individual liberties and the treatment of minorities. With the recent exceptions of Spain and Holland, they disagree with the United States on the broad criminalization of indirect support for terrorist activities, especially with regard to what may be deemed legal and what might constitute an offense. Particularly contentious is the disagreement over what EU states view as funding for humanitarian

organizations and the United States views as support for terrorist organizations in Palestine. The United States will have to respect these limitations and seek provisions in multilateral agreements that meet the standards of European countries.

Sharing Information

- ▶ More effective information sharing requires greater numbers of analysts with expertise on the international financial system, as well as greater numbers of people in international law enforcement with fluency in foreign languages. The Europol Training and Education Program (TEP) addresses this factor by training Europol officers to operate in multicultural environments. The U.S. Government would make a wise investment by sending people to European capitals to gain working fluency in local languages and understanding and respect of local cultures. Communicating in the language of an ally is a sign of an intent to work multilaterally rather than unilaterally.
- ▶ Policymakers face continued obstacles posed by poor or uneven sharing of information between national agencies. At the moment, serious institutional and cultural gaps exist in the dissemination of data and sources and the ability of each community to use the information to prevent, preempt, or deter terrorists. In addition, information produced by intelligence and law enforcement agencies needs to be put together in an effective and legally admissible way. Intelligence is rarely admissible in court, but its format could be modified so that it could be made more available to investigative bodies. Investigative evaluations could usefully complement intelligence ones. Europol, in its Counter Terrorism Program for example, addresses this point in its TEP, which trains law enforcement and intelligence officers to work together and thus to be open to other institutional approaches. However, investment in intelligence capabilities in the Middle East and South Asia is somewhat lacking in numerous European states. The role of European intelligence in detecting the activities of terrorist financial operators in these regions would be invaluable, as many of the counterparts for the organizations are based in European countries such as Belgium.
- ▶ In the United States, classified information cannot easily be shared with foreign nationals, which complicates prosecution and extra-

dition proceedings. Increased sharing of intelligence presents the possibility of unauthorized disclosures to people who might harm U.S. interests and those of its allies. A concerted effort must be made to ensure that unclassified information can be safeguarded so that it may be shared with other countries. This has been a particular problem for European courts attempting to try terrorist suspects. At trial, courts have been forced to drop cases due to the unwillingness of U.S. authorities to share evidence. A case in point was that of Moroccan Mounir el Motassadeq, who was convicted in 2003 for assisting the Hamburg-based September 11 suicide pilots. His conviction was overturned by a German appeals court in 2004 on the grounds that he was unfairly denied testimony from U.S.-held suspects, including Ramzi Binalshibh, who is believed to be the Hamburg cell connection to al Qaeda. Further, some European states have at times refused to block bank accounts because they claim that the United States is unwilling to share intelligence on many of the designated organizations and individual members.²⁹

Curbing Corruption in Third Party Countries

When collaborative efforts lead U.S. and EU partners to countries rife with corruption, some genuine understanding and attempt to address the problem must be made. Most governments appear willing to collaborate, share expertise and intelligence, conduct joint training, and work more closely with inter-governmental organizations. Yet, if their systems have been corrupted and their officials suborned, the information being shared is likely tainted, and their efforts can be only partly effective. Hence, working outside the coalition can be costly and fraught with the threat of receding cooperation. The value of intelligence from countries outside the coalition may require constant, rigorous scrutiny.³⁰

Accepting the Use of Criminal Justice Methods

The overarching goal of international counterterrorism efforts should be to stop terrorist attacks before they occur rather than to bring terrorists to justice for plotting terrorist conspiracies. The lessons learned by Europeans are important to note in this regard. The United States has dedicated significant monetary and human resources to hunting down terrorists and proving their conspiracies. Enormous political weight has been thrown behind the war on terrorism, and new tools, such as the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, have been formulated to prosecute it. Meanwhile, Euro-

peans have looked for ways to interdict terrorists before they can commit their acts.³¹ While this sounds like a distinction without a difference, it is not. Europeans have dealt with terrorism for decades and have come to recognize the shadowy and elusive nature of these groups. They prefer to interdict the acts before they occur and have found that the political fallout is worse from a terrorist act occurring than it is from incarcerating known terrorists for criminal acts. As recently as January 2005, the European Commission (EC) teamed up with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to fight drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. As UNODC Director Antonio Maria Costa observed, the joint commitment with the EC is a "clear recognition of the links between drugs, organized crime and terrorism, and our shared responsibility to combat this immediate, three-dimensional threat."³²

Most terrorist cells have to raise their own operating funds now that state sponsorship has all but vanished, and many of their recent money-making activities are criminal in nature, since these readily generate quick cash. The heightened security tensions that resulted after September 11 have tended to obscure developments in the justice sector. Further, political considerations have led to heightened scrutiny and a rethinking of some practices and approaches, such as the sharing of intelligence, and whether these agreements truly meet U.S. national security needs and EU constitutional traditions. Yet, the areas of cooperation against organized crime are less contentious, and pursuing terrorists from the criminal justice angle may bring more success. Although proving a terrorist conspiracy can present a significant and often impossible evidentiary burden, proving criminal activity is not nearly as difficult. The key to apprehending, or at least interrupting, terrorist conspiracies as well as working in a close transatlantic partnership may well lie in cooperating on the law enforcement side to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists for criminal activity. The United States may have to be satisfied when terrorists are brought to justice for organized criminal activity in EU states. While this does not hold the same political weight as convictions for terrorism, the result may be fewer acts of terrorism.

Limitations, Obstacles, and Differences

Most Europeans are steadfast in their dedication to protecting human rights and see this as a matter of preserving their most basic values. They have made clear that, while they are fully committed to the fight against terrorism, they will not compromise on human rights to win that fight. In the words of the EU's Javier Solana, "There is absolutely no trade-

off between security and human rights protection and the rule of law. The violation of human rights in the fight against terrorism is not only morally undesirable, but also ineffective in the long run.”³³ The United States admittedly has confused international partners by not classifying prisoners at Guantanamo Bay as either belligerents or terrorists. Yet the potential for collaboration in this regard exists, as new international law often emerges from customary practices of states. Whether or not these prisoners might constitute a new form of international legal personality has largely gone undebated on both sides of the Atlantic.

Despite these seeming differences in perspectives, a landmark U.S.–EU extradition treaty was concluded. The main obstacle had been American use of the death penalty for certain capital crimes. By providing sufficient assurances that extradition will not lead to violations of European constitutional norms, the United States reached agreement with the EU on the terms of a treaty. While not explicitly taking the death penalty off the table, the United States conceded that the EU has the right to refuse extradition if the death penalty will be, or could be, imposed.³⁴

Other issues also stall the prospects of formulating better transatlantic relations. EU countries still smart over U.S. refusals to sign the Kyoto Treaty on Global Warming, to support the International Criminal Court, and to accept another term for Mohamed El Baradei as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Further, the United States has continued to pressure Europe to list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and impose sanctions. Led by France, Europe refuses to do so on the grounds that this step would impact future negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue. France also argues that blacklisting Hezbollah will damage relations with other Middle Eastern countries, such as Lebanon, where the group not only engages in military operations, but is also a political party. Finally, Europeans watch with great skepticism the holding of the so-called illegal combatants in Guantanamo Bay. They cite the Geneva Conventions as well as international human rights law in urging the United States to uphold international law and either try these prisoners or set them free.

The Way Ahead

There is, of course, no way to suppress or interdict every conceivable terrorist movement or conspiracy, even when countries are cooperating fully. A more realistic scenario would be to increase dramatically the costs and risks that criminals and terrorists face when they seek to engage in conspiracies. Beyond that, more steps can be taken. The United States can work more with European partners to bolster states in transition and those

new to democracy in any number of economic arenas. Indeed, the European model seems to offer incentives before punitive threats.

When the United States requests that European countries clamp down on terrorist groups, U.S. policymakers should anticipate that the successful interdiction of illegal transactions by law enforcement personnel will tend to drive terrorists and criminal groups further underground or toward more sophisticated methods of evasion. To the greatest extent possible, counterterrorism and organized crime operations must address entire networks rather than their component parts; partial quick fixes generate new problems that could become problems for Europeans exclusively. For example, if only some members of a terrorist network are apprehended and their assets forfeited, other operatives will fill the void. By addressing the problem as one terminated when the effects are no longer felt in America, the United States risks angering Europeans, who may see themselves as being left behind with a problem that was only transferred to them. The United States cannot cease operations until the entire problem has been addressed satisfactorily for all partners.

Finally, attempting to impede terrorist financing only in the legitimate financial sector is insufficient. It overlooks the fact that groups that have gone underground have resorted to alternative methods, such as the hawalas, for the movement and manipulation of finances.³⁵ Not only are movements through these systems virtually untraceable, but also many EU countries are reluctant to tamper with a system that allows remittances to be sent home to family members in the country of origin of many minority groups. As a result, cooperation between the United States and EU countries on this issue may be one of the most critical and difficult in countering terrorists and their financing.

Conclusion

As a result of differences over the war in Iraq, tensions between several EU states and the United States have been high. Despite this lapse in good relations, EU countries have undertaken many effective actions and initiatives in the war on terrorism. While many of the steps taken have been to secure European homelands and critical infrastructure, most have materialized as cooperative efforts with the United States. Many of the practices that the United States has put in place since September 11 already existed in European states that are all too familiar with terrorist activity.

There is little transatlantic disagreement that terrorism is a scourge and a threat to national and international security. There is also little doubt that EU states are working closely and collaboratively with U.S. counter-

parts. However, notable differences do exist in the way some of the justice components of the war on terrorism are being pursued. Standards on both sides of the Atlantic vary and are unlikely to converge on many of the legal issues, especially with regard to the monitoring of suspects, sufficient and compelling trial evidence, and sentencing guidelines. Perhaps the greatest task that lies ahead for the transatlantic partnership is to renew the sense of urgency for cooperation in areas where the United States and EU countries do agree, such as in the collection and sharing of intelligence. The fact remains that the United States will have to make some difficult choices in the interests of good relations with EU partners. It will have to decide between matters of vital importance and those on which it might be willing to concede so that, over the long term, EU states remain strong and cooperative partners in the war on terrorism.

Notes

¹ Source: Kimberly L. Thachuk, *Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic?*, Defense Horizons 53 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006).

² I am grateful to my colleagues Hans Binnendijk, Spike Bowman, Stephen J. Flanagan, Richard L. Kugler, and Courtney Richardson, for their comments and suggestions that so enriched the content of this paper. I am also grateful to Peter C. Potman, Counselor, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Washington, DC, for his numerous insights, remarks, and suggestions.

³ Javier Solana, "Terrorism in Europe: How Does the Union of 25 Respond to this Phenomenon?" Remarks by EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Berlin, October 7, 2004, available at <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/82163.pdf>.

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⁵ Glenn Frankel, "Europe, U.S. Diverge on How to Fight Terrorism," *The Washington Post*, March 28, 2004, A15.

⁶ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003), 29. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf>.

⁷ Jonathan Stevenson, "How Europe and America Defend Themselves," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, issue 2 (March/April 2003), 75.

⁸ *The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism: Initial Findings* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2004), available at <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0408_transatlanticterrorism.pdf>, 6.

⁹ Roger Cohen, "A French Call for a New Day with U.S.," *International Herald Tribune*, January 10, 2005, 1.

¹⁰ Stevenson, 75.

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¹³ Dick Marty, "Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States," Information Memorandum II, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Council of Europe, January 22, 2006, available at <http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060124_Jdoc032006_E.pdf>.

¹⁴ Joel Brinkley, "U.S. Interrogations are Saving European Lives, Rice Says," *The New York Times*, December 6, 2005.

¹⁵ See Colin Warbrick, "The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human Rights," *The European Journal of International Law*, vol. 15, no. 5 (2004), 989-1018.

¹⁶ Speaking Notes of the Secretary General on Council of Europe Report on Article 52 Investigation Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Council of Europe, March 1, 2006, available at <http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Events/2006-cia/Speaking_notes%20_sg.asp>.

¹⁷ "Bush Rebuffs Merkel on Guantanamo," *BBC News*, January 13, 2006, available at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4610872.stm>>.

¹⁸ Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva, Switzerland: 12 August 1949), available at <<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm>>.

¹⁹ Kimberley Thachuk, "Transnational Threats: Falling Through the Cracks?" *Journal of Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 47-67.

²⁰ Christopher Bouchek, "Belgium: the Epicentre of Terrorism in Europe," *Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor*, March 12, 2002. Service subscription.

²¹ Gary Mason, "Immigration Criminals May Aid Terrorists," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 1, 2002. Service subscription.

²² The Schengen Agreement, which is part of EU law, introduces a common visa policy by removing all internal border controls and implementing effective controls at the external borders of the EU. For more details, see <http://europa.eu/abc/travel/doc/index_en.htm>.

²³ Jonathan M. Winer, "Cops across Borders: The Evolution of Transatlantic Law Enforcement and Judicial Co-operation," Council on Foreign Relations, September 1, 2004, available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/7389/cops_across_borders.html>, 2.

²⁴ On May 30, 2006, however, the European Court of Justice overturned an agreement that provides the United States personal data from air passengers traveling to the United States from Europe. Current procedures remain in effect for the next 4 months—the deadline set for the European Commission and the U.S. Government to negotiate a new agreement. For more details, see Nicola Clark, "EU Court Bars Giving Passenger Data to U.S.," *International Herald Tribune*, May 31, 2006.

²⁵ "EU Agrees New Security Measures," *BBC News*, July 14, 2005.

²⁶ The majority of the more than 200 suspects arrested in Europe since September 11 have been North African rather than Middle Eastern. European intelligence sources believe that al Qaeda, having been disrupted, is attempting to recruit long-established Islamic terror groups from countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.

²⁷ "Dutch Jail 'Terror Group' Muslims," *BBC News*, March 10, 2006.

²⁸ Renwick McLean, "Spain Finds Qaeda Cell Chief Guilty in 9/11 Plot," *International Herald Tribune*, September 27, 2005, 1.

²⁹ For example, the Luxembourg government stated recently that the country's banking regulatory agency "did not have access to releasable intelligence information" related to the case against al Barakaat and thus released the assets of an organization allegedly linked to the *hawala*. European governments have faced legal challenges from citizens on the United Nations terrorist list of 219 people who are suspected members or supporters of al Qaeda. These people claim that they have been denied their right to trial which is enshrined in the Council of Europe Human Rights Charter, available at <http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/default_en.htm>.

³⁰ For example, in Cyprus, an aspirant to the EU, questions remain about the nature of certain members of the Greek Cypriot leadership and their ability to regulate international companies according to EU best practices for money laundering. Greek Cypriot President Papadopoulos' law firm has recently been accused of providing front companies to launder Slobodan Milosevic's arms trafficking profits. For more details, see Kerin Hope, "Greek Cypriot leader's law firm linked to funding web for Milosevic," *Financial Times*, April 15, 2003, 14.

³¹ Speech by member of the Guardia Civil, April 1, 2003, Garmisch, Germany.

³² "UN Teams Up with European Commission to Fight Drug Trafficking, Crime and Terror," January 21, 2005, available at <<http://www.europaworld.org/week208/unteams21105.htm>>.

³³ Solana.

³⁴ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *European Union Factsheet: Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance* (Brussels: June 2003), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/us/sum06_03/extra.pdf>.

³⁵ *Hawalas* are informal money exchange networks that have existed for centuries. They are based on trust and no money physically moves across international borders in a normal transaction.

Part IV:

Transforming

NATO Technology

NATO Technology: From Gap to Divergence? (2004)¹

Donald C. Daniel

Overview

A widening technology gap between the United States and other NATO members will challenge the ability of NATO to function as a cohesive, multinational force. Over several decades, great disparities in the funding of defense research and technology by NATO members has provided a widening technological gap that threatens to become a divergence – a condition from which the Alliance may not be able to recover. The technology gap, in turn, is creating a capabilities gap that undercuts the operational effectiveness of NATO forces, including the new NATO Response Force.

With only slight modifications (not additions) to current total defense expenditures, and using funds that will be available as they restructure their forces, European members could not only double their current investment but take significant strides to ensure that they are not left behind in a world dominated by technology.

In addition, and of equal importance, the United States must share more of its fundamental basic and applied research with NATO partners, take a greater role of leadership in NATO's Research and Technology Organization (RTO), and increase participation across all technical areas in the RTO. These primary actions, coupled with other actions by all NATO nations and the Allied Command Transformation, offer the potential to dramatically improve a situation that very much needs immediate attention. It is a relatively straightforward matter now. NATO has both a capabilities gap and a technology gap. Immediate attention to the latter, with a commitment by every

NATO nation to invest three percent of its military budget in research and technology, may, over time, significantly reduce the capability gap.

One of the major results of the Prague Summit in November 2002 was the formal recognition of the military capabilities gap between the United States and the other NATO nations. Members made a strong commitment to address this gap, especially in strategic transport, UAVs, precision guided munitions, air-to-air refueling, maritime counter-mine capabilities, and nuclear, chemical, and biological identification and defense capabilities. The Prague Capabilities Commitment is silent on a major long-term issue—funding of the defense research and technology needed to reduce the capabilities gap over the long term.

The United States makes the largest annual investment in warfighting capability in the world, exceeding that of the closest NATO members by an order of magnitude.² The disparity is even greater when one compares how the NATO nations invest their budgets. The United States spends approximately 35 percent of its defense budget on personnel, 30 percent on equipment expenditures, and the remainder in miscellaneous areas, including infrastructure.³ By comparison, Belgium and Italy spend over 70 percent on personnel. France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Spain each spend approximately 60 percent on personnel. These same nations make investments in equipment from 5 percent (Belgium) to 20 percent (France), with most being in the range of 10 percent.⁴ These imbalances have existed for years.

The effect of this mismatch on defense investments is considerable: an overly large force structure in much of NATO that is ill equipped (as well as ill trained) to fight modern conflicts, and a widening technology gap between the United States and the rest of NATO.

In recent years, the United States has undergone its most significant military transformation since World War II as it has aligned and equipped itself to meet changing threats. The resulting forces are lighter, more mobile, and more lethal than ever before. The United States has moved so rapidly in this transformation that it has left its traditional allies behind.

Consider air power. The capabilities gap here is unquestionably one of the largest. The United States has the only significant strategic transport, refueling, surveillance, and bomber capabilities among the NATO nations—at a time when the Alliance has clearly committed itself to out-of-area activities. This mismatch in capabilities is of significant concern now, and may be stemmed slightly by the Prague Capabilities Commitment.

The air power gap widens when one considers fighter and attack aircraft, such as the F/A-22 and F-35, that the United States will introduce this decade.⁵ These aircraft will feature such new capabilities as all-internal carriage of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, materials and vehicle shaping to provide low observable characteristics, supersonic cruise without afterburner, and vertical/short take off and landing. Unmanned combat air vehicles contribute additional capabilities unmatched by other NATO members. The X-45A, for example, which is now undergoing testing in the United States, with a possible initial operational capability around 2010, features all-internal carriage of weapons and low observable characteristics.

The widening NATO capabilities gap is driven by many elements, the most important of which is defense funding. A subset of the capabilities gap is driven by the dominant role of technology in nearly every facet of modern society. Again, funding plays a key role.

Research and Technology Investments


The United States Government invests over \$12 billion annually in defense science and technology (S&T). This includes approximately \$1.5 billion in basic research, \$4.5 billion in applied research, and \$6 billion in advanced technology development. To put the magnitude of this investment in perspective, the current U.S. defense S&T program exceeds the total annual defense investments of its NATO allies Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey (See figure 22-1). Only the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy invest more in their total defense programs than the United States does in defense research and technology alone. The total defense research and technology annual investment by all other NATO nations combined is estimated to be only \$3 billion.

The American investment in defense research and technology has increased dramatically during the Bush administration, which considers it to be a major factor in enhancing the quality of U.S. armed forces, with almost all of this increase going to advanced technology development. The significance of this increase should not be lost on NATO, as it will yield even more advanced technology for the U.S. armed forces in the near term.

In addition to the near-term investments already mentioned (again using air power examples), the United States is the only nation in the world investing significantly in longer-term technologies, such as hyper-

sonics, a technology featured in the Department of Defense's National Aerospace Initiative. This initiative features, among other things, research in hypersonic scramjet propulsion with potential application to air-to-ground missiles, long-range strike aircraft and two-stage-to-orbit space vehicles with an air breathing first stage. None of these capabilities, the latter two of which are revolutionary, are even on the long-term planning horizon of any other NATO nation.

Figure 22-1: Defense Budgets of European Members Compared to U.S. Defense S&T Budget



Unfortunately, additional potentially revolutionary technology areas can be cited where the United States is making significant investments and NATO colleagues are doing at best very little. These areas include directed energy laser and high-power microwave devices, distributed mission training, miniaturized conventional weapons technologies, and microsatellites.

Will the Gap Become Divergent?

The order of magnitude differences in defense funding between the United States and other NATO members, if sustained, will eventually cause such a wide gap in technical capabilities that a divergence will occur. The great danger here is that, whereas a gap can be narrowed over time by sufficient investment, a divergence may be unrecoverable. Should this divergence occur, the Alliance is at risk.

Given that, at least in the short term, the United States is not likely to reduce military spending, NATO, and more important, the NATO nations,

must make this issue a very high priority. The time to address the issue is now and the amount of time to resolve it is perhaps a decade. Ten years from now, the United States may have so many revolutionary technologies that it is difficult to imagine how NATO units so mismatched in technical capability will be able to function as cohesive, allied force.

Other factors also must be considered. Fortunately, technology matures slowly from basic research to completion of advanced technology development and it may be, that time is on NATO's side. Another factor to consider is that technologies that offer significant promise today may not pan out. Research and technology development are risky undertakings; spending vast resources does not guarantee success in solving difficult technical problems. And we sometimes see breakthroughs result from limited funding. This latter point is especially significant for NATO nations that have notable research and technology establishments and personnel who stay well connected to worldwide research projects and the results they are producing.

The Way Ahead

Specific actions taken now by NATO and member nations could have a dramatic, positive effect on the Alliance. As will be discussed below, the subjects of these actions certainly include funding. Although many technology areas are important to the Alliance, certain ones, including the personnel and infrastructure to support them, are more important in today's military environment; these areas also are discussed. The Alliance is fortunate to have at this time a major Command that is charged with transformation and recognizes the need for aggressively transitioning technology to the operational forces.

Funding

No discussion on the way ahead for reducing NATO capabilities and technology gaps can avoid funding, and there is, perhaps, a glimmer of hope for the future. The good news comes from the fact that small, but consistently sustained, investments in research and technology could make a significant difference in the technology gap. Even for a defense program as large as that of the United States, their research and technology investment is only about 3 percent of the total defense budget. If all NATO nations would invest this same percentage amount in their defense research and technology programs, we could see an effective doubling of the investment by the non-U.S. nations. This singular investment in the future, requiring no new funds, but rather a reprioritization, would set the stage for the Al-

liance to maintain essential technical connectivity across all nations. It can be achieved if members sustain their defense funding at current levels and make the funding of research and technology a top priority with funds made available by reduction of their current force components.

The European members of NATO could also benefit by closer cooperation and collaboration among themselves in defense research and technology investments. There is a sense in some quarters that significant, unnecessary duplication persists among member nations. This negative effect is further compounded by problems of interoperability as technologies enter development phases.

The United States

NATO is fortunate to have a strong organization that is specifically chartered to share defense research and technology information.⁶ It is imperative, however, that the United States take a stronger leadership position throughout the RTO than it is currently doing. For example, of the seven major technical panels in the RTO, the United States chairs only one, the panel on Information Systems Technology.⁷ These panels form the heart of the organization as they formulate, execute and report on the more than 100 technical activities that take place annually involving several thousand scientists and engineers.⁸ It may be appropriate for the United States to set as a goal chairing three panels at any one time, as well as making individuals available to serve as vice chairs of the others. Furthermore, the individuals made available to serve in these positions should be very high-ranking leaders (preferably members of the Senior Executive Service) who direct significant resources within the U.S. defense laboratory structure.

The United States also must take a much more active role in sharing basic and applied research with its NATO partners. The United States participates in most RTO activities, but not at a level that is consistent with its very large investment in defense research and technology and not across the full spectrum of RTO activities. Whereas, for example, participation in air platform related technologies might sometimes be sufficient, the same case cannot be made for naval related technologies or space related technologies. Failure by the United States to address these leadership and participation areas is every bit as significant as the funding-related deficiencies of other NATO members.

If the United States moves to share more of its basic and applied research information, however, the other NATO nations must be receptive, particularly where doing so can be done with modest infrastructure

investments. Failure to be receptive may well eliminate these nations from access to, or use of, such technology in the future, simply because it is so unknown to them. Also, issues of possible, future equipment procurement must not get in the way of research. It is incumbent on the total NATO research community to consider, whenever possible, technical approaches that will not result in a single strategy for future equipment purchases.

Technology Areas

There are many areas of technology that especially lend themselves to a more aggressive posture by the NATO RTO on sharing. Although it is impossible to mention all of these, at least three must get special mention: distributed mission training, sensor fusion and information technology. It is also important to note that the NATO Response Force (NRF) will be especially dependent on these technologies; consequently, they must receive priority consideration for funding.

Distributed mission training will be absolutely essential for NRF. The ability to link simulators, actual equipment, and personnel from various geographic locations on both sides of the Atlantic has been demonstrated to some extent by technologists and operational forces. As elements of the NRF, with all of their different equipment, are moved into and out of readiness, there is simply no other way to keep them fully prepared to execute their missions. The United States and the United Kingdom have made significant progress in this area, especially with their air forces. Equal progress across broader technology areas and across many more nations is essential.

Sensors have become the enabler in today's information age and the near-real time fusion of the information from a vast array of many different types of devices is key to NATO military capability. These devices include the full range of sensors on air-, space-, land- and sea-based platforms that cover the complete electromagnetic spectrum. This is an area that lends itself to participation by a wide variety of large and small nations. Larger nations with larger budgets will no doubt pursue a broader range of sensor options, but smaller nations with more limited budgets can certainly do research in some of the vital areas and, by partnering with other nations, can pursue significant activities in sensor fusion. This area also lends itself to research at the component level or with almost any combination of components and platforms. There is also significant work that can be performed in sensor fusion algorithms as well as automatic target recognition algorithms. Again, because of this diversity, large or small nations can become involved to whatever level they can afford.

Information technology is, of course, the glue that holds today's modern society together. There are so many elements of this technology area that it is almost impossible to imagine how any nation could not find a niche area. One of the more appealing for some may be fundamental mathematics. This is an area that requires a modest infrastructure investment to enter and that lends itself to partnering as a nation moves toward more applied activities, such as with sensors and sensor fusion. The interaction of machine-based information technology with human elements is another niche of this research area that enables numerous contributions at various levels of investment and with various levels of infrastructure. The overall area of information technology is one in which European members of NATO, particularly the United Kingdom and France, have invested broadly, and one that is perhaps most promising in terms of closing or preventing a technology gap.⁹

The RTO also should seek more involvement with, and participation by the defense industries from both sides of the Atlantic. A case could perhaps be made that contributions by European defense industries contribute significantly to the better balancing of vast differences in military research and technology funding. Also, the technical areas mentioned above could especially lend themselves to increased industry involvement. To this end, the RTO should request the NATO Industrial Advisory Group to investigate this matter, with specific emphasis on the magnitude and technical excellence of non-government sponsored, defense relevant industrial research.

Infrastructure and Work Force

Just as the military dimension of NATO is working to modernize and transform itself into an agile force, the technical dimension must do the same. This is particularly true with respect to physical infrastructure and manpower. The cost associated with maintaining infrastructure for technologies that are not part of the modern equation must be eliminated. Just as we no longer need large immobile land armies in NATO, neither do we need antiquated laboratories and facilities that are not highly relevant to the challenges of current and future technologies.

Similarly, the workforce in defense research and technology needs to be one that is skilled in science, mathematics, and engineering for the future, not the past. The workforce of the future, from both national and NATO perspectives, would also benefit significantly with more prolonged exposure to each other. There is no better way to share technology than to share the people who are experts in it. To this end, one-, two- and three-

year laboratory exchange programs, both to learn and to teach, should be pursued much more vigorously than is currently done. The United States is especially deficient in this area.

Allied Command Transformation

The formation in 2003 of the NATO Allied Command Transformation created a golden opportunity for sharing technology and demonstrating it in multinational forums. ACT must seize this opportunity and, working with the RTO, Main Armament Groups, and member nations, among others, provide the framework and leadership to demonstrate emerging technologies across the broadest possible spectrum of NATO nations.¹⁰ This is not a trivial task. Individual nations repeatedly struggle with transitioning technology from the laboratory to the military user. ACT should, and must, assume this role for NATO as a whole. Their recent creation of a NATO Technical Advisory Board, with the RTA Director and Deputy Director as members, will help facilitate this process, as will emphasis on joint experimentation, exercises and assessment. It also is important to note that both activities are led by NATO flag officers. One particularly difficult area, once again, will be funding. To this end, ACT must work carefully with NATO as an entity and individual nations (which fund the military research and development) to obtain sufficient funding commitments from all to demonstrate the emerging technologies and to enhance their availability for transition. A key element of this is for nations to accept the responsibility for funding demonstrations of their technologies in a NATO environment.

Conclusion

As perplexing as today's NATO capabilities gap may be, some relatively simple and straightforward actions could prevent a potential divergence driven by technology. Foremost among these actions is increased investment in defense research and technology by the European members. The good news here is that, with only slight modifications (not additions) to current total defense expenditures and using funds that will be available as they restructure their forces, these nations could not only double their current investment but take significant strides to assure that they are not left behind in a world dominated by technology.

The second most important action is an American initiative. The United States simply must make sharing more of its fundamental basic and applied research with NATO partners a higher priority. This requires at least two subset actions: increased leadership in the Research and Tech-

nology Organization, especially at the panel level, and a far greater level of participation across all technical areas in the RTO. These two primary actions, coupled with other actions by all NATO nations and Allied Command Transformation proposed above, offer the potential to dramatically improve a situation that needs immediate attention. NATO has both a capabilities gap and a technical gap. A commitment by every NATO nation to invest 3 percent of its military budget in research and technology, would go far toward reducing both gaps and keeping NATO militarily relevant in the new strategic environment.

NATO Research and Technology Organization

The Research and Technology Organization (RTO) was formed in 1998 by the merger of two NATO bodies: the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) and the Defense Research Group (DRG). The aim of the merger was primarily to ensure that NATO's structure was better adapted to the changing defense environment, in particular by providing a common focus for all NATO research and technology activities and developing a research and technology strategy for NATO. The RTO has carried out both tasks in the short time that has elapsed since its formation, and has just started to implement the strategy. The RTO comprises the Research and Technology Board (RTB) and its subordinate bodies and the Research and Technology Agency.

The Research and Technology Agency is tasked with providing support to the RTB and with executing those actions required to support the development, coordination, and execution of the RTO scientific and technical program. RTA staff include about thirty NATO civil servants and a further twenty staff members, both military and civilian, supplied voluntarily by the nations for limited periods. Its headquarters and most of the staff are in France, but a small unit is located in NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.

The Research and Technology Board is the highest authority within the TRO and serves as the single integrating body within NATO for the direction and coordination of defense research and technology and is the policy body. The RTB is tasked by the North Atlantic Council through both the Military Committee (MC) and the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). Its membership comprises up to three leaders in the field of defense

research and technology from each NATO nation capable of speaking with authority on science and technology and their application to military problems. These members may come from government, industry, or academia. Ex officio representatives are also appointed by the NATO research and technology agencies NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and the SACLANT Undersea Research Center (SACLANTCEN) and the NATO Strategic Commands. The Chairman is a senior member of the Board, elected by the national members for a three-year term. Each nation appoints a national coordinator to oversee its RTO activities.

The RTB oversees the activities of all subordinate bodies and delegates the responsibility for conducting the technical program to six Technical Panels. The technical Panels and the Modeling and Simulation Group each consist of national experts, including a number of members at large, who are internationally recognized experts from the NATO nations. The Panels are the heart of the RTO, because they propose, develop, and steer the various tasks that together make up the technical program of the technical program of the organization. The missions of the six Panels are:

- ▀ **Applied Vehicle Technology (AVT):** to improve the performance, affordability, and safety of vehicle platforms, propulsion, and power systems through the advancement of appropriate technologies. The AVT Panel addresses technology issues related to vehicle platforms, propulsion, and power systems operating in all environments including land, sea, air, and space, for both new and aging systems.
- ▀ **Human Factors and Medicine (HFM):** to optimize performance, health, well-being, and safety of the human in operational environments with consideration of affordability. This involves understanding and ensuring the physical, physiological, psychological and cognitive compatibility among military personnel, technological systems, missions, and environments. The HFM Panel covers the fields of human factors, operational medicine, and human protection in adverse environments.
- ▀ **Information Systems Technology (IST):** to identify and review areas of research of common interest, to recommend the establishment of activities in these areas and to initiate and

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continued

approve exploratory teams. The IST Panel covers the fields of information warfare and assurance, information and knowledge management, communications and networks, and architecture and enabling technologies.

- ▶ **Studies, Analysis and Simulation (SAS):** to conduct studies and analyses of an operational and technology nature, exchange information on operational (OA) analysis technology, advance the development of OA methods and tools, and provide a forum for NATO modeling and simulation oriented toward operational issues.
- ▶ **Systems Concepts and Integration (SCI):** to advance knowledge concerning advanced systems, concepts, integration, engineering technologies and technologies across the spectrum of platforms and operating environments in ensure cost-effective mission area capabilities, including integrated manned and unmanned air, land, sea, and space defense systems and the associated weapon and countermeasure integration. Panel activities focus on NATO and national mid-to long-term, system-level operational needs.
- ▶ **Sensors and Electronics Technology (SET):** to advance technology in electronics and passive/active sensors as they pertain to reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition, electronic warfare, communications, and navigation, and to enhance sensor capabilities through multi-sensor integration/fusion. This concerns the phenomenology related to target signature, propagation, and battlespace environment, EO, RF, acoustic and magnetic sensors, antenna, signal and image processing, components, sensor hardening, and electromagnetic compatibility.

Source: NATO RTO mission statements available at <<http://rta.nato.int>>.

Notes

¹ Source: Donald C. Daniel, *NATO Technology: From Gap to Divergence?*, Defense Horizons 42 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004).

² The United States defense budget for fiscal year 2004 is approximately \$400 billion. Of the NATO nations, The United Kingdom has the next largest defense budget at approximately \$40 billion, with France second at approximately \$30 billion and Germany third at approximately \$25 billion.

³ Equipment expenditures include research and development.

⁴ The figures given here are taken from the NATO web site on "Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence—Defence Expenditures of NATO countries (1980-2003)," accessed at <www.nato.int/docu/pr/pr2003.htm#december>.

⁵ The F-35 will also most likely be acquired by other NATO nations, including the UK.

⁶ The NATO Research and Technology Organization is described in detail in *NATO Defense Science and Technology*, Defense Horizons 24. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press), March 2003.

⁷ The RTO Technical Panels are Applied Vehicle Technology; Human Factors and Medicine; Information Systems Technology; Sensors and Electronics Technology; Studies, Analysis and Simulation; Systems Concepts and Integration; and the NATO Modeling and Simulation Group.

⁸ Technical activities include Task Groups, Symposia, Workshops, Lecture Series, Cooperative Demonstrations of Technology, and other activities.

⁹ For an excellent discussion on C4ISR technology in Europe, see the recent work of Gordon Adams at The Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

¹⁰ The Main Armament Groups consist of the NATO Army Armaments Group, the NATO Navy Armaments Group, and the NATO Air Force Armaments Group. They are primarily concerned with development and procurement of equipment.

Russia and NATO: Increased Interaction in Defense Research and Technology (2005)¹

Donald C. Daniel and Michael I. Yarymovych

Overview

As a member of both the Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—Russia Council (NRC), Russia enjoys remarkable status in an alliance formed principally to counter Soviet aggression. Active participation in one additional element of NATO—the Research and Technology Organization (RTO)—would offer unique opportunities to enhance relationships and mutual security. The RTO is the largest organization of its type in the world, has an extremely active program of work, and is eager to work with Russia.

Enhanced cooperation between NATO and Russia in defense-related research and technology would not be easy. Mistrust is an obstacle, as is difficulty communicating in English and French, the official NATO languages. Also, Russian economic weakness impedes consistent participation, particularly in events outside Russia.

NATO could reach out to Russia, offering sequential, specific opportunities and limited funding. These opportunities could include involving young Russian scientists and engineers in selected, defense-related research and technology projects; having a special ad hoc senior executive group identify a small number of flagship activities and report on progress to the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors, the Military Committee, and the NRC; and inviting a few mid-level scientists, engineers, or technical managers to work directly with RTO staff in Paris,

where they could assist in defining and providing support for specific elements of the RTO program of work.

If NATO vectors toward Russia in this way, Russia must respond by vectoring toward the Alliance. The key here is a more consistent and cooperative representation by Russia in the forums that are available to it. Russian representatives must also become more fluent in English and French to achieve meaningful dialogue. This is especially true at the technical, senior executive levels. Finally, Russia must respond promptly to these initiatives. The opportunities are there. Now is the time.

Neither the charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nor the formal statement by President Harry S. Truman transmitting the proposed draft treaty to the U.S. Congress for ratification named the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It was clear, however, that the principal purpose of NATO was to resist communist aggression. It should have come as no surprise, then, that the breakup of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact four decades later caused an identity crisis for the Alliance. Arguments were made that NATO had lost its purpose and should be dissolved. Concerns were expressed that offering membership to former Soviet allies, but not Russia, might provoke a conflict with Russia. It was obvious to many that special and very specific attention had to be given to this new situation.²

Thus, in 1991, almost as soon as the Berlin Wall came down, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The NACC assembled all the newly liberated countries in Europe, together with the Soviet Union, to sit around the same table with NATO nations. As former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson later recalled, the unprecedented gathering was historic in an unexpected way:

A rather dramatic moment took place at the first meeting of the NACC in NATO headquarters in Brussels, on the evening of December 20th, 1991. At a certain point in the evening, a messenger came into the room and whispered in the ear of the representative of the Soviet Union. He excused himself and left the room. A few minutes later, he returned. He took his chair, and asked for the microphone. He announced that he could no longer speak for the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Union had, in the past few minutes, dissolved. He would henceforth represent only Russia.³

In an attempt to resolve the uncertainty about the future of NATO, the Alliance began the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program in 1994. More

than 20 countries, including Russia, joined the program. The PFP provides for joint military planning and exercises and other activities (including cooperation in defense research and technology) with NATO members. Over time, many of the Partners have become members of NATO.⁴

The true basis for the development of a strong and durable partnership between NATO and Russia was provided by the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security, which expressed a joint commitment to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. This act established the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), where Russia met with all NATO members to discuss common security concerns, work toward mutual understanding and, where possible, cooperate. A new phase was opened with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) at the NATO-Russia Summit on May 28, 2002, in Rome. This new body, which replaced the PJC, brought together the 19 member countries and Russia to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action. Unlike the PJC, where positions on all issues were coordinated among the 19 members before discussions with Russia, the NRC works on the principle of consensus. As Lord Robertson observed:

The seating arrangements alone speak volumes. In the old PJC, a cumbersome troika shared the chair. We called it “19 plus 1.” Russia called it “19 versus 1” . . . In the new NATO-Russia Council, there is no “19,” and no “1.” All participants sit as equals, in alphabetical order—great powers and small powers together. Russia sits between Spain and Portugal, fully comfortable as one of 20 participating nations. We meet monthly, in NATO Headquarters—a building that was on the target list of every Soviet nuclear missile commander. And I—the Secretary General of NATO—chair the meeting.⁵

The creation of the NRC, spurred by the tragic events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated the resolve of members to work closely as equal partners in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats. Chaired by the NATO Secretary General, NRC meetings are held at least monthly at the level of ambassadors and military representatives, twice yearly at the level of foreign and defense ministers and chiefs of staff, and occasionally at summit level. Work focuses on all areas of mutual interest identified in the Founding Act.

The NRC is both a forum in which military issues can be discussed and a mechanism through which military cooperation can be intensified to meet new challenges. Under the terms of the Rome Declaration, military representatives of the NRC meet in Brussels at least once a month.

In addition, chiefs of defense and chiefs of staff meet twice a year. Practical cooperation has been facilitated by the establishment of a permanent NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow.

Since 2002, NATO has embarked on a major effort of transformation. In that context, the relationship with Russia has intensified under the auspices of the NRC. Despite the ebb and flow of political relations with the events in Iraq and Afghanistan, practical tasks are being accomplished. In the context of military-to-military cooperation being developed between NATO and Russia, General Harald Kujat, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, emphasized such areas as the struggle against terrorism, defense reform, search and rescue at sea, exercises and training, and logistics.

In addition, progress is being made in developing a cooperative regime in theater missile defense (TMD). In June 2002, the NRC established the TMD Ad Hoc Working Group at ambassadorial level as a dedicated body to carry forward the technical work of the TMD cooperation initiative. To better address the many challenges involved, the work is divided into five areas of activity: terminology, experimental concepts, joint concept of operations, training and exercises, and systems capabilities. Each of these elements is addressed by a dedicated Support Working Team composed of experts from the various countries, military authorities, NATO agencies, and the International Staff in NATO Headquarters.⁶

Russian Defense Research and Technology

Russia has a distinctive approach to research and technology that traces to the evolution and dominance of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1724, an Imperial Academy of Sciences was created by order of Peter the Great to help modernize and strengthen Russia. It drew many prominent European mathematicians and scientists, including Leonard Euler and Nicolas and Daniel Bernoulli, and remained an intellectual center of international renown through many regimes and under many names.⁷ The Academy is the leading center of fundamental research in the natural and social sciences in the Russian Federation and employs the best scientific minds of the country. Members enjoy immense prestige and privileges. Unlike members of many Western academies, the members of the Russian Academy of Sciences are full-time employees of the Academy.

Funded entirely by the government of the Russian Federation, the Academy exercises control over the activity of institutes, laboratories, and other bodies in fundamental research and training of scientists. It also is responsible for promoting international cooperation and coordinating

Areas of NATO-Russia Cooperation

Terrorism. Russia and NATO Allies are developing and keeping under review joint assessments of specific terrorist threats in the Euro-Atlantic area. They have agreed to submit the ideas put forward at these conferences to the “20,” to identify concrete proposals for cooperation in this area, moving beyond the theoretical to the practical.

Defense Reform. [There is] a need to transform our military structures from their bloated Cold War incarnations, equipped for traditional territorial defense, to smaller, better equipped, more rapidly deployable forces, geared toward responding to terrorism and other contemporary threats. These include expanding the Moscow-based NATO-Russia retraining center, which provides assistance to former Russian military personnel to transition to civilian life; examining areas for defense industry cooperation; developing a work plan for increased logistics cooperation; sharing experience of force planning aspects of defense reform; establishing a fellowship at the NATO Defence College in Rome for Russian defense planners; setting up a fund to assist with the destruction of landmines; and assisting in the management of Russian military nuclear waste.

Search and Rescue at Sea. Following the loss of the submarine Kursk in August 2000, NATO Allies and Russia intensified joint efforts in the field of search and rescue at sea. A series of cooperative activities associated with submarine crew escape and rescue were launched, which have fostered extremely positive relationships and practical results that will benefit submarine operators from NATO member states, Russia, and other nations.

Interoperability. Efforts to enhance interoperability—the capacity for NATO and Russian forces and equipment to work together against shared threats—link much of the cooperative work in the NRC, from civil emergency planning and response to theater missile defense. Cooperation in training also includes increased attendance at counterpart defense colleges and educational institutions, language training, and seminars. Greater cooperation on logistics could also enhance interoperability between NATO and Russian forces.

Source: Excerpts from General Harald Kujat, former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO and the NATO-Russia Council, published in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, an organ of the Russian Ministry of Defense, December 25, 2002.

international projects. During the Soviet era, the Academy was the central scientific organization of the Soviet Union, with research and development (R&D) capabilities in Russia and the other 14 Soviet republics. The many research institutes of the Academy were responsible for conducting fundamental research, and the Academy ran much of the Soviet military R&D effort. Even today, about half the work of the Academy is devoted to military R&D.

In the first decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, restructuring of the Russian R&D system was driven to a significant extent by the nation's deep economic recession. The recession has contributed to a large decrease in Russian R&D (most of which is state funded) and a consequent major loss of scientific talent. About 11,000 to 12,000 scientists and engineers are reported to have emigrated; a similar number are working under contract outside Russia.⁸

Recent shifts in priorities indicate that military R&D is on the upswing. The external and internal brain drain appears to have slowed, and new military realities are demanding new investments. According to then-First Deputy Defense Minister Andrei A. Kokoshin, funding is available only to modernize arms already produced. A number of plants in the military industrial complex, however, will receive "guaranteed minimal state orders" for new weapons during that period. The 1997–2005 arms development program was to provide Russia with the capability to manufacture "weapons that have no equivalent in the world," Kokoshin assured members of parliament.⁹ Thus, it seems that the Russian military R&D establishment is overcoming the decline from the end of the Cold War and is ready to reestablish itself at a new and perhaps more efficient level. It remains to be seen whether a new spirit of openness can overcome the previous attitude of secrecy so that cooperation with NATO is possible.

The Research and Technology Organization

Within a few years of its inception in 1949, NATO created its first organization devoted to collaboration on defense research and technology, the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD). Several years later, the Defense Research Group (DRG) was created. In 1997, NATO merged the AGARD and DRG to form the Research and Technology Organization (RTO), the largest and most technically advanced forum in the world for sharing defense-related research and technology. The RTO consists of a Research and Technology Board, a Research and Technology Agency (RTA), 6 technical panels, the NATO Modeling

and Simulation Group, and approximately 150 annual, specific technical activities.¹⁰

The technical activities of the RTO reflect the interests and activities of NATO members. The program of work is formulated annually by the technical panels for approval by the RTO Board. The program is then executed by teams of experts. It is noteworthy that essentially all activities, including personnel costs, travel, and equipment, are funded by member nations. The activities are coordinated daily through the RTA, which publishes results. The RTA budget of approximately \$6 million leverages more

Annual Activities of the NATO Research and Technology Organization (RTO)

The RTO program of work consists of approximately 150 annual activities, including:

- ▀ AGARDographs, major publications on a single, clearly defined technical subject and compromised of material generally agreed to be of lasting interest and value to the technical and military communities.
- ▀ Cooperative Demonstrations of Technology, which showcase mature technologies in realistic environments primarily for the military communities.
- ▀ Lecture Series, which disseminate state-of-the-art scientific knowledge in 2-day sessions to junior and mid-level specialists, scientists, and engineers.
- ▀ Specialists Meetings, 2-or 3 day events that promote exchange of knowledge among an audience of specialists with selected speakers on an important scientific or applied topic.
- ▀ Symposia, 3- or 4-day meetings that promote exchange of knowledge among a wide audience with selected speakers on an important scientific or technical topic.
- ▀ Task Groups, which bring together technical teams from member nations to address a particular R&T area over a 1- to- 3- year period, concluding with specific suggestions on the way ahead.
- ▀ Technical Courses are educational activities aimed at transferring practical knowledge and recent field development through on-site instructor training.
- ▀ Workshops facilitate intensive information exchange and focused discussion over a 2-to 3-day period on a specific topic among a limited number of invited experts.

than \$15 billion in defense research and technology invested annually by member nations, almost all of which is available to NATO.

Russia has been involved in a variety of RTO programs, has attended RTB meetings open to Partners, and has participated in numerous RTO-sponsored symposia and other activities. The number of RTO activities open to PFP partners increased steadily during the initial years of the organization and has reached a steady state of approximately 90 activities per year; approximately 60 percent of all RTO activities are open to Russia. Russian participation, however, has not increased similarly. When the RTO has held activities in Russia, the Russian participation has been significant; when activities have been held elsewhere, Russian participation has been much more limited. Although a variety of activities—most notably Task Groups, which are a major growth area—are open to Russia, Russian participation has been limited almost exclusively to symposia and educational activities. The impact of restricted participation and the potential for enhanced interaction will be discussed later.

Opportunities for Cooperation

Of the 67 new activities initiated by the RTO in 2005, 45 are open to Russian participation through the Partnership for Peace program. Significant opportunities are especially available in applied vehicle technology, information systems technology, and modeling and simulation. It is also significant to note that 23 of the 45 opportunities for cooperation are in task groups, which can be especially beneficial in strengthening the relationships between NATO scientists and engineers and their Russian counterparts, and in providing Russia the opportunity to significantly influence and contribute to emerging technologies of value to NATO. By its nature, a task group is the most interactive, sustained activity undertaken by the RTO. It brings together scientists and engineers from member nations to look at a technical area in depth for 1 to 3 years and concludes with recommendations on the way ahead for both NATO and national programs. Some of the 2005 task groups that should be of particular interest to Russia—and where Russia has significant expertise—include: micro-electro-mechanical systems applications to gas turbines; advanced multi-sensor surveillance systems for combating terrorism; infrared/ultraviolet threat-warning sensors; and distributed learning and simulation to support NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and the PFP Training and Education Enhancement Program.

RTO Workshops also offer excellent opportunities for Russia and NATO. These forums bring together some of the world's foremost experts

Selected Activities of the 2004 RTO Program of Work

Applied Vehicle Technology. This panel conducted a symposium on Functional and Mechanical Integration of Weapons with Land and Air Vehicles; a Specialist Meeting on The Control and Reduction of Wear in Military Platforms; a Lecture Series on Critical Technologies for Hypersonic Vehicle Development; and a Task Group on Health Monitoring of Munitions.

Human Factors and Medicine. This panel featured a Lecture Series on Personal Active Noise Reduction; a Technical Course on New Issues in Operational Ophthalmology; a Workshop on Battlespace Visualization: Promises and Reality; and a Task Group on Virtual Environments for Intuitive Human-System Interaction.

Information Systems Technology. Topics included a Symposium on Building Coalition Capabilities and C4ISR Architectures; a Workshop on Visualization and the Common Operating Picture; another Workshop on Enhancing Information Systems Security Through Biometrics; and a Task Group on Network Centric Operations Security.

Sensors and Electronics Technology. This panel sponsored a Task Group on Sensors for Urban Operations; another Task Group on N-Dimensional Eyesafe LADAR Imaging; a Symposium on High Resolution Radar Signatures for Air Targets; and a Lecture Series on Radar Polarimetry and Interferometry.

Studies, Analysis and Simulation. Topics included a Cooperative Demonstration of Technology on Mission Training via Distributed Simulation; a Task Group on Exploring New C2 Concepts and Capabilities; and a Lecture Series on NATO Code of Best practice for C2 Assessment.

Systems Concepts and Integration. This panel featured a Task Group on Correlation Between Laboratory Testing and Field Trials of Multi-Spectral Camouflage Systems; another Task Group on System-Level Integration of Control Plus Automation; a Cooperative Demonstration of Technology in Sensors and Sensor Denial by Camouflage, Concealment and Deception; and a Workshop on Multi-Sensor Fusion Techniques and Architectures for Amphibious Operations.

Modeling and Simulation Group. Activities included a Task Group on Implementation of HLA Compliance Certification within NATO and NATO nations; another Task Group on Modeling and Simulation Tools for Early Warning Identification of Terrorist Activities; a Symposium on Modeling and Simulation to Address NATO's New and Expanding Military Requirements; and a Task Group on Urban Combat Advanced Training Technology.

to discuss and debate the state of the art of defense-related technologies with the aim of significantly broadening and enhancing individual and group knowledge of the subjects. Two workshops open to Russia in 2005—"Toward Recommended Methods for Testing and Evaluation of EV" and "ESV Based Visionic Devices and Military Applications of Multi-Robot Systems"—would benefit from active Russian participation.

Increased Cooperation in Defense R&T

Before discussing several issues and the way ahead, let us look at the context of the current situation. Several questions arise here: Why increase cooperation with Russia in defense-related research and technology (R&T)? What are the interests of NATO and member nations? Do NATO and member nations have sufficient common interests with Russia? Why hasn't cooperation in defense R&T worked better so far?

It is clearly fundamental that NATO wants to cooperate with Russia across a broad front. One only has to consider the Alliance's near-continuous outreach. Because RTO work tends to be on the levels of basic and applied research, cooperation is relatively non-threatening, forms a basis for increasing knowledge of all parties involved, and could form the basis for a more cooperative spirit among all parties across a broader spectrum of activities. Couple this with the fact that Russia has clearly retained outstanding capability in defense-related technologies, and the potential benefit to all parties is apparent.

All nations involved, including Russia, will benefit from open dialogue and discussion on defense-related technologies in the form of an increased knowledge base. There also will be opportunities for individual scientists and engineers to become better acquainted over time, thus building trust. Increased trust can pay off by increasing understanding of cultures, customs, and thought processes—which may open new ways of solving technical problems. Over the long term, individuals involved may also move to positions of increasing responsibility and have the opportunity to cooperate in other areas, including political relations.

NATO and Russia clearly have many common interests in defense-related technologies. Our militaries face common problems, most notably defense against terrorism and the overall transformation of military forces, doctrine, and tactics from a Cold War model to one that can be more responsive to current and projected threats. Cooperation in defense research and technology poses relatively low risks to the parties, because application of the technologies is long-term in nature and creates no immediate military threat.

There are multiple reasons why better cooperation in defense research and technology has not occurred to date. Russia still does not trust NATO and member nations, and the eastward expansion of NATO exacerbated Russian concerns. Conversely, the newest members do not trust Russia and show little interest in being more involved with it under an RTO umbrella. The Russian economic situation also continues to be an obstacle to increased cooperation; the costs associated with almost all RTO activities are funded directly by member nations, which presents a particular problem for Russia. Finally, Russian concerns over intellectual property rights and NATO's lack of understanding of complex Russian laws, rules, and regulations in regard to exchanging pre-competitive scientific information can be stumbling blocks that require education of, and by, all parties involved.

Practical Issues

More than 40 years of Cold War have left a residue of suspicion on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. Fortunately, this is less true of scientists and engineers, especially when purely technical subjects are being discussed. The technical excellence of Russian scientists and engineers and their desire to interact with international colleagues are positive forces in building and enhancing dialog and communication with the NATO nations. Unfortunately, language is a substantial impediment to cooperation.

Russia lacks consistent ability in English and French, the official languages of NATO, among scientists, engineers, and technical executives. (And Russian language ability is almost nonexistent among NATO scientists, engineers, and executives.) The lack of fluency in these languages is particularly awkward when one considers that the majority of Russians involved with NATO—or perhaps more importantly those who could be involved but are not—are senior personnel who are clearly uncomfortable attempting to communicate in languages in which they have little or no skill.

NATO member nations typically have their most senior defense research and technology (R&T) authorities serving as members of the Board, senior executives with significant responsibilities in national defense laboratories serving on the panels, and senior scientists/engineers serving on symposia, task groups and other level-3 activities. It has been very difficult to get Russia to identify and make available appropriate senior technical executives responsible for defense R&T for participation in RTO activities at the Board and panel levels. Some of the difficulty is perhaps due to a lack of Russian understanding (or acceptance) that the sole interest of the RTO is defense R&T.

The lack of response is also perhaps due to a defense organizational structure in Russia that not only is dissimilar to the typical structures in Europe and North America, but also has had limited stability. RTO activities and the associated costs of salary, personnel, travel, and equipment are funded mainly by member nations. Unfortunately, Russia continues to struggle with the costs of doing business with NATO.

The Way Ahead

The Soviet Union had a very strong military technology base, much of which still exists in Russia. Russian solutions of technical problems were robust, exceedingly clever, and often based on different choices of technical systems. Recently, Russian leadership has recognized the need to reverse a decade-long decline, salvage vast intellectual potential, and increase military R&D investments. Russian strengths certainly include missiles and space launch vehicles, radar, aircraft, tanks, and submarines. Their abilities in the underlying technologies of materials, structures, aerodynamics, and propulsion are truly outstanding, as is their ability in fundamental mathematics, which is the foundation of information technology. Russian mathematicians and scientists also have excelled in explaining the physics of technical phenomena using eloquent mathematical tools rather than numerical solutions.

Improving relationships between NATO and Russia in defense research and technology clearly revolves around people and programs. Several steps could be taken now in these areas that have significant potential for improving the current situation. Recognizing that much of the distrust between NATO and Russia is generational in nature, efforts should be made by both sides to identify projects that are amenable to cooperative work by younger engineers and scientists. To this end, each technical panel within the RTO could identify at least one activity for a 2006 start (preferably a task group), work closely with the RTA Partnership for Peace executive to identify appropriate Russian institutions that employ younger scientists and engineers in the identified technical areas, and strongly encourage these institutions to make some of their most capable young people available to participate. Younger Russian scientists generally recognize the need to learn English because of their professional exposure to scientific conferences and would be more comfortable participating in RTO meetings. Recognizing that a shortage of funds may be a barrier to Russian participation, some modest funding, especially to support travel of the young scientists and engineers, could perhaps be made available by NATO.

Assuming that the above activities were successful, the RTO, working with Russia, could next identify a few flagship activities to be pursued jointly in the near term. Although a very wide variety of possibilities exist, attention might be given initially to information technology and aerospace medicine. These are areas where Russian expertise is respected and the RTO program of work is exceptionally strong. In addition, the work could be of a fundamental research nature, but with clear defense relevance. Unlike the task groups that were mentioned earlier for the younger scientists and engineers, these flagship activities would be broader in scope and would seek to attract a significant number of mid- and senior-level scientific and engineering personnel from the NATO nations and Russia. Also, unlike other RTO activities that are open to Partners, these activities would be specifically tailored to Russian expertise (although other Partner nations might also participate). A workshop format, utilizing large and small groups interactively, may be the best format to enhance dialogue. A clear mandate should be to produce a report with emphasis on the way ahead.

Finally, following the success of the first two initiatives, the RTA could perhaps invite Russia to provide a few mid-career scientists and engineers to work with RTA staff for a trial period of 1 year. These individuals could be assigned to work directly for Panel Executives in technical areas of highest mutual interest to NATO and Russia. Immersion in the broad scope of RTO activities on a daily basis could help Russia develop a much better understanding of the NATO research and technology program and become more active in it. In addition, NATO could gain a much better understanding of Russian defense research and technology and the institutions involved. If Russia or NATO judge this broad option to be too large a step, the Russian personnel could still be identified and assigned, but the scope of the interaction could be initially limited, for example, to NATO's Defense Against Terrorism program, which is of great interest to both parties. Security might also be an issue, since the Russians could not be granted NATO security clearances.

Conclusion

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia have much to offer each other in defense-related research and technology. Unfortunately, the pace of cooperation has been erratic and the results uneven. Proactive steps must be taken by both sides. Basic and applied defense-related R&T is relatively nonthreatening to all parties and creates cooperative avenues that can be very significant in a world of asymmetric threats. These ac-

tivities offer mechanisms to create more significant political and military cooperative ventures as scientific understandings of new phenomena are created and implemented into military operations. The opportunities are there. Now is the time.

Notes

¹ Source: Donald C. Daniel and Michael I. Yarymovych, *Russia and NATO: Increased Interaction in Defense Research and Technology*, Defense Horizons 49 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2005).

² "With her nuclear arsenal, her 11 time zones, her 150 million citizens, and her borders stretching from the Caucasus through Central Asia and the Far East, Russia's fate remains vital to the security of the Euro-Atlantic community. Nothing could be of more long-term benefit to our common security than for Russia to take her rightful place as a full, trusting and trustworthy member of the Euro-Atlantic community." "A New Russian Revolution: Partnership with NATO," speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, Royal Society of Edinburgh, December 13, 2002.

³ Ibid.

⁴ In 1998, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO. In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined, raising membership to 26. All of the non-Soviet members of the former Warsaw Pact are now in NATO.

⁵ Lord Robertson.

⁶ Robert Bell, Assistant Secretary General, Chairman, NATO Russia Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Theatre Missile Defense, "Ballistic Missile Threats: A NATO-Russia Strategic Challenge," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, February 27, 2003.

⁷ It became the Russian Academy of Sciences in July 1917, under the Aleksandr Kerensky government, then the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1925. In 1934, it moved from St. Petersburg to Moscow. In December 1991, it regained its pre-Bolshevik name, the Russian Academy of Sciences. A concise history of the Academy is available on the Academy Web site at <<http://www.prn.ru/eng/history/20021211024821history.html>>.

⁸ William C. Boesman, "Research and Development in Russia: An Important Factor for the Future" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 24, 1998).

⁹ Richard F. Staar, "The Bear Sharpens Its Claws," *Hoover Digest*, no. 4 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1997).

¹⁰ For a detailed description of the RTO, see Donald C. Daniel and Leigh C. Caraher, *NATO Defense Science and Technology*, Defense Horizons 24 (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, March 2003).

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